Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, October 2, 2024

AI Summary. Using analyst earnings forecast errors and revisions, the authors construct firm-level "expectations-based returns" and find that predictable movements in non-rational expectations of earnings growth, rather than exotic risk factors, account for much of the cross-sectional return spreads in value, investment, size, and momentum. Growth stocks underperform on average because optimism about them falls more often than it rises.

Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, Rafael La Porta, and Andrei Shleifer National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Shleifer et al find that “return spreads typically attributed to exotic risk factors are explained by predictable movements in non-rational expectations of firms’ earnings growth,” excessively bullish for growth stocks and bearish for value stocks.

Do errors in earnings expectations explain cross-sectional stock return spreads?

Core argument: The authors construct firm-level Expectations Based Returns from analyst forecast errors and revisions, shutting down cross-sectional differences in required returns, and find that variation in these returns accounts for a large share of return spreads in value, investment, size, and momentum factors.

We address the joint hypothesis problem [rational expectations conjunction with a model of risk] in cross-sectional asset pricing by using measured analyst expectations of earnings growth. We construct a firm-level measure of Expectations Based Returns(EBRs) that uses analyst forecast errors and revisions and shuts down any cross-sectional differences in required returns. We obtain three results. First, variation in EBRs accounts for alarge chunk of cross-sectional return spreads in value, investment, size, and momentum factors. Second, time variation in these spreads is predictable, and proxied by predictable time variation in EBRs. Third, firm characteristics typically viewed as capturing risk predict disappointment of expectations (and of EBRs). Overall, return spreads typically attributed to exoticrisk factors are explained by predictable movements in non-rational expectations of firms’ earnings growth. Growth stocks do worse when optimism for them drops relative to that for value stocks, and similarly for big stocks relative to small ones.Growth stocks do worse on average because such optimism happens more than its reverse, not because growth stocks are less risky.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors construct firm-level Expectations Based Returns from analyst forecast errors and revisions, shutting down cross-sectional differences in required returns, and find that variation in these returns accounts for a large share of return spreads in value, investment, size, and momentum factors.
  2. Time variation in value, investment, size, and momentum return spreads is predictable and proxied by predictable time variation in Expectations Based Returns, according to the authors.
  3. Firm characteristics typically viewed as capturing risk predict disappointment of earnings expectations, and the authors argue growth stocks underperform on average because declines in relative optimism toward them occur more often than the reverse, not because they are less risky.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Expectations and Aggregate Fluctuations — When stock analysts' forecasts of long-term earnings growth for S&P 500 firms are high by historical standards, their forecasts of short- and long-term profits are systematically disappointed later, according to the authors. The authors estimate that a 1 standard deviation rise in these long-term forecasts is followed by an investment boom that reverses two years later.
  • The Less-Efficient Market Hypothesis — Markets are never perfectly efficient because betting against other investors' errors carries risk, and the author argues social media, investor overconfidence, and gamified 24/7 trading have made markets meaningfully less efficient, with indexing and very low interest rates a smaller contributor. The recommended response is to adopt the longest possible investment time horizon.

AI Summary. American equities account for nearly 50% of global stock market capitalization, up from 30% in 2009.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
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American equities make up 50% of the world’s market cap, up from 30% in 2009.

Has the US share of global stock market value grown sharply?

Core argument: American equities account for almost 50% of global stock market capitalization, up from 30% in 2009.

In 2009, the market cap of the US stock market was 30% of the global stock market cap. Today it is almost 50%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American equities account for almost 50% of global stock market capitalization, up from 30% in 2009.

Related Articles:

  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • The Great Rotation (Part 2) — The US accounts for 63% of global stock market value but only 26% of global economic output, compared with about 40% of global GDP when its market share last exceeded 60%. The authors argue investors following global indexes are overpaying for US-generated income relative to that earlier period.

