Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, July 1, 2024

AI Summary. US law allows up to $800 of imports per person per day to enter duty-free with minimal customs requirements, and such shipments are not recorded in Census trade data. Analysis of carrier and customs shipment data finds lower-income zip codes are more likely to import these shipments, particularly from China.

Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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Database

Imports valued at <$800 enter the US duty-free, and have grown from $9.2B in 2016 to $54.5B in 2023, 19% of US e-commerce spending, and are not reflected in Census trade data. These imports are largely direct-to-consumer shipments from China.

Do lower-income households benefit most from duty-free small imports?

Core argument: Section 321 of the 1930 Tariff Act lets up to $800 of imports per person per day enter the US duty-free with minimal customs requirements, and such de minimis shipments are not recorded in Census trade data.

Section 321 of the 1930 Tariff Act allows up to $800 in imports per person per day to enter the US duty-free and with minimal customs requirements. Fueled by rising direct-to-consumer trade, these “de minimis” shipments have exploded yet are not recorded in Census trade data. Who benefits from this type of trade, and what are the policy implications? We analyze international shipment data, including de minimis shipments, from three global carriers and US Customs and Border Protection. Lower-income zip codes are more likely to import de minimis shipments, particularly from China, suggesting that the tariff and administrative fee incidence in direct-to-consumer trade is pro-poor

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Section 321 of the 1930 Tariff Act lets up to $800 of imports per person per day enter the US duty-free with minimal customs requirements, and such de minimis shipments are not recorded in Census trade data.
  2. Analyzing shipment data from three global carriers and US Customs and Border Protection, the authors find lower-income zip codes are more likely to import de minimis shipments, particularly from China.
  3. The concentration of de minimis imports in lower-income zip codes suggests that the incidence of tariffs and administrative fees in direct-to-consumer trade is pro-poor.

Related Articles:

  • Setser On Kearney Reshoring Index — US imports from Southeast Asia have risen, but China's reported exports to the US exceed recorded US imports from China by about 10%, reflecting incentives to shift final assembly and to avoid tariffs. Trade data cannot show how much Chinese content is embedded in rising Southeast Asian imports.
  • He Helped Trump Remake Global Trade. His Work Isn’t Done — A former U.S. trade representative argues that countries running chronic trade surpluses for decades are by definition protectionist, and backs a universal 10% tariff plus a higher tariff on China to push toward globally balanced trade over time. Alternatives include import certificates tied to exports and a charge on foreign investment in U.S. assets.
  • Brazil, India, and Mexico are Taking on China’s Exports — Foreign direct investment into China fell to a 30-year low even as Chinese leaders launched an investment push in high-tech goods such as batteries and electric vehicles. Weak domestic demand for cars, chemicals, and steel has pushed Chinese goods into global markets, with average manufactured export prices down nearly 10% and export volumes near record levels.

AI Summary. Amazon plans a discount service shipping low-cost fashion, household, and other goods directly from warehouses in China, replicating the supply-chain approach of rivals Temu and Shein. Those platforms keep prices low by avoiding fast delivery and U.S. inventory, and by using a U.S. rule exempting shipments valued at $800 or less from certain tariffs.

Tracy Qu and Sherry Qin The Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Amazon plans to launch a service focused on shipping cheap products directly from warehouses in China to counter growing competition from low-cost Chinese e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein.

How are low-cost Chinese e-commerce platforms reshaping American retail competition?

Core argument: Amazon plans a service shipping cheap fashion wear, household goods, and other products directly from warehouses in China, as it faces growing competition from low-cost e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein.

Amazon.com plans to launch a service focused on shipping cheap fashion wear, household goods, and other products directly from warehouses in China, as it faces growing competition from low-cost e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein. Both companies are able to offer lower prices in part because they avoid the expense of fast delivery. They ship products directly from China and don’t store much inventory in the U.S. Temu, Shein, and other e-commerce companies benefit from a U.S. statute that allows shipments with a value of $800 or less to enter the country without facing certain tariffs. Merchants who are part of Amazon’s new service could also benefit from the rule. “The only way Amazon could match prices was to replicate the supply-chain advantage,” said Juozas Kaziukėnas, founder of market research firm Marketplace Pulse.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amazon plans a service shipping cheap fashion wear, household goods, and other products directly from warehouses in China, as it faces growing competition from low-cost e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein.
  2. Temu and Shein keep prices low partly by forgoing fast delivery, shipping directly from China and holding little U.S. inventory, and by using a U.S. statute exempting shipments valued at $800 or less from certain tariffs.
  3. Merchants in Amazon's new service could also benefit from the $800 shipment rule, and Marketplace Pulse founder Juozas Kaziukėnas said the only way Amazon could match prices was to replicate the supply-chain advantage.

