Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, October 30, 2024

AI Summary. A survey of truck drivers finds 44% are very or somewhat worried about driverless trucks and 56% expect autonomous vehicles to dominate US roads in coming decades. Drivers most concerned about automation are more likely to intend further investment in trucking careers, except among those who correctly perceive community college as inexpensive.

Daniel Shoag, Michael Strain and Stan Veuger American Enterprise Institute
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A study of long-haul truck drivers finds that the 44% concerned about losing jobs to self-driving trucks are most likely to “double down” on investment in trucking, particularly when they overestimate the cost of retraining. @MichaelRStrain @stanveuger

How do truck drivers respond to the risk of automation?

Core argument: Surveyed truckers are split on automation risk, with 44% very or somewhat worried about driverless trucks and 56% not worried, while 56% believe autonomous vehicles will be the dominant vehicles on US roads in the coming decades.

We find that truckers have mixed views on the risk they face, with around half (44%) very or somewhat worried about driverless trucks and around half (56%) not. 56% believe that AVs will be the dominant vehicles on US roads in the coming decades. The respondents to our survey who are most concerned about automation are also the most likely to report intentions to invest in trucking as an occupation. This finding does not hold among drivers who are most familiar with the low costs of community college. This suggests that providing information on retraining can have large welfare consequences. Column 1 of Table 3 [shows] that respondents who both are very concerned about AVs and correctly perceive community college to be inexpensive are 39.8% less likely to invest more in their trucking career by seeking additional endorsements [qualifications such as the right to transport dangerous chemicals] relative to respondents who do not share both characteristics. The coefficient on the interaction term between concern and perceiving community college to be relatively cheap is large and negative. This report suggests that policymakers may want to focus on the decisions of workers in at-risk occupations before risks fully materialize.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Surveyed truckers are split on automation risk, with 44% very or somewhat worried about driverless trucks and 56% not worried, while 56% believe autonomous vehicles will be the dominant vehicles on US roads in the coming decades.
  2. Truckers most concerned about automation are the most likely to report intentions to invest further in trucking as an occupation, a pattern that does not hold among drivers most familiar with the low costs of community college.
  3. Respondents who are both very concerned about autonomous vehicles and correctly perceive community college to be inexpensive are 39.8% less likely to invest in their trucking career by seeking additional endorsements, suggesting that information on retraining can carry large welfare consequences.

Related Articles:

  • A Data-Driven Case That AI Has Already Changed The U.S. Labor Market — Retail employment began declining in the early 2010s after holding steady for more than two decades, coinciding with heavy big tech investment in deep learning and the commercial adoption of AI-directed warehouse robots and predictive pricing and inventory tools. The author argues this circumstantial evidence suggests AI has already affected the US labor market, but does not constitute proof.
  • Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls — The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.
  • How AI & Robots are Smashing Economics, and Why It Matters — As artificial intelligence and robots make wages less responsive to employment conditions, the link between tight labor markets and inflation weakens, undermining central banks' inflation-targeting frameworks. The author argues central banks would then need far larger interest-rate moves to achieve the same effect, producing more volatile and less predictable outcomes.

AI Summary. Long-term US interest rates are rising even as markets price in five Federal Reserve rate cuts over the coming 12 months and oil prices fall, disconnecting long rates from those drivers. This pattern suggests long rates are being pushed up by emerging concerns about US fiscal sustainability.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
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The 10-year yield has decoupled from Fed expectations, and the term premium is rising. Torsten Sløk suggests long rates are moving higher due to “emerging worries about fiscal sustainability.”

Are fiscal worries pushing long-term interest rates higher?

Core argument: US long-term interest rates are rising even as markets price in five Federal Reserve rate cuts over the coming 12 months, a disconnect from Fed expectations.

US long rates are disconnecting from Fed expectations and oil prices. Despite the market still expecting five Fed cuts over the coming 12 months, long rates are moving higher. And despite oil prices falling, long rates are moving higher. This suggests that long rates are rising because of emerging worries about fiscal sustainability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US long-term interest rates are rising even as markets price in five Federal Reserve rate cuts over the coming 12 months, a disconnect from Fed expectations.
  2. US long rates are moving higher despite falling oil prices, a break from their usual relationship.
  3. The disconnection of US long rates from both Fed expectations and oil prices suggests they are rising on emerging worries about fiscal sustainability.