AI Summary. The U.S. immigrant population rose by about 1.6m to a record 47.8m, the largest single-year increase since 2000, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. Immigrants made up 14.3% of the total U.S. population, up from 4.7% in 1970 but below the 1890 record of 14.8%.

John Gramlich and Jeffrey Passel Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
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A @pewresearch analysis finds the immigrant population of the US increased by 1.6mm in 2023 to a record 47.8mm. Their 14.3% share of the population is approaching the 14.8% peak of 1890.

How large was the increase in the U.S. immigrant population?

Core argument: The U.S. immigrant population rose by roughly 1.6 million in 2023 to a record 47.8 million, up from 46.2 million in 2022, the largest single-year increase since 2000, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

The number of immigrants living in the United States increased by roughly 1.6 million people in 2023. That marks the largest single-year increase in the nation’s immigrant population since 2000, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of recently published data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Overall, a record 47.8 million immigrants lived in the U.S. in 2023, up from 46.2 million in 2022. The nation’s immigrant population includes naturalized U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and lawful temporary residents, as well as unauthorized immigrants. While the number of immigrants in the U.S. reached a new record high last year, their share of the population remained below the all-time peak. Immigrants accounted for 14.3% of the total U.S. population in 2023 – up roughly threefold from 4.7% in 1970, but still below the record high of 14.8% in 1890.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. immigrant population rose by roughly 1.6 million in 2023 to a record 47.8 million, up from 46.2 million in 2022, the largest single-year increase since 2000, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
  2. Immigrants accounted for 14.3% of the total U.S. population in 2023, up roughly threefold from 4.7% in 1970 but below the record high of 14.8% in 1890.
  3. The U.S. immigrant population includes naturalized U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, lawful temporary residents, and unauthorized immigrants.

Related Articles:

  • Without Immigrants, US Working-Age Population Would Shrink — All net US employment growth since early 2020 has been among foreign-born workers, and without immigration the US working-age population would be shrinking — a pattern likely to persist for the rest of the decade. The jump in immigration appears to be enabling a soft landing that most economists had thought impossible.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2024 to 2054 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population will grow from 342mm in 2024 to 383mm in 2054, an average 0.4% a year — less than half the 0.9% pace of the prior five decades. Immigration accounts for about 70% of growth over the next decade and for all population growth beginning in 2040.

AI Summary. Using Austrian administrative data and variation in the share of women in fathers' workplaces as a source of divorce risk, the authors estimate that parental divorce has persistent, mostly negative effects on children. Boys show lower educational attainment, worse labor market outcomes and higher early mortality; girls show lower educational attainment and more teenage childbearing.

Wolfgang Frimmel, Martin Halla and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer Journal of Public Economics
Date Posted:

Parental divorce has persistent, and mostly negative effects on children. Both boys and girls have lower levels of educational attainment, while boys are more likely to die early, and girls are more likely to have children at an early age.

Does parental divorce cause lasting harm to children's outcomes?

Core argument: Using Austrian administrative data, the authors exploit idiosyncratic variation in gender balance in fathers' workplaces, finding that fathers who encounter more women in their relevant age–occupation group are more likely to divorce, conditional on the firm's overall female share and detailed industry affiliation.

Many papers report a negative association between parental divorce and child outcomes. To provide evidence whether this correlation is causal, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in the extent of gender balance in fathers’ workplaces [based on administrative data from Austria]. Fathers who encounter more women in their relevant age–occupation–group at work are more likely to divorce. This result is conditional on the overall proportion of female employees in a firm and on detailed industry affiliation. Parental divorce has persistent, and mostly negative effects on children that differ between boys and girls. Treated boys have lower levels of educational attainment, worse labor market outcomes and are more likely to die early. Treated girls also have lower levels of educational attainment, but they are also more likely to have children at an early age (especially in their teens). However, treated girls lose less in terms of employment. This could be a direct consequence of teenage motherhood, which initiates early entry into the labor market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Austrian administrative data, the authors exploit idiosyncratic variation in gender balance in fathers' workplaces, finding that fathers who encounter more women in their relevant age–occupation group are more likely to divorce, conditional on the firm's overall female share and detailed industry affiliation.
  2. Parental divorce has persistent and mostly negative effects on children, with treated boys showing lower educational attainment, worse labor market outcomes, and a higher likelihood of dying early.
  3. Treated girls also have lower educational attainment and are more likely to have children early, especially in their teens, but lose less in terms of employment, which the authors suggest could follow from teenage motherhood initiating early labor market entry.

