Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
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Monday, June 24, 2024

Trump and Biden: The National Debt

AI Summary. An analysis of the estimated ten-year debt impact of enacted policies finds the Trump administration approved $8.4tn of new ten-year borrowing over a full term, or $4.8tn excluding COVID relief, while the Biden administration approved $4.3tn over three years and five months, or $2.2tn excluding the American Rescue Plan.

CRFB Staff Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A new @MarcGoldwein @BudgetHawks analysis finds that Trump approved $2.9T of net non-Covid related borrowing, plus $1.9T for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. So far Biden has approved $2.2T of net borrowing, plus $2.1T for the American Rescue Plan.

How much new ten-year borrowing did recent administrations approve?

Core argument: President Trump approved an estimated $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing over his full term, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief, based on policy costs scored around the time of enactment.

This analysis focuses on the estimated ten-year debt impact of policies approved by Presidents Trump and Biden around the time of enactment. In this analysis, we find: President Trump approved $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing during his full term in office, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief. President Biden, in his first three years and five months in office, approved $4.3 trillion of new ten-year borrowing, or $2.2 trillion excluding the American Rescue Plan. President Trump approved $8.8 trillion of gross new borrowing and $443 billion of deficit reduction during his full presidential term. President Biden has so far approved $6.2 trillion of gross new borrowing and $1.9 trillion of deficit reduction.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Trump approved an estimated $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing over his full term, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief, based on policy costs scored around the time of enactment.
  2. President Biden approved an estimated $4.3 trillion of new ten-year borrowing in his first three years and five months in office, or $2.2 trillion excluding the American Rescue Plan.
  3. President Trump approved $8.8 trillion of gross new borrowing and $443 billion of deficit reduction during his full term, while President Biden has so far approved $6.2 trillion of gross new borrowing and $1.9 trillion of deficit reduction.

Allysia Finley commented, “…We could spend all night fact-checking both candidates, but a brief note on a tendentious question on the national debt posed by CNN moderator Jake Tapper. He referred to a study by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, which purportedly found that Donald Trump approved $8.4 trillion of new 10-year borrowing, while Joe Biden added only $4.3 trillion. The study inflates the cost of Mr. Trump’s tax cuts—including bipartisan efforts that repealed the Affordable Care Act’s medical device and Cadillac insurance taxes—while low-balling the costs of Mr. Biden’s spending increases and regulations. For example, the study dings Mr. Trump for adding to the debt by ending certain Affordable Care Act cost subsidies, which it says caused insurers to raise premiums and thereby increased other insurance subsidies. The outfit says Mr. Trump added to the deficit with a 2020 rule that restricted drug-maker rebates in Medicare, though that rule never took effect. Then the study claims that Mr. Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act reduced the national debt by delaying the same rebate rule and increasing IRS funding. All of which is to say that the figures cited by Mr. Tapper include subjective judgments that are biased in favor of Mr. Biden. But for the record, the national debt increased by $2.6 trillion during Mr. Trump’s first three years before Covid and $5.2 trillion during Mr. Biden’s first three….”

Marc Goldwein commented, Re: “But for record, the national debt increased by $2.6T during Mr. Trump’s first three years before Covid and $5.2T during Mr. Biden’s first three.” That’s true, but says nothing about how much debt each approved over a ten year period.   “…1) Their response over-estimates Biden executive orders by $800 billion — mainly because it counts proposals that haven’t been finalized ($150b) or even introduced ($350b), but also because they overestimate some provisions (~$200b) and don’t count deficit reducing executive orders (~$100b) 2) There is no “Extra $1.1 trillion” from the infrastructure bill. What they are referring to is a weird baseline budget rule quirk that required CBO to assume $1.1 trillion of extra costs in their 2022 baseline and then remove $1 trillion of that in their 2023 baseline 3) IRA does indeed save less/cost more, which we discuss in our paper. But our paper is based off of prospective estimates. And House budget overstates the difference — its probably about $250 billion worse than we say 4) TCJA also costs more, even though house budget says it costs less. Heck, estimates of extending TCJA have gone up 50%!. The extra $1 trillion they point to has nothing to do with TCJA, and was a one-time revenue surge from the big surprise inflation and capital gains during and after the pandemic.”

