Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, August 21, 2024

AI Summary. The share of patients taking semaglutide for weight control rather than type 2 diabetes rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7%. Obesity and overweight, affecting 1 in 8 people worldwide, cost the global economy $2tn — nearly 70 cents on the dollar from premature mortality and lost productivity — an impact projected to double by 2035 absent intervention.

Azeem Azhar and Nathan Warren Exponential View
Date Posted:

.@ExponentialView argues that GLP-1 agonists like Ozempic and Mounjaro “will be the most impactful technology in the US over the next two years,” countering the $2T global economic costs of overweight and obesity, projected to double by 2035.

Are weight-loss drugs poised to deliver trillions in economic gains?

Core argument: The share of semaglutide patients taking the drug for weight control rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7% by the middle of last year, expanding use beyond its initial type 2 diabetes focus.

While GLP-1s were initially focused on patients with type 2 diabetes, their effectiveness for weight management has seen demand grow outside of their initial treatment purpose. In 2019, fewer than 10% of patients on semaglutide were taking it for weight control. By the middle of last year, that proportion surged to 41.7%. Besides bolstering the pockets of big pharma, the economic potential of GLP-1s comes in its second and third-order impacts. 1 in 8 people worldwide are living with obesity. Alongside those who are overweight, they cost the global economy $2 trillion. Nearly 70 cents in the dollar is due to indirect costs – premature mortality and productivity losses associated with ill health. Without intervention, this impact is expected to double by 2035.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of semaglutide patients taking the drug for weight control rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7% by the middle of last year, expanding use beyond its initial type 2 diabetes focus.
  2. Obesity affects 1 in 8 people worldwide, and together with those who are overweight costs the global economy $2 trillion, with nearly 70 cents on the dollar from indirect costs such as premature mortality and productivity losses.
  3. Without intervention, the economic cost of obesity and being overweight is expected to double by 2035, and the economic potential of GLP-1s lies in such second- and third-order impacts beyond pharmaceutical revenue.

Related Articles:

  • The Year of Ozempic — GLP-1 medications act on receptors in the gut, liver, muscles, and brain, and studies report they reduce heart attacks and strokes, slow kidney disease progression, and shrink liver fat deposits. Users have also reported diminished cravings for alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and other compulsive behaviors, though anecdotal reports outpace clinical studies.
  • How Weight Loss Drugs Stopped a Danish Recession — Strong demand for the weight-loss and diabetes drugs Ozempic and Wegovy has kept Denmark out of recession: GDP is up about 1.1% over the past year but down 0.9% excluding pharmaceuticals, meaning drugmakers added roughly 2% to growth. Booming exports let Denmark's central bank hold rates lower while maintaining its euro peg.

AI Summary. Sharply higher prices during disasters or demand surges—often labeled price gouging—occur in competitive markets rather than through monopoly, collusion, or price-fixing, arising when supply contracts or demand spikes. Allowing prices to rise directs limited supply to those who need it most.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:

.@JohnHCochrane argues “We should praise price-gouging. “Windfall” profits belong in the pantheon of saints along with price-gouging. In competitive industries, that’s what encourages people to enter and offer new supply.”

Do sharply higher prices during shortages allocate scarce supply efficiently?

Core argument: Price gouging arises in perfectly competitive markets when a demand surge or supply contraction leaves too little to go around, which distinguishes it from monopoly pricing, collusion, or price-fixing.

The classic case of “price gouging” happens in a natural disaster or pandemic. A hurricane is coming, people run down to hardware stores and clean out the 4’x8’ plywood to board up their windows. Stores raise their prices, people who have them sell at high prices to those that don’t. In the pandemic, people got worried about toilet paper and went out to buy, cleaning out shelves. Stores that raised prices were accused of “gouging.” Price gouging is fundamentally different from monopoly pricing, collusion, or price-fixing. Price gouging happens in perfectly competitive markets. There suddenly isn’t enough to go around, either from a surge in demand or a contraction in supply. Prices rise sharply above what people are used to paying. Those that have inventories, bought when prices were lower, can turn around and make a temporary profit. Price gouging is wonderful for all the reasons that letting supply equal demand is wonderful. When there is a limited supply, then a sharply higher price directs that supply to those who really need it.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Price gouging arises in perfectly competitive markets when a demand surge or supply contraction leaves too little to go around, which distinguishes it from monopoly pricing, collusion, or price-fixing.
  2. Sharply higher prices for a limited supply direct that supply to those who really need it, the same reason letting supply equal demand works, the author argues.
  3. Hurricanes and the pandemic illustrate the pattern, as buyers cleared hardware stores of 4'x8' plywood and emptied shelves of toilet paper, and stores that raised prices were accused of gouging.