Related Articles:

  • C’est la vie: Bond Vigilantes Are Back — France's government bond yield spread widened by 0.29 percentage points, more than Italy's 0.22 and Spain's 0.2, which the authors attribute to political uncertainty created by the calling of a snap national election. The French spread has remained elevated, while the Italian and Spanish spreads have come down.
  • 10 Facts About the US Treasury Market: Monitoring Demand For US Government Debt — US government debt is projected to rise from 100% to 200% of GDP, with deficits above $1tn annually over the next decade and $9tn of debt maturing within 12 months. Debt servicing costs equal 12% of total government outlays, and interest payments have doubled from about $1bn per day before the pandemic to nearly $2bn per day.
  • Larry Summers and Bob Rubin Join Our CIOs to Discuss the Surprising Economic Cycle — Adopting the Simpson-Bowles fiscal consolidation when interest rates were at zero would have risked excessive disinflation, since long rates had no room to fall to provide an offsetting expansionary impulse. After the large run-up in debt and rise in real interest rates, the developing fiscal situation risks inflationary pressure, Treasury market disruption, or crowding out of private investment.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that inflation-adjusted employee compensation per person aged 16 or older remained 4.6% below the linear trend established from early 2017 through late 2019. They attribute about three-fourths of that shortfall to lower real wages and the remainder to lower employment.

Kevin Hassett and Casey Mulligan Wall Street Journal
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In Q2 of 2024, real per income capita from work was 4.6% under the 2017-2019 trend. 75% of the shortfall is due to slower real wage growth rather than reduced employment and work hours. @caseybmulligan

How far has real compensation per person fallen below trend?

Core argument: Real employee compensation per person aged 16 or older stood 4.6% below its 2017 Q1–2019 Q4 linear trend as of 2024 Q2, the most recent national accounts data.

The chart shows inflation-adjusted real employee compensation per person 16 or older. It is an index taking the value of 100 for the first quarter of 2017. Although we don’t know for sure what would have happened if Mr. Trump had begun a second term in 2021, our chart shows a linear trend from the first quarter of 2017 through the fourth quarter of 2019. The trend is a good model of what happened after the second full quarter of the pandemic into late 2021. Then inflation hit and employee compensation—and national income more broadly, which isn’t shown in the chart—couldn’t keep up. That’s when we began to see the deleterious effects of Mr. Biden’s policies. By the second quarter of 2024 (the most recent national accounts), real per capita income from work remained 4.6% below the trend. The 4.6% shortfall is due to both low employment and low real wages. The real-wage part accounts for three-fourths of the shortfall.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real employee compensation per person aged 16 or older stood 4.6% below its 2017 Q1–2019 Q4 linear trend as of 2024 Q2, the most recent national accounts data.
  2. Low real wages account for three-fourths of the 4.6% shortfall in real per capita income from work, with low employment accounting for the remainder.
  3. The authors argue the pre-pandemic linear trend modeled actual compensation well from the second full pandemic quarter into late 2021, until inflation hit and employee compensation and national income could not keep up.

Related Articles:

  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • Has Pay Kept Up With Inflation? — All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.
  • Real Wage Growth: The Post-Pandemic Labor Market and Beyond — Real wage gains for non-managerial workers, roughly 80% of the private workforce, exceeded both those of all workers and projections based on pre-pandemic trends, which is attributed to labor market tightness and strong demand in low-wage sectors. This compression of wage inequality has persisted even as the labor market cooled and unemployment rose above 4%.

AI Summary. The International Energy Agency now estimates coal consumption in 2030 will be 6% higher than it projected a year earlier — an increase equal to Japan's entire coal use — and above 2010 levels. Fossil fuels met two-thirds of the recent global increase in energy demand.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
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The International Energy Agency has raised their 2030 forecast for global coal consumption by 6% vs. last year’s forecast. Fossil fuels represented ⅔ of the increase in energy demand in 2023 vs. 2022. @JavierBlas

Is coal consumption rising even as clean power expands?

Core argument: The IEA now estimates 2030 coal consumption 6% higher than its estimate a year ago, an increase equivalent to adding the consumption of Japan, the world's fourth-largest coal burner.

