Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, September 23, 2024

AI Summary. In the U.S., the number of workers per firm is stable or rises with output per worker over time and across states, and the number of firms tracks total employment more closely than productivity. The authors argue this implies the cost of creating a new firm rises with productivity, so productivity-enhancing policies would not induce new firm entry.

Peter Klenow and Huiyu Li National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

.@PeteKlenow and Huiyu Li argue that rising labor productivity raises the entry costs for new firms through higher wages and start-up costs, limiting the impact of productivity-enhancing policies on welfare.

Do rising productivity levels raise the cost of starting new firms?

Core argument: U.S. data from 1978 to 2020 show the number of workers per firm is stable or rises with output per worker over time and across states, while the number of firms tracks total employment more closely than output per worker.

In the U.S., the number of workers per firm is stable or rises with output per worker over time and across states. This fact can be explained by a model in which entry costs rise with labor productivity. Over time and across states in the U.S., the number of firms is more closely tied to overall employment than to output per worker. In many models of firm dynamics, trade, and growth with a free entry condition, these facts imply that the costs of creating a new firm increase sharply with productivity growth. How entry costs vary with growth matters for welfare. For example, our findings suggest that productivity-enhancing policies will not induce entry of firms, thereby limiting the total impact of such policies on welfare. Figure 1 displays the result of regressing log number of firms on log employment and log employment per firm on log GDP per worker, respectively, over time. The data is yearly from 1978 to 2020. Both bilateral relationships are strongly positive both economically and statistically. These results are consistent with entry costs being more labor intensive than goods intensive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. data from 1978 to 2020 show the number of workers per firm is stable or rises with output per worker over time and across states, while the number of firms tracks total employment more closely than output per worker.
  2. In models of firm dynamics, trade, and growth featuring a free entry condition, these patterns imply that the cost of creating a new firm increases sharply with productivity growth, consistent with entry costs being more labor intensive than goods intensive.
  3. Because entry costs rise with labor productivity, productivity-enhancing policies would not induce firm entry, limiting the total welfare impact of such policies.

Related Articles:

  • Trends in U.S. Business Dynamism and the Innovation Landscape — U.S. patent ownership has grown more concentrated over recent decades, a pattern that can affect how innovation spreads, alongside a rise in patent litigation. Annual litigation cases per 100 granted patents rose from about 1.2 in the early 1990s to roughly 1.5 in 1995–2010 and above 1.8 in 2010–2015.
  • Big Firms Have Different Incentives — Inventors who move to incumbent large firms and those who move to young small firms show indistinguishable patenting and earnings paths beforehand, then diverge afterward. The authors suggest large firms pay inventors more but assign them projects less likely to yield patents, including innovations less likely to threaten existing product lines.

AI Summary. The US accounts for 63% of global stock market value but only 26% of global economic output, compared with about 40% of global GDP when its market share last exceeded 60%. The authors argue investors following global indexes are overpaying for US-generated income relative to that earlier period.

Brian Chingono Verdad
Date Posted:

.@verdadcap_quant notes that today’s 63% equity allocation to the US is the highest since the “Nifty Fifty” era in the 1960s and early 1970s when the US economy made up 40% of global GDP vs. 26% today. They argue for a more balanced geographic allocation.

Are investors overpaying for the US share of global output?

Core argument: The US accounts for 63% of global equity market capitalization, near a six-decade high, while its share of global GDP sits near a six-decade low at 26%.

When the United States last exceeded 60% of global market capitalization in the 1960s, the US economy accounted for 40% of global GDP. Today, the US is similarly overrepresented in global market capitalization, but it only accounts for 26% of global GDP. Since equity ownership represents a share in economic activity, there appears to be a disconnect between the United States’ share of global market cap sitting near a six-decade high at 63%, while its share of global economic output is near a six-decade low at 26%. In our opinion, index followers who assign 63% of market value to 26% of economic output must be willing to overpay for income that’s generated in the United States. And today’s overpayment is arguably more extreme than the 1960s, when America’s share of global economic output was 18 percentage points higher at 38% on average.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US accounts for 63% of global equity market capitalization, near a six-decade high, while its share of global GDP sits near a six-decade low at 26%.
  2. When the US last exceeded 60% of global market capitalization in the 1960s, it accounted for 40% of global GDP, and its share of global output averaged 38%, 18 percentage points above today's 26%.
  3. Index followers who assign 63% of market value to 26% of global economic output must be willing to overpay for income generated in the United States, an overpayment arguably more extreme than in the 1960s.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • The Seven Samurai: Big Tech to the Rescue! — The seven largest US technology companies — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta, and Tesla — added $5.1tn in combined market value in a single year, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in the entire US equity market's capitalization. US equities returned 23.25% including them and 12.6% without them.