Related Articles:

  • Fortunate Families? The Effects of Wealth on Marriage and Fertility — Using lottery winners, the authors estimate that wealth windfalls raise the short- and medium-run probability of marriage, an effect driven by male winners. The estimated average effect on marriage dissolution is not statistically distinguishable from zero, but for married women a 1M-SEK windfall nearly doubles the short-run divorce rate, with the effect fading over the long run.
  • Divorced Men for Trump — Survey data show 56% of divorced men report supporting Trump versus 42% of divorced women, the largest gender gap of any marital-status group. Married men and women report similar support levels (50% vs. 45%), while single men are somewhat more likely than single women to back Trump.
  • The Marriage Paradox: Understanding And Remedying The Paradoxical Place Of Marriage In America — The U.S. marriage rate has fallen more than 60% since 1970, from 85.9 to 30.5 marriages per 1,000 unmarried Americans aged 15 and older, and the share of adults who are married has dropped from 72% to about 50%. Demographers project roughly one in three young adults may never marry.

AI Summary. Universal tariffs would raise costs for US manufacturers by taxing imported raw materials and equipment, with capital goods making up 28% of US imports and industrial supplies and materials another 22%. Intel imports Dutch-made extreme ultraviolet lithography machines costing hundreds of millions of dollars each with no US alternatives, so tariffs would add tens of millions to reshoring chip production.

Joseph Politano Apricitas Economics
Date Posted:

.@JosephPolitano notes that half of US imports are capital goods and industrial supplies/materials, and argues that universal tariffs “would be borne primarily by American businesses and workers.”

Do universal tariffs raise costs for US manufacturers they aim to protect?

Core argument: Equipment and capital goods made up 28% of US imports last year and industrial supplies and materials another 22%, so universal tariffs would raise input costs for US manufacturers operating within specialized global supply chains.

Even for the industries that are supposed to benefit from protectionism, universal tariffs would end up having massive net negative impacts by driving up the costs of key imported raw materials and equipment. That represents an extremely large hit for US manufacturers, especially in today’s world of highly specialized global supply chains—equipment & capital goods represented 28% of US imports last year while industrial supplies & materials represented another 22%. Intel has bought several high-end Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines from Dutch semiconductor equipment giant ASML and is importing them to the US to help boost US chip production. Each of these units has a cost that numbers in the hundreds of millions of dollars and there are currently no US alternatives available, so Intel would have to pay tens of millions more to reshore US chip production if universal tariffs were implemented. Tariffs on imported lithography machines, construction equipment, steel, and much, much more would be borne primarily by American businesses and workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Equipment and capital goods made up 28% of US imports last year and industrial supplies and materials another 22%, so universal tariffs would raise input costs for US manufacturers operating within specialized global supply chains.
  2. Intel's high-end Extreme Ultraviolet lithography machines from ASML cost hundreds of millions of dollars each with no US alternatives available, so universal tariffs would add tens of millions to the cost of reshoring US chip production.
  3. Tariffs on imported lithography machines, construction equipment, steel, and other inputs would be borne primarily by American businesses and workers, with net negative impacts even for industries protectionism is meant to help.