Related Articles:

  • An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects a federal budget deficit of $1.9tn in fiscal 2024, or $2tn excluding payment-timing shifts, rising to $2.8tn by 2034. On that adjusted basis, deficits equal 7% of gross domestic product in 2024, dip to 5.5% by 2027, and reach 6.9% by 2034, versus a 3.7% average over the past 50 years.
  • CBO Releases June 2024 Baseline Update — The Congressional Budget Office projects federal spending of $84.9tn (24.1% of GDP) over the next decade against revenue of $62.8tn (17.8% of GDP), compared with 50-year averages of 21% and 17.3%. Interest costs are projected to reach $892bn, more than defense or Medicare, and grow to $1.7tn (4.1% of GDP).
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget — The Congressional Budget Office projects that if private investment were more sensitive to federal deficits, debt held by the public would exceed 250% of GDP and real national income per person would be 18% ($21,300) lower than its baseline, with the average interest rate on federal debt 2pp higher.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics

Creating Shortages

AI Summary. Shelter inflation remains higher than before the pandemic and accounts for much of the remaining inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs. Tighter bank lending standards have stalled construction loans while high mortgage rates keep prospective buyers in the rental market, adding upward pressure on rents.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@FedGuy12 notes “the last mile of inflation has largely come down to shelter inflation” and argues that higher rates are counterproductive, reducing new supply.

Do higher financing costs restrict housing supply and keep shelter inflation elevated?

Core argument: Shelter inflation, which remains higher than pre-pandemic levels, accounts for much of the last mile of inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs that appear likely to remain structurally higher.

The last mile of inflation has largely come down to shelter inflation, which remains stubbornly higher than pre-pandemic. The reduced construction of housing appears to be due to higher financing costs, which look to remain structurally higher. From a supply perspective, the rapid rate hiking cycle quickly led to tightening of bank lending standards as banks anticipated higher default risk from a slowing economy. Bank loans to finance construction came to a standstill and have even slightly declined. Homebuilders report difficulty in getting financing for projects, though the largest home builders appear to be less affected. From a demand perspective, multi-decade high mortgage rates have reduced the ability of buyers to pay higher prices. Prospective buyers thus stay in the rental market and contribute to upward pressure on rents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Shelter inflation, which remains higher than pre-pandemic levels, accounts for much of the last mile of inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs that appear likely to remain structurally higher.
  2. The rapid rate hiking cycle tightened bank lending standards as banks anticipated higher default risk from a slowing economy, bringing bank construction loans to a standstill and slight decline, with homebuilders reporting difficulty financing projects.
  3. Multi-decade high mortgage rates have reduced buyers' ability to pay higher prices, keeping prospective buyers in the rental market and adding upward pressure on rents, while the largest homebuilders appear less affected.

Related Articles:

  • The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy Is Much Slower than Normal — The share of outstanding US mortgages with interest rates below 4% has risen from 38% before the pandemic to 63%, leaving millions of households insulated from Federal Reserve rate increases. The author argues this slows the transmission of monetary policy and will require the Federal Reserve to hold rates higher for longer to contain inflation.
  • It’s All About Shelter — Producer price inflation for final demand tracks consumer price inflation excluding shelter closely, and both show inflation under control; overall consumer inflation looks hot only because the shelter component is up 5.6%. That shelter measure lags rents by construction, and more current rent series show no recent inflation.
  • Importing Shelter Inflation — Shelter costs make up about 30% of the consumer price index, and their monthly inflation appears to be stabilizing above pre-pandemic rates rather than delivering the disinflation forward-looking data had implied. The author suggests this may be related to a surge in migration, estimated at 3.3m migrants in a year.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Housing

The Calm Before the Storm

AI Summary. Private credit and direct lending have not rewritten the rules of credit risk, and much financial innovation amounts to repackaging risk in higher-fee wrappers. High-yield bonds followed a comparable path: after the 1980s boom, below-investment-grade default rates reached roughly 10.4% and 9.1% before the market matured.

