Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, September 12, 2024

AI Summary. The American Community Survey counted 1.7m foreign-born U.S. residents who had been abroad a year earlier, a figure historically correlated (0.91) with the Census Bureau's final revised immigration estimate. The author estimates this implies a revision to over 1.4m, above the original Census estimate of 1.1m but far below the Congressional Budget Office's 3.3m.

Jed Kolko Slow Boring
Date Posted:

.@JedKolko notes that immigration data from the latest Census Bureau survey does not resolve the discrepancy between the Census and CBO numbers on the 2023 immigration spike: Census estimates 1.1mm, while CBO estimates 3.3mm.

Do new survey data narrow the gap between competing immigration estimates?

Core argument: The 2023 American Community Survey reported 1.7m foreign-born residents who were abroad one year earlier, the key input into the Census Bureau's immigration estimate.

The 2023 [Census Bureau’s American Community Survey] reported 1.7m foreign-born residents who were abroad one year ago, which is the key input into the Census immigration estimate. That key input has been highly correlated with the final revision of the Census immigration estimate since 2010 (the correlation is .91). If this strong prior relationship holds, I estimate that the new ACS figure of 1.7m foreign-born, abroad one year ago, implies that the Census population estimate for 2023 will be revised to over 1.4m. That’s 300,000 more than the original Census 2023 immigration estimate of 1.1mm published in December 2023, but still way below the CBO’s 2023 estimate of 3.3mm.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 2023 American Community Survey reported 1.7m foreign-born residents who were abroad one year earlier, the key input into the Census Bureau's immigration estimate.
  2. That ACS input has correlated at .91 with the final revision of the Census immigration estimate since 2010, and if that relationship holds, the 1.7m figure implies a 2023 revision to over 1.4m.
  3. A revised figure above 1.4m would exceed the original Census 2023 immigration estimate of 1.1m published in December 2023 by 300,000, while remaining far below the CBO's 2023 estimate of 3.3m.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2024 to 2054 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population will grow from 342mm in 2024 to 383mm in 2054, an average 0.4% a year — less than half the 0.9% pace of the prior five decades. Immigration accounts for about 70% of growth over the next decade and for all population growth beginning in 2040.
  • The Strong Labor Market Has Boosted US-Born Employment — The authors estimate that the cumulative increase in the U.S.-born population since 2010 was about 1.4m larger, and the foreign-born increase 1.7m larger, than official survey data show. Published data show a decline in the U.S.-born population over a recent one-year span, while the authors estimate an increase of 1.5m.
  • How Immigration Remade the U.S. Labor Force — The Congressional Budget Office estimates more than 9m people have migrated on net to the U.S. in recent years, nearly matching the prior decade's total and lifting population growth to almost 1.2% a year. Fewer than 30% are lawful permanent residents; without immigration, growth would be 0.2%.

AI Summary. The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of its gross domestic product through transfers and taxes, a larger share than any developed country except France at 30.1%. Counting transfers as income and taxes as income lost and adjusting for household size, average households in the bottom, second, and middle income fifths have roughly equal incomes despite large differences in work effort.

Phil Gramm and Jodey Arrington Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Phil Gramm notes that after transfers and taxes “the average household in the bottom, second, and middle quintiles all have roughly the same incomes—despite dramatic differences in work effort.” He argues rising transfers have driven declining LFP.

How much income does the U.S. redistribute through transfers and taxes?

Core argument: The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of GDP through transfers and taxes, more than any developed country except France at 30.1%.

The U.S. today redistributes a larger share of its gross domestic product, 29.4%, through transfers and taxes than any developed country in the world except France with 30.1%. After counting all transfer payments as income to the recipients and taxes as income lost by taxpayers, and adjusting for household size, the average households in the bottom, second, and middle quintiles all have roughly the same incomes—despite dramatic differences in work effort. With the explosion of means-tested transfer payments, the portion of prime work-age persons in the bottom quintile who actually work has fallen to 36% from 68%. In the second quintile, households with a work-age adult who actually works have declined to 85% from 90%. While work effort fell in the bottom two quintiles, the percentage of middle-income households with a prime work-age person who works has risen to 92% from 86%. The injustice of this government-created income equality is palpable. For about the same income, 2.4 times as many work-age persons in the second quintile actually work and on average work 85% more hours than those in the bottom quintile. And 2.5 times as many work-age middle-income persons actually work and work on average 108% more hours.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of GDP through transfers and taxes, more than any developed country except France at 30.1%.
  2. After counting transfers as recipient income and taxes as income lost by taxpayers, and adjusting for household size, average households in the bottom, second, and middle quintiles have roughly the same incomes despite dramatic differences in work effort.
  3. The share of prime work-age persons in the bottom quintile who work has fallen to 36% from 68%, while the middle-income share rose to 92% from 86%, with middle-income persons working on average 108% more hours.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Chronic absenteeism—students missing 10% or more of the school year—rose from 15% of K–12 students before the pandemic to 28%, then eased to 26% in the first full post-pandemic school year. Data from eight states show continued declines, including New Mexico's drop from 40% to 33%, but rates remain well above pre-pandemic levels.

Nat Malkus American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

The number of students missing 10% or more of the school year doubled from 15% in 2019 to 28% in 2022 and 26% in 2023. Early reports for 2024 show signs of improvements but @natmalkus argues “chronic absenteeism is still a major problem.”

Has student chronic absenteeism returned to pre-pandemic levels?

Core argument: Chronic absenteeism—students missing 10% or more of the school year—nearly doubled from 15% of K–12 students in 2019 to 28% in 2022, and fell only to 26% during 2022–23, the first full post-pandemic school year.

Chronic absenteeism, the percentage of students missing 10% or more of the school year, nearly doubled during the pandemic, surging from 15% of K–12 students in 2019 to 28% in 2022. During the 2022–23 school year, the first full post-pandemic year, that rate fell, but only to 26%. I recently managed to get 2023–24 data for eight states, and it seems to be a glass half full glass half empty situation. On the one hand, states are making progress. On the other hand, states are making less progress than I would like, and I worry that progress will come more slowly in future years. Of the states that have released data so far, New Mexico made the biggest strides last year, cutting its chronic absenteeism rate from 40% during the 2022–23 school year to 33% during the 2023–24 school year—a huge drop, but one that still leaves chronic absenteeism rates in the Land of Enchantment far higher than the national average two years earlier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chronic absenteeism—students missing 10% or more of the school year—nearly doubled from 15% of K–12 students in 2019 to 28% in 2022, and fell only to 26% during 2022–23, the first full post-pandemic school year.
  2. New Mexico cut its chronic absenteeism rate from 40% in 2022–23 to 33% in 2023–24, the largest improvement among the eight states that have released data, leaving it far above the earlier national average.

Related Articles:

  • Long COVID for Public Schools: Chronic Absenteeism Before and After the Pandemic — Nationwide chronic absenteeism — the share of students missing at least 10% of a school year — rose from 15% in 2018 to 28% in 2022, and although rates improved in 2023, they remained 75% above the pre-pandemic baseline. Chronic absenteeism is associated with lower standardized test scores, with the highest rates in lower-achieving, higher-poverty districts.
  • Students Are Making a ‘Surprising’ Rebound From Pandemic Closures. But Some May Never Catch Up — An analysis of standardized test data led by Stanford and Harvard researchers finds elementary and middle-school students have regained about a third of pandemic learning losses in math and a quarter in reading. Because poorer districts lost more ground initially, the typical poor district remains nearly half a grade level behind, versus about a fifth for rich districts.
  • What the Data Says About Pandemic School Closures, Four Years — Among school districts with similar poverty levels, remote learning was associated with greater declines in student achievement, and a district-level analysis found community poverty rates and the length of school closures had roughly equal effects on outcomes. For each week spent remote, students in poor districts experienced steeper math losses than peers in richer districts.

AI Summary. China's private sector difficulties reflect the country's economic slowdown, the withdrawal of most US-based investors amid bilateral tensions, and political decisions that have changed the environment for private business, including a crackdown on technology companies seen as monopolistic or misaligned with Communist Party values and a continuing anti-corruption campaign.

Eleanor Olcott and Wang Xueqiao Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

.@FT quotes data provider IT Juzi, “In 2018, at the height of VC investment, 51,302 start-ups were founded in China. By 2023, that figure had collapsed to 1,202 and is on track to be even lower this year.”

Why is China's private sector struggling?

Core argument: China's entrepreneurial sector crisis reflects the economic slowdown and the withdrawal of most US-based investors amid rising bilateral tensions, alongside political decisions by President Xi Jinping that have changed the environment for private business.

The crisis in the [entrepreneurial sector] partly reflects the slowdown in the Chinese economy. As bilateral tensions have risen, US-based investors have also largely pulled out. But it is also the direct result of political decisions taken by President Xi Jinping that have dramatically changed the environment for private business in China — including a crackdown on technology companies regarded as monopolistic or not attuned to Communist party values, and an anti-corruption crusade that continues to ripple through the business community. Desmond Shum, author of Red Roulette and a former real estate mogul, says the party “has throttled the private sector”. “Successful entrepreneurs . . . can expect to be closely monitored, unable to transfer money offshore and their transactions and public statements scrutinized,” he adds. “Their money is the country’s money.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's entrepreneurial sector crisis reflects the economic slowdown and the withdrawal of most US-based investors amid rising bilateral tensions, alongside political decisions by President Xi Jinping that have changed the environment for private business.
  2. Xi Jinping's crackdown on technology companies regarded as monopolistic or not attuned to Communist party values, together with an anti-corruption crusade, continues to ripple through China's business community.

Related Articles:

  • Communist Party Priorities Complicate Plans to Revive China’s Economy — China's leadership objects to Western-style consumption-driven growth, viewing it as wasteful and at odds with the goal of making China a world-leading industrial and technological power, according to people familiar with decision-making in Beijing. Chinese officials also emphasized avoiding a current-account deficit, which would signal greater dependence on the outside world.
  • 2023 Letter — Rising numbers of Chinese nationals are being apprehended at the US-Mexico border, with US officers encountering around 1,000 in one month early in the year and nearly 5,000 by November. Most Chinese emigrants leave through legal means, going primarily to Singapore, Japan, and Thailand.
  • Living Outside China Has Become More Like Living Inside China — About 10.5m people living outside China are or once were Chinese citizens, a diaspora exceeded only by India's, Russia's, and Mexico's. Chinese citizens received more than 70% of 81,000 American investor visas issued to dollar-millionaires over a decade, and 18% of China's nearly 900 dollar-billionaires now live abroad, up from 6%.

AI Summary. American firms with greater exposure to China have seen declines in research and development spending, patents, profitability, and employment, according to the analysis. US research and development spending, which slowed in the early 21st century, accelerated from 2018 through 2022, which the author reads as a tentative sign that reducing engagement with China has benefited American firms.

Derek Scissors American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

.@DerekScissors1 @AEIecon argues that Sino-American decoupling “is first about avoiding losses, rather than generating gains” but will increase US business productivity via investment by companies no longer discouraged by unfair Chinese competition.

Does reducing engagement with China benefit American firms?

Core argument: American firms with higher exposure to China have seen declines in R&D expenditure, patents, profitability, and employment, and the author argues these firms would hire and profit more if Beijing could less effectively target them.

For American firms with higher exposure to China, R&D expenditure, patents, profitability, and employment have all declined. If Beijing can less effectively target them for extinction, these firms will hire and profit more than otherwise. For innovation in particular, Beijing subsidizes less innovative firms under its control and tries to steal technology it cannot acquire from more innovative foreign firms. The PRC is an innovation parasite, and starving it to the extent possible will continually improve quality of life. It’s not only that American R&D spending slowed for an extended period in the early 21st century; there is even a hint of a reversal just as the US becomes more suspicious of its China engagement. The pace of R&D spending notably accelerated starting in 2018 and continuing through 2022 (the latest year for which data are available), right through COVID. This is certainly not definitive, but initial attempts to reverse the China embrace and thus assist most American firms seem to have paid off.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American firms with higher exposure to China have seen declines in R&D expenditure, patents, profitability, and employment, and the author argues these firms would hire and profit more if Beijing could less effectively target them.
  2. U.S. R&D spending growth accelerated starting in 2018 and continued through 2022, the latest year of available data, which the author reads as a hint, though not definitive, that initial efforts to reverse the China embrace paid off.
  3. Beijing subsidizes less innovative firms under its control and attempts to steal technology it cannot acquire from more innovative foreign firms, which the author characterizes as innovation parasitism that should be starved where possible.

Related Articles:

  • Business Spending Is Lining Up to Reinforce Growth — Around 70% of sectors are posting positive year-over-year profit growth, with big tech showing the largest acceleration in demand and profits but strength broadening across the economy. Companies are responding with rising capital spending growth and more optimistic investment plans, as firms typically add capacity with a slight lag after real demand picks up.
  • U.S. Business Investment in the Post-COVID Expansion — Business fixed investment has held at roughly the same share of U.S. GDP as before COVID, a better outcome than after every other recession since 1980, when investment typically fell as a share of GDP and contributed less well into the recovery. American businesses invested $430bn more than if investment had followed its usual historical pattern.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.

AI Summary. China's economy is bifurcated: domestic demand is stagnant amid a property bust and weak labor market, while real exports rose 14% over the past year. Its goods trade surplus already equals 0.8% of global GDP, and if trading partners close their borders to Chinese goods, policymakers will need to boost domestic demand to prevent slower growth and worsening deflation.

Jan Hatzius Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

Jan Hatzius argues that “China’s trading partners are unlikely to tolerate sustained further expansion in the goods trade surplus, which already stands at 0.8% of global GDP.” Trade restrictions may drive deflation in China.

Can China keep growing if trading partners close markets to its exports?

Core argument: China's real exports rose 14% over the past year, contrasting with lackluster manufacturing performance elsewhere, even as domestic demand remains stagnant amid the property bust and a weak labor market.

China remains a highly bifurcated economy. Domestic demand is stagnant, for all the well-known reasons including the property bust and a weak labor market. But real exports are up 14% over the past year, a pace that is all the more impressive when contrasted with the continued lackluster performance of manufacturing elsewhere. The looming issue is that China’s trading partners are unlikely to tolerate sustained further expansion in the goods trade surplus, which already stands at 0.8% of global GDP (one of the highest in world economic history). If they respond by increasingly closing their borders to Chinese-made goods, China’s policymakers will have to find ways of boosting domestic demand to keep growth from slowing ever further and deflation from worsening.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's real exports rose 14% over the past year, contrasting with lackluster manufacturing performance elsewhere, even as domestic demand remains stagnant amid the property bust and a weak labor market.
  2. China's goods trade surplus stands at 0.8% of global GDP, one of the highest in world economic history, and its trading partners are unlikely to tolerate sustained further expansion.
  3. If trading partners increasingly close their borders to Chinese-made goods, China's policymakers will have to find ways of boosting domestic demand to keep growth from slowing further and deflation from worsening.

Related Articles:

  • Why China Is Starting a New Trade War — Chinese policy advisers say China's leadership is guided by building a self-sufficient industrial supply chain that could withstand severe Western sanctions and by a philosophical objection to U.S.-style consumption as wasteful. That leaves exports as the main route to stabilizing a weakened economy and replacing jobs lost in domestic construction, shifting job losses to workers abroad.
  • Can China’s Export Machine Run Without the West? — China has shifted exports toward Southeast Asia and Latin America and away from the West, with shipments to Southeast Asia up 12% over two years while exports to the U.S. fell 17%. With a housing collapse weighing on domestic demand, Beijing has leaned on exports to drive growth.
  • The Dangerous Myth of Deglobalization — China's manufacturing surplus rose by about 1 percentage point of global GDP over a four-year span and is far larger than those of Germany and Japan. China's $800bn goods trade surplus depends on the large U.S. trade deficit, which is still indirectly financed by China through the large offshore dollar stockpiles held by Chinese exporters.

Friday, September 13, 2024

AI Summary. Earlier research using pairs of neighboring counties straddling state borders found no relationship between minimum wages and U.S. restaurant employment, but the authors show that result reverses when local economic areas are instead defined as multi-state commuting zones. Under that definition, they estimate an employment elasticity of −0.305 four years after a minimum wage change.

Priyaranjan Jha, David Neumark and Antonio Rodriguez-Lopez National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Comparing restaurants in different states within multi-state commuting zones, rather than contiguous county pairs, @NeumarkEcon and team find that a 10% increase in a state’s minimum wage leads to a 3% decrease in restaurant employment after four years.

Does defining local labor markets differently change minimum wage employment effects?

Core argument: Using multi-state commuting zones instead of contiguous county pairs, the authors estimate the cumulative effect of a minimum wage increase on U.S. restaurant employment reaches an elasticity of −0.305 after four years.

Using minimum wage variation within contiguous county pairs sharing a state border, [previous authors] find no relationship between minimum wages and employment in the U.S. restaurantindustry. Using the same research design, we show that this result is overturned if we use instead multi-state commuting zones, which provide superior definitions of local economic areas. Notice that although the cumulative effect of a minimum wage change on restaurant employment is stable around zero when using county pairs, the story is very different when using pairs from multi-state commuting zones. In the latter case, the cumulative effect is near zero two quarters before the minimum wage change, but then it gets into a solid negative trend, reaching a significant elasticity of −0.305 after four years.Therefore, a simple switch of the definition of local economic area—from pairs of contiguous counties sharing a state border, to multi-state commuting zones that are actually defined as local economic areas—dramatically overturns DLR’s finding of a near zero long-term effect of minimum wages on employment in the restaurant industry.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using multi-state commuting zones instead of contiguous county pairs, the authors estimate the cumulative effect of a minimum wage increase on U.S. restaurant employment reaches an elasticity of −0.305 after four years.
  2. The authors report that the estimated employment effect is near zero two quarters before a minimum wage change and then enters a negative trend when local economic areas are defined as multi-state commuting zones.
  3. The authors argue that switching the definition of local economic area from border-county pairs to multi-state commuting zones overturns prior findings of no relationship between minimum wages and restaurant employment, using the same cross-border research design.

Related Articles:

  • How Important are Minimum Wage Increases in Increasing the Wages of Minimum Wage Workers? — The authors find state minimum wage increases account for only a modest share of the wage gains realized by minimum wage workers, with improving macroeconomic conditions and movement across occupations and industries appearing more important. Wage increases are the norm among minimum wage workers even absent minimum wage hikes.
  • The U.S. Low-Wage Structure: A McWage Comparison — Using wage data from most U.S. McDonald's restaurants, the authors find that before the Covid-19 pandemic, differences in entry-level wages across states were strongly related to state minimum wages, with real wages rising only in the roughly half of states raising their minimums. The 2021 wage spike nearly eliminated those geographic differences and left the federal minimum wage near-irrelevant.
  • Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls — The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.

AI Summary. Using U.S. survey and census data, the authors find people are most selective on race in marriage markets, followed by education and age, and are more selective on the combination of income and skill than on either alone. They estimate that increased assortative matching accounts for about half of the rise in household income inequality between 1980 and 2020.

Anton Cheremukhin, Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria and Antonella Tutino Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

Comparing 1980 vs. 2020, Americans became less selective on race and more selective on income and skill in choosing a spouse. “Assortative mating” accounts for ~ 50% of the increase in household income inequality from 1980 to 2020. @paures12

How much of rising household income inequality comes from assortative matching?

Core argument: The authors estimate that the observed increase in assortativeness accounts for approximately half of the rise in U.S. household income inequality between 1980 and 2020.

We use the American Community Survey for the 2008-2021 period, and for longer term comparisons we employ data from the U.S. Census for the years 1960 and 1980. Using the yearly data for the 2008-2021 period allows us to study the effects of the proliferation of online dating. In terms of selection, we find that people are most selective on race followed by a large difference by education and age. Also, people are more selective on the interaction of income and skill than on the two characteristics individually. During the 2008-2021 period, both males and females became slightly more selective on age. When we include the results for 1960 and 1980, it’s clear that both males and females became less selective on race and more selective on income and skill. We find that the observed increase in assortativeness accounts for approximately half of the increase in household income inequality between 1980 and 2020.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that the observed increase in assortativeness accounts for approximately half of the rise in U.S. household income inequality between 1980 and 2020.
  2. Using American Community Survey data for 2008–2021, the authors find people are most selective on race, followed by a large difference by education and age, and more selective on the interaction of income and skill than on either characteristic individually.
  3. Comparing U.S. Census data for 1960 and 1980 with 2008–2021 figures, the authors find both males and females became less selective on race and more selective on income and skill, and slightly more selective on age during 2008–2021.

Related Articles:

  • The Marriage Paradox: Understanding And Remedying The Paradoxical Place Of Marriage In America — The U.S. marriage rate has fallen more than 60% since 1970, from 85.9 to 30.5 marriages per 1,000 unmarried Americans aged 15 and older, and the share of adults who are married has dropped from 72% to about 50%. Demographers project roughly one in three young adults may never marry.
  • Intermarriage in America Post-Loving v. Virginia — US interracial marriage rates showed no decline despite heightened public discourse about racial tension, a metric where increased racial tension would be expected to register. The author argues America's ethnoracial composition is more mixed than it has ever been, resembling a Latin American country more than a European one.
  • Online Daters Are Less Open-Minded Than Their Filters Suggest — Data from an online dating service covering 80,000 users across ten cities show women block 70% of potential matches versus 55% for men, largely by excluding shorter or younger users. Among both sexes, the 10% with the strictest filters like 11-13 percentage points fewer of their remaining candidates than the 10% with the broadest filters.

AI Summary. An election forecast model gives Donald Trump a 61% chance of winning the Electoral College even as Kamala Harris leads the national polling average by 2.1 points. The authors caution against reading much into the latest polls, since most come from online or automated-phone firms that typically show little movement.

Nate Silver and Eli McKown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

The latest @NateSilver538 model shows Harris leading nationally by 2.1pp and gives Trump a 61% chance of winning the electoral college, but he cautions that the traditional polling inputs to the model do not yet reflect Tuesday’s debate.

Can a national polling lead coexist with lower Electoral College odds?

Core argument: Kamala Harris leads Donald Trump by 2.1 points in the Silver Bulletin national polling average, while Trump holds a 61 percent chance of winning the Electoral College in the forecast.

We’ve gotten a few more post-debate polls since yesterday’s update, but not much has changed in our forecast. Kamala Harris leads by 2.1 points in our national polling average, but Donald Trump has a 61 percent chance to win the Electoral College. We’d still caution against reading too much into any of this data just yet. It takes several days to conduct a traditional poll and most of the post-debate data so far comes from online or IVR firms, which typically don’t show a lot of movement.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Kamala Harris leads Donald Trump by 2.1 points in the Silver Bulletin national polling average, while Trump holds a 61 percent chance of winning the Electoral College in the forecast.
  2. The Silver Bulletin forecast changed little after additional post-debate polls, and its authors caution against reading too much into the data so far.
  3. Most post-debate polling so far comes from online or IVR firms, which typically show little movement, while traditional polls take several days to conduct.

Related Articles:

  • Many Gen Z Men Feel Left Behind. Some See Trump As An Answer — National polling shows a gender gap of roughly 39 to 51 percentage points among voters under 30, with young men favoring the Republican candidate and young women favoring the Democrat. The Republican message resonates particularly with young men without college degrees and young men of color.
  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
  • An Unsettled Electorate: How Uncertainty and Apathy Are Shaping the 2024 Election — A survey of young registered voters finds 54% backing Biden and 46% backing Trump, with 60% of young women supporting Biden while 52% of young men support Trump. Young men are more likely than young women to say the country has gone too far in giving women equal rights, 19% versus 9%.

AI Summary. Listed American firms are on average larger and more profitable than European ones, and Europe's productivity lags America's while lacking world-beating corporate giants. The gap is most striking in technology, where American firms are twice as profitable and more than 10x the size.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

Compared to EU public companies, US public firms are larger and more profitable. “The difference is particularly striking among tech firms, which are twice as profitable and more than ten times the size in America.”

Are European firms smaller and less profitable than American ones?

Core argument: American tech firms are twice as profitable and more than ten times the size of their European counterparts, the widest gap in a broader pattern among listed companies.

Europe's productivity lags behind America’s, and it lacks world-beating corporate giants. Rising geopolitical tensions have made this problem more acute for European policymakers. They are right to worry. Listed American firms are, on average, bigger and more profitable than European ones. The difference is particularly striking among tech firms, which are twice as profitable and more than ten times the size in America.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American tech firms are twice as profitable and more than ten times the size of their European counterparts, the widest gap in a broader pattern among listed companies.
  2. Europe's productivity lags behind America's, and Europe lacks world-beating corporate giants, a shortfall that rising geopolitical tensions have made more acute for European policymakers.
  3. Listed American firms are, on average, bigger and more profitable than European ones, giving European policymakers grounds for concern.

Related Articles:

  • Europe Regulates Its Way to Last Place — Europe's regulators tend to act on the mere possibility of harm rather than evidence of it, an approach that can throttle innovation early. The McKinsey Global Institute found that among companies with over $1bn in revenue, U.S. firms spent 80% more on research and development, had 30% higher return on capital, and grew revenue 1.3 percentage points faster.
  • Europe Has Fallen Behind America and the Gap is Growing — The EU economy was somewhat larger than the US in 2008 ($16.2tn versus $14.7tn), but by 2022 the US had grown to $25tn while the EU and UK combined reached only $19.8tn. The dollar's status as the world's reserve currency allows the US to finance its ambitions without unsettling markets.
  • From Strength To Strength — The US produced $25.5tn in GDP, about 25% of the world total—roughly its 1990 share—while China's share stands at 18%; the US share of the G7's nominal GDP rose from 40% in 1990 to 58%. Income per person is now about 30% above western Europe and 54% above Japan, adjusted for purchasing power.

AI Summary. China will raise its retirement age for the first time since 1978, phasing in over 15 years a shift for men from 60 to 63 and for women from 50 to 55 for ordinary workers and 55 to 58 for managers. People 65 and older are projected to reach 30% of the population by around 2035, from 14.2%.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:

China is raising the retirement age from 60 to 63 for men, and from 50 to 55 for women in non-managerial positions, in an effort to enlarge the workforce and shore up pensions.

Is China raising its retirement age as its population ages?

Core argument: China will raise its retirement age for the first time since 1978, to 63 from 60 for men, to 55 from 50 for ordinary female workers, and to 58 from 55 for women in management positions, Xinhua reported.

China will raise the retirement age for the first time since 1978. Top lawmakers endorsed a plan to delay retirement for employees by as long as five years, Xinhua News Agency reported Friday. Men will retire at 63 instead of 60. Women will retire at 55 instead of 50 for ordinary workers, and 58 instead of 55 for those in management positions. The change will take place over 15 years starting January, and will allow more people to work longer. As China’s life expectancy has risen, delaying retirement has become more important to offset the demographic challenges from its decades-long enforcement of a one-child policy, which left a generation of single children supporting a large elderly population. Today, the average Chinese lives to 78 from 66 four decades ago. People aged 65 and older are expected to make up 30% of the population by around 2035 from 14.2% in 2021, according to a report by state broadcaster CCTV on Tuesday.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China will raise its retirement age for the first time since 1978, to 63 from 60 for men, to 55 from 50 for ordinary female workers, and to 58 from 55 for women in management positions, Xinhua reported.
  2. The retirement change will phase in over 15 years starting in January, delaying retirement for employees by as long as five years and allowing more people to work longer.
  3. Chinese life expectancy has risen to 78 from 66 four decades ago, and people aged 65 and older are expected to make up 30% of the population by around 2035 from 14.2% in 2021, according to CCTV.

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