Related Articles:

  • The Value of De Minimis Imports — US law allows up to $800 of imports per person per day to enter duty-free with minimal customs requirements, and such shipments are not recorded in Census trade data. Analysis of carrier and customs shipment data finds lower-income zip codes are more likely to import these shipments, particularly from China.

AI Summary. Inflation expectations derived from the gap between regular Treasury yields and inflation-indexed Treasury yields show expected annual inflation over the next 10 and 20 years running considerably above expected inflation for the decade beginning 20 years out. Before the pandemic-era inflation surge, actual inflation and expected future inflation tracked each other closely.

Jesper Rangvid Rangvid's Blog
Date Posted:

Jesper Rangvid reviews the pricing of Treasuries relative to TIPS and concludes that the market expects annual inflation of 2.33% in 2024-34 and 2.65% in 2034-44, implying “the Fed will struggle to control inflation for the next twenty years.”

Do bond markets expect inflation to stay above target for two decades?

Core argument: Subtracting expected real interest rates from Inflation-Indexed Treasuries from expected nominal Treasury rates yields expected inflation excluding risk premiums, measured over the next 10 years, 2034–2044, and 2044–2054.

By subtracting [expected real interest rates from Inflation-Indexed Treasuries] from [expected nominal interest rates from Treasuries], we can determine expected inflation rates (excluding the effects of risk premiums). Figure 2 illustrates the results of this calculation, showing the expected annual inflation rate over the next 10 years (10y), the expected annual inflation rate for the period from 2034 to 2044 (10y10y), and the expected annual inflation rate for the period from 2044 to 2054 (20y10y). Figure 2 reveals an interesting development in expected inflation following the inflation flare-up in 2021. Up until the pandemic, inflation and expected future inflation closely tracked each other. However, after the pandemic and the associated inflation surge, expected inflation over the next ten and twenty years is considerably higher than expected inflation twenty years out.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Subtracting expected real interest rates from Inflation-Indexed Treasuries from expected nominal Treasury rates yields expected inflation excluding risk premiums, measured over the next 10 years, 2034–2044, and 2044–2054.
  2. Expected inflation over the next ten and twenty years is considerably higher than expected inflation twenty years out, a divergence that followed the pandemic and the 2021 inflation surge.
  3. Up until the pandemic, inflation and expected future inflation closely tracked each other.

Related Articles:

  • Don’t Rely (Too Much) On Implied Forward Rates When Predicting Future Interest Rates — Market-implied forward rates are highly correlated with current interest rates, so with the US ten-year rate around 4.5% they imply it will stay near 4.5% decades ahead; academic research finds such expectations are usually poor predictions. Estimates of the future neutral interest rate instead suggest future rates will be low.
  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • An Analysis of Pandemic-Era Inflation In 11 Economies — A cross-country analysis of 11 economies finds wide agreement that global energy and food price increases and supply disruptions in key sectors drove pandemic-era inflation, and that their recession accounts for most of the global cooling of inflation. The authors find tight labor markets had smaller but more persistent inflationary effects, leaving wage inflation as the larger remaining factor.

AI Summary. US labor income net of social insurance taxes has grown at a 6% annual rate while nominal consumer spending grew 4% and capital income 3%. Growth in core "market-based" consumer spending is running about half a percentage point below its 4.4% pre-pandemic annual average, while net labor income runs roughly a point faster.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

The pace of consumer spending has slowed to 4% the slowest rate since the pandemic. @M_C_Klein argues that this pace may allow for an “immaculate disinflation,” a return to target inflation without a major hit to labor markets.