Coal consumption in 2030 is now estimated 6% higher than only a year ago. That may sound small, but it amounts to adding the equivalent of the consumption of Japan, the world’s fourth-largest coal burner. By 2030, the IEA now believes coal consumption will remain higher than it was back in 2010. Two-thirds of the total increase in energy demand in 2023 was met by fossil fuels, according to the IEA. Yes, clean power is the future. For now, however, fossil fuels remain the present — especially when electricity demand is accelerating this fast. Between 2023 and 2030, electricity consumption is expected to grow six times faster than total energy demand, compared with two times faster in the 2010-2023 period and 1.4 times faster in 2000-2010. According to the IEA, the equivalent of the electricity use of the world’s 10 largest cities is being added to global demand each year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IEA now estimates 2030 coal consumption 6% higher than its estimate a year ago, an increase equivalent to adding the consumption of Japan, the world's fourth-largest coal burner.
  2. The IEA projects coal consumption in 2030 will remain above its 2010 level, and reports that fossil fuels met two-thirds of the total increase in energy demand in 2023.
  3. Electricity consumption is expected to grow six times faster than total energy demand between 2023 and 2030, versus two times faster in 2010–2023 and 1.4 times faster in 2000–2010.

Related Articles:

  • Electravision — The fossil fuel share of global primary energy is falling about 0.40% per year, matching the pace of decarbonization during the 1973–1988 nuclear buildout, though total carbon dioxide emissions have not declined because energy consumption keeps rising. Renewable energy is used almost exclusively for the electricity grid, with little penetration in industry and transport.
  • Electricity 2024 — More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.
  • The Climate Short: Hedge Funds Pile Up Huge Bets Against Green Future — An analysis of positions voluntarily disclosed by roughly 500 hedge funds found more funds are net short batteries, solar, electric vehicles and hydrogen than long them, while more are net long fossil fuels than short oil, gas and coal. This comes despite large green stimulus programs in the US, Europe and China.

AI Summary. The US national average gasoline price of $3.13/gallon is 37 cents below a year earlier, and crude oil fell about 6% in a week after Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran spared energy facilities. Adjusted for inflation, that price is lower than in 78% of the past two decades, and the average production worker needs 6.4 minutes of work per gallon.

Ryan Cummings and Neale Mahoney Briefing Book
Date Posted:

Adjusted for inflation, the mean national gas price, $3.13/gal, is lower than it has been for 78% of the past 20 years. @nealemahoney @weakinstrument

Are gasoline prices low relative to wages and inflation?

Core argument: Crude oil prices fell 6%, roughly $5, this week after Israel avoided striking Iranian energy facilities in its retaliatory strikes Friday night.

Crude oil prices plunged 6% (or roughly five dollars) this week after Israel avoided hitting Iranian energy facilities in retaliatory strikes on Friday night. At $3.13/gallon, the national average gas price is down 37 cents from last year. Gas prices are below $3.00/gallon in battleground states of Georgia, North Carolina, and Wisconsin and have declined by more than 50 cents from last year in Arizona and Nevada. Adjusted for inflation or wages, current gas prices are lower than they’ve been for most of the last 20 years. At $3.13/gal, the real (inflation-adjusted) gas price is lower than it has been for 78% of the last 2 decades. Today, the average worker (production and nonsupervisory) needs only 6.4 minutes on the job to earn enough to buy a gallon of gas, less time than 84% of the last 20 years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Crude oil prices fell 6%, roughly $5, this week after Israel avoided striking Iranian energy facilities in its retaliatory strikes Friday night.
  2. The U.S. national average gas price of $3.13/gallon is down 37 cents from a year earlier, with prices below $3.00/gallon in Georgia, North Carolina, and Wisconsin and down more than 50 cents in Arizona and Nevada.
  3. Adjusted for inflation, the $3.13/gallon gas price is lower than it has been for 78% of the last two decades, and the average production and nonsupervisory worker needs only 6.4 minutes of work per gallon, less than 84% of the last 20 years.

