Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, October 3, 2024

AI Summary. An analysis of inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, uses annual Current Population Survey data to layer taxes and transfers onto earnings that include both employee pay and self-employment income.

Scott Winship Economic Innovation Group
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Between 1979 and 2022 prime-age men in the bottom quintile saw their inflation-adjusted market income rise 10%, to an all-time high of $22,800/year. Their female counterparts saw their market income rise 63% to $20,300/year. @swinshi

How do taxes and transfers affect low-earning men's disposable income?

Core argument: Figure 1 tracks four trends in inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, from 1979 to 2022.

Figure 1 shows four trends in the disposable income of lower-earning men, from 1979 to 2022, after adjusting for inflation. In each case, the focus is on the bottom fifth of working-age men (age 25 to 54), as ranked by their pretax earnings. In all of the analyses here, “earnings” includes not just the pay of employees but self-employment income. Looking at annual earnings rather than hourly pay is useful because, in addition to earnings, the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) includes information on a variety of taxes and transfers, measured on an annual basis. Looking at the bottom fifth’s average rather than the 20th percentile of earnings makes it easy to layer on the impact of taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Figure 1 tracks four trends in inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, from 1979 to 2022.
  2. Earnings in the analysis include self-employment income alongside employee pay, and the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement provides annual measures of a variety of taxes and transfers.
  3. Using the bottom fifth's average rather than the 20th percentile of earnings makes it easy to layer on the impact of taxes and transfers.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Trends in Worker Pay over the Past 50 Years — Productivity growth has been unequal across industries, across firms within industries, and across workers within firms, slowing growth in both the productivity and the pay of the median worker. The authors argue that working- and middle-class men earlier received "breadwinner rents"—pay above their marginal value to employers—and then endured slow wage growth as women's workforce participation rose.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — The authors estimate that post-pandemic labor market tightness compressed the US wage distribution, reducing the college wage premium and offsetting roughly one-quarter of the four-decade rise in 90-10 wage inequality. They attribute this in part to greater labor supply elasticity facing firms in low-wage markets, which reduced employer market power as young non-college workers moved to higher-paying jobs.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.

AI Summary. The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.

Michael Pettis and Erica Hogan Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
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China comprises 17% of global GDP but 29% of manufacturing and 13% of consumption while the US is 26% of GDP, 16% of manufacturing, and 26% of consumption. @michaelxpettis favors capital controls over tariffs to correct these imbalances.

Are capital controls a better response than tariffs to trade surpluses?

Core argument: The author argues the United States should intervene to reverse surplus nations' beggar-thy-neighbor policies, either by restricting their ability to dump goods into the U.S. economy through tariffs or by taxing capital inflows into the U.S. financial system.

The best response would be for the United States to intervene to reverse the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of surplus nations. This could be achieved either through restrictions on the ability of surplus countries to dump goods into the U.S. economy, for instance via the imposition of tariffs, or through restrictions on their ability to dump excess savings into the U.S. financial system, notably by taxing capital inflows. Neither approach is a perfect antidote. A system of uniform tariffs, for instance, risks imposing the same costs on countries that are more and less aggressively mercantilist. A more direct and focused alternative to tariffs is to reintroduce capital controls. Capital inflows could be controlled through a number of mechanisms, including taxes, volume restrictions, bank reserve requirements, government approvals for transactions, and limitations on investor eligibility. An effective capital inflow regulation regime would need to be flexible, allowing for benign, temporary trade imbalances that balance an increase in productive investment while penalizing short-term and speculative inflows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the United States should intervene to reverse surplus nations' beggar-thy-neighbor policies, either by restricting their ability to dump goods into the U.S. economy through tariffs or by taxing capital inflows into the U.S. financial system.
  2. Uniform tariffs risk imposing the same costs on countries that are more and less aggressively mercantilist, and the author presents capital controls as a more direct and focused alternative.
  3. Capital inflows could be controlled through taxes, volume restrictions, bank reserve requirements, government approvals for transactions, and limits on investor eligibility, with an effective regime permitting benign, temporary imbalances tied to productive investment while penalizing short-term and speculative inflows.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Myth of Deglobalization — China's manufacturing surplus rose by about 1 percentage point of global GDP over a four-year span and is far larger than those of Germany and Japan. China's $800bn goods trade surplus depends on the large U.S. trade deficit, which is still indirectly financed by China through the large offshore dollar stockpiles held by Chinese exporters.
  • Brazil, India, and Mexico Are Taking on China’s Exports — Foreign direct investment into China fell to a 30-year low even as Chinese leaders launched an investment push in high-tech goods such as batteries and electric vehicles. Weak domestic demand for cars, chemicals, and steel has pushed Chinese goods into global markets, with average manufactured export prices down nearly 10% and export volumes near record levels.
  • China’s Excess Savings Are A Danger — China's current account surplus of 4% of GDP is larger in global terms than its 2007 peak of 10%, because its share of the world economy at market prices rose from 6% to 17%. Sustaining that surplus would require China to fund deficits in smaller developing countries.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a labor disruption at U.S. East and Gulf Coast ports would halt roughly $4.9bn of containerized goods per day — about $25bn after one work week — equal to roughly 61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total daily U.S. trade. Pulled-forward demand and re-routing to the West Coast could mitigate the impact.