Is consumer spending growing more slowly than labor income?

Core argument: Labor income net of social insurance taxes has grown at a 6% annual rate since the end of 2023, while nominal consumer spending has grown 4% and capital income 3% annualized.

Since the end of 2023, the total amount of dollars earned as labor income net of social insurance taxes has grown at a yearly rate of 6%. Over the same period, nominal consumer spending has grown at a yearly rate of just 4%. (Capital income has grown by 3% annualized.) Focus specifically on the subset of consumer spending that excludes imputations as well as volatile food and energy prices, and nominal spending growth year-to-date has been slower than in any five-month period since the great reopening. In fact, the annualized growth rate in the dollar value of core “market-based” consumer spending so far this year is about half a percentage point slower than the January 2018-February 2020 yearly average of 4.4%. By contrast, net labor income is currently rising about 1 percentage faster than the pre-pandemic pace.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Labor income net of social insurance taxes has grown at a 6% annual rate since the end of 2023, while nominal consumer spending has grown 4% and capital income 3% annualized.
  2. Core "market-based" consumer spending, which excludes imputations and volatile food and energy prices, has grown year-to-date at an annualized rate about half a percentage point below the January 2018–February 2020 average of 4.4%.
  3. Net labor income is rising about 1 percentage point faster than its pre-pandemic pace, while nominal growth in core market-based consumer spending year-to-date is slower than in any five-month period since the great reopening.

Related Articles:

  • An Update About How Inflation Has Affected Households at Different Income Levels Since 2019 — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that income after transfers and taxes grew faster than consumption prices for all income groups, lowering the share of income needed to buy the same goods by 2% for the lowest-income fifth and 6.3% for the highest-income fifth.
  • Has Pay Kept Up With Inflation? — All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.
  • The Defining Economic Issue of the US Election — Although inflation has largely receded from the 2021-23 shock, the price level remains elevated: the US consumer price index is about 20% above its level at the start of the Biden administration. A back-of-the-envelope estimate puts the aggregate price level roughly 15 percentage points higher than if inflation had continued on its 1.5% pre-COVID path.

AI Summary. The 10 largest companies in the S&P 500 account for 35% of its market value but only 23% of its earnings, the widest such gap on record. The author argues this reflects record bullishness on future earnings from a small group of companies, compounding the index's concentration.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

The top 10 firms in the S&P 500 make up 35% of market cap but only 23% of earnings, a record gap. Torsten Sløk argues the market is “looking more vulnerable.”

Does top-company concentration leave the index more vulnerable?

Core argument: The top 10 companies in the S&P 500 account for 35% of index market cap but only 23% of earnings, the widest such divergence on record.

The top 10 companies in the S&P 500 make up 35% of the market cap but only 23% of earnings. This divergence has never been bigger, suggesting that the market is record bullish on future earnings for the top 10 companies in the index. In other words, the problem for the S&P 500 today is not only the high concentration but also the record-high bullishness on future earnings from a small group of companies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 10 companies in the S&P 500 account for 35% of index market cap but only 23% of earnings, the widest such divergence on record.
  2. The record gap between the top 10 companies' share of S&P 500 market cap and their share of earnings suggests the market is record bullish on those firms' future earnings.
  3. The S&P 500 faces not only high concentration in a small group of companies but also record-high bullishness on that group's future earnings.

Related Articles:

  • The Life Cycle of Market Champions — The 10 largest US companies make up almost one-third of US equity market capitalization, a concentration not seen in decades. Historically, about half of each decade's largest companies underperform the market and drop out of the top 15 within a decade or two, and nearly all are eventually displaced.
  • Stock Market Concentration — Over 2014–2023 the 10 largest U.S. stocks averaged 19% of market capitalization while generating 47% of total economic profit, and by 2023 they were 27% of market capitalization and 69% of economic profit. The S&P 500 returned above its average when concentration was rising and below it when concentration was falling.
  • The Concentration Conundrum; What To Do About Market Dominance — The largest US stocks make up a bigger share of the equity market than during the 2000 technology bubble, yet their valuations are lower than in earlier bubble episodes including the Nifty 50 of the early 1970s and Japan's late-1980s bubble. Today's dominant companies are also more profitable with stronger balance sheets.