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Energy Production Exceeded Consumption By Record Amount In 2023 — U.S. energy production rose 4% to nearly 103 quadrillion British thermal units while consumption fell 1% to 94, leaving production exceeding consumption by 9 quadrillion British thermal units, the widest gap in records dating to 1949. Dry natural gas, crude oil, natural gas plant liquids, and renewables all reached record output.
  • The Shale Revolution Helped Make America’s Economy Great — The US produces roughly 13mm barrels per day of crude oil and 3bn cubic metres per day of natural gas, making it the world's largest producer of both. Its need for foreign crude began declining in 2008, and it became a net energy exporter in 2019, recording a net energy surplus of about $65bn last year.
  • US Shale: The Marginal Supplier Matures — The responsiveness of US oil supply to prices has declined and is estimated to be much smaller for publicly traded producers than private ones, with a 10% price increase raising US liquids output by roughly 1%, or 200,000 barrels a day. That implies US supply would offset only about 20-25% of a geopolitical supply shock.

AI Summary. Research by Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg Intelligence finds that of 13 key technologies tracked, China has reached global leadership in five and is catching up in seven others, with clear leads in electric vehicles, automotive software and lithium battery technology. China still struggles to develop manufacturing processes for advanced semiconductors, the main focus of US export controls.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:

A Bloomberg analysis finds that after a decade the China 2025 industrial policy initiative has largely been a success: Chinese firms are on the technological frontier in 5 of 13 key sectors including drones, EVs and lithium battery technology.

Are US efforts to contain China's technology advances working?

Core argument: Of 13 key technologies tracked by Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg Intelligence, China has reached a global leadership position in five and is catching up fast in the other seven, a decade after Made in China 2025 was unveiled.

New research by Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg Intelligence shows that Made in China 2025 — an industrial policy blueprint unveiled a decade ago to make the nation a leader in emerging technologies — has largely been a success. Of 13 key technologies tracked by Bloomberg researchers, China has achieved a global leadership position in five of them and is catching up fast in seven others. Although China is still struggling to develop manufacturing processes for advanced semiconductors — the main focus of US export controls — it now has a clear lead in EVs, automotive software and lithium battery technology, according to Bloomberg Intelligence.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of 13 key technologies tracked by Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg Intelligence, China has reached a global leadership position in five and is catching up fast in the other seven, a decade after Made in China 2025 was unveiled.
  2. Bloomberg Intelligence finds China holds a clear lead in electric vehicles, automotive software and lithium battery technology.
  3. China is still struggling to develop manufacturing processes for advanced semiconductors, the main focus of US export controls.

Related Articles:

  • The Surprising Resilience of Globalization: An Examination of Claims of Economic Fragmentation — China's exports have grown faster than its own economy, rising by about 3 percentage points as a share of its GDP, with a nearly $1tn surge over four years. Measured against the GDP of its trading partners, China's manufactured-goods surplus has increased by about three-quarters of a percentage point of world GDP to a record high.
  • Why Europe’s Car Crisis Is Mostly Made In China — Volkswagen, which has never closed a factory in its German heartland, is weighing shutting three plants and cutting worker pay by 10% after warning on profits twice in a year. China has overtaken Japan as the world's largest car exporter, with Chinese manufacturers building advanced electric cars at costs said to be 30% below European rivals'.
  • Can the World Make an Electric Car Battery Without China? — China dominates electric-vehicle battery supply chains, controlling 41% of global cobalt mining and the most lithium mining, and is projected to produce more than twice as many batteries as all other countries combined by 2030. It can build battery factories at nearly half the cost of North America or Europe.

Thursday, October 31, 2024

AI Summary. Among Massachusetts community college entrants, men were far more likely than women to complete associate degrees in science and technology fields, while women were far more likely to finish healthcare degrees, and White and Asian students out-completed Hispanic and Black peers in both. Program leaders report supply constraints limit healthcare programs, not STEM.

Richard Murnane, John Willett, Aubrey McDonough, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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A study of MA community college cohorts between 2005-16 estimates that degree attainment in STEM within 6 years rose for males in all racial categories, largely driven by an increase in male enrollment in STEM from 15.4% in 2005 to 24.6% in 2016.

How do community college degree completions differ by gender and race?

Core argument: Among Massachusetts public high school graduates from 2005–2016 who enrolled in a Massachusetts community college, male students had a much higher six-year probability of earning an associate degree in STEM than females, while females were much likelier to complete healthcare degrees.