Related Articles:

  • When Your Opponent Calls You ‘Communist,’ Maybe Don’t Propose Price Controls? — Proposed federal legislation would ban "grossly excessive" prices during any "atypical disruption" of a market without defining those terms, empowering the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the ban using whatever metric it chooses. The author argues this amounts to sweeping government price controls across every industry, replacing supply and demand with bureaucratic judgment.
  • What Was Up with Grocery Prices? — Retail grocery workers' wages rose roughly 15 percentage points more than wages in food manufacturing and the overall workforce, and profit margins at food and beverage stores increased from 2.9% to 4.4% while food manufacturing margins were little changed at about 6.8%. That margin increase is small relative to the 25% rise in grocery prices.
  • An Update About How Inflation Has Affected Households at Different Income Levels Since 2019 — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that income after transfers and taxes grew faster than consumption prices for all income groups, lowering the share of income needed to buy the same goods by 2% for the lowest-income fifth and 6.3% for the highest-income fifth.

AI Summary. New York City's population is shrinking as domestic out-migration has accelerated, with those leaving tending to be younger, higher-income, and with fewer children than the city's overall population. Census Bureau surveys that ask movers their reasons indicate jobs matter more than any other consideration, including housing affordability.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
Date Posted:

New York City’s population has shrunk by 6% since 2020 driven by older people moving to Florida, and job opportunities luring higher-income younger people to Tier 1 cities, and lower-income younger people to low-cost cities. @AzizSunderji

Are jobs driving out-migration from New York City more than housing costs?

Core argument: New York City's population is shrinking because domestic out-migration has accelerated, with those leaving skewing younger, higher income, and having fewer children than the overall city population.

New York City is shrinking because the pace of domestic out-migration has accelerated. Most people who leave the city are younger, higher income, and have fewer kids, compared to the overall New York City population. Jobs seem to be the most important driver of emigration, more than housing affordability. Higher-earning young New Yorkers are moving to places like Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington, DC—hardly bastions of cheap homes. Moreover, Census Bureau surveys that directly ask about the reason for moving show that, for emigrating New Yorkers, jobs are more important than any other consideration. There is evidence that some of these emigrants are motivated by concerns about stretched home affordability: some younger, lower income New Yorkers are moving to cheaper cities, particularly in Texas. This is not incompatible with jobs also being a key concern: payroll data shows that companies in Florida and Texas have been hiring more people than those in New York, especially over the last decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City's population is shrinking because domestic out-migration has accelerated, with those leaving skewing younger, higher income, and having fewer children than the overall city population.
  2. Jobs appear to outweigh housing affordability as the driver of departures from New York City, with higher-earning young residents moving to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, and Census Bureau surveys ranking jobs above any other stated reason for moving.
  3. Some younger, lower-income New Yorkers are moving to cheaper cities, particularly in Texas, and payroll data show companies in Florida and Texas hiring more people than those in New York, especially over the last decade.

Related Articles:

  • Young Families Have Continued Leaving Big Cities Post-Pandemic — Large urban counties have continued to lose population of young children even as their overall population growth resumed, driven by immigration. Birth rates in large urban counties have declined twice as fast as in rural counties over the past decade, and the number of children under five fell in 58% of all US counties.
  • Booming Southern Cities and the Shrinking Northeast — Population growth since 2020 has been concentrated in southern cities and across most of the West except its largest metros such as San Francisco, San Jose, and Portland, while the Midwest and Northeast have lost population, especially in smaller towns. Larger places continue to grow faster than smaller ones, though by a narrower margin than before 2020.
  • On The Move: Hidden Costs And Slowing Spending — Bank of America deposit data indicates fewer households are moving between cities, with cross-city moves down 4% year-over-year, while those who do move skew toward Gen Z and lower-income households. Payments data show "hidden" homeownership costs such as insurance and property taxes are up significantly, especially in the Sun Belt.

AI Summary. China has stopped publishing daily data on foreign investment flows into mainland stocks through the Hong Kong trading link, shifting to quarterly disclosure of foreign holdings. International investors have withdrawn more than $12bn from mainland Chinese equities, pushing net flows for the year negative; there has never been a full year of net outflows since the link launched in 2014.

