Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, July 2, 2024

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the slowdown in US labor supply growth can explain up to 52% of the decline in the start-up rate and up to 80% of the decline in start-ups' share of employment. In their model, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which comes through entry of new firms or a lower real wage.

Fatih Karahan, Benjamin Pugsley and Ayşegül Şahin American Economic Review
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.@yfatihkarahan et al argue that 52% of the decline in US start-ups since the late 1970s is explained by a drop in labor supply growth linked to demographics. The findings are supported by cross-state startup and labor supply growth data.

Does slower labor force growth explain the declining start-up rate?

Core argument: The slowdown in US labor supply growth, which began in the late 1970s, can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups' decline in employment share.

The start-up rate is linked in equilibrium to the pace of labor supply growth, which slowed dramatically in the late 1970s. The slowdown in US labor supply growth can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups’ decline in employment share. It explains the widespread declines across markets since the labor force growth slowdown affected them nearly universally, and it explains the stability of average incumbent dynamics conditional on their age, with aggregate effects following from the resulting shift towards older firms. We validate the model’s implications using variation across states and in the aggregate time series. Why should labor supply growth affect the start-up rate at all? Ultimately, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which can only arise from a decline in the real wage that allows incumbent labor demand to expand or through entry of new firms. A lesson from models of firm dynamics is that in the long run, free entry of new firms relieves any pressure on the real wage from shifts in labor supply.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The slowdown in US labor supply growth, which began in the late 1970s, can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups' decline in employment share.
  2. Because the labor force growth slowdown affected markets nearly universally, the model accounts for widespread declines in start-up rates across markets, with aggregate effects following from a resulting shift toward older firms.
  3. In the model, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which arises either from a decline in the real wage that lets incumbent firms expand or from entry of new firms, with free entry relieving real wage pressure in the long run.

Related Articles:

  • High Tech Business Entry In The Pandemic Era — High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.
  • America is in the Midst of an Extraordinary Startup Boom — US business-formation applications reached a record 5.5m in a year, with the monthly average running about 80% above the pre-pandemic decade versus a 20% rise in Europe. In the four years before the pandemic, established firms added one net job for every four created by startups; in the four years since, they lost one for every four.
  • Business Applications Eked Out a New Record in 2023 — Americans filed 5.5m applications to start new businesses in a single year, nearly 1.8m of them highly likely to hire employees — both series highs in U.S. Census Bureau Business Formation Statistics. Likely-employer applications ran 37% above pre-pandemic levels, evidence that startup activity has settled at a higher baseline.

AI Summary. Younger Americans now hold about double the average wealth Generation X had at the same age, roughly matching what Generation X and Baby Boomers had 5-6 years later in life. Generation X and Baby Boomers currently have roughly equal average wealth at the same age, after Generation X had been about $100,000 ahead.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
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Based on Q1 2024 Federal Reserve data, real mean wealth per capita for 31-year-old Millennials & Gen Z (born 1981-2006) is about double their Gen X counterparts (1965-80) when they were 31 years old. @jmhorp

Are young Americans wealthier than earlier generations were at the same age?

Core argument: Millennials and Gen Z hold roughly double the wealth Gen X had at the same age, with average wealth matching what Gen X and Boomers had five to six years later in life.

What’s notable about the data is just how much the youngest “generation” in the chart has jumped up in recent years. They now have about double the wealth that Gen X had at roughly the same age. Average wealth is about as much as Gen X and Boomers had 5-6 years later in life — and while there are no guarantees, odds are Millennial/Gen Z wealth will be much, much higher in another 5-6 years. You may notice at the tail end of the chart that Gen X and Boomers now have roughly equal amounts of average wealth at the same age (Gen X’s current age), while 2 years ago they were $100,000 ahead. I suspect this is just temporary, and Gen X will soon be ahead again, but we shall see.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Millennials and Gen Z hold roughly double the wealth Gen X had at the same age, with average wealth matching what Gen X and Boomers had five to six years later in life.
  2. Gen X and Boomers hold roughly equal average wealth at Gen X's current age, after Gen X led by about $100,000 two years earlier.

