Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, September 26, 2024

AI Summary. The authors find that Congress reduced deficits in response to rising projected deficits during 1984–2003 but that this year-to-year response was absent on average during 2004–2024. They estimate that holding the debt ratio below 250% with 95% probability requires gradual deficit reduction averaging 0.5%–1.2% of GDP over the next decade.

Alan Auerbach and Danny Yagan Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:

Btw 1984 and 2003, Congress offset ~ 1/3 of the changes in the projected 5-year deficit within a year. Post-2004 this policy feedback is absent. Auerbach and @dannyyagan suggest annual deficits should average .5-1.2% of GDP lower over the next decade.

How much deficit reduction is needed to stabilize the debt ratio?

Core argument: Congress on average did not respond to projected deficits during 2004–2024, ending the year-to-year fiscal feedback found for 1984–2003, when rising projected deficits were met with outlay reductions and tax increases.

Previous work found that Congress reduced the deficit during 1984-2003 when projected deficits rose; [e.g.] in the first period of 1991 the projected five-year surplus averaged −3.4% of potential GDP, and Congress enacted outlay reductions and tax increases of similar magnitudes that cumulatively increased the weighted surplus over the five-year window by 0.8% of GDP. We find that this year-to-year feedback has disappeared: Congress on average during 2004-2024 did not respond to the projected deficit. With large transitory deficit shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic and persistent interest rate shocks, keeping the debt ratio below 250% with 95% probability requires strong gradual feedback – 0.5%-1.2% of GDP average deficit reduction in the next decade – though less strong than actually observed during 1984-2003. [Alternatively], successful sudden feedback requires being able to undertake 1.5%-of-GDP deficit reductions twice in twelve-year periods, suggesting that a “wait-and-see” approach to successful deficit reduction sometimes allows little waiting.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Congress on average did not respond to projected deficits during 2004–2024, ending the year-to-year fiscal feedback found for 1984–2003, when rising projected deficits were met with outlay reductions and tax increases.
  2. Keeping the debt ratio below 250% with 95% probability requires gradual deficit reduction averaging 0.5%–1.2% of GDP over the next decade, less strong than the feedback observed during 1984–2003.
  3. Successful sudden feedback requires the ability to enact deficit reductions of 1.5% of GDP twice within twelve-year periods, suggesting a "wait-and-see" approach to deficit reduction sometimes allows little waiting.

Related Articles:

  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget — The Congressional Budget Office projects that if private investment were more sensitive to federal deficits, debt held by the public would exceed 250% of GDP and real national income per person would be 18% ($21,300) lower than its baseline, with the average interest rate on federal debt 2pp higher.
  • Larry Summers and Bob Rubin Join Our CIOs to Discuss the Surprising Economic Cycle — Adopting the Simpson-Bowles fiscal consolidation when interest rates were at zero would have risked excessive disinflation, since long rates had no room to fall to provide an offsetting expansionary impulse. After the large run-up in debt and rise in real interest rates, the developing fiscal situation risks inflationary pressure, Treasury market disruption, or crowding out of private investment.
  • An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects a federal budget deficit of $1.9tn in fiscal 2024, or $2tn excluding payment-timing shifts, rising to $2.8tn by 2034. On that adjusted basis, deficits equal 7% of gross domestic product in 2024, dip to 5.5% by 2027, and reach 6.9% by 2034, versus a 3.7% average over the past 50 years.

AI Summary. Self-reported mental health deteriorated across all U.S. population subgroups examined from 1993 to 2019, and the authors estimate these declines raised death rates among prime-age non-Hispanic Whites and, to a lesser extent, Blacks, though worsening mental health is not the predominant explanation for those mortality trends.

Christopher Ruhm National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

.@christopherruhm examines adverse mortality trends for prime-age non-Hispanic Whites from 1999-2019 and finds that “worsening mental health is not the predominant explanation,” contrary to the Case and Deaton “deaths of despair” narrative.

Does worsening mental health explain rising prime-age death rates?

Core argument: Mental health deteriorated across all population subgroups examined between 1993 and 2019, and these declines raised death rates and contributed to adverse mortality trends among prime-age non-Hispanic Whites from 1999–2019, and to a lesser extent Blacks.