[We examine] completion rates in Associates Degree healthcare and STEM programs among groups of students who graduated from a MA public high school in a year between 2005 and 2016 and enrolled in a MACC soon thereafter. Male students had a much higher probability of earning an associate degree in a STEM program within six years of their entry into a MACC than did females. Female students had a much higher six-year probability of earning an AD in a healthcare program than did males. White, and especially Asian, students in every entry cohort had higher probabilities of AD attainment in both healthcare and STEM programs than did their Hispanic and Black peers. The estimated six-year probabilities of degree attainment in healthcare, and especially in STEM, increased across the MACC entry cohorts from 2005 through 2016 for students in almost every racial/ethnic group. [According to interviews with MACC program leaders], supply constraints hinder expansion of many healthcare programs, but not STEM programs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among Massachusetts public high school graduates from 2005–2016 who enrolled in a Massachusetts community college, male students had a much higher six-year probability of earning an associate degree in STEM than females, while females were much likelier to complete healthcare degrees.
  2. White and especially Asian students in every Massachusetts community college entry cohort had higher probabilities of associate degree attainment in both healthcare and STEM programs than their Hispanic and Black peers.
  3. Estimated six-year probabilities of associate degree attainment in healthcare, and especially STEM, rose across entry cohorts from 2005 through 2016 for students in almost every racial/ethnic group, while interviewed program leaders reported supply constraints hindering expansion of many healthcare programs but not STEM programs.

Related Articles:

  • Do Liberal Arts Colleges Pay Off? What the Data Say — 35% of bachelor's degree programs at liberal arts colleges have a negative return on investment, versus 23% elsewhere, meaning students are typically worse off than not attending college. The gap reflects higher tuition and slightly lower alumni earnings, but engineering, computer science, nursing, and economics majors there beat national averages.
  • Marginal Returns to Public Universities — Using admission-score cutoffs across all 35 Texas public universities, the author estimates that marginally admitted students complete an additional year of four-year education, are 12 percentage points more likely to earn a bachelor's degree, and earn 5–10% more than marginally rejected peers, with gains driven by students who otherwise would not attend a four-year school.
  • Where Do STEM Graduates Stem From? The Intergenerational Transmission of Comparative Skill Advantages — Using a Dutch database matching parents' and children's test scores at similar ages, the authors find that parents who were relatively stronger in math than language as children are significantly more likely to have children with the same math advantage. Parents' comparative skill advantage also predicts their own and their children's science and technology field choices.

AI Summary. Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make climate change appear more tractable, the author argues, since the scenarios used to model emissions rely on socio-economic assumptions that are more extreme than real-world observations. With slower population and economic growth, even partial policy successes could bring emissions consistent with a 2C target within reach.

Roger Pielke Jr. The Honest Broker
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.@RogerPielkeJr argues that more realistic projections of global population and GDP growth suggest that “even partial future policy successes could more easily bring into view future emissions consistent with a 2C temperature target.”

Do lower population and GDP projections make climate change more tractable?

Core argument: Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make the challenge of climate change appear more tractable, according to the author, who argues the "assumption space" behind emissions scenarios should shift away from extreme socio-economic assumptions toward scenarios consistent with real-world observations.

Updated understandings of population and GDP suggest that, at a minimum, the “assumption space” used to generate scenarios needs to reorient away from extreme socio-economic assumptions and towards more realistic socio-economic scenarios consistent with observations of the real world. Every time global population GDP projections are revised down, the challenge of climate change appears that much more tractable. Of course, peak population and slower economic growth bring with them considerable societal and policy challenges of their own. “Current policy” projections are based on a very conservative set of assumptions — who thinks there will be no new climate and energy policies? — and many countries have committed to accelerating decarbonization. Conditional on slower-than-projected population and/or GDP growth, that means that even partial future policy successes could more easily bring into view future emissions consistent with a 2C temperature target. Basing our expectations on the latest understandings of population and GDP changes is thus essential for a clear-eyed view of climate and energy challenges.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make the challenge of climate change appear more tractable, according to the author, who argues the "assumption space" behind emissions scenarios should shift away from extreme socio-economic assumptions toward scenarios consistent with real-world observations.
  2. "Current policy" emissions projections rest on the conservative assumption that no new climate and energy policies will be adopted, even though many countries have committed to accelerating decarbonization.
  3. Conditional on slower-than-projected population and GDP growth, even partial future policy successes could more easily bring future emissions consistent with a 2C temperature target into view, though peak population and slower growth carry their own societal and policy challenges.