Greg Obenshain Verdad
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@GregObenshain argues direct lending, at $574B in June ‘23, 46% as large as the $1.25T high-yield market, is in “the calm before the storm,” that will be followed by a “default spiral.”

Has private credit rewritten the rules of credit risk?

Core argument: Moody's below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% in 1990 and 9.1% in 1991, following the junk bond boom of the 1980s.

In our view, neither private credit nor direct lending have rewritten the rules of credit risk. We’d argue that what passes for innovation in finance is often just repackaging risk in more convenient and higher-fee wrappers. To cite just one example of risky lending that grew rapidly, faced a reckoning and then developed into a more stable, mature market, look no further than high yield. The junk bond boom of the 1980s was built on the idea that the historical performance of high-yield bonds more than compensated for their higher risk. At its core, this idea has proved to be correct, but it was taken to extremes. After the boom in the 1980s, the Moody’s below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% and 9.1% in 1990 and 1991. But what developed afterwards was a mature market that is now tame compared with its history. We suspect that private credit will follow a similar path.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Moody's below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% in 1990 and 9.1% in 1991, following the junk bond boom of the 1980s.
  2. The authors argue that neither private credit nor direct lending has rewritten the rules of credit risk, and that much of what passes for financial innovation is risk repackaged in more convenient, higher-fee wrappers.
  3. High yield matured after its 1980s boom and reckoning into a market now tame relative to its own history, a path the authors suspect private credit will follow.

Related Articles:

  • Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks — Private credit loans are negotiated bilaterally outside traditional regulatory requirements and are illiquid because no secondary market exists, leaving investors expected to hold them to maturity or face steep losses if they need to exit. Scarce data on this growing form of nonbank lending makes assessing its risks difficult.
  • Where Are All the Defaults? — One explanation for subdued high-yield bond spreads is that the lowest-quality borrowers, those most likely to default, have migrated from high-yield markets into private credit. Moody's reports the number of issuers with its lowest speculative-grade ratings has fallen, and that 62% of its rated universe is rated single-B or below.
  • Corporate Debt, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Financial Crises — Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

AI’s $600B Question

AI Summary. Comparing spending on AI chips to historical railroad construction overlooks that high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost businesses without monopoly or oligopoly power tend to see prices competed down to marginal cost, and that semiconductors continually improve in cost versus performance, unlike physical infrastructure. Speculative frenzies accompany technology, but the payoff will take a long time.

David Cahn Sequoia Capital
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@DavidCahn6 at @sequoia argues that because of lack of pricing power and rapidly improving chip technologies, multi-$B investments in current-generation GPUs run the risk of “investment incineration.”

Is AI chip spending really comparable to building railroads?

Core argument: The author argues the "GPU CapEx is like building railroads" analogy misses that, absent a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost and low marginal cost businesses such as airlines see prices competed down to marginal cost.

One of the major rebuttals to my last piece was that “GPU CapEx is like building railroads.” I actually agree with this, but I think it misses a few points: Lack of pricing power: Without a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost + low marginal cost businesses almost always see prices competed down to marginal cost (e.g., airlines). Depreciation: We know from the history of technology that semiconductors tend to get better and better. Again, this parallel doesn’t exist for physical infrastructure, which does not follow any “Moore’s Law” type curve, such that cost vs. performance continuously improves. Speculative frenzies are part of technology, and so they are not something to be afraid of. But we need to make sure not to believe in the delusion that says that we’re all going to get rich quick, because AGI is coming tomorrow, and we all need to stockpile the only valuable resource, which is GPUs. In reality, the road ahead is going to be a long one. It will have ups and downs. But almost certainly it will be worthwhile.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the "GPU CapEx is like building railroads" analogy misses that, absent a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost and low marginal cost businesses such as airlines see prices competed down to marginal cost.
  2. Depreciation is the author's second objection to the railroad comparison: semiconductors historically keep improving on cost versus performance, while physical infrastructure follows no such "Moore's Law" type curve.
  3. The author frames speculative frenzies as part of technology rather than something to fear, while rejecting the delusion of getting rich quick because AGI is coming tomorrow and GPUs are the only valuable resource to stockpile.