AI Summary. Constellation Energy will spend about $1.6bn to restart the undamaged reactor at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island nuclear plant, which closed in 2019, and has signed a 20-year agreement to sell the power to Microsoft. The deal reflects the scale of round-the-clock carbon-free electricity sought for artificial intelligence data centers.

Jennifer Hiller Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Microsoft has signed a deal with Constellation Energy to purchase 100% of the electricity from a revived Three Mile Island; Constellation will spend $1.6B to restart the plant.

Is AI demand bringing shuttered nuclear reactors back online?

Core argument: Constellation Energy expects to spend about $1.6 billion to restart Three Mile Island's undamaged reactor by early 2028, selling the power to Microsoft under a 20-year power-purchase agreement.

A deal between Constellation Energy and Microsoft will restart Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island to help power the tech giant’s growing artificial intelligence ambitions. Under the agreement, Constellation would revive the plant’s undamaged reactor, which was too costly to run and closed in 2019, and sell the power to Microsoft. The plan signals the gargantuan amount of power needed for data centers for AI, along with the tech industry’s thirst for a carbon-free, round-the-clock electricity source needed to meet climate goals. Constellation expects to spend around $1.6 billion to restart the reactor by early 2028. Microsoft has signed a 20-year power-purchase agreement with Constellation, the companies said Friday. The deal would help Microsoft pair its 24-7 electricity use with a matching source of nearby clean power generation. This is the second U.S. attempt to revive a closed nuclear reactor. The federal government and the state of Michigan are spending nearly $2 billion to restart the Palisades nuclear reactor on the shores of Lake Michigan. That plant was mothballed in 2022, with reopening targeted for October 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Constellation Energy expects to spend about $1.6 billion to restart Three Mile Island's undamaged reactor by early 2028, selling the power to Microsoft under a 20-year power-purchase agreement.
  2. Three Mile Island's reactor closed in 2019 because it was too costly to run, and its revival would help Microsoft pair its 24-7 electricity use with a matching source of nearby clean power generation.
  3. The Three Mile Island restart is the second U.S. attempt to revive a closed nuclear reactor, after the federal government and Michigan committed nearly $2 billion to reopen the Palisades reactor, mothballed in 2022, by October 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Nuclear Power Is Hard. A Climate-Minded Billionaire Wants to Make It Easier — Start-up TerraPower has begun building a sodium-cooled nuclear reactor designed to be smaller and cheaper than conventional water-cooled plants, with completion expected no earlier than 2030 and the design not yet approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The company says the reactors should ultimately generate electricity at half the cost of traditional nuclear plants.
  • Plant Vogtle Unit 4 Begins Commercial Operation — The 1,114-megawatt Unit 4 reactor at Georgia's Plant Vogtle entered commercial operation, completing an 11-year expansion that brings the plant's capacity to nearly 5 gigawatts and makes it the largest US nuclear plant. No nuclear reactors are currently under construction in the United States, where nuclear supplies about 19% of electricity.
  • Electravision — The fossil fuel share of global primary energy is falling about 0.40% per year, matching the pace of decarbonization during the 1973–1988 nuclear buildout, though total carbon dioxide emissions have not declined because energy consumption keeps rising. Renewable energy is used almost exclusively for the electricity grid, with little penetration in industry and transport.

AI Summary. The U.S. rate of violent victimization — including rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault — was 22.5 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older, statistically unchanged from the prior year and from five years earlier. The rate declined over the prior three decades from 79.8 per 1,000.

Susannah Tapp and Emilie Coen U.S. Department of Justice
Date Posted:

The 2023 National Crime Victimization Survey shows that the rate of violent victimization, including sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault, is 7% above 2019 levels; excluding simple assault, the violent crime rate is up 19%.

Has violent victimization in the United States declined over recent decades?

Core argument: The U.S. rate of violent victimization was 22.5 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2023, similar to the 2022 rate and not statistically different from the 2019 rate.