Related Articles:

  • Only Trump Can Make America European — A European-style welfare state with government spending at 45% of GDP cannot be financed by taxing the rich alone and would require a large consumption tax, which Republican opposition has long blocked. Proposed tariffs of 10% on all imports and 60% on China are a regressive consumption tax that could open the door to a later value-added tax.
  • He Helped Trump Remake Global Trade. His Work Isn’t Done — A former U.S. trade representative argues that countries running chronic trade surpluses for decades are by definition protectionist, and backs a universal 10% tariff plus a higher tariff on China to push toward globally balanced trade over time. Alternatives include import certificates tied to exports and a charge on foreign investment in U.S. assets.
  • Reciprocity and the China Shock — The authors find China's tariff cuts after joining the World Trade Organization exceeded the norm of reciprocity, which raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through better terms of trade while amplifying the China Shock. They estimate this shifted employment from tradable to non-tradable sectors abroad.

Thursday, October 3, 2024

AI Summary. An analysis of inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, uses annual Current Population Survey data to layer taxes and transfers onto earnings that include both employee pay and self-employment income.

Scott Winship Economic Innovation Group
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Between 1979 and 2022 prime-age men in the bottom quintile saw their inflation-adjusted market income rise 10%, to an all-time high of $22,800/year. Their female counterparts saw their market income rise 63% to $20,300/year. @swinshi

How do taxes and transfers affect low-earning men's disposable income?

Core argument: Figure 1 tracks four trends in inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, from 1979 to 2022.

Figure 1 shows four trends in the disposable income of lower-earning men, from 1979 to 2022, after adjusting for inflation. In each case, the focus is on the bottom fifth of working-age men (age 25 to 54), as ranked by their pretax earnings. In all of the analyses here, “earnings” includes not just the pay of employees but self-employment income. Looking at annual earnings rather than hourly pay is useful because, in addition to earnings, the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) includes information on a variety of taxes and transfers, measured on an annual basis. Looking at the bottom fifth’s average rather than the 20th percentile of earnings makes it easy to layer on the impact of taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Figure 1 tracks four trends in inflation-adjusted disposable income for the bottom fifth of working-age men aged 25 to 54, ranked by pretax earnings, from 1979 to 2022.
  2. Earnings in the analysis include self-employment income alongside employee pay, and the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement provides annual measures of a variety of taxes and transfers.
  3. Using the bottom fifth's average rather than the 20th percentile of earnings makes it easy to layer on the impact of taxes and transfers.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Trends in Worker Pay over the Past 50 Years — Productivity growth has been unequal across industries, across firms within industries, and across workers within firms, slowing growth in both the productivity and the pay of the median worker. The authors argue that working- and middle-class men earlier received "breadwinner rents"—pay above their marginal value to employers—and then endured slow wage growth as women's workforce participation rose.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — The authors estimate that post-pandemic labor market tightness compressed the US wage distribution, reducing the college wage premium and offsetting roughly one-quarter of the four-decade rise in 90-10 wage inequality. They attribute this in part to greater labor supply elasticity facing firms in low-wage markets, which reduced employer market power as young non-college workers moved to higher-paying jobs.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.

AI Summary. The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.

Michael Pettis and Erica Hogan Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
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China comprises 17% of global GDP but 29% of manufacturing and 13% of consumption while the US is 26% of GDP, 16% of manufacturing, and 26% of consumption. @michaelxpettis favors capital controls over tariffs to correct these imbalances.

Are capital controls a better response than tariffs to trade surpluses?

Core argument: The author argues the United States should intervene to reverse surplus nations' beggar-thy-neighbor policies, either by restricting their ability to dump goods into the U.S. economy through tariffs or by taxing capital inflows into the U.S. financial system.