Related Articles:

  • Are We on the Brink of an AI Investment Arms Race? — Spending on AI chips and data centers was a bit below $100bn in 2023, around 0.4% of US GDP, and the broader set of companies exposed to AI-related investment has not yet seen a major jump in sales. The authors argue the underlying dynamics point to a spending surge large enough to shape the business cycle.
  • The AI Transition One Year Later: On Track, but Macro Impact Still Several Years Off — Investment in AI hardware is projected to rise substantially as a precursor to integrating AI into business processes, with the investment cycle estimated to peak at 2–2½% of GDP and early signs visible among AI-enabling companies. The authors estimate generative AI could raise developed-market labor productivity growth by 1.5pp annually over a 10-year adoption period, roughly 15% cumulatively.
  • Measuring Trends in AI — The United States led the world in private artificial intelligence investment with $67.2bn, roughly 8.7x China's $7.8bn and 17.8x the United Kingdom's $3.8bn. Cumulative private AI investment over the prior decade shows the same ranking: $335.2bn for the United States, $103.7bn for China, and $22.3bn for the United Kingdom.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Europe’s Response to China Shock 2.0: Hold China Closer

AI Summary. European officials have largely welcomed greenfield investment from Chinese battery and electric-vehicle makers, including CATL, BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain. Chinese purchases of existing European businesses have collapsed, partly because of growing European scrutiny, while newly built plants and companies reached 78% of Chinese direct investment in Europe.

Tom Fairless and Bertrand Benoit Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

Chinese-made EVs have risen from 2.9% of the EU’s EV market in 2020 to 21.7% last year; in response, European governments are encouraging greenfield investment by Chinese battery and EV makers.

Is Europe welcoming Chinese factory investment while blocking company takeovers?

Core argument: Greenfield projects reached 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.

European officials have largely been in favor of investments from Chinese battery makers such as CATL and from Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturers such as BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain. While Chinese purchases of existing European businesses have collapsed in recent years, in part because of growing European scrutiny, greenfield investment—i.e. newly created companies or plants—has risen rapidly, reaching 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Greenfield projects reached 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.
  2. Chinese acquisitions of existing European businesses have collapsed in recent years, in part because of growing European scrutiny, while newly built Chinese plants and companies in Europe have risen rapidly.
  3. European officials have largely favored investments from Chinese battery maker CATL and Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturers including BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain.

Related Articles:

  • The World Is In For Another China Shock — Weak demand and overcapacity have pushed Chinese producer prices down for 16 months, and that disinflationary impulse is spreading abroad: US import prices from China fell 2.9% year over year while prices of imports from the European Union, Japan, and Mexico rose. Western protectionism could redirect the deflationary impact toward poorer markets.
  • EU To Hit Chinese Electric Cars With Tariffs Of Up To 48% — The European Commission will provisionally apply additional duties of 17–38% on imported Chinese electric vehicles, on top of an existing 10% tariff, with the rate depending on how far each carmaker cooperated with an EU subsidy investigation. EU officials say heavily subsidized Chinese imports put European industry at risk of injury.
  • Can Trade Intervention Lead to Freer Trade? — China accounts for over 31% of global manufacturing but under 13% of global consumption, while the United States accounts for under 17% of manufacturing and nearly 27% of consumption. The author argues persistent surpluses reflect household subsidies to producers, and that the US could counter them with tariffs or taxes on capital inflows.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

Emotions and Subjective Crash Beliefs

AI Summary. Using investor survey data and option prices, the authors decompose beliefs about stock market crashes into fundamental and subjective components, finding the subjective part is volatile and almost always positive. Investor sentiment, measured from survey narratives with a large language model, is correlated with this subjective component and with non-fundamental variation.

William Goetzmann, Dasol Kim and Robert Shiller National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database

.@RobertJShiller and @WGoetzmann find that subjective assessments consistently overestimate the risk of stock market collapse, and that emotional response to non-fundamental shocks explains at least some of the variation.

Do investor emotions shape beliefs about stock market crashes?