In 2023, the rate of violent victimization in the United States was 22.5 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older, which was similar to the 2022 rate. Violent victimization includes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. The last three decades saw an overall decline in the rate of violent victimization, from 1993 (79.8 per 1,000) to 2023. While the 2023 rate was higher than those in 2020 and 2021, it was not statistically different from 5 years ago, in 2019.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. rate of violent victimization was 22.5 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2023, similar to the 2022 rate and not statistically different from the 2019 rate.
  2. Violent victimization in the U.S. declined overall across three decades, from 79.8 per 1,000 in 1993 to 22.5 per 1,000 in 2023.
  3. The 2023 U.S. violent victimization rate was higher than the rates in 2020 and 2021, with violent victimization covering rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Polling in three Sun Belt battleground states shows Trump leading Harris: 50% to 45% in Arizona, 49% to 47% in North Carolina, and 49% to 45% in Georgia, with margins of error of four to five percentage points. All three states were decided by margins under 75,000 votes in the 2020 presidential election.

Adam Nagourney, Ruth Igielnik, and Camille Baker New York Times
Date Posted:

New York Times/Siena finds Trump leading Harris by 2pp in NC, 4pp in GA, and 5pp in Arizona.

Is the Republican candidate leading in Sun Belt battleground states?

Core argument: Trump leads Harris 50% to 45% in Arizona, a state Biden carried by just over 10,400 votes in 2020, according to the poll.

Arizona, which Mr. Biden won by just over 10,400 votes in 2020, now presents a challenge for the Harris campaign. Mr. Trump is ahead, 50% to 45%, the poll found. In North Carolina, which Mr. Trump won by under 75,000 votes in 2020, the former president has a slim lead over Ms. Harris, drawing 49% of the vote compared with 47% for Ms. Harris. In Georgia, a state that Mr. Biden won by just under 11,800 votes in 2020, Mr. Trump continues to have a slight lead over Ms. Harris, 49% to 45%. The margin of error in each state is between four and five percentage points.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Trump leads Harris 50% to 45% in Arizona, a state Biden carried by just over 10,400 votes in 2020, according to the poll.
  2. In Georgia, which Biden won by just under 11,800 votes in 2020, Trump holds a 49% to 45% lead over Harris in the poll.
  3. Trump leads Harris 49% to 47% in North Carolina, which he won by under 75,000 votes in 2020, with the margin of error in each state between four and five percentage points.

Related Articles:

Tuesday, September 24, 2024

AI Summary. A nationally representative U.S. survey found 39% of people aged 18-64 used generative AI, with more than 24% of workers using it in the prior week and nearly one in nine using it every workday. The authors estimate 0.5-3.5% of U.S. work hours are currently assisted by generative AI.

Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin and David Deming National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

.@ProfDavidDeming and team found that 39% of the US population aged 18-64 used generative AI in August, faster adoption than either the PC or the internet. However, only 0.5-3.5% of US work hours are currently assisted by AI.

How widely have Americans adopted generative AI at work and home?

Core argument: In August 2024, 39% of the U.S. population aged 18–64 used generative AI, according to the first nationally representative U.S. survey of generative AI adoption at work and at home.

This paper reports results from the first nationally representative U.S. survey of generative AI adoption at work and at home. We mention examples of some popular generative AI products because we thought some respondents may be more familiar with those product names than with the broader concept of generative AI. In August 2024, 39% of the U.S. population aged 18-64 used generative AI. More than 24% of workers used it at least once in the week prior to being surveyed, and nearly one in nine used it every workday. Figure 4 compares the speed of adoption of generative AI with two other technologies: PCs and the internet. We estimate that between 0.5 and 3.5% of all work hours in the U.S. are currently assisted by generative AI. Assuming that the productivity gains from recent experimental studies are externally valid, this suggests that generative AI could plausibly increase labor productivity by between 0.125 and 0.875 percentage points at current levels of usage, although we caution that this calculation should be considered highly speculative given the assumptions it requires.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In August 2024, 39% of the U.S. population aged 18–64 used generative AI, according to the first nationally representative U.S. survey of generative AI adoption at work and at home.
  2. More than 24% of U.S. workers used generative AI at least once in the week before being surveyed, and nearly one in nine used it every workday.
  3. The authors estimate that 0.5–3.5% of all U.S. work hours are assisted by generative AI, which they calculate could plausibly raise labor productivity by 0.125–0.875 percentage points if experimental productivity gains are externally valid, a figure they call highly speculative.

