Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, August 19, 2024

AI Summary. Administrative tax data show that entrants to the taxi and limousine services industry after online ridesharing platforms appeared were more likely to be young, female, White, and U.S.-born, and to combine driving income with wage and salary jobs. Average net earnings of entrants fell to $2,110, consistent with driving being used to supplement income.

Katharine Abraham, John Haltiwanger, Claire Hou, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

From 2013-2019, drivers in the taxi/rideshare industry grew six-fold to 1.3mm. The mean entrant in 2016 had net earnings of just $2,110, as the share of drivers supplementing other wage and salary earnings rose from <20% in 2011 to over 70% in 2015.

How did ridesharing platforms change who drives and what they earn?

Core argument: Average net earnings of entrants to the Taxi and Limousine Services industry (NAICS 4853) fell to $2,110 by 2016, while 2011 nonemployer incumbents averaged $12,290 in net earnings (in 2015 dollars), according to administrative tax data.

Using administrative tax data, we explore the effects of the introduction of online ridesharing platforms on entry, employment, and earnings in the Taxi and Limousine Services industry [NAICS 4853]. New entrants were more likely to be young, female, White, and U.S. born, and to combine earnings from ridesharing with wage and salary earnings. The first two panels of Figure 4 display the gross receipts and net earnings of the 2011 NAICS 4853 nonemployer incumbents and of entrants to the industry. Incumbents had net earnings that averaged just $12,290 (in 2015 dollars) in 2011. Beginning in 2013, the net earnings of NAICS 4853 entrants began to fall off sharply. By 2016, the average NAICS 4853 entrant had net earnings of just $2,110. The decline in average nonemployer earnings and increased propensity to combine nonemployer self-employment with a wage and salary job among NAICS 4853 entrants are consistent with earlier findings that many app-based drivers use driving to supplement or smooth their earnings rather than as a primary source of income

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average net earnings of entrants to the Taxi and Limousine Services industry (NAICS 4853) fell to $2,110 by 2016, while 2011 nonemployer incumbents averaged $12,290 in net earnings (in 2015 dollars), according to administrative tax data.
  2. Entrants to NAICS 4853 following the introduction of online ridesharing platforms were more likely to be young, female, White, and U.S. born, and to combine ridesharing earnings with wage and salary earnings.
  3. The decline in average nonemployer earnings and the greater propensity of NAICS 4853 entrants to pair self-employment with a wage and salary job are consistent with earlier findings that many app-based drivers drive to supplement or smooth earnings rather than as a primary income source.

Related Articles:

  • Consumer Morsel: The Gig Is Up – In A Good Way — Bank of America internal data show the share of its customers receiving income from gig platforms reached 3.8% on a three-month moving average, above the prior peak, after stalling and then resuming an uptrend. Ridesharing has driven the increase and is now the largest gig category, while social commerce and delivery shares have moderated.
  • The Short-Term Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Employment: Evidence from an Online Labor Market — Freelancers in occupations most exposed to generative AI saw employment and earnings decline, with the authors estimating a 2% drop in jobs and a 5.2% drop in monthly earnings on an online labor platform. Offering high-quality service did not mitigate the effect, and top-rated freelancers appear disproportionately hurt.

AI Summary. Data from private-company services provider Carta show start-up shutdowns rising sharply, with 254 venture-backed clients going bust in a single quarter and the failure rate more than 7x the level when tracking began. Carta also reports a steep drop in the share of companies able to raise new funding within two years of their last round.

George Hammond Financial Times
Date Posted:
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Start-up failures are up 60% year-over-year in Q1 2024 and are running at 7x the 2019 rate according to @cartainc data. Only 9% of venture funds raised in 2021 have returned capital to investors, vs. 25% of 2017 funds in their third year of operation.

Are start-up failures rising as follow-on funding becomes harder to get?

Core argument: Carta reported 254 of its venture-backed clients went bust in the first quarter of this year, a bankruptcy rate more than seven times higher than when Carta began tracking failures in 2019.