AI Summary. U.S. sales of electricity to commercial customers exceeded pre-pandemic levels by 14 billion kilowatt-hours, or 1%, with growth concentrated in a few states building large-scale computing facilities such as data centers. Virginia added the most demand at 14 billion kilowatt-hours, followed by Texas at 13 billion.

Nilay Manzagol and Tyler Hodge Energy Information Administration
Date Posted:

American electrical consumption was 1% higher than pre-pandemic levels in 2023; demand growth has been concentrated in states with data center clusters led by Virginia and Texas.

Is commercial electricity demand growth concentrated in data center states?

Core argument: U.S. sales of electricity to commercial customers totaled 14 BkWh, or 1%, more in 2023 than in 2019, with the growth concentrated in a handful of states developing large-scale computing facilities such as data centers.

Consumption of electricity in the U.S. commercial sector has recovered from pandemic levels, with annual U.S. sales of electricity to commercial customers in 2023 totaling 14 billion kilowatt-hours (BkWh), or 1%, more than in 2019. However, the growth in commercial demand for electricity is concentrated in a handful of states experiencing rapid development of large-scale computing facilities such as data centers. Electricity demand has grown the most in Virginia, which added 14 BkWh, and Texas, which added 13 BkWh. Electricity demand has grown the most in Virginia, largely driven by Dominion Energy Virginia, the main electricity utility in the state. Virginia has become a major hub for data centers, with 94 new kilowatt-hours connected since 2019 given the access to a densely packed fiber backbone and to four subsea fiber cables.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. sales of electricity to commercial customers totaled 14 BkWh, or 1%, more in 2023 than in 2019, with the growth concentrated in a handful of states developing large-scale computing facilities such as data centers.
  2. Virginia added the most commercial electricity demand at 14 BkWh, followed by Texas at 13 BkWh, with Virginia's growth largely driven by Dominion Energy Virginia, the state's main electricity utility.
  3. Virginia has become a major hub for data centers, connecting 94 new kilowatt-hours since 2019, with access to a densely packed fiber backbone and four subsea fiber cables.

Related Articles:

  • Generational Growth AI, Data Centers and the Coming US Power Demand Surge — Data center power demand is projected to grow 15% annually through 2030, lifting data centers to 8% of US power demand from about 3% and raising overall US power demand growth to 2.4% a year versus roughly 0% over the prior decade.
  • Electricity 2024 — More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.
  • Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions — Under a scenario based on announced government pledges, global electricity demand is projected to grow 2.7% per year, more than doubling from just under 25,000 terawatt-hours to nearly 54,000 terawatt-hours by 2050. Hydrogen production via electrolysis and electric vehicles account for more than half of that projected growth.

Tuesday, July 2, 2024

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the slowdown in US labor supply growth can explain up to 52% of the decline in the start-up rate and up to 80% of the decline in start-ups' share of employment. In their model, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which comes through entry of new firms or a lower real wage.

Fatih Karahan, Benjamin Pugsley and Ayşegül Şahin American Economic Review
Date Posted:
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Database

.@yfatihkarahan et al argue that 52% of the decline in US start-ups since the late 1970s is explained by a drop in labor supply growth linked to demographics. The findings are supported by cross-state startup and labor supply growth data.

Does slower labor force growth explain the declining start-up rate?

Core argument: The slowdown in US labor supply growth, which began in the late 1970s, can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups' decline in employment share.

The start-up rate is linked in equilibrium to the pace of labor supply growth, which slowed dramatically in the late 1970s. The slowdown in US labor supply growth can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups’ decline in employment share. It explains the widespread declines across markets since the labor force growth slowdown affected them nearly universally, and it explains the stability of average incumbent dynamics conditional on their age, with aggregate effects following from the resulting shift towards older firms. We validate the model’s implications using variation across states and in the aggregate time series. Why should labor supply growth affect the start-up rate at all? Ultimately, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which can only arise from a decline in the real wage that allows incumbent labor demand to expand or through entry of new firms. A lesson from models of firm dynamics is that in the long run, free entry of new firms relieves any pressure on the real wage from shifts in labor supply.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The slowdown in US labor supply growth, which began in the late 1970s, can explain up to 52% of the declining start-up rate and up to 80% of start-ups' decline in employment share.
  2. Because the labor force growth slowdown affected markets nearly universally, the model accounts for widespread declines in start-up rates across markets, with aggregate effects following from a resulting shift toward older firms.
  3. In the model, growing labor supply requires growing labor demand, which arises either from a decline in the real wage that lets incumbent firms expand or from entry of new firms, with free entry relieving real wage pressure in the long run.