Arjun Neil Alim Financial Times
Date Posted:

Beijing has restricted trading data that traced net investment flows from foreign funds into Chinese stocks; since June foreign investors have pulled more than $12B out of Chinese equities.

Is China limiting foreign investment flow data as investors withdraw?

Core argument: International investors have pulled more than $12bn out of mainland Chinese equities since the start of June, according to Hong Kong stock exchange data, reversing earlier inflows and pushing year-to-date net flows negative.

On Monday, daily data showing net investment flows from foreign funds into stocks in mainland China — so-called northbound trades from Hong Kong via the Stock Connect trading link — was no longer available. Information on foreign stock holdings will instead be available quarterly. The move comes as international investors have pulled more than $12bn out of mainland Chinese equities since the start of June, according to Hong Kong stock exchange data, reversing earlier inflows that many analysts said were driven by the offshore arms of state-backed institutions, and taking year-to-date net flows into the red. There has never been a full year of net outflows since Stock Connect — which allows foreign investors access to China’s stock market — launched in 2014.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. International investors have pulled more than $12bn out of mainland Chinese equities since the start of June, according to Hong Kong stock exchange data, reversing earlier inflows and pushing year-to-date net flows negative.
  2. Daily data on net foreign investment flows into mainland Chinese stocks via the Stock Connect link became unavailable on Monday, with information on foreign stock holdings to be published quarterly instead.
  3. Stock Connect, which opened China's stock market to foreign investors in 2014, has never recorded a full year of net outflows.

Related Articles:

  • Anatomy of Capital Fight in China… — Unaccounted capital outflows from China show up not only in the balance of payments' net errors and omissions category but also in net other investment and in the gap between customs-reported and foreign-exchange-reported goods trade balances. This combined residual averaged roughly $100bn per quarter, and about twice that during periods of heavier outflow pressure.
  • The New Money Laundering Network Fuelling The Fentanyl Crisis — Analysts estimate private capital flight from China has run at an annualized rate of roughly $516bn, peaking near $738bn, compared with about $94bn before the pandemic. Chinese officials and analysts attribute the outflows to wealthy entrepreneurs losing confidence in China's future and seeking ways to move money abroad through informal or illicit channels.
  • China to See Biggest Millionaire Exodus in 2024 as Many Head to U.S. — China is projected to see a record 15,200 high-net-worth individuals — those with at least $1m in assets — leave the country, the world's largest such outflow, according to a Henley & Partners report. The prior year's 13,800 departures went mostly to the US, Canada, and Singapore.

Thursday, August 22, 2024

AI Summary. Bank and nonbank credit often move in opposite directions, and the authors find they predict downside growth risk differently: a one-standard-deviation increase in bank credit raises the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points against a 6% baseline, while the same increase in nonbank credit lowers it by 1.9 percentage points.

Nina Boyarchenko and Leonardo Elias Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

A @NewYorkFed analysis of 33 countries over 1966-2020 finds 1 s.d. higher growth rate in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 percentage points, while nonbank credit has the opposite effect.

Do bank and nonbank credit booms predict different downside growth risks?

Core argument: A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.

Credit extended by the banking and nonbanking sector[s] do not always move together. One type of lending is [often] expanding while the other is contracting, which suggests a substitution between bank and nonbank lending. Overall booms in private credit can be driven by either. We find that bank and nonbank credit expansions predict differentially the downside risk to growth—that is, the probability of extreme negative real GDP growth realizations. The blue line in the chart shows that the likelihood of an extreme negative real GDP growth realization —which we define as year-on-year real GDP growth below -2%— increases following expansions in bank credit for horizons of one to three years, while at the same horizon, growth in nonbank credit actually lowers the probability of a large drop in real GDP growth. In particular, a 1 s.d. Increase in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 ppts relative to a baseline 6% probability in our sample. In contrast, a 1 s.d. higher growth rate in nonbank credit lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 1.9 ppts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.
  2. A 1 standard deviation higher nonbank credit growth lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 1.9 percentage points, the opposite sign from bank credit expansions at horizons of one to three years.
  3. Bank and nonbank credit do not always move together, with one often expanding while the other contracts, which the authors read as substitution between the two, and private credit booms can be driven by either.