According to data from Carta, which provides services to private companies, start-up shutdowns are rising sharply, even as billions of dollars of venture capital gushes into artificial intelligence outfits. Carta said 254 of its venture-backed clients had gone bust in the first quarter of this year. The rate of bankruptcies today is more than seven times higher than when Carta began tracking failures in 2019. Peter Walker, head of insights at Carta, said there had been a “huge drop” in the number of companies able to raise money again within two years of their last funding round. That is particularly galling for start-ups that have slashed costs to survive over the past two years, sacrificing growth in the process. “The advice shifted…VCs [were] telling you to grow at all costs, then to be profitable tomorrow. If you’ve curtailed your growth with cuts then it’s maybe not a VC business.” Only 9% of venture funds raised in 2021 have returned any capital to their ultimate investors, according to Carta. By comparison, a quarter of 2017 funds had returned capital by the same stage.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Carta reported 254 of its venture-backed clients went bust in the first quarter of this year, a bankruptcy rate more than seven times higher than when Carta began tracking failures in 2019.
  2. Only 9% of venture funds raised in 2021 have returned any capital to their ultimate investors, according to Carta, versus a quarter of 2017 funds by the same stage.
  3. Peter Walker, head of insights at Carta, described a "huge drop" in the number of start-ups able to raise money again within two years of their last funding round, even as billions of dollars of venture capital flows into artificial intelligence companies.

Related Articles:

  • High Tech Business Entry In The Pandemic Era — High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.
  • America is in the Midst of an Extraordinary Startup Boom — US business-formation applications reached a record 5.5m in a year, with the monthly average running about 80% above the pre-pandemic decade versus a 20% rise in Europe. In the four years before the pandemic, established firms added one net job for every four created by startups; in the four years since, they lost one for every four.
  • It’s Mostly a Paper Moon: Alternative Investments Review — Venture capital financing has tightened: the median time between funding rounds has lengthened, more startups have shut down through bankruptcy, and the share of "down rounds" — new financing at a lower valuation — rose from 8% to nearly 20%, with those rounds cutting post-money valuations by more than 50%.

AI Summary. Consumer price inflation slowed only modestly over the past year, a deceleration attributable to slower rental inflation based on signed leases that are checked once every six months. Measures stripping out housing and volatile components indicate underlying inflation has been running around 2.5%-3% annually since the end of 2022.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

.@M_C_Klein argues that the CPI increase of 0.1% between April and July overstates the extent of the disinflation, and that “CPI inflation is still running around 2.5%-3% a year, just as it has been since the end of 2022.”

Has underlying inflation actually slowed over the past year?

Core argument: CPI inflation slowed only modestly, from 3.1% over the 12 months to June 2023 to 2.9% over the 12 months to July 2024, a deceleration attributed entirely to slower rental inflation based on signed leases, which are checked once every six months.

The 12-month change in the CPI from June 2022 to June 2023 was 3.1%, while the 12-month change from July 2023 to July 2024 was 2.9%. That modest slowdown is entirely attributable to the substantial deceleration in rental inflation based on signed leases—which are checked only once every six months. Measures based on listed rents for available units had long implied that this measure of inflation would eventually slow, and it has. Higher-frequency cuts of the CPI that strip out housing and other volatile or idiosyncratic components tell a similar story: underlying CPI inflation is still running around 2.5%-3% a year, just as it has been since the end of 2022. I do not know what would be gained by squeezing the last percentage point or so of inflation out of the economy, especially if that came at the cost of impoverishing consumers and reducing business investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CPI inflation slowed only modestly, from 3.1% over the 12 months to June 2023 to 2.9% over the 12 months to July 2024, a deceleration attributed entirely to slower rental inflation based on signed leases, which are checked once every six months.
  2. Higher-frequency CPI measures that strip out housing and other volatile or idiosyncratic components show underlying inflation running around 2.5%–3% a year, as it has since the end of 2022.
  3. Squeezing the last percentage point of inflation out of the economy offers unclear gains if the cost is impoverishing consumers and reducing business investment.

Related Articles:

  • Markets Think Inflation Will Be Too High For The Next 20 Years — Inflation expectations derived from the gap between regular Treasury yields and inflation-indexed Treasury yields show expected annual inflation over the next 10 and 20 years running considerably above expected inflation for the decade beginning 20 years out. Before the pandemic-era inflation surge, actual inflation and expected future inflation tracked each other closely.
  • The Fed Should Not Cut Interest Rates Yet — Labor demand continues to outpace labor supply, with job openings 17% above pre-pandemic levels and average wages up 3.9% year on year. The author argues current conditions do not warrant interest rate cuts, as the risk of inflation getting stuck above 2.5% is too great.
  • Strong, But Not Too Hot: The U.S. Economy as of Mid-2024 — Nominal spending by U.S. consumers and businesses continues rising at roughly 5.5% a year, a pace that makes it difficult for inflation to settle at the Federal Reserve's 2% goal unless real output grows about 3.5% annually. Output is growing about 2.5%-3% while inflation has slowed toward 2.5%-3%, an improvement the author attributes to faster productivity and easing supply disruptions.