Related Articles:

  • An Update from Our CIOs: How Durable Is the Economy? — Central banks will likely struggle to deliver the stimulus already priced into rate markets, and the cost of capital must rise enough to offset structurally higher government borrowing and durable private demand. Artificial intelligence spending is inflationary near-term while building capacity, but its deflationary potential is massive and could arrive fast.
  • Navigating the Future of Work — Demographic groups whose work has been more displaced by automation have seen slower real wage growth, and automation is estimated to account for about 70% of between-group wage inequality in the US since 1980. Establishments adopting artificial intelligence have slowed hiring of non-AI workers by more than they have added AI specialists.
  • Generative AI at Work — A study of 5,179 customer support agents finds that access to a generative AI conversational assistant raised issues resolved per hour by 14% on average, with the largest gains for novice and low-skilled workers and minimal effect on experienced, highly skilled ones. The authors also find AI assistance improved customer sentiment, reduced requests for managerial intervention, and improved employee retention.

AI Summary. As artificial intelligence and robots make wages less responsive to employment conditions, the link between tight labor markets and inflation weakens, undermining central banks' inflation-targeting frameworks. The author argues central banks would then need far larger interest-rate moves to achieve the same effect, producing more volatile and less predictable outcomes.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
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.@pkedrosky argues that the historical relationship between labor markets and wages is being severed by automation. “Our economic frameworks are increasingly misaligned with the realities of an automated economy.”

Does automation weaken the link between tight labor markets and inflation?

Core argument: Robots and AI break the link between wage pressures and inflation, leaving wages less responsive to employment changes and tight labor markets generating weaker inflationary pressure.

As wages in an increasingly AI-economy become less responsive to employment changes, the inflationary pressures that would traditionally result from tight labor markets decline. This is largely due to how robots and AIs break the link between wage pressures and inflation. As such, central banks relying on inflation-targeting regimes that depend on this relationship are facing a growing challenge. The effectiveness of monetary policy in such a scenario is questionable, as central banks may find that traditional tools, such as interest rate adjustments, have less impact on inflation and wage dynamics. The implications are immense. Monetary authorities may be forced to implement much larger-than-usual adjustments in interest rates to achieve the desired economic outcomes. To get the same effect as a smaller rate change once did, central banks will need to raise or lower rates far more aggressively. This will lead to more volatile economic conditions, and even less reliable outcomes, as the traditional metrics for evaluating monetary policy’s effectiveness become less reliable.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Robots and AI break the link between wage pressures and inflation, leaving wages less responsive to employment changes and tight labor markets generating weaker inflationary pressure.
  2. Central banks using inflation-targeting regimes that depend on the wage–inflation relationship face a growing challenge, as interest rate adjustments may exert less impact on inflation and wage dynamics.
  3. Monetary authorities may need far more aggressive rate increases or cuts to achieve what smaller changes once did, producing more volatile economic conditions and less reliable outcomes.

Related Articles:

  • Assessing the Implications of a Productivity Miracle — If artificial intelligence can perform economically valuable cognitive tasks at very low marginal cost, consumers would buy far more of the cheapened goods and spend the savings in other categories, expanding activity and employment in sectors facing new demand. Where supply is inherently limited, such as real estate, those savings could bid up prices and produce inflation.
  • The AI Transition One Year Later: On Track, but Macro Impact Still Several Years Off — Investment in AI hardware is projected to rise substantially as a precursor to integrating AI into business processes, with the investment cycle estimated to peak at 2–2½% of GDP and early signs visible among AI-enabling companies. The authors estimate generative AI could raise developed-market labor productivity growth by 1.5pp annually over a 10-year adoption period, roughly 15% cumulatively.
  • Erik Brynjolfsson: ‘This Could Be The Best Decade in History — Or The Worst’ — Studies of large language models across tasks including software coding, consulting, and writing find double-digit productivity gains appearing within months, with less-skilled workers typically benefiting most. Given the large share of modern work these tools can augment, the author projects US productivity growth near 3% annually in the 2020s, roughly double the Congressional Budget Office's 1.4% projection.

AI Summary. Standard metrics indicate U.S. Treasury market liquidity improved to levels last seen before the start of the current monetary policy tightening cycle, with volatility also trending down. Bid-ask spreads widened during earlier market disruptions but narrowed quickly, while order book depth implies worse liquidity.

Michael Fleming Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:

The @NewYorkFed finds most measures of US Treasury liquidity – bid-ask spreads, order book depth, impact of trades on prices, and price volatility – indicate Treasuries have become more liquid in 2024, and are back at pre-tightening levels.

Has Treasury market liquidity improved to pre-tightening levels?

Core argument: Standard metrics indicate Treasury market liquidity improved in 2024 to levels last seen before the start of the current monetary policy tightening cycle, with volatility also trending down, consistent with the improved liquidity.