Related Articles:

  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • The Age of Depopulation: Surviving a World Gone Gray — The United States remains the main outlier among developed countries resisting depopulation, with fertility of just over 1.6 births per woman — high for a rich country but below the 2.1 replacement threshold — plus steady immigration. The Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will peak around 2080 and decline continuously thereafter.
  • The Dangerous Effects Of Rising Sea Temperatures — The world's oceans have absorbed 90% of excess heat and about a quarter of human-caused carbon dioxide emissions during the industrial era, and scientists are investigating what drove an anomalous rise in sea temperatures and whether seas will cool again. Researchers caution there is no guarantee oceans will keep absorbing heat at the same rate.

AI Summary. Rural population growth accelerated to 1.4% from 0.7%, a gain of nearly 1m residents, while large urban areas shifted from 1.5% growth to a 0.5% decline, losing more than 500,000 residents. About a third of new residents in rural counties that voted Republican came from Democratic-leaning counties, rising to 40% in rural counties within urban commuting zones.

August Benzow Agglomerations
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Rural counties saw population growth of ~ 1mm persons between 2020-23 largely from urban areas which likely will depolarize the countries politically. As of 2022, 32% of new residents in Trump rural counties came from blue counties. @AugustBenzow

Are city residents moving to rural counties in growing numbers?

Core argument: Rural population growth doubled from 0.7% in 2016–2019 to 1.4% in 2020–2023, a gain of nearly one million residents, while large urban areas flipped from 1.5% growth to a 0.5% decline, losing more than 500,000 residents.

After decades of relative stagnation, rural population growth accelerated in recent years — doubling from 0.7% in 2016-2019 to 1.4% from 2020 to 2023 (representing a gain of nearly one million residents). The trajectory of large urban areas, meanwhile, flipped from 1.5% growth to a 0.5% decline (a loss of more than 500,000 residents). In 2021, 33% of new residents in these Trump rural counties came from blue counties, the highest share in over a decade. In 2022, the last year for which the data is available, the share fell to 32%, which is still higher than before the pandemic. The impact becomes even more pronounced when focusing on rural counties within urban commuting zones (rural countries in which a large share of residents commute to a nearby city for work). In these counties, the percentage of blue-county in-migration was 40% in 2022.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rural population growth doubled from 0.7% in 2016–2019 to 1.4% in 2020–2023, a gain of nearly one million residents, while large urban areas flipped from 1.5% growth to a 0.5% decline, losing more than 500,000 residents.
  2. In 2021, 33% of new residents in Trump rural counties came from blue counties, the highest share in over a decade, easing to 32% in 2022 but remaining above pre-pandemic levels.
  3. Rural counties within urban commuting zones, where a large share of residents commute to a nearby city for work, drew 40% of their in-migration from blue counties in 2022.

Related Articles:

  • Young Families Have Continued Leaving Big Cities Post-Pandemic — Large urban counties have continued to lose population of young children even as their overall population growth resumed, driven by immigration. Birth rates in large urban counties have declined twice as fast as in rural counties over the past decade, and the number of children under five fell in 58% of all US counties.
  • Pandemic Population Boom in Rural Hotspots Sparks Resentment — U.S. rural population grew for a second consecutive year after decades of decline, with non-metro areas outpacing urban growth for the first time in three decades. Gains were concentrated: the 10 rural counties with the largest increases grew about 5% on average versus a 0.4% national rate, and their house prices rose more than 40% over three years.
  • What America’s Relocation Boom Means for Election 2024 — Census Bureau estimates show 16.1m US residents moved to another state over a two-year period. A Bloomberg analysis of state population forecasts finds swing-state counties that Democrats won in 2020 will have gained on net almost twice as many people as Republican-won counties, though North Carolina is an exception.

AI Summary. Registered Republicans who moved chose neighborhoods that voted Republican by an average of 19 points, while Democrats chose neighborhoods Democratic by the same margin, widening the partisan gap between movers' neighborhoods from 31 to 38 points. The gap remained 24 points among demographically similar movers from similar neighborhoods.