Related Articles:

  • Has Intergenerational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans — Using post-tax, post-transfer income data, the authors find each of the past four US generations was better off than the prior one, with Millennials' real median household income at ages 36–40 18% above the previous generation's, versus 34% for the Silent Generation, 27% for Baby Boomers, and 16% for Generation X.
  • Young People Have a Lot More Wealth Than We Thought — Wealth data for young people comes from the Federal Reserve's quarterly Distributional Financial Accounts, which project forward results from the Survey of Consumer Finances conducted every three years. When newer survey results were released, young people turned out to hold considerably more wealth than the projections based on the prior survey had indicated.
  • The Cost of Thriving Has Fallen: Correcting and Rejecting the American Compass Cost of Thriving Index — The authors recalculate the Cost of Thriving Index and estimate the cost of supporting a family on one male earner's wages rose by just over 10 weeks of work rather than 22 weeks. Accounting for federal taxes—including the child tax credit—and quality improvements in health care and cars, they estimate the cost is now lower than in 1985.

AI Summary. An election forecasting model shows Trump leading the national polling average by 2.7 points, with Biden's win probability falling to 28% from 35%. The model's authors attribute the shift to a weak debate performance by Biden rather than random polling noise.

Nate Silver and Eli Mckown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
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As of July 1st @NateSilver538 notes Biden’s debate performance is showing up in his model; Trump now leads by 2.7p in his national average and Biden’s probability of an electoral win has dropped from 35% on the night of the debate to 28%.

Does a weak debate performance lower an incumbent's election forecast?

Core argument: Joe Biden's win probability in the Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast has fallen to 28% from 35% on debate night.

Last update: 6:40 p.m, Monday, July 1: We’ve got a string of polls in late this afternoon, they’re mostly poor for Joe Biden, and they’re beginning to have a bigger impact on the model. Trump now leads by 2.7 points in our national average. And Biden’s win probability has dropped to 28% from 35% on debate night. Our guess is that more likely than not, there’s some further decline ahead: the model is trying to figure out whether this is random noise, but instead it’s almost certainly caused by a challenging first debate for Biden. It’s not great news for the president.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Joe Biden's win probability in the Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast has fallen to 28% from 35% on debate night.
  2. Donald Trump leads Biden by 2.7 points in the Silver Bulletin national polling average, following a string of polls that were mostly poor for Biden.
  3. Silver Bulletin judges further decline in Biden's numbers more likely than not, attributing the shift almost certainly to a challenging first debate rather than random noise.

Related Articles:

  • The Presidential Election Isn’t A Toss-Up — A presidential election model's simulations show that a candidate who loses Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada must sweep Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, which are correlated but differ in rural share and demographics. The simulations have him winning at least one of the three 54% of the time but all three only 32%.
  • Outlier Poll Results Are Inevitable. They’re Also Sometimes Right. — A New York Times/Siena College national poll found Trump ahead of Biden by six percentage points among registered voters and three among likely voters, well outside the average of polls, which showed Trump up by one point. The authors argue poll averages are a safer measure, though outlier results are sometimes right.
  • If Everyone Voted, Would Biden Benefit? Not Anymore — Polling indicates infrequent, less engaged voters now favor the Republican presidential candidate, a reversal that would mean higher turnout benefits Republicans rather than Democrats. In Pennsylvania, new registrants under automatic voter registration have affiliated with Republicans over Democrats by six percentage points.

AI Summary. Panama's president has pledged to halt illegal migration through the Darién Gap and cooperate with the US government in limiting arrivals at its southern border, saying the country can no longer bear the economic and social costs of migration.

Christine Murray Financial Times
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Panama’s new President has pledged to work with the US to close the Darién Gap, “Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.” Last year at least 500,000 people crossed the gap, largely on their way to the US.

Will Panama close its migrant route and cooperate with the US?