AI Summary. The author argues that a proposed economic plan combining demand subsidies—such as housing support and loan forgiveness—with supply-discouraging measures like higher taxes and price controls would produce stagflation, historically bad for stocks and bonds. The expansion of executive power could allow such a program to advance without congressional cooperation.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:

.@FedGuy12 argues that “Vice President Harris’ proposed economic plan essentially guarantees stagflation by both subsidizing demand and discouraging supply.” He notes that stagflation “has historically been bad for equities and bonds.”

Does subsidizing demand while discouraging supply produce stagflation?

Core argument: The author argues Vice President Harris' proposed economic plan would produce stagflation by subsidizing demand through housing subsidies and loan forgiveness while discouraging supply through higher taxes and price controls.

Vice President Harris’ proposed economic plan essentially guarantees stagflation by both subsidizing demand and discouraging supply. While Harris has been shy about her economic platform, her recent speech and prior campaigns suggest she would favor measures that discourage supply such as higher taxes and price controls. It also seems she would like to increase demand by subsidizing housing and forgiving some types of loans. A combination of stronger demand amidst lower supply suggests a stagflationary economy, which has historically been bad for equities and bonds. While Harris’ should need the cooperation of Congress to realize her aspirations, the recent expansion of executive power implies she may have more influence than expected.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues Vice President Harris' proposed economic plan would produce stagflation by subsidizing demand through housing subsidies and loan forgiveness while discouraging supply through higher taxes and price controls.
  2. Stagflation, which the author expects from Harris' combination of stronger demand and lower supply, has historically been bad for both equities and bonds.
  3. Although Harris would need congressional cooperation to enact her agenda, the author contends the recent expansion of executive power implies she may hold more influence than expected.

Related Articles:

  • When Your Opponent Calls You ‘Communist,’ Maybe Don’t Propose Price Controls? — Proposed federal legislation would ban "grossly excessive" prices during any "atypical disruption" of a market without defining those terms, empowering the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the ban using whatever metric it chooses. The author argues this amounts to sweeping government price controls across every industry, replacing supply and demand with bureaucratic judgment.
  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • Has Pay Kept Up With Inflation? — All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.

AI Summary. Polling of likely voters in four Sun Belt states shows Harris leading Trump 50% to 45% in Arizona, edging ahead in North Carolina, and narrowing his lead in Georgia and Nevada, with the two tied at 48% across the four-state average.

Shane Goldmacher and Ruth Igielnik New York Times
Date Posted:

The latest Times/Siena poll shows the race for the White House is a dead heat, with Harris putting the Sun Belt in play; she leads in Arizona by 5pp and NC by 2pp, while Trump leads in Georgia by 4pp and Nevada by 1pp. @Nate_Cohn

Are Sun Belt battleground states now competitive again?

Core argument: Harris leads Trump among likely voters in Arizona, 50% to 45%, in Times/Siena polls conducted Aug. 8–15.

Ms. Harris is now leading Mr. Trump among likely voters in Arizona, 50% to 45%, and has even edged ahead of Mr. Trump in North Carolina — a state Mr. Trump won four years ago — while narrowing his lead significantly in Georgia and Nevada. Mr. Trump and Ms. Harris are tied at 48% across an average of the four Sun Belt states in surveys conducted Aug. 8 to 15.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Harris leads Trump among likely voters in Arizona, 50% to 45%, in Times/Siena polls conducted Aug. 8–15.
  2. Harris has edged ahead of Trump in North Carolina, a state Trump won four years ago, and has narrowed his leads in Georgia and Nevada, according to Times/Siena polls.
  3. Trump and Harris are tied at 48% across an average of the four Sun Belt states surveyed by Times/Siena from Aug. 8 to 15.