Mental health deteriorated between 1993 and 2019 for all population subgroups examined. These declines raised death rates and contributed to the adverse mortality trends experienced by prime-age non-Hispanic Whites and, to a lesser extent, Blacks from 1999-2019. However, worsening mental health is not the predominant explanation for them. To the extent these relationships support the general idea of “deaths of despair”, the specific causes comprising it should be both broader and different than previously recognized: still including drug mortality and possibly alcohol deaths but replacing suicides with fatalities from heart disease, lower respiratory causes, homicides, and conceivably cancer. Heterogeneity in the consequences of a given increase of poor mental health are generally more important than the sizes of the changes in poor mental health in explaining Black-White differences in the overall effects of mental health on mortality.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Mental health deteriorated across all population subgroups examined between 1993 and 2019, and these declines raised death rates and contributed to adverse mortality trends among prime-age non-Hispanic Whites from 1999–2019, and to a lesser extent Blacks.
  2. Worsening mental health is not the predominant explanation for the adverse mortality trends among prime-age non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks, despite raising death rates over 1999–2019.
  3. The causes comprising "deaths of despair" should be broader and different than previously recognized, still including drug mortality and possibly alcohol deaths but replacing suicides with heart disease, lower respiratory causes, homicides, and conceivably cancer.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. In the early 1950s US government spending on public services such as teacher salaries and hospital construction equaled about 25% of GDP while entitlements, including pensions and welfare, equaled about 3%; today each is around 15% of GDP. The authors estimate federal compensation pledges to various groups total roughly 6x US GDP.

Callum Williams The Economist
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

US entitlement and pension spending is crowding out government spending on public services; in the 1950s spending on public services was 25% of GDP, and entitlement/pension spending was about 3%. Today they are at par at 15%. @econcallum

Has government spending shifted from public services to entitlements?

Core argument: U.S. state spending on public services fell from an estimated 25% of GDP in the early 1950s to about 15% today, while entitlements spending rose from roughly 3% of GDP to about 15%.

America shows how one government became a Lumbering Leviathan. In the early 1950s, we estimate that state spending on public services, including everything from paying teachers’ salaries to building hospitals, equaled 25% of the country’s GDP. At the same time, entitlements spending, broadly defined, was a small line item, with outlays on both pensions and other sorts of welfare equivalent to about 3% of GDP. Today the situation is very different. The American government’s outlays on entitlements have swelled and spending on public services has crashed. Both now equal around 15% of GDP. Governments have accumulated mind-boggling off-balance-sheet obligations to dole out money in the future. We estimate that America’s federal government has made pledges of compensation to different groups worth, in aggregate, six times American GDP

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. state spending on public services fell from an estimated 25% of GDP in the early 1950s to about 15% today, while entitlements spending rose from roughly 3% of GDP to about 15%.
  2. The U.S. federal government has made pledges of compensation to different groups worth, in aggregate, an estimated six times American GDP, an off-balance-sheet obligation to dole out money in the future.

Related Articles:

  • An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects a federal budget deficit of $1.9tn in fiscal 2024, or $2tn excluding payment-timing shifts, rising to $2.8tn by 2034. On that adjusted basis, deficits equal 7% of gross domestic product in 2024, dip to 5.5% by 2027, and reach 6.9% by 2034, versus a 3.7% average over the past 50 years.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • Federal Debt — Stabilizing federal debt would require a zero primary deficit — borrowing only to cover interest on past borrowing — which today would mean a cash deficit of about 3% of GDP, or roughly $800bn a year. The actual deficit is about $1.7tn, or 6% of GDP, with no political dynamics in prospect that would cut it to 3%.

AI Summary. Saudi Arabia is prepared to accept a prolonged period of lower oil prices as it and seven other OPEC+ members restore long-standing production cuts, abandoning an unofficial $100-a-barrel target. The International Monetary Fund estimates the kingdom needs oil near $100 a barrel to balance its budget.

Tom Wilson Financial Times
Date Posted:

Saudi Arabia plans to increase production in December, even if it means abandoning its prior target of $100/barrel, the price required to balance its budget. The Kingdom plans to tap FX reserves and issue debt to finance its budget deficit.

Will Saudi Arabia accept lower oil prices to regain market share?

Core argument: Saudi officials are committed to restoring OPEC+ production as planned on December 1, even if it brings a prolonged period of lower prices, with the kingdom ready to abandon its $100-a-barrel ambition to regain market share.