Related Articles:

  • High Tech Business Entry In The Pandemic Era — High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.
  • America is in the Midst of an Extraordinary Startup Boom — US business-formation applications reached a record 5.5m in a year, with the monthly average running about 80% above the pre-pandemic decade versus a 20% rise in Europe. In the four years before the pandemic, established firms added one net job for every four created by startups; in the four years since, they lost one for every four.
  • Business Applications Eked Out a New Record in 2023 — Americans filed 5.5m applications to start new businesses in a single year, nearly 1.8m of them highly likely to hire employees — both series highs in U.S. Census Bureau Business Formation Statistics. Likely-employer applications ran 37% above pre-pandemic levels, evidence that startup activity has settled at a higher baseline.

AI Summary. Younger Americans now hold about double the average wealth Generation X had at the same age, roughly matching what Generation X and Baby Boomers had 5-6 years later in life. Generation X and Baby Boomers currently have roughly equal average wealth at the same age, after Generation X had been about $100,000 ahead.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:

Based on Q1 2024 Federal Reserve data, real mean wealth per capita for 31-year-old Millennials & Gen Z (born 1981-2006) is about double their Gen X counterparts (1965-80) when they were 31 years old. @jmhorp

Are young Americans wealthier than earlier generations were at the same age?

Core argument: Millennials and Gen Z hold roughly double the wealth Gen X had at the same age, with average wealth matching what Gen X and Boomers had five to six years later in life.

What’s notable about the data is just how much the youngest “generation” in the chart has jumped up in recent years. They now have about double the wealth that Gen X had at roughly the same age. Average wealth is about as much as Gen X and Boomers had 5-6 years later in life — and while there are no guarantees, odds are Millennial/Gen Z wealth will be much, much higher in another 5-6 years. You may notice at the tail end of the chart that Gen X and Boomers now have roughly equal amounts of average wealth at the same age (Gen X’s current age), while 2 years ago they were $100,000 ahead. I suspect this is just temporary, and Gen X will soon be ahead again, but we shall see.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Millennials and Gen Z hold roughly double the wealth Gen X had at the same age, with average wealth matching what Gen X and Boomers had five to six years later in life.
  2. Gen X and Boomers hold roughly equal average wealth at Gen X's current age, after Gen X led by about $100,000 two years earlier.

Related Articles:

  • Has Intergenerational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans — Using post-tax, post-transfer income data, the authors find each of the past four US generations was better off than the prior one, with Millennials' real median household income at ages 36–40 18% above the previous generation's, versus 34% for the Silent Generation, 27% for Baby Boomers, and 16% for Generation X.
  • Young People Have a Lot More Wealth Than We Thought — Wealth data for young people comes from the Federal Reserve's quarterly Distributional Financial Accounts, which project forward results from the Survey of Consumer Finances conducted every three years. When newer survey results were released, young people turned out to hold considerably more wealth than the projections based on the prior survey had indicated.
  • The Cost of Thriving Has Fallen: Correcting and Rejecting the American Compass Cost of Thriving Index — The authors recalculate the Cost of Thriving Index and estimate the cost of supporting a family on one male earner's wages rose by just over 10 weeks of work rather than 22 weeks. Accounting for federal taxes—including the child tax credit—and quality improvements in health care and cars, they estimate the cost is now lower than in 1985.

AI Summary. An election forecasting model shows Trump leading the national polling average by 2.7 points, with Biden's win probability falling to 28% from 35%. The model's authors attribute the shift to a weak debate performance by Biden rather than random polling noise.