Core argument: Panama's president José Raúl Mulino pledged in his inauguration speech to halt illegal immigration through the Darién Gap, declaring that "Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.".

Panama’s new president has pledged to halt illegal immigration through the notorious Darién Gap and work with the US government as it seeks to limit arrivals at its southern border ahead of its presidential election. José Raúl Mulino, the right-wing leader who won the May vote, said in his inauguration speech on Monday that the country could no longer pay the economic and social costs associated with migration. “Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals,” he said, adding that migrants were being organised by “international groups related to drug trafficking and people smuggling”.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Panama's president José Raúl Mulino pledged in his inauguration speech to halt illegal immigration through the Darién Gap, declaring that "Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.".
  2. Mulino, the right-wing leader who won Panama's May election, said the country could no longer pay the economic and social costs associated with migration.
  3. Mulino said migrants were being organised by "international groups related to drug trafficking and people smuggling," and pledged to work with the US government as it seeks to limit arrivals at its southern border ahead of its presidential election.

Related Articles:

  • Migration at US Southern Border Slumps on Regional Efforts — Encounters between migrants and US immigration authorities fell to about 190,000 per month in February and March from a record of more than 300,000 in December, after Mexico restored funding for migration services and increased deportations. Administration officials say encounters over four months were down 40% from the prior four-month period.
  • The Force Shaping Western Politics — The foreign-born share of the population has risen sharply since 1990 in nearly every large Western country. As mainstream politicians from the center-right to the left dismissed voters' concerns about immigration, many voters drifted toward extreme-right parties that promised to reduce it.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

Wednesday, July 3, 2024

AI Summary. The dollar-yen exchange rate is above 160 and 10-year Japanese government bond yields are approaching 1.1%, while Japan holds $1.2tn of US Treasuries versus China's $770bn. A declining three-month moving average of Japanese net Treasury purchases suggests repatriation, and an econometric model based on US-Japan interest differentials implies a rate of 140.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
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Japanese demand for US Treasuries is declining as domestic assets become more attractive, with 10-year JGB rates approaching 1.1%. At $1.2T Japan is the biggest foreign holder of US Treasuries.

Is a weak yen pushing Japanese investors to sell US Treasuries?

Core argument: The yen is above 160 per dollar and 10-year JGB yields are approaching 1.1%, while a simple econometric model based on the current US–Japan interest differential implies a USD/JPY rate of 140.

The Japanese yen has risen above 160 and 10-year JGB yields are approaching 1.1%. Japan is the biggest foreign holder of US Treasuries, holding $1.2 trillion. This is more than China’s $770 billion. The three-month moving average of Japanese net purchases of US Treasuries is declining, suggesting that Japanese investors are repatriating money from abroad and taking money home to buy Japanese assets. A simple econometric model forecasting the USD/JPY exchange rate shows that based on the current interest differential between the US and Japan, the USD/JPY exchange rate should currently be 140. In other words, with Japanese yields rising relative to US yields, the yen should be appreciating, which is the opposite of what has happened.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The yen is above 160 per dollar and 10-year JGB yields are approaching 1.1%, while a simple econometric model based on the current US–Japan interest differential implies a USD/JPY rate of 140.
  2. Japan is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries at $1.2 trillion, ahead of China's $770 billion, and the three-month moving average of Japanese net Treasury purchases is declining.
  3. The decline in Japanese net purchases of US Treasuries suggests Japanese investors are repatriating money from abroad to buy Japanese assets.