The best response would be for the United States to intervene to reverse the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of surplus nations. This could be achieved either through restrictions on the ability of surplus countries to dump goods into the U.S. economy, for instance via the imposition of tariffs, or through restrictions on their ability to dump excess savings into the U.S. financial system, notably by taxing capital inflows. Neither approach is a perfect antidote. A system of uniform tariffs, for instance, risks imposing the same costs on countries that are more and less aggressively mercantilist. A more direct and focused alternative to tariffs is to reintroduce capital controls. Capital inflows could be controlled through a number of mechanisms, including taxes, volume restrictions, bank reserve requirements, government approvals for transactions, and limitations on investor eligibility. An effective capital inflow regulation regime would need to be flexible, allowing for benign, temporary trade imbalances that balance an increase in productive investment while penalizing short-term and speculative inflows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the United States should intervene to reverse surplus nations' beggar-thy-neighbor policies, either by restricting their ability to dump goods into the U.S. economy through tariffs or by taxing capital inflows into the U.S. financial system.
  2. Uniform tariffs risk imposing the same costs on countries that are more and less aggressively mercantilist, and the author presents capital controls as a more direct and focused alternative.
  3. Capital inflows could be controlled through taxes, volume restrictions, bank reserve requirements, government approvals for transactions, and limits on investor eligibility, with an effective regime permitting benign, temporary imbalances tied to productive investment while penalizing short-term and speculative inflows.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Myth of Deglobalization — China's manufacturing surplus rose by about 1 percentage point of global GDP over a four-year span and is far larger than those of Germany and Japan. China's $800bn goods trade surplus depends on the large U.S. trade deficit, which is still indirectly financed by China through the large offshore dollar stockpiles held by Chinese exporters.
  • Brazil, India, and Mexico Are Taking on China’s Exports — Foreign direct investment into China fell to a 30-year low even as Chinese leaders launched an investment push in high-tech goods such as batteries and electric vehicles. Weak domestic demand for cars, chemicals, and steel has pushed Chinese goods into global markets, with average manufactured export prices down nearly 10% and export volumes near record levels.
  • China’s Excess Savings Are A Danger — China's current account surplus of 4% of GDP is larger in global terms than its 2007 peak of 10%, because its share of the world economy at market prices rose from 6% to 17%. Sustaining that surplus would require China to fund deficits in smaller developing countries.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a labor disruption at U.S. East and Gulf Coast ports would halt roughly $4.9bn of containerized goods per day — about $25bn after one work week — equal to roughly 61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total daily U.S. trade. Pulled-forward demand and re-routing to the West Coast could mitigate the impact.

Jordan Alliger, Paul Stoddard and Andrzej Tomczyk Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

A @GoldmanSachs analysis estimates ~$4.9B trade impact per day of the longshoreman’s strike on the East and Gulf coasts. The impact could be mitigated by “pull forward” in demand and diversion to the West Coast to try to get ahead of the disruption.

How much daily trade would an East Coast port shutdown halt?

Core argument: Applying $52,000 per container to the ~95k containers handled daily, the analysts estimate East/Gulf Coast ports move ~$4.9bn of goods each day, with trade impacted reaching ~$25bn after one work week and ~$113bn through the end of October.

Applying a $52,000 value per container to the ~95k containers handled each day, we arrive at ~$4.9bn handled each day by the ports that could be affected [the] work disruption. Depending on the length of the disruption, we see a scenario where trade impacted could reach $25bn after one work week, and $113bn through the end of October. Adjusting for the recent ~41% average of ocean trade on total U.S. trade implies October ocean trade at $186bn. October has 23 workdays which means there would be ~$8bn in ocean trade each day of October. Using our implied daily ocean container value handled each day on the East Coast, we estimate that a potential work disruption could impact ~61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total U.S. daily trade in October. That said, we note that given the appearance of a pull forward in demand and diversion to the West Coast, the impact could be mitigated, especially if shippers continue to re-route to the West Coast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Applying $52,000 per container to the ~95k containers handled daily, the analysts estimate East/Gulf Coast ports move ~$4.9bn of goods each day, with trade impacted reaching ~$25bn after one work week and ~$113bn through the end of October.
  2. The analysts estimate a work disruption at East/Gulf Coast ports could affect ~61% of total U.S. ocean trade and 25% of total U.S. daily trade in October, based on implied October ocean trade of $186bn over 23 workdays, or ~$8bn per day.
  3. A pull forward in demand and diversion of cargo to the West Coast could mitigate the impact of an East/Gulf Coast port disruption, especially if shippers continue re-routing.