Core argument: Using more than two decades of Shiller's Stock Market Confidence Survey and option prices, the authors decompose investor crash beliefs into fundamental and subjective components, finding the subjective component highly volatile, typically right-skewed, and nearly always positive.

Using more than two decades of Shiller’s Stock Market Confidence Survey we decompose crash beliefs into subjective and fundamental components based upon option prices, [which] reflect the time-varying beliefs and preferences of the marginal investor in these markets [who] take[s] into account fundamental factors and on average, rationally assess[es] crash probabilities. The subjective crash probability measure is highly volatile, typically right-skew, and nearly always positive. To better understand the subjective component in crash risk forecasts, we apply a large language model (LLM) to [survey response] narratives, to construct high-frequency measures of sentiment/emotion. The model is fine-tuned using rich data on human-derived emotion annotations to narratives. We find that investor sentiment is correlated with the subjective crash probability component and find strong evidence that it is related to non-fundamental variation. [Finally] we find that exposure and attention to news of rare, extreme events: i.e. nearby earthquakes, large lottery winnings, and excess COVID deaths is significantly associated with a higher or lower rare crash probability, depending on emotional valence.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using more than two decades of Shiller's Stock Market Confidence Survey and option prices, the authors decompose investor crash beliefs into fundamental and subjective components, finding the subjective component highly volatile, typically right-skewed, and nearly always positive.
  2. Applying a large language model fine-tuned on human emotion annotations to survey response narratives, the authors construct high-frequency sentiment measures and find investor sentiment correlated with the subjective crash probability component and related to non-fundamental variation.
  3. Exposure and attention to news of rare, extreme events — nearby earthquakes, large lottery winnings, and excess COVID deaths — is significantly associated with a higher or lower rare crash probability, depending on emotional valence, according to the authors.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Expectations and Aggregate Fluctuations — When stock analysts' forecasts of long-term earnings growth for S&P 500 firms are high by historical standards, their forecasts of short- and long-term profits are systematically disappointed later, according to the authors. The authors estimate that a 1 standard deviation rise in these long-term forecasts is followed by an investment boom that reverses two years later.
  • The Expensive Stock Market — Falling interest rates reduced interest payments as a share of corporate profits, raising profits and stock market valuations. Measured against GDP, the US stock market is historically expensive, and since rates cannot fall as sharply as they have over the past four decades, expected future returns are low.
  • The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! — The U.S. stock market's cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio of 34 ranks in the top 1% of history while corporate profits sit near record levels, a combination the author argues means long-run return prospects are as poor as at almost any time in history. No sustained rally has begun from such valuations or from full employment.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Is Software Eating the World?

AI Summary. Using Korean firm- and establishment-level data, the authors estimate that equipment and labor are complements (elasticity 0.6) while software and labor are substitutes (1.6). They find production reallocates toward software-intensive firms, which have higher markups and lower labor shares, raising the aggregate markup and reducing the aggregate labor share.

Sangmin Aum and Yongseok Shin National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Analysis of firm and establishment-level data from Korea shows that software and labor are substitutes and that the rise of software accounts for two-thirds of the decline in Korean labor share of income between 1990 and 2018. @NBERpubs

Does software substitute for labor and lower the aggregate labor share?

Core argument: Using Korean firm- and establishment-level data, the authors estimate an elasticity of substitution of 0.6 between equipment and labor (complements) and 1.6 between software and labor (substitutes), a finding that helps reconcile the macro and micro elasticity discord.

When explaining the declining labor income share in advanced economies, the macro literature finds that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is greater than one. However, the vast majority of micro-level estimates shows that capital and labor are complements (elasticity less than one). Using firm- and establishment-level data from Korea, we divide capital into equipment and software, as they may interact with labor in different ways. Our estimation shows that equipment and labor are complements (elasticity 0.6), consistent with other micro-level estimates, but software and labor are substitutes (1.6), a novel finding that helps reconcile the macro vs. micro-literature elasticity discord. In addition, production reallocates toward firms that use software more intensively, as they become effectively more productive. Because in the data these firms have higher markups and lower labor shares, the reallocation further raises the aggregate markup and reduces the aggregate labor share.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Korean firm- and establishment-level data, the authors estimate an elasticity of substitution of 0.6 between equipment and labor (complements) and 1.6 between software and labor (substitutes), a finding that helps reconcile the macro and micro elasticity discord.
  2. Macro studies of the declining labor income share in advanced economies find a capital-labor elasticity of substitution greater than one, while the vast majority of micro-level estimates find capital and labor are complements, with elasticity below one.
  3. Production reallocates toward firms that use software more intensively as they become effectively more productive, and because those firms have higher markups and lower labor shares, the reallocation raises the aggregate markup and reduces the aggregate labor share.