Jordan Alliger, Paul Stoddard and Andrzej Tomczyk Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

A @GoldmanSachs analysis estimates ~$4.9B trade impact per day of the longshoreman’s strike on the East and Gulf coasts. The impact could be mitigated by “pull forward” in demand and diversion to the West Coast to try to get ahead of the disruption.

How much daily trade would an East Coast port shutdown halt?

Core argument: Applying $52,000 per container to the ~95k containers handled daily, the analysts estimate East/Gulf Coast ports move ~$4.9bn of goods each day, with trade impacted reaching ~$25bn after one work week and ~$113bn through the end of October.

Applying a $52,000 value per container to the ~95k containers handled each day, we arrive at ~$4.9bn handled each day by the ports that could be affected [the] work disruption. Depending on the length of the disruption, we see a scenario where trade impacted could reach $25bn after one work week, and $113bn through the end of October. Adjusting for the recent ~41% average of ocean trade on total U.S. trade implies October ocean trade at $186bn. October has 23 workdays which means there would be ~$8bn in ocean trade each day of October. Using our implied daily ocean container value handled each day on the East Coast, we estimate that a potential work disruption could impact ~61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total U.S. daily trade in October. That said, we note that given the appearance of a pull forward in demand and diversion to the West Coast, the impact could be mitigated, especially if shippers continue to re-route to the West Coast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Applying $52,000 per container to the ~95k containers handled daily, the analysts estimate East/Gulf Coast ports move ~$4.9bn of goods each day, with trade impacted reaching ~$25bn after one work week and ~$113bn through the end of October.
  2. The analysts estimate a work disruption at East/Gulf Coast ports could affect ~61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total U.S. daily trade in October, based on implied October ocean trade of $186bn over 23 workdays, or ~$8bn per day.
  3. A pull forward in demand and diversion of cargo to the West Coast could mitigate the impact of an East/Gulf Coast port disruption, especially if shippers continue re-routing.

Related Articles:

  • Dockworkers Launch Strike at Ports From Maine to Texas — Dockworkers at dozens of East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, represented by the International Longshoremen's Association's 45,000 members, launched a strike at cargo terminals handling more than half of US import and export volumes. Port employers raised their wage offer to a 50% increase over six years, up from 40%.
  • Trends in Real Wage Growth among Union, Nonunion Workers — Wage changes for union and nonunion workers tend to move similarly over time, with union workers' nominal wage changes less volatile, and since 2002 both groups' wages increased at the same rate. When consumer prices grew faster than wages, real wage growth turned negative despite a strong labor market, then turned positive as inflation fell.
  • Labor Market Conflict and the Decline of the Rust Belt — The authors argue that persistent labor market conflict in the Rust Belt's main industries lowered investment and productivity growth, shifting employment to the rest of the country, and estimate it accounts for roughly half the decline in the region's share of US manufacturing employment. Rising foreign competition plays a more modest quantitative role.

AI Summary. The United States and Canadian economies have diverged, with American output expected to grow 11% over five years versus 6% in Canada. The International Monetary Fund projects Canadian national income per head will fall to 70% of the American level, down from roughly 80% in the decade before the pandemic.