The world’s largest oil exporter and seven other members of the Opec+ producer group had been due to unwind long-standing production cuts from the start of October. But a two-month delay sparked speculation over whether the group would ever be able to raise output, with the price of Brent crude, the international benchmark, briefly dropping below $70 this month to its lowest since December 2021. However, officials in the kingdom are committed to bringing back that production as planned on December 1, even if it leads to a prolonged period of lower prices. Saudi Arabia needs an oil price of close to $100 a barrel to balance its budget, according to the IMF, as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to fund a series of megaprojects at the heart of an ambitious economic reform programme.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Saudi officials are committed to restoring OPEC+ production as planned on December 1, even if it brings a prolonged period of lower prices, with the kingdom ready to abandon its $100-a-barrel ambition to regain market share.
  2. Brent crude briefly fell below $70 a barrel, its lowest since December 2021, after a two-month delay in unwinding OPEC+ cuts raised speculation over whether the group could ever raise output.
  3. Saudi Arabia needs an oil price close to $100 a barrel to balance its budget, according to the IMF, as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to fund megaprojects central to his economic reform programme.

Related Articles:

  • The World Is Transitioning to American Oil From Saudi Crude — Saudi Aramco scrapped plans to raise production capacity to 13mm barrels a day from 12mm, a cancellation expected to save $20–40bn in capital spending over five years and signaling insufficient demand for additional Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia, pumping about 9mm barrels a day under OPEC+ cuts, appears set on lower output to support higher prices.
  • United States Produces More Crude Oil Than Any Country, Ever — The United States has produced more crude oil than any nation at any time for six consecutive years, averaging 12.9m barrels per day in 2023 and surpassing the prior record of 12.3m barrels per day. Output fell to 5.0m barrels per day in 2008 before rising as producers applied hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.
  • US Shale: The Marginal Supplier Matures — The responsiveness of US oil supply to prices has declined and is estimated to be much smaller for publicly traded producers than private ones, with a 10% price increase raising US liquids output by roughly 1%, or 200,000 barrels a day. That implies US supply would offset only about 20-25% of a geopolitical supply shock.

AI Summary. U.S. officials say China's first Zhou-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, which features a distinctive X-shaped stern designed for greater maneuverability, sank at a shipyard near Wuhan, a setback for a priority weapons program that Chinese authorities sought to conceal.

Michael Gordon Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

China’s newest Zhou-class nuclear-powered submarine suffered an accident and sank at a pier prior to going to sea. While the boat has been salvaged, Chinese authorities have not acknowledged the episode.

Has China's naval modernization suffered a setback from a submarine sinking?

Core argument: China's first Zhou-class nuclear-powered attack submarine sank at a shipyard near Wuhan in late May or early June, a major setback for a priority weapons program, U.S. officials said.

China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank in the spring, a major setback for one of the country’s priority weapons programs, U.S. officials said. The episode, which Chinese authorities scrambled to cover up and hasn’t previously been disclosed, occurred at a shipyard near Wuhan in late May or early June. The Zhou-class vessel that sank is the first of a new class of Chinese nuclear-powered subs and features a distinctive X-shaped stern, which is designed to make the vessel more maneuverable. The U.S. has suffered similar setbacks, which proved costly. In 1969, the nuclear-powered USS Guitarro was moored at a shipyard in California when it sank following a series of mistakes by construction workers. It wasn’t officially commissioned until 32 months after its sinking.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's first Zhou-class nuclear-powered attack submarine sank at a shipyard near Wuhan in late May or early June, a major setback for a priority weapons program, U.S. officials said.
  2. The Zhou-class vessel features an X-shaped stern designed to make the submarine more maneuverable, and Chinese authorities scrambled to cover up the sinking, which had not previously been disclosed.
  3. The U.S. has suffered similar costly setbacks, including the nuclear-powered USS Guitarro, which sank while moored at a California shipyard in 1969 after a series of construction-worker mistakes and was commissioned 32 months later.