Standard metrics point to an improvement in Treasury market liquidity in 2024 to levels last seen before the start of the current monetary policy tightening cycle. Volatility has also trended down, consistent with the improved liquidity. While at least one market functioning metric has worsened in recent months, that measure is an indirect gauge of market liquidity and suggests a level of current functioning that is far better than at the peak seen during the global financial crisis (GFC). Bid-ask spreads widened during the COVID-related disruptions of March 2020, and again around the banking failures of March 2023, but narrowed quickly after both episodes. Order book depth, measured as the average quantity of securities available for sale or purchase at the best bid and offer prices, implies worse liquidity. Depth plunged in March 2020, recovered thereafter, and then declined again in the months around the start of the current policy rate tightening cycle in March 2022 and around the banking failures in March 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Standard metrics indicate Treasury market liquidity improved in 2024 to levels last seen before the start of the current monetary policy tightening cycle, with volatility also trending down, consistent with the improved liquidity.
  2. Treasury bid-ask spreads widened during the COVID-related disruptions of March 2020 and again around the March 2023 banking failures, but narrowed quickly after both episodes.
  3. Order book depth, the average quantity available at the best bid and offer prices, implies worse Treasury liquidity, having plunged in March 2020 and declined again around the March 2022 tightening start and the March 2023 banking failures.

Related Articles:

  • Weaker Demand for Treasuries — Recent 10-year and 30-year US Treasury auctions each cleared three basis points above the yields trading minutes beforehand, signaling demand significantly weaker than the market expected. Larger and more frequent such gaps since the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates make auction metrics an early indicator of weakening Treasury demand.
  • Government Debt in Mature Economies. Safe or Risky? — When governments insulate taxpayers rather than bondholders from unfunded spending shocks, government bond yields rise as debt is marked to market, shifting the risk to bondholders — a "risky debt" regime the authors argue better fits recent experience. In that regime, large-scale central bank asset purchases give government bonds temporary price support at a net loss to taxpayers.
  • Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market — The authors argue that large, persistent US federal deficits and limited dealer balance-sheet flexibility will cause outstanding Treasury debt to grow rapidly relative to the market's capacity to intermediate trades, absent significant changes in market structure. They contend broad central clearing, all-to-all trading, real-time post-trade reporting, capital-regulation changes, and transparent official purchase programs could strengthen market capacity and resilience.

AI Summary. Europe's demographics track Japan's with roughly a 20-year lag, with its working-age population set to begin declining this decade, while higher migration keeps the U.S. notably younger. Like Japan, Europe has seen rising labor force participation and unemployment at a record low of 6.4%, contributing to accelerating wage growth.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
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.@FedGuy12 argues that the rise in wages as Japan’s workforce shrinks suggests that aging demographics are likely to be inflationary. Unless offset by automation, this will also put upward pressure on interest rates as the BOJ confronts inflation.

Is Europe following Japan's path toward labor scarcity and faster wages?

Core argument: Europe's unemployment rate stands at a record low of 6.4% alongside rising labor force participation, factors that have contributed to accelerating wage growth in recent years.

The demographics of Europe closely follow those of Japan while that of the U.S. is notably younger due to higher migration. Europe is around 20 years behind Japan in its demographics, with the decline in [the] working age population set to begin this decade. Similar to Japan, Europe is also seeing a rising labor force participation and a declining unemployment rate that is currently at record lows of 6.4%. These factors have contributed to accelerating wage growth in recent years. The Japanese experience suggests these trends will continue as the labor scarcity intensifies. The U.S. has been historically more open to migration than Japan or Europe. Note that many of the U.S. migrants are illegal with less than a high school education, suggesting low productivity and a weaker disinflationary impact.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Europe's unemployment rate stands at a record low of 6.4% alongside rising labor force participation, factors that have contributed to accelerating wage growth in recent years.
  2. Europe's demographics trail Japan's by roughly 20 years, with a decline in the working age population set to begin this decade, and the Japanese experience suggests these trends continue as labor scarcity intensifies.
  3. The U.S. population is notably younger than Europe's or Japan's due to higher migration, though many U.S. migrants are illegal with less than a high school education, suggesting low productivity and a weaker disinflationary impact.