Related Articles:

  • Movers And Money: Mapping the Flow of Income During the Pandemic — Manhattan recorded the largest county-level income outflow to other states at $16.5bn, with 27.7 cents of every dollar leaving—$4.6bn—going to Florida, including $2.9bn to Miami-Dade County and $1.1bn to Palm Beach County. California had the largest state-level losses, while Florida was the biggest beneficiary with a net gain of $39bn.
  • Let’s Recap: 2023 At A Glance — Bank of America found that Sun Belt cities such as Phoenix, Miami, Tampa, and Atlanta experienced a stronger housing boom, with rents and mortgage costs rising more than in the Northeast and West. Potential explanations include domestic migration driven by affordability, above-average employment gains, and a growing share of higher-paid jobs.
  • The New Hispanic Diploma Divide — Survey data from the Survey Center on American Life show a large education split among Hispanic voters, with the Democratic presidential candidate leading by 24 points among college-educated Hispanics but only 2 points among those without degrees. 13% of working-class Hispanics are undecided, and non-college Hispanics make up roughly 7% of the electorate versus 3% for college-educated Hispanics.

AI Summary. China's unemployment rate for 16–24 year-olds excluding students rose to 17.2% from 13.2% a month earlier, the highest level since the National Bureau of Statistics adopted a revised counting method. The bureau excluded students from the calculation, saying this more accurately reflects that job-hunting is not a priority for students in China.

Orange Wang and Danielle Popov South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

Youth unemployment (16-24) in China hit 17.2% in July, a record high under the new data methodology that excludes students. A previous approach that included students was suspended after hitting 21.3% in June 2023.

Is youth unemployment rising as more graduates enter China's labor market?

Core argument: China's youth unemployment rate for 16–24 year-olds excluding students rose to 17.2% in July from 13.2% a month earlier, the highest in the eight months since the National Bureau of Statistics adopted a new counting method.

China’s youth unemployment surged to 17.2% in July, the highest level in the eight months since the National Bureau of Statistics adopted a new method of counting. The jobless rate for 16 to 24 year-olds – excluding students – was up from 13.2% a month earlier and ended three months of declines, according to NBS data released on Friday. Beijing introduced the revised method for December after suspending the release of youth unemployment data from July. Under the previous approach, the jobless rate for the 16-24 age group, including students, peaked at 21.3% in June. Student numbers were then stripped out of the calculation, a change that the NBS said was to “more accurately” reflect that job-hunting was not a priority for students in China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's youth unemployment rate for 16–24 year-olds excluding students rose to 17.2% in July from 13.2% a month earlier, the highest in the eight months since the National Bureau of Statistics adopted a new counting method.
  2. The increase ended three months of declines in China's youth jobless rate, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.
  3. Under China's previous method, which included students, the 16–24 jobless rate peaked at 21.3% in June, after which Beijing suspended publication and introduced a revised measure for December that the NBS said would "more accurately" reflect that job-hunting was not a priority for students.

Related Articles:

  • Xi Jinping Calls for Quality Jobs for Youth Instead of ‘Bitterness’ — China's leadership has ordered that providing "high-quality full employment" be an economic priority, with youth unemployment running at nearly three times the overall rate. Unemployment among 16-24 year-olds, excluding students, stood at 14.7% against an urban unemployment rate of 5%.
  • Why Has Youth Unemployment Risen So Much in China? — Young workers aged 15-24 are particularly vulnerable when economic growth slows, and China's youth unemployment rate does not appear to be an outlier relative to its income level among global peers. Mismatches between the skills graduates acquire in higher education and those employers demand may add to labor market frictions.
  • The Root of China’s Growing Youth Unemployment Crisis — China's government has long encouraged university enrollment, raising higher-education student numbers from 22m to 383m and expanding graduate-school capacity, with master's candidates up 25% in one year. The author argues that boosting graduate numbers while restricting the services sector and subsidizing construction is bad economics and worse social policy.

Tuesday, August 20, 2024

AI Summary. The authors find China's tariff cuts after joining the World Trade Organization exceeded the norm of reciprocity, which raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through better terms of trade while amplifying the China Shock. They estimate this shifted employment from tradable to non-tradable sectors abroad.

Chad Bown, Lorenzo Caliendo, Fernando Parro, Robert Staiger, and Alan Sykes National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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.@ChadBown and team find that China’s tariff reductions in its WTO accession exceeded reciprocity norms, increasing real incomes but driving an incremental 4% decline in labor demand for tradable goods in the rest of the world.