Related Articles:

  • Dockworkers Launch Strike at Ports From Maine to Texas — Dockworkers at dozens of East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, represented by the International Longshoremen's Association's 45,000 members, launched a strike at cargo terminals handling more than half of US import and export volumes. Port employers raised their wage offer to a 50% increase over six years, up from 40%.
  • Trends in Real Wage Growth among Union, Nonunion Workers — Wage changes for union and nonunion workers tend to move similarly over time, with union workers' nominal wage changes less volatile, and since 2002 both groups' wages increased at the same rate. When consumer prices grew faster than wages, real wage growth turned negative despite a strong labor market, then turned positive as inflation fell.
  • Labor Market Conflict and the Decline of the Rust Belt — The authors argue that persistent labor market conflict in the Rust Belt's main industries lowered investment and productivity growth, shifting employment to the rest of the country, and estimate it accounts for roughly half the decline in the region's share of US manufacturing employment. Rising foreign competition plays a more modest quantitative role.

AI Summary. The United States and Canadian economies have diverged, with American output expected to grow 11% over five years versus 6% in Canada. The International Monetary Fund projects Canadian national income per head will fall to 70% of the American level, down from roughly 80% in the decade before the pandemic.

Economist Staff The Economist
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By the end of this year, the US economy will be 11% larger than it was prior to the pandemic while Canada’s will be 6%. Canada’s GDP/person is a bit lower than Alabama, the fourth-poorest US state.

Why is Canada's income per person falling further behind America's?

Core argument: America's economy is expected to be 11% bigger by the end of 2024 than five years earlier, while Canada's will have grown by just 6%.

Yet since the pandemic North America’s two richest countries have diverged. By the end of 2024, America’s economy is expected to be 11% bigger than five years before; Canada’s will have grown by just 6%. The difference is starker once population growth is accounted for. The IMF forecasts that Canada’s national income per head, equivalent to around 80% of America’s in the decade before the pandemic, will be just 70% of its neighbour’s in 2025, the lowest for decades. Were Canada’s ten provinces and three territories an American state, they would have gone from being slightly richer than Montana, America’s ninth-poorest state, to being a bit worse off than Alabama, the fourth-poorest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. America's economy is expected to be 11% bigger by the end of 2024 than five years earlier, while Canada's will have grown by just 6%.
  2. The IMF forecasts Canada's national income per head will be 70% of America's in 2025, down from about 80% in the decade before the pandemic and the lowest for decades.
  3. Treated as an American state, Canada's ten provinces and three territories would have gone from slightly richer than Montana, the ninth-poorest state, to a bit worse off than Alabama, the fourth-poorest.

Related Articles:

  • Canada’s Growth Challenge: Why The Economy Is Stuck In Neutral — Canada's labor productivity is about 30% below the United States and roughly 10% below Australia's, and Canada has fallen from the 6th to the 18th most productive economy in the OECD. The authors attribute this to a shortfall in investment outside real estate, construction, and public services, plus negative multifactor productivity growth.
  • A “Heat Dome” of Immigration — Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
  • Immigration Surge Fuels Male Population Boom in Canada — Canada's adult male population grew 3.4% over the past year versus 2.9% for women, the widest gap in nearly 50 years of records, as a higher share of male newcomers shifts the gender ratio. Among those aged 25 to 44, men outnumber women by 141,000, against a long-run average of zero.

AI Summary. Survey data show 35% of Americans say the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well, down from 51% earlier. Women are more likely than men to identify as feminist (42% vs 27%), with the widest gap among those age 18–29, where 55% of women but 31% of men claim the label.