Related Articles:

  • Perspectives on the Labor Share — The share of US income going to labor reached its lowest level since the Great Depression, falling roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022 across most industries, alongside a worldwide decline of about 6 percentage points since 1980. The author argues the most plausible causes are technological, including capital-augmenting technology.
  • Automation and Rent Dissipation: Implications for Wages, Inequality, and Productivity — The authors argue firms inefficiently automate jobs where wages exceed workers' opportunity cost, so new automation technologies that deliver small cost savings can reduce productivity, average real wages, and aggregate consumption. They estimate workers earned an average wage premium of 35% in jobs automated between 1980 and 2016.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — The authors estimate that post-pandemic labor market tightness compressed the US wage distribution, reducing the college wage premium and offsetting roughly one-quarter of the four-decade rise in 90-10 wage inequality. They attribute this in part to greater labor supply elasticity facing firms in low-wage markets, which reduced employer market power as young non-college workers moved to higher-paying jobs.
  • Investment
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

The American Worker

AI Summary. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages for the median U.S. worker grew 35.9% from 1980 to 2023, and weekly compensation including benefits grew roughly 45%. Gains were uneven by sex: women's real hourly wages rose 59.9% over that period while men's rose 15.6%.

Adam Ozimek, John Lettieri and Benjamin Glasner Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Strong growth since 1994 leaves US real median hourly wages up 36% since 1980. @BenGlasner @LettieriDC @ModeledBehavior

Have real wages for the typical American worker risen since 1980?

Core argument: Real hourly wages for the median U.S. worker grew 35.9% from 1980 to 2023 when adjusted for inflation using PCE, with weekly wages showing a similar gain.

The typical (median) U.S. worker is substantially better off than ever before. From 1980 to 2023, hourly wages for the median worker grew by 35.9% after accounting for inflation [as measured by PCE.]. Weekly wages tell a similar story. Progress becomes even more impressive when we expand the scope to include wages plus benefits, with weekly compensation growth of roughly 45% for the typical worker. The difference in wage growth between men and women is stark. Thanks to a 59.9% increase in real hourly wage since 1980, women have continued to enjoy the kind of boom that all workers experienced in the decades immediately following the Second World War. Meanwhile, menʼs wages have increased by only 15.6%. From 1994 to 2023, menʼs wages shot up 31.3%—almost perfectly reversing the previous rate of decline from -0.87% into positive annualized growth of 0.9%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real hourly wages for the median U.S. worker grew 35.9% from 1980 to 2023 when adjusted for inflation using PCE, with weekly wages showing a similar gain.
  2. Including benefits, weekly compensation for the typical U.S. worker rose roughly 45%.
  3. Women's real hourly wages rose 59.9% since 1980 versus 15.6% for men, while men's wages climbed 31.3% from 1994 to 2023, reversing an annualized decline of -0.87% into 0.9% growth.

Related Articles:

  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • Perspectives on the Labor Share — The share of US income going to labor reached its lowest level since the Great Depression, falling roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022 across most industries, alongside a worldwide decline of about 6 percentage points since 1980. The author argues the most plausible causes are technological, including capital-augmenting technology.
  • Are You Better Off Than You Were Four Years Ago? — Inflation-adjusted wages rose over the past four years, including when measured from just before the pandemic, at roughly the same pace as in the preceding years: about 3% cumulative growth adjusted by the consumer price index versus about 4% in 2015-2019, and about 5% growth adjusted by personal consumption prices.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

The Defining Economic Issue of the US Election

AI Summary. Although inflation has largely receded from the 2021-23 shock, the price level remains elevated: the US consumer price index is about 20% above its level at the start of the Biden administration. A back-of-the-envelope estimate puts the aggregate price level roughly 15 percentage points higher than if inflation had continued on its 1.5% pre-COVID path.