Ronda Kaysen and Ethan Singer New York Times
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A NYT analysis of more than 3.5mm voter registration records finds that GOP voters who moved between 2020 and 2024 moved to neighborhoods Trump won by 19pp in 2020. Democratic voters chose Biden neighborhoods by the opposite margin.

Do Americans sort into more politically like-minded neighborhoods when they move?

Core argument: Republican movers chose neighborhoods Trump won by an average of 19 percentage points in 2020, while Democratic movers chose neighborhoods Biden won by 19 points; independents and unaffiliated voters picked more evenly balanced neighborhoods.

Across all movers, Republicans chose neighborhoods Donald J. Trump won by an average of 19 percentage points in 2020, while Democrats chose neighborhoods President Biden won by the opposite margin (also 19 points). In total, movers started in neighborhoods 31 percentage points apart; they ended in neighborhoods 38 points apart. Across the country, the result is a widening gap between blue neighborhoods and red ones. The independents and unaffiliated voters in our set picked more evenly balanced neighborhoods. The different choices that movers made are not easily explained by things like voters’ ages, race, income or if they were leaving a rural or urban area. Even when narrowing our comparisons to demographically similar pairs of people from the same kinds of neighborhoods Democrats and Republicans still chose neighborhoods that were 24 points apart in the 2020 vote. Our analysis suggests partisanship itself, intentional or not, plays a powerful role when Americans uproot and find a new home.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Republican movers chose neighborhoods Trump won by an average of 19 percentage points in 2020, while Democratic movers chose neighborhoods Biden won by 19 points; independents and unaffiliated voters picked more evenly balanced neighborhoods.
  2. Movers started in neighborhoods 31 percentage points apart in the 2020 vote and ended in neighborhoods 38 points apart, widening the gap between blue and red neighborhoods across the country.
  3. Among demographically similar pairs of people from the same kinds of neighborhoods, Democrats and Republicans still chose neighborhoods 24 percentage points apart in the 2020 vote, which the analysis suggests indicates partisanship itself plays a powerful role in where Americans move.

Related Articles:

  • How Big-City Expats Might Reshape the Politics Of Rural America — Rural population growth accelerated to 1.4% from 0.7%, a gain of nearly 1m residents, while large urban areas shifted from 1.5% growth to a 0.5% decline, losing more than 500,000 residents. About a third of new residents in rural counties that voted Republican came from Democratic-leaning counties, rising to 40% in rural counties within urban commuting zones.
  • Pandemic Population Boom in Rural Hotspots Sparks Resentment — U.S. rural population grew for a second consecutive year after decades of decline, with non-metro areas outpacing urban growth for the first time in three decades. Gains were concentrated: the 10 rural counties with the largest increases grew about 5% on average versus a 0.4% national rate, and their house prices rose more than 40% over three years.
  • What America’s Relocation Boom Means for Election 2024 — Census Bureau estimates show 16.1m US residents moved to another state over a two-year period. A Bloomberg analysis of state population forecasts finds swing-state counties that Democrats won in 2020 will have gained on net almost twice as many people as Republican-won counties, though North Carolina is an exception.

AI Summary. Pew Research polling finds a 17-point gender gap and a 29-point education gap in presidential vote preference. Combining the two, the divide is widest between men without a college degree and women with one, a 43-point difference.

Celinda Lake and Amanda Iovino New York Times
Date Posted:

According to @pewresearch, there is a 43pp gap between college women, who are breaking for Harris by 27pp, and non-college men, who are breaking Trump by 16pp. Levels of support by gender have varied substantially according to @dcoxpolls

Do gender and education together drive the widest voting divide?

Core argument: Pew Research's poll shows a 17-point gender gap in the presidential race, with Trump ahead by 8 points among men and Harris ahead by 9 points among women.

According to a recent poll by Pew Research, the gender gap is 17 points, with Mr. Trump ahead 8 points among men and Ms. Harris up 9 points among women. The gap by education is 29 points, with Mr. Trump ahead 10 points among people without a college degree and Ms. Harris ahead 19 points among those with one. But broken up by gender and education, we see that the gaps are driven particularly by men without a college degree and women with a college degree, with an overall difference of 43 points.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pew Research's poll shows a 17-point gender gap in the presidential race, with Trump ahead by 8 points among men and Harris ahead by 9 points among women.
  2. The education gap in Pew's poll is 29 points, with Trump leading by 10 points among voters without a college degree and Harris leading by 19 points among college graduates.
  3. Broken out by gender and education together, the gaps are driven particularly by men without a college degree and women with one, an overall difference of 43 points.