Did one-sided tariff cuts raise incomes while amplifying trade shocks?

Core argument: China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.

When countries exchange tariff cuts that abide by reciprocity, relative world prices (the terms of trade between them) do not change. We find the tariff reductions China implemented after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity. This deviation from reciprocity increased aggregate real incomes in the United States and in the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, but it also amplified the magnitude of the China Shock. Figure 2 presents the percentage change in employment in the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector in the rest of the world due to the movement in the terms of trade resulting from the actual changes in tariff between China and the rest of the world from 1990-2007. We find that China exceeding reciprocity resulted in employment shifting from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector in the rest of the world.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.
  2. China's deviation from reciprocity raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, while also amplifying the magnitude of the China Shock.
  3. Terms-of-trade movements from the actual tariff changes between China and the rest of the world from 1990 to 2007 shifted employment in the rest of the world from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. The authors introduce "fiscal r-star," the real interest rate needed to stabilize government debt, and find across 140+ years of data for 16 advanced economies that wider gaps between market and fiscal r-star are associated with rising debt, higher inflation, financial repression, and elevated crisis risks.

Marijn Bolhuis, Jakree Koosakul and Neil Shenai International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:

.@MA_Bolhuis notes that over the last 60 years, monetary R* was significantly below “fiscal R*”, the rate required to stabilize debt as a % of GDP, but that a narrowing gap requires growth-enhancing reforms and fiscal consolidation to avoid inflation.

Does a gap between market and debt-stabilizing interest rates raise inflation?

Core argument: Drawing on over 140 years of data from 16 advanced economies, the authors find larger gaps between monetary r* and fiscal r* are associated with rising debt levels, higher inflation, financial repression, and lower real returns on bonds and cash.

This paper explores tensions between active fiscal and monetary policies by introducing the concept of “fiscal r-star,” which is the real interest rate required to stabilize debt levels when the primary balance is set exogenously, output is growing at potential, and inflation is at target. An analysis of over 140 years of data from 16 advanced economies shows that larger gaps [between monetary r* and fiscal r*] are associated with rising debt levels, higher inflation, financial repression, lower real returns on bonds and cash, with elevated risks of future debt, inflation, currency, housing, and systemic crises. Current estimates indicate that fiscal-monetary tensions are at historic highs. Given the tepid growth outlook, growth-enhancing reforms and fiscal consolidation, among other policy adjustments, may be needed to attenuate fiscal-monetary tensions over time.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Drawing on over 140 years of data from 16 advanced economies, the authors find larger gaps between monetary r* and fiscal r* are associated with rising debt levels, higher inflation, financial repression, and lower real returns on bonds and cash.
  2. The authors define "fiscal r-star" as the real interest rate required to stabilize debt levels when the primary balance is set exogenously, output grows at potential, and inflation is at target.
  3. Larger gaps between monetary r* and fiscal r* are associated with elevated risks of future debt, inflation, currency, housing, and systemic crises, and current estimates place fiscal-monetary tensions at historic highs.

Related Articles:

  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.
  • Weaker Demand for Treasuries — Recent 10-year and 30-year US Treasury auctions each cleared three basis points above the yields trading minutes beforehand, signaling demand significantly weaker than the market expected. Larger and more frequent such gaps since the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates make auction metrics an early indicator of weakening Treasury demand.

AI Summary. An analysis of 39 cities with consistent monthly crime reporting found homicides, robberies and aggravated assaults all lower in the first half of the year than in both the prior year and the first half of 2019. High-frequency data from 277 cities showed murders down 17.6% year over year.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
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While noting a decline in homicides reported by the FBI, @foxjust argues the upcoming release of the 2023 National Crime Victimization Survey will be a better confirmation that the crime wave is in fact receding.

Are violent crime rates falling below pre-pandemic levels?

Core argument: Murders across the 277 cities tracked by AH Datalytics were down 17.6% as of mid-August versus the same period last year, a decline that if sustained and nationally representative would retrace all of the 2020–2021 murder rate rise and more.