Stephen Roach Project Syndicate
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024

Despite slowing inflation, @SRoach_econ notes that the May 2024 CPI is currently 20% above its January 2021 level, and 15pp higher than its pre-COVID trajectory of 1.5% annual inflation.

Does falling inflation leave the price level far above its pre-pandemic trend?

Core argument: Headline CPI in May stood 20% above its January 2021 level, when President Biden took office, despite disinflation following the 2021–23 inflation shock.

The near-complete recovery from the inflation shock of 2021-23 contrasts sharply with the still-elevated price level. Therein lies the political problem for Biden: notwithstanding recent disinflation, the headline CPI in May was still fully 20% above its level in January 2021, when he took office. A back-of-the-envelope estimate suggests that, as of May, the aggregate price level, measured by headline CPI, is fully 15 percentage points higher than it would have been had the CPI maintained its 1.5% pre-COVID trajectory.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Headline CPI in May stood 20% above its January 2021 level, when President Biden took office, despite disinflation following the 2021–23 inflation shock.
  2. A back-of-the-envelope estimate puts the May aggregate price level, measured by headline CPI, 15 percentage points higher than it would have been had CPI continued its 1.5% pre-COVID trajectory.
  3. The near-complete recovery from the 2021–23 inflation shock contrasts with the still-elevated price level, which poses the political problem for Biden.

Related Articles:

  • An Update About How Inflation Has Affected Households at Different Income Levels Since 2019 — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that income after transfers and taxes grew faster than consumption prices for all income groups, lowering the share of income needed to buy the same goods by 2% for the lowest-income fifth and 6.3% for the highest-income fifth.
  • Has Pay Kept Up With Inflation? — All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.
  • The Fed Can Take Its Time Taming Inflation — Wage growth and price growth reinforce each other and both run 1 to 1.5 percentage points above pre-pandemic rates, with underlying inflation estimated at 2.5% to 3%. The author puts roughly a 1-in-3 chance that persistently strong demand keeps inflation above 3%, and argues strong job growth lets the Federal Reserve spend months assessing that risk.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle

Apple Wants To Replace 50% Of iPhone Final Assembly Line Workers With Automation

AI Summary. Apple has reportedly directed managers to cut the number of workers on iPhone final assembly lines by as much as 50% over the next few years. The company has acquired firms including DarwinAI and Drishti, the latter analyzing assembly-line video to identify bottlenecks and production problems in real time.

Chance Miller 9to5mac
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024

Apple plans to automate more of the iPhone production process, reducing the number of workers on final assembly lines by as much as 50%. @9to5Mac

Apple plans to automate more of the iPhone production process, reducing the number of workers on final assembly lines by as...

Is smartphone assembly work being replaced by automation?

Core argument: Apple has told managers to cut the number of workers on iPhone final assembly lines by as much as 50% over the next few years, according to a report from The Information.

A new report from The Information details Apple’s efforts to automate more of the iPhone production process. The report explains that Apple has told managers to “reduce the number of workers on iPhone final assembly lines by as much as 50% over the next few years.” According to the report, this edict was handed down by Sabih Khan, Apple’s senior vice president of operations. The decision was reportedly made shortly after violent clashes between iPhone workers and police outside of Foxconn’s primary assembly plant in November 2022. The Information also points to a pair of acquisitions that have helped Apple’s supply chain automation efforts, including DarwinAI. Apple also reportedly acquired a company called Drishti last year, which analyzes video footage of assembly lines to “identify bottlenecks and production problems in real-time.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Apple has told managers to cut the number of workers on iPhone final assembly lines by as much as 50% over the next few years, according to a report from The Information.
  2. The Information reports that the edict came from Sabih Khan, Apple's senior vice president of operations, and that the decision was made shortly after violent clashes between iPhone workers and police outside Foxconn's primary assembly plant in November 2022.
  3. Apple's supply chain automation efforts have been aided by two acquisitions, DarwinAI and Drishti, the latter analyzing assembly line video footage to identify bottlenecks and production problems in real time, according to The Information.