Economist Staff The Economist
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By the end of this year, the US economy will be 11% larger than it was prior to the pandemic while Canada’s will be 6%. Canada’s GDP/person is a bit lower than Alabama, the fourth-poorest US state.

Why is Canada's income per person falling further behind America's?

Core argument: America's economy is expected to be 11% bigger by the end of 2024 than five years earlier, while Canada's will have grown by just 6%.

Yet since the pandemic North America’s two richest countries have diverged. By the end of 2024, America’s economy is expected to be 11% bigger than five years before; Canada’s will have grown by just 6%. The difference is starker once population growth is accounted for. The IMF forecasts that Canada’s national income per head, equivalent to around 80% of America’s in the decade before the pandemic, will be just 70% of its neighbour’s in 2025, the lowest for decades. Were Canada’s ten provinces and three territories an American state, they would have gone from being slightly richer than Montana, America’s ninth-poorest state, to being a bit worse off than Alabama, the fourth-poorest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. America's economy is expected to be 11% bigger by the end of 2024 than five years earlier, while Canada's will have grown by just 6%.
  2. The IMF forecasts Canada's national income per head will be 70% of America's in 2025, down from about 80% in the decade before the pandemic and the lowest for decades.
  3. Treated as an American state, Canada's ten provinces and three territories would have gone from slightly richer than Montana, the ninth-poorest state, to a bit worse off than Alabama, the fourth-poorest.

Related Articles:

  • Canada’s Growth Challenge: Why The Economy Is Stuck In Neutral — Canada's labor productivity is about 30% below the United States and roughly 10% below Australia's, and Canada has fallen from the 6th to the 18th most productive economy in the OECD. The authors attribute this to a shortfall in investment outside real estate, construction, and public services, plus negative multifactor productivity growth.
  • A “Heat Dome” of Immigration — Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
  • Immigration Surge Fuels Male Population Boom in Canada — Canada's adult male population grew 3.4% over the past year versus 2.9% for women, the widest gap in nearly 50 years of records, as a higher share of male newcomers shifts the gender ratio. Among those aged 25 to 44, men outnumber women by 141,000, against a long-run average of zero.

AI Summary. Survey data show 35% of Americans say the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well, down from 51% earlier. Women are more likely than men to identify as feminist (42% vs 27%), with the widest gap among those age 18–29, where 55% of women but 31% of men claim the label.

Daniel Cox and Kelsey Eyre Hammond American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

55% of US women aged 18-29 identify as a “feminist” relative to 41% aged 30-49, 38% aged 50-64, and 35% aged 65+. 31% of US men aged 18-29 identify as a “feminist,” for a 24pp gender gap. @dcoxpolls

Are fewer Americans identifying as feminist, especially young men?

Core argument: The share of Americans saying the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well fell to 35% from 51% in 2020.

Since 2020, more Americans reject the feminist label. Today, roughly one in three (35%) Americans say the term “feminist” describes them somewhat or very well. This represents a rapid deterioration in feminist identity since 2020, when roughly half (51% ) of Americans said the label described their views at least somewhat well. Women are more likely than men to identify as feminist, a gap that has remained relatively stable over the past few years. Forty-two percent of women say the label “feminist” describes them very well or somewhat well. Only 27% of men say the same. There is remarkable variation in feminist identity across generations. Even as feminist identity has declined overall, there remains a massive divide among younger Americans, those age 18 to 29. A majority (55% ) of young women identify as feminist, but less than one-third (31%) of young men claim this label. The gender gap is far smaller among older Americans. Roughly one in three (35%) women age 65 or older identify as feminist, compared with 23% of men in the same age bracket.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Americans saying the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well fell to 35% from 51% in 2020.
  2. Women identify as feminist more than men, 42% to 27%, a gap that has remained relatively stable over the past few years.
  3. Among Americans age 18–29, 55% of women identify as feminist versus 31% of men, while the gap narrows to 35% of women versus 23% of men age 65 or older.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Young Men Are Falling Even Further Behind — Labor force participation among US men ages 25 to 34 has not grown in a decade, standing at 89%, which one analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data estimates is more than 700,000 fewer participants than at 2004 rates; women's participation in that age group is up 6 percentage points over 10 years, to 79%.
  • Divorced Men for Trump — Survey data show 56% of divorced men report supporting Trump versus 42% of divorced women, the largest gender gap of any marital-status group. Married men and women report similar support levels (50% vs. 45%), while single men are somewhat more likely than single women to back Trump.
  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.