Related Articles:

  • Corporate Debt, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Financial Crises — Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.
  • Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations — Credit expansions disproportionately channel credit to non-tradable sector firms and households, and the authors find that the sectoral allocation of credit predicts future GDP paths and the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Credit growth to non-tradable industries predicts boom-bust output patterns and elevated financial fragility, while credit to tradable industries is associated with higher future productivity growth.
  • Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks — Private credit loans are negotiated bilaterally outside traditional regulatory requirements and are illiquid because no secondary market exists, leaving investors expected to hold them to maturity or face steep losses if they need to exit. Scarce data on this growing form of nonbank lending makes assessing its risks difficult.

AI Summary. 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.

Daniel Cox and Sam Pressler American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

17% of Americans report having no close friends in 2024, up from 12% in 2021; 24% of Americans with a high school education or less report having no close friends vs. 10% of college grads. @dcoxpolls notes this gap is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Has an educational divide opened up in Americans' friendship circles?

Core argument: 24% of Americans with a high school education or less report having no close friends, compared with 10% of college graduates, according to the survey.

Today, 17% of Americans report having no close friends—a category that excludes close relatives. This is only a modest increase from 2021, when 12% of Americans reported they had no close friends. 18% of Americans have one or two close friends. About one-third (34%) of Americans have three to five close friends, and one-quarter (25%) have six or more. The survey reveals a massive educational disparity in Americans’ number of close friends. Roughly one in four (24%) Americans with a high school education or less report having no close friends, compared to only 10% of college graduates. College graduates are twice as likely as those without any college education to have at least six close friends (33% vs. 17%). The educational gap in the size of American friendship circles is a relatively recent phenomenon. Roughly three decades ago, Americans with more formal education did not have larger social circles. In 1990, nearly half (49%) of Americans with a high school degree or less reported having at least six close friends—a slightly greater share than those with a college degree—while only 3% reported having no close friends.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 24% of Americans with a high school education or less report having no close friends, compared with 10% of college graduates, according to the survey.
  2. College graduates are twice as likely as Americans with no college education to have at least six close friends, 33% versus 17%.
  3. In 1990, 49% of Americans with a high school degree or less reported at least six close friends—slightly more than college graduates—and only 3% reported having none.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Spreading the 818,000 downward revision to payrolls evenly across the 12-month period amounts to about 68,000 fewer jobs per month, against average monthly job growth of 242,000. Even after that adjustment, every month in the revision period would still show positive job growth.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:

.@jmhorp notes that Goldman Sachs was anticipating a 0.6-1.0mm reduction in the BLS March 2024 jobs revision, vs. the 0.8mm actual reduction, and argues that net of revisions, “every single month in the revision period would still be positive.”

Does a large payroll revision still leave every month positive?

Core argument: Spreading the BLS payroll revision of 818,000 jobs over the 12 months from March 2023 to March 2024 amounts to an average of 68,000 fewer jobs per month.

If we spread the 818,000 jobs revision over 12 months (which is, more or less, what BLS will eventually do once they have the final numbers), this amounts to 68,000 fewer jobs per month on average. Over that time frame (March 2023 to March 2024), the average monthly job growth was 242,000 jobs. Crucially, the lowest monthly job growth during that period was 165,000 jobs, in October 2023. Cutting 68,000 from that month would indeed be large, but every single month in the revision period would still be positive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Spreading the BLS payroll revision of 818,000 jobs over the 12 months from March 2023 to March 2024 amounts to an average of 68,000 fewer jobs per month.
  2. Average monthly job growth from March 2023 to March 2024 was 242,000 jobs, so subtracting 68,000 per month would leave every month in the revision period positive.
  3. The lowest monthly job growth in the revision period was 165,000 jobs in October 2023, and cutting 68,000 from that month would be large but still leave growth positive.

Related Articles:

  • The Strong Labor Market Has Boosted US-Born Employment — The authors estimate that the cumulative increase in the U.S.-born population since 2010 was about 1.4m larger, and the foreign-born increase 1.7m larger, than official survey data show. Published data show a decline in the U.S.-born population over a recent one-year span, while the authors estimate an increase of 1.5m.
  • New Immigration Estimates Help Make Sense Of The Pace Of Employment — The Congressional Budget Office estimates net immigration was 3.3m in 2023, versus the 1m it had projected, implying faster population and labor force growth than currently reported. The authors estimate this raised real economic growth by about 0.1 percentage point and, by lifting both production and demand, added little price or wage pressure.
  • The U.S. Job Market Is Better Than It Looks — Permanent job losers account for just 0.1 percentage point of the 0.8 percentage point rise in the US unemployment rate from its trough, with new entrants and re-entrants to the labor force explaining nearly all of the increase. Typical worker pay is still rising a little more than 4% a year, faster than before the pandemic.