Related Articles:

  • Are Young Men Really Going to Vote for Donald Trump? — Polling finds men aged 18 to 24 are far less likely to identify as feminist and liberal than men aged 25 to 29, and young men hold very different views from their female peers about how the world treats women. The author argues this divergence leaves young men's worldview less aligned with Democrats' current values and priorities.
  • The Politics of Progress and Privilege: How America’s Gender Gap Is Reshaping the 2024 Election — Survey data show 35% of Americans say the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well, down from 51% earlier. Women are more likely than men to identify as feminist (42% vs 27%), with the widest gap among those age 18–29, where 55% of women but 31% of men claim the label.
  • Young Women Are Starting To Leave Men Behind — Across the developed world, the share of young men neither in education, employment, nor seeking work has climbed steadily for decades, and in the UK, France, Spain, and Canada young men now outnumber young women outside the economy for the first time. Over 80% of this group in the UK report long-term health problems.

AI Summary. A pig on a backyard farm in Oregon tested positive for H5N1 bird flu, the first such case in a US pig, with infection found throughout its body despite no signs of illness. Pigs are considered mixing vessels in which human and bird flu viruses can exchange genes, raising concern that hybrid strains could emerge that infect humans more easily.

Riley Griffin, Rthvika Suvarna, and Antonia Mufarech Bloomberg
Date Posted:

A pig in Oregon tested positive for the H5N1 bird flu. Public health officials have been worried that the virus would jump into swine as pigs have “long been considered mixing vessels where flu viruses from humans and birds can exchange genes.”

Do bird flu infections in pigs raise the risk to humans?

Core argument: One of five pigs on a backyard farm in Crook County, Oregon, tested positive for H5N1 bird flu, the first such case in a pig in the US, with evidence of infection throughout its body.

A pig tested positive for the H5N1 bird flu for the first time in the US the infection was confirmed in a pig kept on a backyard farm in Crook County, Oregon. Pigs have long been considered mixing vessels where flu viruses from humans and birds can exchange genes. The concern is that such hybrid, or reassortant, pathogens can emerge with characteristics that allow them to infect humans more easily. The owners of the backyard farm alerted officials when ducks and geese started getting sick and dying. One of five pigs on the farm has been confirmed with H5N1, with evidence of infection throughout its body. The animal didn’t show any sign of illness, the USDA said in a statement. All five pigs were euthanized.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. One of five pigs on a backyard farm in Crook County, Oregon, tested positive for H5N1 bird flu, the first such case in a pig in the US, with evidence of infection throughout its body.
  2. Pigs have long been considered mixing vessels in which human and bird flu viruses exchange genes, and the concern is that reassortant pathogens can emerge with characteristics allowing easier infection of humans.
  3. The infected pig showed no sign of illness, according to the USDA, and all five pigs on the farm were euthanized after the owners alerted officials to ducks and geese sickening and dying.

Related Articles:

  • Is Bird Flu Spreading Among People? Data Gaps Leave Researchers In The Dark — A US bird flu infection in a person with no known contact with animal carriers, alongside illness in two close contacts, has left researchers awaiting data to determine whether human-to-human transmission has emerged. Gaps in surveillance persist because some states do not require farmers to test dairy cattle for the virus.
  • Animal Farm — The H5N1 bird flu virus spreads among wild aquatic birds before passing to domesticated animals, with highly pathogenic strains killing 90%-100% of infected poultry within 48 hours and causing the death or culling of 82m US poultry and $2-$3bn in losses. The virus has also spread to US cattle, reducing milk production in infected herds.
  • Possible Cluster of Human Bird-Flu Infections Expands in Missouri — The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported a possible cluster of eight bird-flu cases in Missouri, which could represent the first person-to-person transmission of the H5N1 virus in the United States. Infections in seven of the individuals, a household member and six healthcare workers, have not been confirmed, leaving open other flulike illnesses.