AI Summary. In a randomized study of 50 physicians working through clinical cases, giving doctors access to the GPT-4 language model did not significantly improve diagnostic reasoning scores compared with conventional resources, with an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points. GPT-4 working alone scored 15.5 percentage points higher than the conventional-resources group.

Ethan Goh, MD, MS, Robert Gallo, MD, Jason Hom, MD, et al. medRxiv
Date Posted:

In a trial with 50 physicians to test the impact of GPT-4 on diagnostic accuracy, the median diagnostic reasoning score was 76% for the GPT-4 group and 74% for the conventional resources group. GPT-4 alone scored 89%

Does giving doctors access to an AI model improve diagnostic reasoning?

Core argument: Physicians given GPT-4 scored a median 76.3% on diagnostic reasoning per case versus 73.7% for those using conventional resources, an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60).

50 physicians (26 attendings, 24 residents) participated, with an average of 5.2 cases completed per participant. The median diagnostic reasoning score per case was 76.3 percent (IQR 65.8 to 86.8) for the GPT-4 group and 73.7 percent (IQR 63.2 to 84.2) for the conventional resources group, with an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60). GPT-4 alone scored 15.5 percentage points (95% CI 1.5 to 29, p=0.03) higher than the conventional resources group. The availability of GPT-4 to physicians as a diagnostic aid did not significantly improve clinical reasoning compared to conventional resources, although it may improve components of clinical reasoning such as efficiency. GPT-4 alone demonstrated higher performance than both physician groups, suggesting opportunities for further improvement in physician-AI collaboration in clinical practice.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Physicians given GPT-4 scored a median 76.3% on diagnostic reasoning per case versus 73.7% for those using conventional resources, an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60).
  2. GPT-4 alone scored 15.5 percentage points higher than the conventional resources physician group (95% CI 1.5 to 29, p=0.03) in a randomized clinical vignette study of 50 physicians, 26 attendings and 24 residents.
  3. Availability of GPT-4 as a diagnostic aid did not significantly improve physicians' clinical reasoning over conventional resources, though it may improve components such as efficiency, suggesting opportunities for better physician-AI collaboration.

Related Articles:

  • AI-Enabled Electrocardiography Alert Intervention and All-Cause Mortality: a Pragmatic Randomized Clinical Trial — In a randomized trial of 15,965 hospitalized patients, an artificial-intelligence electrocardiogram system that flagged patients predicted to be at high risk of death and sent warning messages to physicians was associated with lower 90-day all-cause mortality, 3.6% in the intervention group versus 4.3% in the control group.
  • The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI — A nationally representative U.S. survey found 39% of people aged 18-64 used generative AI, with more than 24% of workers using it in the prior week and nearly one in nine using it every workday. The authors estimate 0.5-3.5% of U.S. work hours are currently assisted by generative AI.
  • Assessing the Implications of a Productivity Miracle — If artificial intelligence can perform economically valuable cognitive tasks at very low marginal cost, consumers would buy far more of the cheapened goods and spend the savings in other categories, expanding activity and employment in sectors facing new demand. Where supply is inherently limited, such as real estate, those savings could bid up prices and produce inflation.

Friday, October 4, 2024

AI Summary. US companies need about 7% earnings-per-share growth to deliver a normal 4% equity risk premium above the risk-free rate, versus about 3% for other developed markets, with the highest expectations embedded in technology and the largest US tech firms. Chinese companies could generate a 4% risk premium over Chinese bonds with no earnings growth.

Atul Narayan and Alex Greene Bridgewater Associates
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Over the last decade, US equities have delivered a 529% total compounded return in dollar terms, vs. 125% for the rest of the developed world. Given current elevated P/E ratios, US companies need about 7% EPS growth to earn a 4% risk premium over bonds.

How much earnings growth must US stocks deliver to justify prices?