AI Summary. Massachusetts Institute of Technology's first undergraduate class admitted after the U.S. Supreme Court banned affirmative action saw Black enrollment fall to 5% from 15% and Hispanic and Latino enrollment fall to 11% from 16%. Asian American students rose to 47% from 40%, while white students were 37% compared with 38%.

Anemona Hartocollis and Stephanie Saul New York Times
Date Posted:

MIT admitted their first post-affirmative action class; the self-reported Asian share rose from 40% for the class of 2027 to 47% for the class of 2028.

How did banning affirmative action change university enrollment by race?

Core argument: Black students fell to 5% of MIT's class of 2028 from 15% in the class of 2027, and Hispanic and Latino students fell to 11% from 16%, the university announced.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s incoming class of 2028 saw a precipitous drop off in the percentage of Black, Hispanic, Native American, and Pacific Islander students, the university announced on Wednesday. It is the university’s first undergraduate class to be admitted since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last year banning affirmative action. The comparison to the class of 2027 was dramatic. The percentage of Black students enrolled dropped to 5% from 15%, and the percentage of Hispanic and Latino students dropped to 11% from 16%. White students made up 37% of the new class, compared to 38% last year. The percentage of Asian American students in the class rose to 47% from 40%. [Class of 2027 percentages add up to 109% because students could declare more than one race, according to M.I.T. Class of 2028 percentages added to 100%]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black students fell to 5% of MIT's class of 2028 from 15% in the class of 2027, and Hispanic and Latino students fell to 11% from 16%, the university announced.
  2. MIT's class of 2028 is its first undergraduate class admitted since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision banning affirmative action.
  3. Asian American students rose to 47% of MIT's class of 2028 from 40%, while white students made up 37%, compared with 38% in the class of 2027.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. China has lent more than $1tn abroad, largely for infrastructure built by Chinese firms, making it the world's largest sovereign lender and leaving many developing countries with debt levels comparable to the 1980s. The World Bank reports interest payments of the 75 poorest countries have quadrupled over the past decade.

Michael Beckley New York Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

China lent $1T over the last two decades under its Belt & Road Initiative, but emerging markets may face a credit crunch due to a decline in China’s lending as its economic growth slows. @AEIecon

Has China's lending left developing countries with unsustainable debt burdens?

Core argument: China has lent more than $1 trillion abroad, largely for Belt and Road infrastructure projects built by Chinese companies, and one in three African infrastructure projects over the past two decades was built by Chinese entities.

China lent more than $1 trillion abroad, largely for infrastructure projects to be built by Chinese companies under its Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past two decades, one in three infrastructure projects in Africa was built by Chinese entities. The long-term debt risks for fragile developing economies were often ignored. China, now by far the world’s largest sovereign lender, has played a leading role in saddling many countries with levels of debt, often through nontransparent arrangements, that are comparable with those seen in the 1980s. The situation is becoming perilous. Over the past decade, during which China doled out more lending than the Paris Club — a grouping of 22 of the world’s largest creditor nations — the total value of interest payments of the 75 poorest countries in the world have quadrupled and will outstrip their total annual spending on health, education and infrastructure combined, according to the World Bank. An estimated 3.3 billion people live in countries where interest payments exceed investments in either education or health, the United Nations said.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China has lent more than $1 trillion abroad, largely for Belt and Road infrastructure projects built by Chinese companies, and one in three African infrastructure projects over the past two decades was built by Chinese entities.
  2. The World Bank reports that interest payments of the world's 75 poorest countries quadrupled over the past decade and will outstrip their total annual spending on health, education and infrastructure combined.
  3. The United Nations estimates that 3.3 billion people live in countries where interest payments exceed investment in either education or health, and China, now the world's largest sovereign lender, lent more over the past decade than the 22-nation Paris Club.

Related Articles:

  • China As an International Lender of Last Resort — Using the first comprehensive dataset of China's overseas bailouts, the authors find China has extended over $170bn in central bank swap line liquidity to distressed countries plus $70bn in rescue loans from state-owned banks and enterprises, equal to more than 20% of International Monetary Fund lending over the past decade.