Related Articles:

  • Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls — The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.
  • Automation and Rent Dissipation: Implications for Wages, Inequality, and Productivity — The authors argue firms inefficiently automate jobs where wages exceed workers' opportunity cost, so new automation technologies that deliver small cost savings can reduce productivity, average real wages, and aggregate consumption. They estimate workers earned an average wage premium of 35% in jobs automated between 1980 and 2016.
  • Apple’s India iPhone Output Hits $14 Billion in China Shift — Apple assembled $14bn of iPhones in India in its last fiscal year, doubling output there to roughly 14%, or about 1 in 7, of its iPhones. China remains Apple's largest iPhone-making hub and biggest overseas market, though its revenue there is falling amid competition from rivals such as Huawei.
  • Investment
  • Productivity
  • Workforce

China Becomes First Country to Retrieve Rocks From the Moon’s Far Side

AI Summary. China became the first country to return soil samples from the far side of the moon, retrieved by the China National Space Administration's Chang'e-6 lander. China's subsequent missions target the lunar south pole to search for water and other resources, with crewed lunar missions planned by 2030 and an eventual international base.

Katrina Miller New York Times
Date Posted:
June 25, 2024

China’s Chang’e-6 successfully retrieved rocks from the dark side of the moon. @NYTScience

China’s Chang’e-6 successfully retrieved rocks from the dark side of the moon. @NYTScience

Is China advancing its lunar exploration capabilities?

Core argument: China became the first country to retrieve rocks from the moon's far side, with the China National Space Administration's Chang'e-6 lander returning a lunar soil capsule to Earth after a 53-day mission.

China brought a capsule full of lunar soil from the far side of the moon down to Earth on Tuesday, achieving the latest success in an ambitious schedule to explore the moon and other parts of the solar system. The sample, retrieved by the China National Space Administration’s Chang’e-6 lander after a 53-day mission, highlights China’s growing capabilities in space and notches another win in a series of lunar missions that started in 2007 and have so far been executed almost without flaw. For the future, China has its eyes set on the lunar south pole, where Chang’e-7 and 8 will explore the environment and search for water and other resources. It hopes to send crewed missions to the moon by 2030. Eventually, China plans to build an international base at the south pole. NASA’s Artemis campaign is also shooting for the lunar south pole. Bill Nelson, the space agency’s administrator, has previously referred to the parallel programs as a race between the United States and China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China became the first country to retrieve rocks from the moon's far side, with the China National Space Administration's Chang'e-6 lander returning a lunar soil capsule to Earth after a 53-day mission.
  2. China's lunar missions, which began in 2007, have been executed almost without flaw, and the Chang'e-7 and 8 missions will explore the lunar south pole and search for water and other resources.
  3. China aims to send crewed missions to the moon by 2030 and eventually build an international base at the lunar south pole, also the target of NASA's Artemis campaign, which administrator Bill Nelson has described as a U.S.–China race.

Related Articles:

  • Building an Enduring Advantage in the Third Space Age — The United States and China each logged their highest-ever annual launch rates, at 103 and 66 launches, while Russia fell to 19 and Europe recorded three. The US accounted for roughly half of global launches but 81% of effective launch capacity, since Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy comprised 93% of US launches.
  • US Lands on Moon in Historic Feat for Private Spacecraft — An American-made lander became the first private spacecraft to reach the lunar surface intact, the first US lander on the moon since the Apollo era. The mission supports Intuitive Machines' aim of building a business ferrying payloads and experiments to the moon, and it holds NASA contracts to deliver two additional landers.
  • Indian Spacecraft Makes Historic Landing At Moon’s South Pole — India landed an uncrewed probe near the Moon's unexplored South Pole, a milestone in its effort to become an international power in space exploration, while a Russian attempt to land in the same region ended with its spacecraft crashing into the surface. Scientists say the region may contain water, making it crucial to any ambitions to inhabit the Moon.
  • China
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research


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