Related Articles:

  • The Japanese Bid for Foreign Bonds After the End of Yield Curve Control — Even as the Bank of Japan moves away from negative interest rates and yield curve control, Japanese short- and long-term interest rates are expected to remain well below those in the U.S. and Europe. On that basis, Japan is likely to remain a modest net buyer of foreign bonds.
  • BOJ Shock Has Wall Street Gaming Out the Global Spillovers — The Bank of Japan has signaled it will allow yields to trade toward 1% from roughly 0.5%, though its intervention in the market suggests that shift is not imminent. With Japanese domestic investors holding around $2.5tn of US stocks, bonds and credit, Wall Street is weighing volatile spillovers that could reinforce higher-for-longer interest rates.
  • Japanese Workers Secure Biggest Pay Rise In Three Decades — Japanese companies including Honda, Nippon Steel, and ANA Holdings granted workers their largest pay rise in more than three decades, with economists expecting large firms to give unionised workers average increases above 4%, up from 3.6% the prior year. The increases strengthen the case for the Bank of Japan to begin raising interest rates.

AI Summary. The US foreign-born labor force has fully recovered from its pandemic decline and now exceeds what pre-pandemic trend growth would have implied, reaching 31.9M. Wages rose faster in immigrant-intensive occupations and industries than in those with a lower share of immigrants.

Pia Orrenius, Ana Pranger, Madeline Zavodny and Isabel Dhillon Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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Despite the US foreign-born labor force growing from 28.7M in February ‘20 to 31.9M in April ‘24, a @DallasFed analysis finds that wage growth in immigrant-intensive industries has outpaced that of other industries.

Does an immigration surge raise wages in immigrant-heavy industries?

Core argument: The foreign-born labor force returned to its February 2020 level of 28.7 million in November 2021 and surpassed trend growth in August 2022 by reaching 30.0 million, per the Current Population Survey.

With this recent immigration wave, the foreign-born labor force [of 31.9M in April ‘24] has recovered completely from the pandemic drop, even exceeding what would have been expected absent the pandemic. The foreign-born labor force reached February 2020 levels [of 28.7M] in November 2021, and surpassed trend growth in August 2022 [by reaching 30.0M,] according to the Current Population Survey. Wages rose faster in immigrant-intensive occupations and industries than in those that had a lower share of immigrants.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The foreign-born labor force returned to its February 2020 level of 28.7 million in November 2021 and surpassed trend growth in August 2022 by reaching 30.0 million, per the Current Population Survey.
  2. Wages rose faster in immigrant-intensive occupations and industries than in those with a lower share of immigrants.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2024 to 2054 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population will grow from 342mm in 2024 to 383mm in 2054, an average 0.4% a year — less than half the 0.9% pace of the prior five decades. Immigration accounts for about 70% of growth over the next decade and for all population growth beginning in 2040.
  • Immigration and the U.S. Economy Since the Pandemic: An Accounting Exercise — The US native-born labor force fell by about 1.2m over four years, a decline driven overwhelmingly by population aging, while foreign-born labor supply grew by about 3m, leaving the overall labor force up roughly 2m. Without immigration, the total US labor force would have shrunk.
  • Without Immigrants, US Working-Age Population Would Shrink — All net US employment growth since early 2020 has been among foreign-born workers, and without immigration the US working-age population would be shrinking — a pattern likely to persist for the rest of the decade. The jump in immigration appears to be enabling a soft landing that most economists had thought impossible.

AI Summary. U.S. labor productivity swung widely after 2020 due to both shifts in industry composition and changes within industries, and has returned to its pre-pandemic trend. Industry-level analysis finds higher labor market churn and greater investment in digitalization, particularly in teleworkable industries, are associated with higher productivity growth.

Mai Chi Dao and Josef Platzer International Monetary Fund
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Data processing and media-related sectors with high technology investment and work-from-home potential saw annual productivity growth of nearly 10% from Q4 ‘19 to Q4 ‘23, while productivity in construction and wholesale trade fell by over 2%.

What drove U.S. productivity swings and its return to trend?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity swung widely since 2020 due to both compositional and within-industry effects, but has returned to its pre-pandemic trend.