Nate Silver and Eli Mckown-Dawson Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

As of July 1st @NateSilver538 notes Biden’s debate performance is showing up in his model; Trump now leads by 2.7p in his national average and Biden’s probability of an electoral win has dropped from 35% on the night of the debate to 28%.

Does a weak debate performance lower an incumbent's election forecast?

Core argument: Joe Biden's win probability in the Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast has fallen to 28% from 35% on debate night.

Last update: 6:40 p.m, Monday, July 1: We’ve got a string of polls in late this afternoon, they’re mostly poor for Joe Biden, and they’re beginning to have a bigger impact on the model. Trump now leads by 2.7 points in our national average. And Biden’s win probability has dropped to 28% from 35% on debate night. Our guess is that more likely than not, there’s some further decline ahead: the model is trying to figure out whether this is random noise, but instead it’s almost certainly caused by a challenging first debate for Biden. It’s not great news for the president.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Joe Biden's win probability in the Silver Bulletin 2024 presidential forecast has fallen to 28% from 35% on debate night.
  2. Donald Trump leads Biden by 2.7 points in the Silver Bulletin national polling average, following a string of polls that were mostly poor for Biden.
  3. Silver Bulletin judges further decline in Biden's numbers more likely than not, attributing the shift almost certainly to a challenging first debate rather than random noise.

Related Articles:

  • The Presidential Election Isn’t A Toss-Up — A presidential election model's simulations show that a candidate who loses Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada must sweep Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, which are correlated but differ in rural share and demographics. The simulations have him winning at least one of the three 54% of the time but all three only 32%.
  • Outlier Poll Results Are Inevitable. They’re Also Sometimes Right. — A New York Times/Siena College national poll found Trump ahead of Biden by six percentage points among registered voters and three among likely voters, well outside the average of polls, which showed Trump up by one point. The authors argue poll averages are a safer measure, though outlier results are sometimes right.
  • If Everyone Voted, Would Biden Benefit? Not Anymore — Polling indicates infrequent, less engaged voters now favor the Republican presidential candidate, a reversal that would mean higher turnout benefits Republicans rather than Democrats. In Pennsylvania, new registrants under automatic voter registration have affiliated with Republicans over Democrats by six percentage points.

AI Summary. Panama's president has pledged to halt illegal migration through the Darién Gap and cooperate with the US government in limiting arrivals at its southern border, saying the country can no longer bear the economic and social costs of migration.

Christine Murray Financial Times
Date Posted:

Panama’s new President has pledged to work with the US to close the Darién Gap, “Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.” Last year at least 500,000 people crossed the gap, largely on their way to the US.

Will Panama close its migrant route and cooperate with the US?

Core argument: Panama's president José Raúl Mulino pledged in his inauguration speech to halt illegal immigration through the Darién Gap, declaring that "Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.".

Panama’s new president has pledged to halt illegal immigration through the notorious Darién Gap and work with the US government as it seeks to limit arrivals at its southern border ahead of its presidential election. José Raúl Mulino, the right-wing leader who won the May vote, said in his inauguration speech on Monday that the country could no longer pay the economic and social costs associated with migration. “Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals,” he said, adding that migrants were being organised by “international groups related to drug trafficking and people smuggling”.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Panama's president José Raúl Mulino pledged in his inauguration speech to halt illegal immigration through the Darién Gap, declaring that "Panama will no longer be a transit country for illegals.".
  2. Mulino, the right-wing leader who won Panama's May election, said the country could no longer pay the economic and social costs associated with migration.
  3. Mulino said migrants were being organised by "international groups related to drug trafficking and people smuggling," and pledged to work with the US government as it seeks to limit arrivals at its southern border ahead of its presidential election.

Related Articles:

  • Migration at US Southern Border Slumps on Regional Efforts — Encounters between migrants and US immigration authorities fell to about 190,000 per month in February and March from a record of more than 300,000 in December, after Mexico restored funding for migration services and increased deportations. Administration officials say encounters over four months were down 40% from the prior four-month period.
  • The Force Shaping Western Politics — The foreign-born share of the population has risen sharply since 1990 in nearly every large Western country. As mainstream politicians from the center-right to the left dismissed voters' concerns about immigration, many voters drifted toward extreme-right parties that promised to reduce it.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.