Core argument: US companies need about 7% EPS growth to deliver a normal 4% risk premium over the risk-free rate, versus 3% for other developed equity markets.

While the US continues to have significantly better companies, that’s also a lot more priced-in today versus a decade ago. We show the EPS hurdle rate by sector needed to generate a normal level of risk premium for equity investors above the risk-free rate [estimated at 4%.] You can see that US companies need about a 7% EPS growth to clear this hurdle, while other developed equity markets need less than half as much (3%) to achieve the same risk premium. This priced-in hurdle is broad-based across sectors, and with both a higher weight and more aggressive expectations, the burden for outperformance in tech and the Mag 7 specifically is higher than ever. In contrast, even with no earnings growth, Chinese companies should be able to generate a 4% risk premium over Chinese bonds—in other words, a very high-risk premium is priced into Chinese stocks today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US companies need about 7% EPS growth to deliver a normal 4% risk premium over the risk-free rate, versus 3% for other developed equity markets.
  2. Chinese companies could generate a 4% risk premium over Chinese bonds with no earnings growth, indicating a very high risk premium is priced into Chinese stocks.
  3. The priced-in EPS hurdle is broad-based across sectors, and with both a higher weight and more aggressive expectations, the burden for outperformance in tech and the Magnificent 7 is higher than ever.

Related Articles:

  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • End of an Era: The Coming Long-Run Slowdown in Corporate Profit Growth and Stock Returns — The authors estimate that declining interest and corporate tax rates accounted for over 40% of real corporate profit growth from 1989 to 2019, while falling risk-free rates explain the entire expansion in price-to-earnings multiples. Real earnings before interest and taxes grew slightly more slowly than in 1962–1989, at 2.2% versus 2.4% per year.

AI Summary. Newly released data show the US adult obesity rate fell by about two percentage points between 2020 and 2023, with the steepest decline among college graduates. The author argues the new generation of diabetes and weight-loss drugs is highly likely behind the reversal, as one in eight US adults have used them.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:

The US obesity rates declined 2pp between 2020 and 2023. @jburnmurdoch argues the decline is likely a function of GLP-1 drugs like Ozempic and Wegovy; 6% of Americans are current users and 1 in 8 have used such drugs.

Are new weight-loss drugs driving the first drop in obesity?

Core argument: Newly released data finds the US adult obesity rate fell by around two percentage points between 2020 and 2023, following decades of rising obesity rates worldwide.

Around the world, obesity rates have been stubbornly climbing for decades, if anything accelerating in recent years. But now newly released data finds that the US adult obesity rate fell by around two percentage points between 2020 and 2023. We have known for several years from clinical trials that Ozempic, Wegovy, and the new generation of diabetes and weight loss drugs produce large and sustained reductions in body weight. Now with mass public usage taking off — one in eight US adults have used the drugs, with 6% current users — the results may be showing up at the population level. While we can’t be certain that the new generation of drugs is behind this reversal, it is highly likely. For one, the decline is steepest among college graduates, the group most likely to be using them.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Newly released data finds the US adult obesity rate fell by around two percentage points between 2020 and 2023, following decades of rising obesity rates worldwide.
  2. One in eight US adults have used drugs such as Ozempic and Wegovy, with 6% current users, after clinical trials showed large and sustained reductions in body weight.
  3. The obesity decline is steepest among US college graduates, the group most likely to be using the new drugs, though the drugs' role in the reversal cannot be confirmed.

Related Articles:

  • Today’s Most Important Technology — The share of patients taking semaglutide for weight control rather than type 2 diabetes rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7%. Obesity and overweight, affecting 1 in 8 people worldwide, cost the global economy $2tn — nearly 70 cents on the dollar from premature mortality and lost productivity — an impact projected to double by 2035 absent intervention.
  • The Year of Ozempic — GLP-1 medications act on receptors in the gut, liver, muscles, and brain, and studies report they reduce heart attacks and strokes, slow kidney disease progression, and shrink liver fat deposits. Users have also reported diminished cravings for alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and other compulsive behaviors, though anecdotal reports outpace clinical studies.
  • How Weight Loss Drugs Stopped a Danish Recession — Strong demand for the weight-loss and diabetes drugs Ozempic and Wegovy has kept Denmark out of recession: GDP is up about 1.1% over the past year but down 0.9% excluding pharmaceuticals, meaning drugmakers added roughly 2% to growth. Booming exports let Denmark's central bank hold rates lower while maintaining its euro peg.