We study U.S. labor productivity growth and its drivers since the COVID-19 pandemic. Labor productivity experienced large swings since 2020, due to both compositional and within-industry effects, but has since returned to its pre-pandemic trend. Industry-level panel regressions show that measures of labor market churn are associated with higher productivity growth both in the cross-section and over time. Sectors with higher investment in digitalization, particularly in teleworkable industries, also experience higher productivity growth on average. There has also been an increase in business formation since the pandemic, but its impact on productivity dynamics will likely need more time to be reflected in the data.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity swung widely since 2020 due to both compositional and within-industry effects, but has returned to its pre-pandemic trend.
  2. Industry-level panel regressions show that measures of labor market churn are associated with higher productivity growth both across industries and over time.
  3. Sectors with higher investment in digitalization, particularly in teleworkable industries, experience higher productivity growth on average, while the impact of increased business formation since the pandemic will likely need more time to appear in the data.

Related Articles:

  • Business Spending Is Lining Up to Reinforce Growth — Around 70% of sectors are posting positive year-over-year profit growth, with big tech showing the largest acceleration in demand and profits but strength broadening across the economy. Companies are responding with rising capital spending growth and more optimistic investment plans, as firms typically add capacity with a slight lag after real demand picks up.
  • Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls — The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.
  • High Tech Business Entry In The Pandemic Era — High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.

AI Summary. China holds 6% of the world's freshwater while supporting 20% of its population, with most northern provinces—home to 40% of Chinese people—falling below the United Nations threshold for water scarcity. Himalayan glaciers feeding China's major rivers have lost a fifth of their ice cover, and meltwater runoff is expected to begin declining around mid-century.

Economist Staff The Economist
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Changes in weather patterns are adding stress to China’s water supply. With 20% of the global population, China has only 6% of the world’s freshwater.

Is China's water supply strained by scarcity and shrinking glaciers?

Core argument: China holds just 6% of the world's freshwater while supporting 20% of the world's population, and its uneven internal distribution has led leaders past and present to rely on large infrastructure projects to move water from wetter to drier regions.

With just 6% of the world’s freshwater China must quench the thirst of 20% of the world’s people. The uneven distribution of the country’s water adds to the challenge. Chinese leaders past and present have relied on big infrastructure projects to move it from wetter to drier places. But now climate change is testing the entire country. Northern China has long been parched. Most of the provinces in the region, where 40% of the population lives, fall below the threshold for “water scarcity” set by the UN. Another trend is hitting western China. Glaciers high in the Himalayas, which feed the country’s great rivers are retreating. 1/5 of their ice cover has melted since the 1950s. For the moment, that is making parts of China wetter. Oases in western deserts are blooming. But around mid-century, the meltwater runoff is expected to start decreasing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China holds just 6% of the world's freshwater while supporting 20% of the world's population, and its uneven internal distribution has led leaders past and present to rely on large infrastructure projects to move water from wetter to drier regions.
  2. Most provinces in northern China, home to 40% of the country's population, fall below the UN threshold for "water scarcity.".
  3. Himalayan glaciers feeding China's great rivers have lost one-fifth of their ice cover since the 1950s, which for the moment is making parts of China wetter and western desert oases bloom, though meltwater runoff is expected to start decreasing around mid-century.

Related Articles:

  • Global Water Scarcity: H2O No! — Less than 1% of the planet's water is usable; water demand has risen about 40% over 40 years and is estimated to increase another 25% by 2050, while supply has more than halved since 1970. Some 57% of global freshwater aquifers are beyond their tipping point, and one-third of piped fresh water is lost to leakage.
  • Climate Change and the Geography of the U.S. Economy — The positive association between extreme heat and U.S. county population growth weakened over recent decades and disappeared entirely in the 2010s, as hot counties grew hotter. Projected climate change is predicted to shift population from the Southeast and parts of the Southwest toward the North, Mountain West, and Pacific coast.
  • Arizona Is Running Out of Cheap Water. Investors Saw It Coming — Phoenix-area suburbs are paying sharply higher prices for water rights from a basin west of the city, with one suburb approving $80m for 6,000 acre-feet — more than double the per-acre-foot price another suburb paid earlier. Arizona's groundwater replenishment assessments rose from $154 to $768 per acre-foot.