Related Articles:

  • The Era of Total U.S. Submarine Dominance Over China Is Ending — China has launched a nuclear-powered attack submarine using pump-jet propulsion, the first appearance on a Chinese submarine of noise-reducing technology used on the newest American submarines, and satellite images show expanded submarine construction capacity. China has also built or nearly completed underwater sensor networks around its coast that improve its ability to detect enemy submarines.
  • China’s Shipyards Are Ready for a Protracted War. America’s Aren’t — China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output, while Europe accounts for about 5% and the US next to nothing, with most of the remainder built in South Korea and Japan. Analysts argue that in a protracted conflict China's wartime-scale yards could quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones.
  • U.S. Launches Military Command in Tokyo to Counter China — The U.S. is establishing a new military command in Japan, initially led by a three-star general, to coordinate military operations with Japanese forces, plan joint exercises, and participate in Japan's defense if hostilities break out. The move is intended to keep pace with Japan's buildup of its own military capabilities, including a planned joint command.

Friday, September 27, 2024

AI Summary. Official budget estimates generally exclude legislative proposals' likely effects on labor, capital, and productivity and the resulting feedback to the federal budget; these excluded effects are small for most proposals but have been estimated to be significantly different for some. Dynamic estimates would be far more time-consuming, and in some areas the research base is insufficient for credible estimation.

Douglas Elmendorf, Glenn Hubbard and Heidi Williams Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:

“Dynamic scoring” of budget proposals has both costs and benefits. “For some areas, the budgetary impacts of the currently excluded effects have been estimated to be significantly different from the impacts of the included effects.” @heidilwilliams_

Should official budget estimates include proposals' broader economic feedback effects?

Core argument: Official budget estimates for legislative proposals generally exclude effects on labor, capital, productivity, and other economic outcomes, along with feedback from those outcomes to the federal budget, effects that are small for most proposals.

By design, official budget estimates for legislative proposals generally exclude the proposals’ likely effects on levels of labor, capital, productivity, and other economic outcomes, as well as any feedback effects from changes in those outcomes to the federal budget. The excluded effects are small for most proposals. [But] for some areas, the budgetary impacts of the currently excluded effects have been estimated to be significantly different from the impacts of the included effects. Producing dynamic estimates would be substantially more time-consuming than producing conventional estimates, and in some areas, the research base needed to inform modeling of the relevant economic effects is insufficient for credible estimation. [As an example, compare] population-change approaches for a Section 80303-style proposal. Figure 2 summarizes their estimates of the effects on budget deficits over the next 20 years. The conventional estimate (the blue line) shows a slight increase in deficits, while the population-change approach (the red line) shows a decrease in deficits in the first decade and a much larger decrease in the second decade as lawful permanent residents naturalize and sponsor family members..

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Official budget estimates for legislative proposals generally exclude effects on labor, capital, productivity, and other economic outcomes, along with feedback from those outcomes to the federal budget, effects that are small for most proposals.
  2. For a Section 80303-style proposal, the conventional estimate shows a slight increase in deficits over 20 years, while a population-change approach shows deficits decreasing in the first decade and falling much more in the second as lawful permanent residents naturalize and sponsor family members.
  3. Producing dynamic estimates would be substantially more time-consuming than conventional estimates, and in some areas the research base needed to model the relevant economic effects is insufficient for credible estimation.

Related Articles:

  • Policy Steps in the Federal Budget and Health Care to Achieve Sustainable Fiscal Conditions in the U.S. — The authors project that the US fiscal trajectory is unsustainable, with deficits and debt exceeding both historical norms and official projections, arguing that official forecasts understate how labor shortages raise health care prices in inefficient sectors. They argue that reducing health care spending, increasing capital, and fiscal retrenchment could restore sustainable fiscal conditions.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.

AI Summary. Real wage gains for non-managerial workers, roughly 80% of the private workforce, exceeded both those of all workers and projections based on pre-pandemic trends, which is attributed to labor market tightness and strong demand in low-wage sectors. This compression of wage inequality has persisted even as the labor market cooled and unemployment rose above 4%.

Arin Dube Arin's Substack
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Real wages for non-managerial workers, who make up 80% of the private workforce, are above their pre-pandemic trend, while wages for all workers remain below the pre-pandemic trend. @arindube

Have real wage gains for lower-paid workers reduced wage inequality?

Core argument: Real wage gains for non-managerial workers, roughly 80% of the private workforce, exceeded those of all workers in 2021–2023 and outpaced projections based on pre-pandemic trends.