A Council on Criminal Justice analysis of data from 39 cities that have been consistently reporting monthly crime statistics for the past six years found that homicides, robberies and aggravated assaults were all down in the first half of this year relative not just to last year but to the first half of 2019. In the 277 cities from which AH Datalytics collects high-frequency data, murders were down 17.6% as of mid-August relative to the same period last year — a decline that if it (1) holds up for the full year and (2) turns out to be representative of murders nationwide would mean the national murder rate would have retraced all of its rise in 2020 and 2021 and then some. Over the decades, the [National Crime Victimization] survey’s findings have mostly paralleled the FBI’s crime numbers, but the 2022 edition found a marked increase in violent crime victimization over 2020 and 2021 even as reported violent crime fell. I’m betting it will have fallen back again in 2023. If it doesn’t, like many Americans, I’ll get a little more skeptical of the crime decline.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Murders across the 277 cities tracked by AH Datalytics were down 17.6% as of mid-August versus the same period last year, a decline that if sustained and nationally representative would retrace all of the 2020–2021 murder rate rise and more.
  2. A Council on Criminal Justice analysis of 39 cities consistently reporting monthly crime data over the past six years found homicides, robberies and aggravated assaults all lower in the first half of this year than in the first halves of both last year and 2019.
  3. The National Crime Victimization Survey's findings have mostly paralleled FBI crime numbers over the decades, but its 2022 edition found a marked increase in violent crime victimization over 2020 and 2021 even as reported violent crime fell.

Related Articles:

  • Violent Crime Is Falling, But That’s Not the Whole Story — Violent crime in large US cities and some of the largest suburban counties fell 2.6% and homicides fell 10.4% after three straight years of increases, but both remained above pre-pandemic levels, according to the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Federal Bureau of Investigation data show a milder pattern because they also cover suburbs, small towns, and rural areas.
  • New York’s Subways Have Less Crime but More Violence — Major crime on New York's subways is on track to run 13.4% below 2019 levels, but ridership remains down about a third, so crime per rider is much higher this year than from 2006 through 2019. Property crime has not risen; violent incidents account for the increase.
  • Homicides Are Plummeting in American Cities — Felony assaults in New York City's subway have risen two- to threefold since the pandemic, a pattern that does not match the rest of the country and appears connected to local criminal justice practices. Research finds that ending cash bail for most misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies is associated with increased repeat offending among those previously charged with violent felonies.

AI Summary. The Silver Bulletin presidential election forecast rates the race as essentially 50/50, with Harris holding a slight edge. Newly added state-level polls more favorable to Trump left the forecast's topline numbers unchanged.

Nate Silver and Eli McKown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

Going into the democratic convention @NateSilver538 model gave Harris a 53.6% probability of winning the electoral college versus a 45.7% probability of a Trump win; the race is a coin flip though “Harris has the ever-so-slightly stronger hand.”

Is the presidential race still essentially a coin flip?

Core argument: The Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast holds the race at basically 50/50, with Kamala Harris holding a slightly stronger position than Donald Trump.

As the DNC kicks off our forecast is holding steady. We’ve added some new state-level polls that are much better for Trump than last week’s New York Times/Siena poll, but they didn’t change our topline numbers. The race is still basically 50/50, though Harris has the ever-so-slightly stronger hand.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast holds the race at basically 50/50, with Kamala Harris holding a slightly stronger position than Donald Trump.
  2. State-level polls added to the Silver Bulletin forecast are much better for Trump than the prior week's New York Times/Siena poll, yet they left the topline numbers unchanged.

Related Articles:

  • Harris Puts Four Sun Belt States Back in Play, Times/Siena Polls Find — Polling of likely voters in four Sun Belt states shows Harris leading Trump 50% to 45% in Arizona, edging ahead in North Carolina, and narrowing his lead in Georgia and Nevada, with the two tied at 48% across the four-state average.
  • Let’s Recap: 2023 At A Glance — Bank of America found that Sun Belt cities such as Phoenix, Miami, Tampa, and Atlanta experienced a stronger housing boom, with rents and mortgage costs rising more than in the Northeast and West. Potential explanations include domestic migration driven by affordability, above-average employment gains, and a growing share of higher-paid jobs.
  • The 2024 Election Won’t Be Up To the Same Voters Who Chose Biden — Polling of likely voters in four Sun Belt states shows Harris leading Trump 50% to 45% in Arizona, edging ahead in North Carolina, and narrowing his lead in Georgia and Nevada, with the two tied at 48% across the four-state average.