Daniel Cox and Kelsey Eyre Hammond American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

55% of US women aged 18-29 identify as a “feminist” relative to 41% aged 30-49, 38% aged 50-64, and 35% aged 65+. 31% of US men aged 18-29 identify as a “feminist,” for a 24pp gender gap. @dcoxpolls

Are fewer Americans identifying as feminist, especially young men?

Core argument: The share of Americans saying the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well fell to 35% from 51% in 2020.

Since 2020, more Americans reject the feminist label. Today, roughly one in three (35%) Americans say the term “feminist” describes them somewhat or very well. This represents a rapid deterioration in feminist identity since 2020, when roughly half (51% ) of Americans said the label described their views at least somewhat well. Women are more likely than men to identify as feminist, a gap that has remained relatively stable over the past few years. Forty-two percent of women say the label “feminist” describes them very well or somewhat well. Only 27% of men say the same. There is remarkable variation in feminist identity across generations. Even as feminist identity has declined overall, there remains a massive divide among younger Americans, those age 18 to 29. A majority (55% ) of young women identify as feminist, but less than one-third (31%) of young men claim this label. The gender gap is far smaller among older Americans. Roughly one in three (35%) women age 65 or older identify as feminist, compared with 23% of men in the same age bracket.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Americans saying the term "feminist" describes them somewhat or very well fell to 35% from 51% in 2020.
  2. Women identify as feminist more than men, 42% to 27%, a gap that has remained relatively stable over the past few years.
  3. Among Americans age 18–29, 55% of women identify as feminist versus 31% of men, while the gap narrows to 35% of women versus 23% of men age 65 or older.

Related Articles:

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AI Summary. In a randomized study of 50 physicians working through clinical cases, giving doctors access to the GPT-4 language model did not significantly improve diagnostic reasoning scores compared with conventional resources, with an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points. GPT-4 working alone scored 15.5 percentage points higher than the conventional-resources group.

Ethan Goh, MD, MS, Robert Gallo, MD, Jason Hom, MD, et al. medRxiv
Date Posted:

In a trial with 50 physicians to test the impact of GPT-4 on diagnostic accuracy, the median diagnostic reasoning score was 76% for the GPT-4 group and 74% for the conventional resources group. GPT-4 alone scored 89%

Does giving doctors access to an AI model improve diagnostic reasoning?

Core argument: Physicians given GPT-4 scored a median 76.3% on diagnostic reasoning per case versus 73.7% for those using conventional resources, an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60).

50 physicians (26 attendings, 24 residents) participated, with an average of 5.2 cases completed per participant. The median diagnostic reasoning score per case was 76.3 percent (IQR 65.8 to 86.8) for the GPT-4 group and 73.7 percent (IQR 63.2 to 84.2) for the conventional resources group, with an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60). GPT-4 alone scored 15.5 percentage points (95% CI 1.5 to 29, p=0.03) higher than the conventional resources group. The availability of GPT-4 to physicians as a diagnostic aid did not significantly improve clinical reasoning compared to conventional resources, although it may improve components of clinical reasoning such as efficiency. GPT-4 alone demonstrated higher performance than both physician groups, suggesting opportunities for further improvement in physician-AI collaboration in clinical practice.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Physicians given GPT-4 scored a median 76.3% on diagnostic reasoning per case versus 73.7% for those using conventional resources, an adjusted difference of 1.6 percentage points (95% CI -4.4 to 7.6; p=0.60).
  2. GPT-4 alone scored 15.5 percentage points higher than the conventional resources physician group (95% CI 1.5 to 29, p=0.03) in a randomized clinical vignette study of 50 physicians, 26 attendings and 24 residents.
  3. Availability of GPT-4 as a diagnostic aid did not significantly improve physicians' clinical reasoning over conventional resources, though it may improve components such as efficiency, suggesting opportunities for better physician-AI collaboration.

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