AI Summary. Ice loss from Alaska's Juneau Icefield accelerated, with glacier volume loss of 0.65–1.01 km³ per year from 1770–1979 rising to 3.08–3.72 km³ from 1979–2010 and 5.91 ± 0.80 km³ from 2010–2020. The authors attribute the acceleration to rising snowline elevations and pervasive plateau thinning that trigger melt-accelerating feedbacks likely to inhibit future regrowth.

Bethan Davies, Robert McNabb, Jacob Bendle, Jonathan Carrivick, Jeremy Ely, Tom Holt, Bradley Markle, Christopher McNeil, Lindsey Nicholson and Mauri Pelto Nature Communications
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The rate of ice loss in the Juneau Icefield in Alaska has doubled after 2010 relative to 1979-1990. The ice field has lost 25% of its volume since the late 18th century when the glaciers expanded during the Little Ice Age.

Why has ice loss from an Alaskan plateau icefield accelerated?

Core argument: Volume loss from Alaska's Juneau Icefield reached 5.91 ± 0.80 km³ a⁻¹ during 2010–2020, roughly double the 3.08–3.72 km³ a⁻¹ rate of 1979–2010 and above the 0.65–1.01 km³ a⁻¹ that held from 1770–1979.

Ice loss from Juneau Icefield, a plateau icefield in Alaska, accelerated after 2005 AD. Rates of area shrinkage were 5 times faster from 2015–2019 than from 1979–1990. Glacier volume loss remained fairly consistent (0.65–1.01 km3 a−1) from 1770–1979 AD, rising to 3.08–3.72 km3 a−1 from 1979–2010, and then doubling after 2010 AD, reaching 5.91 ± 0.80 km3 a−1 (2010–2020). Thinning has become pervasive across the icefield plateau since 2005, accompanied by glacier recession and fragmentation. Rising equilibrium line altitudes and increasing ablation across the plateau has driven a series of hypsometrically controlled melt-accelerating feedbacks and resulted in the observed acceleration in mass loss. As glacier thinning on the plateau continues, a mass balance-elevation feedback is likely to inhibit future glacier regrowth, potentially pushing glaciers beyond a dynamic tipping point.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Volume loss from Alaska's Juneau Icefield reached 5.91 ± 0.80 km³ a⁻¹ during 2010–2020, roughly double the 3.08–3.72 km³ a⁻¹ rate of 1979–2010 and above the 0.65–1.01 km³ a⁻¹ that held from 1770–1979.
  2. Juneau Icefield area shrinkage ran 5 times faster in 2015–2019 than in 1979–1990, with thinning pervasive across the icefield plateau since 2005 alongside glacier recession and fragmentation.
  3. Rising equilibrium line altitudes and increasing ablation across the Juneau Icefield plateau are identified as driving hypsometrically controlled melt-accelerating feedbacks, with a mass balance-elevation feedback likely to inhibit future glacier regrowth.

Related Articles:

  • The Rapid Loss Of Antarctic Sea Ice Brings Grim Scenarios Into View — Unusual wind and wave patterns are a leading short-term explanation for the loss of Antarctic sea ice, which holds the continent's coastal ice shelves in place. If those shelves collapsed, continental ice could flow rapidly into the oceans; the West Antarctic ice sheet alone holds enough water to raise global sea level by 11 feet.
  • What Happens in Antarctica, Doesn’t Stay in Antarctica — Antarctic sea-ice extent reached a level three times further from the average than any previously recorded in July, and only 0.2–0.4% of the continent is currently exposed above the ice. Further warming is likely to expose more land, reducing the surface's reflectivity and increasing the heat the planet absorbs.
  • Antarctic Sea Ice Has Shrunk By An Area Nine Times The Size Of Britain — Antarctic sea ice cover fell to 10.7m square km, 1.15m square km below the prior record low for that date and 2.3m square km below the 1981–2010 average. Scientists have not established why sea ice around the continent dropped so steeply after an earlier period of growth.