The post-pandemic recovery was marked by continued tightness in the labor market, driving wages for non-managerial workers beyond pre-pandemic expectations. This is especially evident in the data for 2021-2023, where real wage gains for non-managerial workers exceeded those of all workers. In fact, wage growth in this group outpaced projections based on pre-pandemic trends, reflecting the intense demand for labor in low-wage sectors. These trends suggest that tight labor markets helped reduce wage inequality, as employers had to raise wages to attract and retain workers in non-managerial roles, which make up roughly 80% of the private workforce. Even as the labor market has cooled somewhat over 2024, and unemployment has climbed above 4%, real wage growth has been strong, and the reduction in inequality has persisted.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real wage gains for non-managerial workers, roughly 80% of the private workforce, exceeded those of all workers in 2021–2023 and outpaced projections based on pre-pandemic trends.
  2. Continued labor market tightness in the post-pandemic recovery drove wages for non-managerial workers beyond pre-pandemic expectations, reflecting demand for labor in low-wage sectors that pushed employers to raise pay to attract and retain workers.
  3. Even as the labor market cooled over 2024 and unemployment climbed above 4%, real wage growth remained strong and the reduction in wage inequality persisted.

Related Articles:

  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • Has Pay Kept Up With Inflation? — All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.
  • On Average, American Wage Earners are Better Off Than They Were Four Years Ago — Average US wages have now outpaced average price inflation over the past four years, after a stretch in which prices had risen faster than wages. Wage growth has continued even as price growth moderated.

AI Summary. Harmonised labour force surveys across Western countries show rates of activity-limiting health conditions have risen markedly among people in their twenties and thirties in the UK, US, Ireland and Sweden, with little change among older groups. Receipt of health-related disability benefits shows a similar pattern, rising among young adults and led by the UK and Ireland.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Across the West, the age curve of activity-limiting health conditions has flattened due to a rise in disability rates among people in their 20’s and 30’s. “But there is little change — or even a reduction — further up the age distribution.” @jburnmurdoch

Are health-related work limitations and disability benefits rising among young adults?

Core argument: Harmonised labour force surveys across the West show the age curve of activity-limiting health conditions has flattened considerably in countries including the UK, US, Ireland and Sweden, with disability rates rising markedly among people in their twenties and thirties.

Using harmonised labour force surveys from across the west, I find that the age curve of activity-limiting health conditions has flattened considerably in many countries including the UK, US, Ireland and Sweden. Rates of disability have risen markedly among people in their twenties and thirties, but seen little change among older groups. I find that awards of health-related benefits show strikingly similar patterns, with the receipt of disability benefits among young adults rising in several countries, led by the UK and Ireland. But there is little change — or even a reduction — further up the age distribution.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Harmonised labour force surveys across the West show the age curve of activity-limiting health conditions has flattened considerably in countries including the UK, US, Ireland and Sweden, with disability rates rising markedly among people in their twenties and thirties.
  2. Rates of activity-limiting health conditions have changed little among older age groups even as they rise markedly among people in their twenties and thirties.
  3. Awards of health-related benefits follow strikingly similar patterns, with disability benefit receipt among young adults rising in several countries, led by the UK and Ireland, while showing little change or a reduction further up the age distribution.

Related Articles:

  • Further Evidence on the Global Decline in the Mental Health of the Young — Across cross-country survey data, the age pattern of reporting frequent unhappiness and depression reversed: one wave sloped upward with age while a later wave sloped downward, and women report more unhappiness. Young people with poorer mental health spend more daily time in front of a screen.
  • Disability Prevalence is Rising Alongside Employment — Reported disability among people aged 25-54 has risen about 0.9 percentage points to 6.9%, nearly 1.3m additional people and a 16% increase in that population. Increases in reported cognitive difficulties have been concentrated among younger people, rising about 1.1 percentage points for ages 16-34 and 0.7 points for ages 35-44 — at least 25% increases in prevalence.
  • Not Working, Out-of-School Young Adults in the U.S. by Race and Geography — More than a third of U.S. young adults reported no salary or wages, and 13.3% were neither in school nor working outside the summer months, down slightly from a record 14%. Disconnection rates are highest in rural areas (1 in 5) and among young Black adults, reaching 29.1% in rural areas.

AI Summary. A meta-analysis of 56 studies found that disorder policing consistently reduces crime, but that indiscriminate "aggressive order maintenance" arrests did not significantly reduce crime while problem-oriented strategies targeting specific sources of disorder often had sizable effects without spillovers. The authors note that a large share of disorder comes from a small number of people and places.