Related Articles:

  • Japanese Workers Secure Biggest Pay Rise In Three Decades — Japanese companies including Honda, Nippon Steel, and ANA Holdings granted workers their largest pay rise in more than three decades, with economists expecting large firms to give unionised workers average increases above 4%, up from 3.6% the prior year. The increases strengthen the case for the Bank of Japan to begin raising interest rates.
  • Unions’ Inflation Warning? — The share of people aged 16 and over working or looking for work fell when the pandemic hit and has only partly recovered, with population aging accounting for most of the remaining shortfall. That implies economic activity must run at a lower level to avoid persistent wage and price inflation.
  • Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls — The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.

AI Summary. A survey of more than 5,000 Americans by the Survey Center on American Life found that nearly 40% of Gen Z women call themselves religiously unaffiliated versus 34% of men, reversing the pattern in every other age group, where men are more likely to be unaffiliated.

Ruth Graham New York Times
Date Posted:

Within Gen Z (18-29) 40% of women are religiously unaffiliated relative to 34% of men, making them the only cohort in which men are more religious than women.

Are young women now less religious than young men?

Core argument: Nearly 40% of Gen Z women describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated versus 34% of Gen Z men, according to a Survey Center on American Life survey of more than 5,000 Americans; in every other age group, men were more likely to be unaffiliated.

Church membership has been dropping in the United States for years. But within Gen Z, almost 40% of women now describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated, compared with 34% of men, according to a survey last year of more than 5,000 Americans by the Survey Center on American Life at the American Enterprise Institute. In every other age group, men were more likely to be unaffiliated. That tracks with research that has shown that women have been consistently more religious than men, a finding so reliable that some scholars have characterized it as something like a universal human truth. About two-thirds of women ages 18 to 29 say that “most churches and religious congregations” do not treat men and women equally, the Survey Center on American Life found.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly 40% of Gen Z women describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated versus 34% of Gen Z men, according to a Survey Center on American Life survey of more than 5,000 Americans; in every other age group, men were more likely to be unaffiliated.
  2. Research has shown women to be consistently more religious than men, a finding so reliable that some scholars have characterized it as something like a universal human truth.
  3. About two-thirds of women ages 18 to 29 say "most churches and religious congregations" do not treat men and women equally, the Survey Center on American Life found.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. China's unemployment rate for 16-24 year olds, excluding students, rose to 18.8% from 17.1% the prior month, the highest since the country reintroduced the revised data series. The jobless rate for 25-29 year olds, excluding college students, also rose, to 6.9% from 6.5%.

Sylvia Ma South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

Youth unemployment (16-24) in China hit 18.8% in August, a record high under the new data methodology that excludes students. A previous approach that included students was suspended after hitting 21.3% in June 2023.

Is China's youth unemployment rate climbing to record highs?

Core argument: China's jobless rate for the 16–24 age group excluding students rose to 18.8% in August from 17.1% in July, the highest since the revised data set was reintroduced, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

China’s revised youth unemployment rate rose to the highest level since the data set was reintroduced last year. The jobless rate for the 16-24 age group, excluding students, rose to 18.8% in August, the National Bureau of Statistics said on Friday, up from 17.1% in July. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate for the 25-29 age group, excluding college students, also rose to 6.9% in August from 6.5% a month earlier. Beijing introduced the revised method for December having suspended the release of youth unemployment data from July last year. Under the previous approach, the jobless rate for the 16-24 age group, including students, had peaked at 21.3% in June last year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's jobless rate for the 16–24 age group excluding students rose to 18.8% in August from 17.1% in July, the highest since the revised data set was reintroduced, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
  2. The unemployment rate for China's 25–29 age group, excluding college students, rose to 6.9% in August from 6.5% in July, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
  3. Beijing suspended youth unemployment releases from July last year and introduced a revised method in December, after the prior measure including students peaked at 21.3% in June last year.

Related Articles:

  • Why Has Youth Unemployment Risen So Much in China? — Young workers aged 15-24 are particularly vulnerable when economic growth slows, and China's youth unemployment rate does not appear to be an outlier relative to its income level among global peers. Mismatches between the skills graduates acquire in higher education and those employers demand may add to labor market frictions.
  • Xi Jinping Calls for Quality Jobs for Youth Instead of ‘Bitterness’ — China's leadership has ordered that providing "high-quality full employment" be an economic priority, with youth unemployment running at nearly three times the overall rate. Unemployment among 16-24 year-olds, excluding students, stood at 14.7% against an urban unemployment rate of 5%.
  • China’s Defeated Youth — Urban Chinese unemployment among those aged 16 to 24 has run above 20%, about double the pre-pandemic level for that age group, with over 70% of unemployed youth in one year calculated to be graduates. Sentiment analysis of social media indicates the mood of young Chinese is growing darker.