AI Summary. The European Union voted to impose tariffs of up to 45% on electric vehicles made in China, lasting five years, with China vowing to protect its companies. Chinese-made electric cars rose from around 3% to more than 20% of EU electric vehicle sales over three years, with Chinese brands accounting for about 8%.

Alberto Nardelli, Jorge Valero, and Craig Trudell Bloomberg
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The EU voted to impose tariffs as high as 45% on Chinese-built EVs; over the past three years, the Chinese-built EV share of European sales rose from 3 to 20%. Germany voted against the move.

Is Europe imposing steep tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles?

Core argument: The European Union voted to impose tariffs as high as 45% on electric vehicles made in China for five years, with Beijing having vowed to protect its companies and a broader trade conflict threatened.

The European Union voted on Friday to impose tariffs as high as 45% on electric vehicles from China, threatening a broader trade conflict with Beijing which has already vowed to protect its companies. The European Commission, the bloc’s executive arm, can now proceed with implementing the duties, which would last for five years. Ten member states voted in favor of the measure, while Germany and four others voted against and 12 abstained, according to people familiar with the results. The share of electric cars sold in the EU that were made in China climbed from around 3% to more than 20% in the past three years. Chinese brands accounted for around 8% of that market share, as international companies that export from China including Tesla Inc. taking up the rest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The European Union voted to impose tariffs as high as 45% on electric vehicles made in China for five years, with Beijing having vowed to protect its companies and a broader trade conflict threatened.
  2. Ten EU member states voted in favor of the duties, while Germany and four others voted against and 12 abstained, according to people familiar with the results.
  3. Electric cars made in China rose from around 3% to more than 20% of EV sales in the EU over three years, with Chinese brands accounting for roughly 8% and exporters from China including Tesla the rest.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Excess Savings Are A Danger — China's current account surplus of 4% of GDP is larger in global terms than its 2007 peak of 10%, because its share of the world economy at market prices rose from 6% to 17%. Sustaining that surplus would require China to fund deficits in smaller developing countries.
  • China’s Auto Export Wave Echoes Japan’s in the ’70s — The shift from petroleum-fueled internal combustion vehicles to electric vehicles moves resource leverage from Persian Gulf oil producers to critical minerals, with China holding more than half of global processing capacity for lithium, cobalt, and graphite and about a third for nickel. Chinese companies have spent $4.5bn acquiring stakes in nearly 20 lithium mines, mostly in Latin America and Africa.
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.

AI Summary. An analysis of federal survey data estimates that about 18m US adults — nearly a third of adult cannabis users — report symptoms of cannabis use disorder, with roughly 3m considered addicted. Among those aged 18 to 25, the cannabis use disorder rate of 16.6% matches the alcohol use disorder rate of 15.1%.

Megan Twohey, Danielle Ivory, and Carson Kessler New York Times
Date Posted:
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Database

More than 4.5mm Americans aged 18-25 use marijuana daily or nearly daily. A @nytimes analysis finds 1/3 of American marijuana users have reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder, including 16.6% of users 18-25.

How widespread are cannabis use disorder symptoms among American adults?

Core argument: Columbia University epidemiologist Deborah Hasin estimates, in an analysis conducted for The New York Times, that about 18 million Americans — nearly a third of users ages 18 and up — report symptoms of cannabis use disorder, with about three million considered addicted.

About 18 million people — nearly a third of all users ages 18 and up — have reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder, according to estimates from a unique data analysis conducted for The Times by a Columbia University epidemiologist. That would mean they continue to use the drug despite significant negative effects on their lives. Of those, about three million people are considered addicted. Last year, the federal government’s National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that the rate of cannabis use disorder among people ages 18 to 25 was 16.6%. It has caught up to the rate of alcohol use disorder, 15.1%. “It’s a really significant turning point,” said Deborah Hasin, a professor of epidemiology at Columbia University who performed the unique analysis of other data from the survey for The Times. Those ages 12 to 17 have not shown notable increases in cannabis use in the survey, but their rate of cannabis use disorder is ticking up, and it’s higher than their rate of alcohol use disorder (5% compared with 3%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Columbia University epidemiologist Deborah Hasin estimates, in an analysis conducted for The New York Times, that about 18 million Americans — nearly a third of users ages 18 and up — report symptoms of cannabis use disorder, with about three million considered addicted.
  2. The federal National Survey on Drug Use and Health put cannabis use disorder among people ages 18 to 25 at 16.6%, catching up to the 15.1% rate of alcohol use disorder, which Hasin called "a really significant turning point.".
  3. Among those ages 12 to 17, the survey shows no notable increase in cannabis use, but their cannabis use disorder rate is ticking up and exceeds their alcohol use disorder rate, 5% versus 3%.

Related Articles:

  • Changes in Self-Reported Cannabis Use in the United States From 1979 to 2022 — US survey data show per capita reports of past-year cannabis use rose 120% and reported days of use rose 218% over a recent 14-year span, with a 15-fold increase in daily or near-daily use reported over three decades. Daily or near-daily cannabis users now outnumber comparable alcohol users (17.7m vs 14.7m), though far more people drink.
  • American Workers Testing Positive for Marijuana Reaches 25-Year Record — Marijuana positivity in U.S. workplace drug tests rose to 4.3% of more than 6m general workforce tests, up from 3.9%, the highest rate since 1997, while positivity for some opioids and barbiturates declined. Positive tests following on-the-job accidents reached 7.3%, tripling over a decade as more than two-thirds of U.S. states legalized recreational or medicinal use.
  • It’s Time to Talk About America’s Disorder Problem — A meta-analysis of 56 studies found that disorder policing consistently reduces crime, but that indiscriminate "aggressive order maintenance" arrests did not significantly reduce crime while problem-oriented strategies targeting specific sources of disorder often had sizable effects without spillovers. The authors note that a large share of disorder comes from a small number of people and places.

AI Summary. US dockworkers ended a three-day strike that halted trade at East and Gulf coast ports, extending their contract and reopening ports while negotiations resume on a long-term deal including a pay increase of about 62%. A supply-chain data company estimates the resulting cargo backlog will take over a month to clear.

Laura Curtis and Josh Wingrove Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The dockworker’s three-day strike ended with a pay increase of about 62% with the longshoremen agreeing to extend their contract through January 15. The cargo backlog from the strike will likely take over a month to clear.

How long will a brief port strike's cargo backlog take to clear?

Core argument: US dockworkers ended a three-day strike that had paralyzed trade on the East and Gulf coasts, with the International Longshoremen's Association and the US Maritime Association extending their prior contract through Jan. 15.

US dockworkers agreed to end a three-day strike that had paralyzed trade on the US East and Gulf coasts and threatened to become a factor in the presidential election. The International Longshoremen’s Association and the US Maritime Association extended their previous contract through Jan. 15, the two groups said in a joint statement Thursday. Ports are opening Friday and the two sides will restart negotiations on a long-term agreement, which will include a pay increase of about 62%. Even though the strike lasted just three days, the cargo backlog is likely to take over a month to clear, according to project44, a supply chain data company in Chicago.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US dockworkers ended a three-day strike that had paralyzed trade on the East and Gulf coasts, with the International Longshoremen's Association and the US Maritime Association extending their prior contract through Jan. 15.
  2. Ports reopen Friday as the International Longshoremen's Association and the US Maritime Association restart negotiations on a long-term agreement that will include a pay increase of about 62%.
  3. The cargo backlog from the three-day strike is likely to take over a month to clear, according to project44, a Chicago-based supply chain data company.

Related Articles:

  • Dockworkers Launch Strike at Ports From Maine to Texas — Dockworkers at dozens of East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, represented by the International Longshoremen's Association's 45,000 members, launched a strike at cargo terminals handling more than half of US import and export volumes. Port employers raised their wage offer to a 50% increase over six years, up from 40%.
  • Americas Transportation: Eye on Freight: Potential Ramifications Should Labor Disruption Arise at East/Gulf Coast Ports — The authors estimate that a labor disruption at U.S. East and Gulf Coast ports would halt roughly $4.9bn of containerized goods per day — about $25bn after one work week — equal to roughly 61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total daily U.S. trade. Pulled-forward demand and re-routing to the West Coast could mitigate the impact.
  • Trends in Real Wage Growth among Union, Nonunion Workers — Wage changes for union and nonunion workers tend to move similarly over time, with union workers' nominal wage changes less volatile, and since 2002 both groups' wages increased at the same rate. When consumer prices grew faster than wages, real wage growth turned negative despite a strong labor market, then turned positive as inflation fell.

AI Summary. The Silver Bulletin election model gives Harris a 56% chance of winning the presidency to Trump's 44%, close to a tossup. Harris leads the national polling average by 3.1 points but Pennsylvania by only 1.3, and the model puts a 21% chance she wins the popular vote while losing the Electoral College.

Nate Silver and Eli McKown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

The latest @NateSilver538 update shows Harris leading in the national popular vote by 3.1pp. His model shows a 56% probability of Harris winning the electoral college, “about as close to a pure tossup as you can get.”

Is the presidential race close to a tossup with Electoral College bias?

Core argument: The Silver Bulletin forecast gives Harris a 56% chance of winning the presidency to Trump's 44%, about as close to a pure tossup as possible.

Another day, another few polls added to the model, and still very little change to the overall forecast. At the moment Harris has an ever-so-slight edge — she has a 56% chance of winning the election to Trump’s 44% chance — but we’re about as close to a pure tossup as you can get. Harris is still hurt by Electoral College bias though. She leads by 3.1 points in our national polling average but only 1.3 points in the Pennsylvania average. And the model thinks there’s a 21% chance Harris wins the popular vote but loses the Electoral College.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Silver Bulletin forecast gives Harris a 56% chance of winning the presidency to Trump's 44%, about as close to a pure tossup as possible.
  2. Harris leads by 3.1 points in the Silver Bulletin national polling average but only 1.3 points in Pennsylvania, leaving her hurt by Electoral College bias.
  3. The Silver Bulletin model puts a 21% chance on Harris winning the popular vote while losing the Electoral College.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Researchers built a complete map of the fruit fly brain from electron microscopy images stitched together with AI tools, identifying 8,453 neuron types, of which 4,581 were newly discovered. A computer simulation built from the map was more than 90% accurate at predicting which neurons would respond and how the fly would behave.

Sara Reardon Nature
Date Posted:

Mala Murthy and @SebastianSeung announced a complete fruit fly brain wiring diagram, or ‘connectome’, of nearly 140,000 neurons and more than 54.5 million synapses. A computer model based on the data predicted fruit fly behavior with 90% accuracy.

Can a complete brain map accurately predict neural responses and behavior?

Core argument: The FlyWire fruit-fly brain map identified 8,453 neuron types, more than anyone had expected, of which 4,581 were newly discovered, opening new research directions, according to Seung and Murthy.

Seung and Murthy say that they’ve been developing the FlyWire map for more than four years, using electron microscopy images of slices of the fly’s brain. The researchers and their colleagues stitched the data together to form a full map of the brain with the help of AI tools. The researchers identified 8,453 types of neuron — much more than anyone had expected. Of these, 4,581 were newly discovered, which will create new research directions. The team was surprised by some of the ways in which the various cells connect to one another, too. Neurons that were thought to be involved in just one sensory wiring circuit, such as a visual pathway, tended to receive cues from multiple senses, including hearing and touch. Researchers used the connectome to create a computer model of the entire fruit-fly brain, including all the connections between neurons. The researchers learned that the simulation was more than 90% accurate at predicting which neurons would respond and therefore how the fly would behave.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The FlyWire fruit-fly brain map identified 8,453 neuron types, more than anyone had expected, of which 4,581 were newly discovered, opening new research directions, according to Seung and Murthy.
  2. Seung, Murthy, and colleagues built the FlyWire map over more than four years from electron microscopy images of slices of the fly's brain, stitching the data together with the help of AI tools.
  3. A computer model of the entire fruit-fly brain built from the connectome was more than 90% accurate at predicting which neurons would respond and how the fly would behave.