Charles Fain Lehman The Causal Fallacy
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Crime statistics miss the rise in public disorder, which @CharlesFLehman describes as the “domination of public space for private purposes.” He argues that police should focus their resources on phenomena like homelessness, litter, and graffiti.

Does targeted disorder policing reduce crime more than indiscriminate arrests?

Core argument: An updated meta-analysis of 56 studies of disorder policing found that such policing consistently reduces crime, though some approaches work better than others.

Police can deter disorder simply by being a visible presence in communities. But they also can strategically target sources of disorder, helping to bring it to levels where the community can keep it under control. A recently updated meta-analysis of 56 studies of disorder policing found that such policing consistently reduces crime. But some approaches work better than others. The authors note that “aggressive order maintenance strategies”—arresting people indiscriminately—did not significantly reduce crime. But problem-oriented strategies, which tried to identify and redress specific sources of disorder, had often sizable effects without spill-overs. This last insight is an important one for thinking about disorder (and crime more generally). A large share of disorder is generated by a small number of people and places—one drunk or one vacant lot, one uncontrolled bar or one guy shouting on the street, can ruin the whole experience for everyone else. Identifying these problem places and people, and remediating them—not exclusively through the criminal justice system—can bring disorder under control.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An updated meta-analysis of 56 studies of disorder policing found that such policing consistently reduces crime, though some approaches work better than others.
  2. The meta-analysis authors found that aggressive order maintenance strategies involving indiscriminate arrests did not significantly reduce crime, while problem-oriented strategies targeting specific sources of disorder often had sizable effects without spillovers.
  3. A large share of disorder is generated by a small number of people and places, so identifying and remediating those problem places and people—not exclusively through the criminal justice system—can bring disorder under control.

Related Articles:

  • The Collapse of Broken-Windows Policing in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, 2013–22 — Arrests for minor "broken-windows" offenses—counted as misdemeanors, violations, and infractions per 100,000 residents—fell 74% in New York, 77% in Washington, DC, and 81% in Los Angeles over the period studied, declining steadily in New York and Los Angeles.
  • Changes in Self-Reported Cannabis Use in the United States From 1979 to 2022 — US survey data show per capita reports of past-year cannabis use rose 120% and reported days of use rose 218% over a recent 14-year span, with a 15-fold increase in daily or near-daily use reported over three decades. Daily or near-daily cannabis users now outnumber comparable alcohol users (17.7m vs 14.7m), though far more people drink.
  • Criminal Victimization, 2023 — The U.S. rate of violent victimization — including rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault — was 22.5 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older, statistically unchanged from the prior year and from five years earlier. The rate declined over the prior three decades from 79.8 per 1,000.

AI Summary. An election forecasting model shows Harris leading national polls by 3 points, with weaker polling in Arizona discounted because that state is relatively unlikely to be the tipping-point state. The model identifies Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin as her most direct path, with North Carolina and Georgia as alternatives.

Nate Silver and Eli McKown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

The latest @NateSilver538 update shows Harris leading in the national popular vote by 3pp. His model shows a 58.1% probability of Harris winning the electoral college – still a toss-up, but he notes “you’d probably rather have Harris’s hand to play.”

Which states matter most to the leading candidate's path to victory?

Core argument: National polls in the Silver Bulletin forecast show Kamala Harris's lead expanding to an even 3 points, and the model read the new polling as mostly favorable to Harris.

A lot of polling since our last update, and the model mostly liked it for Harris — especially the national polls, which show her lead expanding to an even 3 points. There were exceptions, notably in Arizona, though the model somewhat shrugs Arizona polling off since it’s relatively unlikely to be the tipping-point state, making it among the less critical swing states. Instead, Plan A for Harris runs through Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin — and Plan B involves North Carolina, Georgia or both.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. National polls in the Silver Bulletin forecast show Kamala Harris's lead expanding to an even 3 points, and the model read the new polling as mostly favorable to Harris.
  2. Arizona polling ran against Harris, but the Silver Bulletin model discounts it because Arizona is relatively unlikely to be the tipping-point state, placing it among the less critical swing states.
  3. Harris's Plan A to win runs through Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, with Plan B involving North Carolina, Georgia or both, according to the Silver Bulletin forecast.

Related Articles: