Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, September 10, 2024

AI Summary. Using a high-frequency narrative approach around news about US 2021 deficits, the authors estimate an "inflation multiplier" of 0.18% price-level growth over two years for a deficit shock of 1% of GDP. They estimate this implies the 2021 deficits caused about 30% of the 2021–22 inflation.

Jonathon Hazell and Stephan Hobler Working Paper
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.@JADHazell and @sj_hobler review inflation swap market reactions to the results of ‘21 Georgia Senate run-offs which allowed Democrats to pass legislation on a party-line vote. They infer that the resultant stimulus caused ~30% of 2021-22 inflation.

How much of recent inflation did deficits cause?

Core argument: The authors estimate an "inflation multiplier" of 0.18% price-level growth over two years for a 1% deficit-to-GDP shock, implying the 2021 U.S. deficits caused around 30% of 2021–22 inflation.

This paper measures the causal effect of deficits on inflation using a “high frequency narrative approach”. We identify an event that released news about the 2021 deficits in the United States—the Georgia Senate election runoff. Figure 4 graphs the results for the single event study. The figure shows a jump in inflation expectations around the election, representing the causal effect of the Georgia shock. The outcome variable is the expected increase in the price level over two years, which is calculated from the two year inflation swap, deducting the first value on January 5th. From January 5th to January 7th—as news about the Georgia election is released—the inflation swap jumps upwards. The green line is the estimate of what would have happened to inflation expectations absent the Georgia election. The difference between the blue and green lines is the causal effect of the election on inflation expectations. Excluding data after 2PM on January 6th leads to a qualitatively similar but smaller estimate of 18 basis points. We estimate an “inflation multiplier” of 0.18% price level growth over two years, for a 1% deficit-to-GDP shock. Our estimate implies that the 2021 deficits caused around 30% of the 2021-22 inflation—meaning deficits were important but not the only cause.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate an "inflation multiplier" of 0.18% price-level growth over two years for a 1% deficit-to-GDP shock, implying the 2021 U.S. deficits caused around 30% of 2021–22 inflation.
  2. Using the Georgia Senate election runoff as a high-frequency narrative shock releasing news about 2021 U.S. deficits, the authors find two-year inflation expectations derived from inflation swaps jumped between January 5 and January 7.
  3. Excluding data after 2PM on January 6 yields a qualitatively similar but smaller estimate of 18 basis points, and the authors conclude deficits were important but not the only cause of the inflation.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Fiscal Narratives for US Inflation — Fiscal theory attributes the deflation of the deep recession to a fall in real interest rates that lowered real interest costs on government debt, an effect that outweighed large deficits. The predicted deflation spiral and the hyperinflation forecast from quantitative easing both failed to materialize.
  • Fiscal Arithmetic and the Global Inflation Outlook — Across advanced economies, core inflation is significantly positively associated with growth in government debt since the start of the pandemic, and the authors expect this decade's fiscal expansions to shift price levels permanently higher. They argue this differs from permanently higher inflation, projecting inflation to diminish as temporary deficits normalize, with medium-term inflation expectations still anchored near central bank targets.

AI Summary. Adjusting for time spent, tuition costs, and completion probability drastically reduces the estimated return on a master's degree, leaving master's programs with the lowest adjusted return among degree types. Averages mask wide variation: business master's degrees show a negative return on average, while top programs' graduates can earn millions more.

Mark Schneider American Enterprise Institute
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Mark Schneider @AEIecon reviews the ROI of master’s degree programs and finds “vast differences among fields of study and among programs in the same field of study.” He argues that policymakers need to provide accurate ROI metrics to applicants.

Do master's degrees pay off for students after accounting for costs?

Core argument: Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.

The absolute increase in lifetime earnings is the average gain in income between students completing the degree and the counterfactual earnings of similarly situated students without the degree. Incorporating the time spent getting a master’s degree, the cost of obtaining the degree, and the probability of completing a program generates an “adjusted ROI.” Taking these costs into account drastically reduces the return to the student—and puts the return for master’s degrees dead last. [But] Averages Hide Lots of Information. Business is the single largest field of study for master’s students; but, on average, business master’s degrees have a negative ROI. But graduates from the top performing programs—including Dartmouth, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pennsylvania— can earn millions more than graduates from other business programs. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million. Even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates from some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.
  2. Business, the single largest field of study for master's students, has a negative ROI on average, while graduates of top-performing programs at Dartmouth, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania can earn millions more than graduates of other business programs.
  3. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million, and even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates of some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.

AI Summary. Billionaires own more than $5tn in stock, 7% of the entire stock market and 66% of their wealth, so an annual wealth tax would require hundreds of billions in stock sales every year, a long-term drag on all investors' returns. An exemption for wealth held in illiquid private assets would encourage delisting and discourage public listings.

Hal Scott and John Gulliver Wall Street Journal
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.@HalScott_HLS notes that billionaires own more than $5T in stock, 7% of the market, and argues that ongoing wealth tax-driven sales would send equity markets into a “tailspin” and potentially reduce the number of public firms.

Would a wealth tax on billionaires lower all investors' returns?

Core argument: Billionaires own more than $5 trillion in stock, or 7% of the entire stock market, and with public stock making up 66% of their wealth they would need to sell hundreds of billions of dollars of stock each year to pay the proposed wealth tax.

Billionaires own more than $5 trillion in stock, or 7% of the entire stock market. Public stock represents 66% of their wealth, so they would need to sell hundreds of billions of dollars worth of stock to fund wealth-tax payments. This wouldn’t be a one-time problem. Stock sales would need to continue each year to pay the annual wealth tax. This would be a long-term drag on the returns of all investors, while also reducing the skin in the game of the innovative founders who built these companies. The Biden-Harris tax includes an exemption from the proposed wealth tax for ultrarich investors who have 80% of their wealth in nontradable illiquid assets, such as investments in private companies. This would create a major incentive for the wealthiest Americans either to delist the public companies that they control or to keep their private companies from going public in the first place. Public markets are already small and getting smaller. In 1996 there were more than 8,000 public companies in the U.S. Today there are fewer than 5,000.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Billionaires own more than $5 trillion in stock, or 7% of the entire stock market, and with public stock making up 66% of their wealth they would need to sell hundreds of billions of dollars of stock each year to pay the proposed wealth tax.
  2. The author argues that recurring annual stock sales to fund wealth-tax payments would be a long-term drag on the returns of all investors while reducing the skin in the game of the innovative founders who built these companies.
  3. The Biden-Harris proposal exempts investors holding 80% of their wealth in nontradable illiquid assets, which the author argues would incentivize the wealthiest Americans to delist companies they control or keep private companies from going public; U.S. public companies fell from more than 8,000 in 1996 to fewer than 5,000.

Related Articles:

  • Taxing Top Wealth: Migration Responses and Their Aggregate Economic Implications — Swedish data show that when a wealth-taxed entrepreneur emigrates, employment at their businesses falls 33%, value-added 34%, tax payments 50%, and investment 21%, but 60% of closed firms are absorbed by other domestic companies. The authors estimate aggregate effects on employment and investment are small.
  • Birth, Death, and Wealth Creation — The median age at which US companies went public rose from 7.9 years in 1976–2000 to 9.5 years in 2001–2022, implying that more wealth creation now occurs in private markets. Research on more than 28,000 US-listed companies since 1926 finds that just under 60% destroyed $9.1tn of wealth while about 2% created $50tn.
  • Most of the US Economy Is in Private Markets — Companies in the S&P 500 employ 29m people globally, compared with 158m total US employment, meaning more than 80% of US employment lies outside the index. 87% of US firms with revenue above $100m are private.

AI Summary. Germany is extending temporary border controls to all of its land borders, expanding existing checks on its frontiers with Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland. The interior ministry says the controls are intended to restrict irregular immigration and guard against Islamist terrorism and serious crime, and that 30,000 people have been turned away under the existing checks.

Guy Chazan Financial Times
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Germany is introducing border checks along all of its land borders to limit illegal immigration; after introducing such controls along its south and eastern borders last year 30,000 migrants were turned away.

Is a country extending temporary controls to all its land borders?

Core argument: Germany has turned away 30,000 people since last October under temporary controls on its borders with Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland, which interior minister Nancy Faeser called highly effective.

Germany is to introduce temporary controls along all its land borders, as the government steps up its response to public calls for a tougher approach on irregular immigration. Interior minister Nancy Faeser said on Monday that the move — an extension of existing controls on borders with four countries — is designed to “further restrict irregular immigration and protect us from the acute dangers posed by Islamist terror and serious crime.” Faeser said the introduction of temporary controls on its external borders had been highly effective, with 30,000 people turned away since last October along Germany’s borders with Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany has turned away 30,000 people since last October under temporary controls on its borders with Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland, which interior minister Nancy Faeser called highly effective.
  2. Germany will extend temporary controls to all of its land borders, expanding measures currently applied to four neighbouring countries, as the government responds to public calls for a tougher approach on irregular immigration.
  3. Interior minister Nancy Faeser said the expanded border controls are designed to "further restrict irregular immigration and protect us from the acute dangers posed by Islamist terror and serious crime.".

Related Articles:

  • The Rich World Revolts Against Sky-High Immigration — 15m people moved to rich countries over three years, the biggest surge in modern history, with net migration exceeding 3m to America, 1.3m to Canada and about 700,000 to Britain. As immigration surged, output per person fell in Britain and Germany, partly because recent arrivals are on average less skilled than residents.
  • Europe Hopes Barbed Wire Will Keep Migrants Out. It Won’t — The total length of border fences in the European Union grew from 315km to 2,163km over roughly a decade, yet unauthorised crossings made up just 0.13% of all external crossings into the EU. Most migrants arrive via the Mediterranean rather than the Balkans or the eastern land border.
  • Changing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Growth Trajectory — Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population is growing nearly 3% a year, versus close to zero in much of the world, and is projected to exceed China's within about a decade and reach a quarter of the global total. With modest productivity growth near 2%, the region is likely among the world's fastest-growing.

AI Summary. Russia's state statistics service reported 599,600 births in the first half of the year, 16,000 fewer than the same period a year earlier and the lowest count since 1999. Natural population decline accelerated, with 325,100 deaths recorded over those six months, 49,000 more than a year earlier.

Reuters Staff Reuters
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In the first half of 2024, the Russian birth rate fell 2.7% from the same period in 2023 to the lowest level since 1999, according to official data published on Monday.

Is Russia's population declining as births fall to a quarter-century low?

Core argument: Russia recorded 599,600 births in the first half of 2024, 16,000 fewer than the same period in 2023 and the lowest level since 1999, according to Rosstat data.

According to data published by the statistics service Rosstat, 599,600 children were born in Russia in the first half of 2024, which is 16,000 fewer than in the same period in 2023 and the lowest since 1999. In June, the number of newborns fell 6%, to 98,600, which is the first time the number fell below 100,000, Russian media reported. Russia's natural decline of population accelerated this year, with 325,100 deaths recorded between January and June, or 49,000 more than in the corresponding period of last year. "This is catastrophic for the future of the nation," Kremlin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said in July, according to Russian state news agencies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Russia recorded 599,600 births in the first half of 2024, 16,000 fewer than the same period in 2023 and the lowest level since 1999, according to Rosstat data.
  2. Russian births in June fell 6% to 98,600, the first time the monthly figure dropped below 100,000, Russian media reported.
  3. Russia registered 325,100 deaths between January and June, 49,000 more than in the corresponding period of 2023, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called the situation "catastrophic for the future of the nation.".

Related Articles:

  • Putin’s Existential Problem: Not Enough Russians — Russia's population has been declining for years, with Western estimates of at least 150,000 Russian battlefield deaths in Ukraine, nearly a million people leaving the country after the war began, and births at their lowest level in more than two decades. Russia has pledged to spend up to $157bn over six years on measures supporting families and children.
  • Russians Have Emigrated in Huge Numbers Since the War in Ukraine — An analysis network estimates that between 817,000 and 922,000 people have left Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine, roughly 1% of the country's workforce, worsening an acute labour shortage. A Moscow think-tank reported that 35% of manufacturing businesses lacked enough workers, the highest share since 1996.
  • Russia’s Population Nightmare is Going to Get Even Worse — Russia lost an estimated 1.9m–2.8m people beyond its normal demographic decline over a roughly three-year span, combining pandemic deaths, war casualties and emigration. Life expectancy for Russian males aged 15 fell by nearly five years, and women now outnumber men by at least 10m.

Wednesday, September 11, 2024

AI Summary. The authors find the incidence of mental ill-health in the UK has been rising, especially among young people and particularly in Scotland, with well-being of the young declining sharply from around 2013 and women most affected. Because the growth began in the 1990s, the authors argue smartphones cannot account for all of the increase.

David Blanchflower, Alex Bryson and David Bell National Bureau of Economic Research
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.@D_Blanchflower @AlexanderBryson and David Bell find a significant increase in depression and phobia among Scots aged 16-24, from 1.3% in 2000 to 15.7% in 2023, mirroring similar trends in the US.

Do smartphones explain the rise in young people's mental ill-health?

Core argument: The incidence of mental ill-health in the UK has been rising especially among the young and especially in Scotland, with the well-being of the young declining sharply from around 2013 and especially affecting women, a pattern seen globally.

We show the incidence of mental ill-health has been rising especially among the young and especially so in Scotland. In earlier papers, we have noted the correlation between spending substantial amounts of time in front of a screen and poor mental health, especially among the young. The fact that the growth in mental ill-being in the UK began in the 1990s suggests that, although smartphone technologies may have impacted individuals’ ill-being, they cannot account for all of the increases in mental ill-health from the late 1990s, suggesting other factors may be at play. There are likely multiple forces at work here. But the facts to be explained are that the well-being of the young started declining sharply around 2013 or so, and has especially impacted women, and this is a global phenomenon. The increasing use of the internet and smartphones and the rise in cyberbullying and body shaming seem to fit the ticket especially given the timing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The incidence of mental ill-health in the UK has been rising especially among the young and especially in Scotland, with the well-being of the young declining sharply from around 2013 and especially affecting women, a pattern seen globally.
  2. The authors note that growth in mental ill-being in the UK began in the 1990s, suggesting smartphone technologies cannot account for all the increases in mental ill-health since the late 1990s and that other factors may be at play.
  3. The authors report a correlation between spending substantial amounts of time in front of a screen and poor mental health among the young, and argue that rising internet and smartphone use, cyberbullying, and body shaming fit the timing.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates inflation-adjusted median household income was $80,610 in 2023, up 4% from $77,540 in 2022. The bureau said that figure was not statistically different from the $81,210 recorded in 2019, the highest level in data going back to 1967.

Jon Kamp and Paul Overberg Wall Street Journal
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Real median US household income of $80,610 remains below its 2019 level of $81,210.

Has median household income returned to its pre-pandemic peak?

Core argument: Inflation-adjusted median U.S. household income was $80,610 in 2023, up 4% from the 2022 estimate of $77,540, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Inflation-adjusted median household income was $80,610 in 2023, up 4% from the 2022 estimate of $77,540 [according to] the U.S. Census Bureau. The bureau said 2023 inflation-adjusted median income wasn’t statistically different from the $81,210 in 2019, the highest point reached in data back to 1967. The U.S. is only getting back to the 2019 median income peak after a long interruption, rather than continuing increases that preceded the pandemic, said Erik Hurst, a professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. “We are still well below where we should have been,” he said.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inflation-adjusted median U.S. household income was $80,610 in 2023, up 4% from the 2022 estimate of $77,540, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
  2. The Census Bureau said 2023 inflation-adjusted median income was not statistically different from the $81,210 recorded in 2019, the highest point in data going back to 1967.

Related Articles:

  • Has Intergenerational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans — Using post-tax, post-transfer income data, the authors find each of the past four US generations was better off than the prior one, with Millennials' real median household income at ages 36–40 18% above the previous generation's, versus 34% for the Silent Generation, 27% for Baby Boomers, and 16% for Generation X.
  • The State of the American Middle Class — US households in every income tier had higher inflation-adjusted incomes in 2022 than in 1970, with median income rising 55% for lower-income households, 60% for middle-class households, and 78% for upper-income households. The gap widened: upper-income median income was 7.3x that of lower-income households, up from 6.3x.
  • Upward Mobility Is Alive and Well in America — Comparing children's adult incomes with the inflation-adjusted income quintiles of their childhood rather than contemporaneous quintiles produces much higher measured upward mobility: only 28% of children raised in the bottom quintile remained below that childhood threshold as adults, while 26% reached the top childhood quintile, which required $111,416 (2016 dollars) for a family of four.

AI Summary. The Federal Reserve's own projections call for short-term interest rates to fall by about 1.25 percentage points by end-2025 and more than 2 percentage points by end-2026, though inflation data alone would not justify cuts, with typical hourly pay gains running about 1.5 percentage points above pre-pandemic rates and consumer spending rising 5.5%-6% annually.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
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.@M_C_Klein argues the Fed should lower the FFR from the current 5.25-5.5% to “3.25%-3.5% immediately, and then waiting to see what happens. That seems to be around where traders and Fed officials think “neutral” is.”

Should the Fed cut to neutral now and hike later if needed?

Core argument: Federal Reserve officials indicated in June that they broadly agree short-term rates should fall by about 1.25 percentage points by the end of 2025 and by more than 2 percentage points by the end of 2026, though they are unsure how rapidly to move.

Federal Reserve officials believe that it is time to start lowering short-term interest rates. But they are unsure of how rapidly to do so, even though they told us in June that they broadly agree that short rates should drop by about 1.25 percentage points by the end of 2025 and by more than 2 percentage points by the end of 2026. The inflation data would not be sufficient to justify lowering rates. Annualized hourly pay gains for the typical worker are still coming in about 1.5 percentage points faster than pre-pandemic, and total consumer spending is still rising at a yearly rate of 5.5%-6%, with no obvious signs of slowing. That would imply annualized real growth of 3.5-4% if inflation were coming in at 2% a year, which, while appealing, does not seem a plausible combination over sustained periods of time. My suggestion: they should lower rates to their best estimate of “neutral” immediately, while remaining willing to raise rates rapidly again if that estimate turns out to be too low.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Federal Reserve officials indicated in June that they broadly agree short-term rates should fall by about 1.25 percentage points by the end of 2025 and by more than 2 percentage points by the end of 2026, though they are unsure how rapidly to move.
  2. Annualized hourly pay gains for the typical worker are running about 1.5 percentage points faster than pre-pandemic and total consumer spending is rising at a 5.5%–6% yearly rate with no obvious signs of slowing; the inflation data would not be sufficient to justify lowering rates.
  3. Consumer spending growth of 5.5%–6% would imply annualized real growth of 3.5%–4% if inflation ran at 2%, a combination the author calls implausible over sustained periods, and he suggests cutting immediately to the Fed's best estimate of neutral while remaining willing to raise rates rapidly.

Related Articles:

  • Quantifying What Fed Cuts Mean for GDP and Inflation — A simulation using a simplified version of the Federal Reserve's model of the US economy estimates that a 100bps cut in the federal funds rate plus guidance for 150bps more would raise GDP by 2% and inflation by 1%. The author argues such cuts would lift stock prices, tighten credit spreads, and risk reaccelerating growth and inflation.
  • The Case for Cutting Rates (or Not) is the Same As It Was Last Year — Consumer price inflation slowed only modestly over the past year, a deceleration attributable to slower rental inflation based on signed leases that are checked once every six months. Measures stripping out housing and volatile components indicate underlying inflation has been running around 2.5%-3% annually since the end of 2022.
  • Larry Summers and Bob Rubin Join Our CIOs to Discuss the Surprising Economic Cycle — Adopting the Simpson-Bowles fiscal consolidation when interest rates were at zero would have risked excessive disinflation, since long rates had no room to fall to provide an offsetting expansionary impulse. After the large run-up in debt and rise in real interest rates, the developing fiscal situation risks inflationary pressure, Treasury market disruption, or crowding out of private investment.

AI Summary. Survey research estimates that an additional 13.3 million American adults were single by 2022 compared with before the Covid-19 pandemic, with informal relationships dissolving while married and cohabitating couples largely remained intact. The share of single, non-dating adults was higher in 2022 than in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous.

Ben Steverman Bloomberg
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Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld finds that declining social connections during COVID led to 13.3mm more single Americans in 2022 vs. pre-pandemic, delaying traditional adult milestones like getting married, having children, or buying a home.

Did the pandemic leave millions more American adults single and not dating?

Core argument: Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022 compared with before the pandemic, a dating disruption encompassing more than 1 in 20 US adults.

When Covid-19 hit, Stanford sociology professor Michael Rosenfeld reran a survey he had conducted in 2017 to measure those more casual [social] ties. The exercise revealed that millions of informal relationships fell apart, even as married and cohabitating couples survived the pandemic largely intact. More disturbing than the size of this dating disruption—encompassing more than 1 out of every 20 US adults—was the timing. After the number of singles surged in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous, Rosenfeld ran the survey again in 2022 and was surprised to find that even more people were alone and not dating. Compared with before the pandemic, he estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022. A longer-term consequence of the “dating recession,” Rosenfeld says, is that Americans continue to delay traditional adult milestones. Since the 1980s, the shares of those who live on their own, get married, have children, or buy a home by age 30 have been dropping steadily.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022 compared with before the pandemic, a dating disruption encompassing more than 1 in 20 US adults.
  2. Rosenfeld's surveys found the number of singles surged in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous, and his 2022 rerun showed even more people alone and not dating.
  3. Rosenfeld's survey work indicates informal relationships fell apart during Covid-19 while married and cohabitating couples survived largely intact, and he says a longer-term consequence of the "dating recession" is continued delay of traditional adult milestones.

Related Articles:

  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
  • Why Young Men and Women are Drifting Apart — An analysis of polling from 20 rich countries found that a political gap between men and women aged 18-29 that was negligible two decades ago reached 0.75 points on a 1-10 liberal-conservative scale by 2020, roughly twice the gap between graduates and non-graduates. Young men were more conservative than young women in every large country examined.
  • The Data is Clear: People Are Having Less Sex — Survey data show every age group now reports less frequent sexual activity than counterparts in earlier decades, with roughly an 8 percentage point decline across age groups. Among people around age 25, the share reporting sex at least monthly fell from over 80% to 72%, while the peak years remain ages 30 to 40.