Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
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Friday, June 21, 2024

Does Worker Scarcity Spur Investment, Automation and Productivity? Evidence from Earnings Calls

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, raises its investment by 28 basis points, implying roughly $55bn in additional US investment attributable to tighter labor markets. The effect is concentrated in industries relying heavily on routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly and warehouse packaging.

Mick Dueholm, Aakash Kalyani and Serdar Ozkan Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
June 21, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A @stlouisfed analysis finds that since 2021 an increase in labor issues has spurred an additional $55B in investment, driven by firms that heavily employ routine manual tasks like assembly and warehouse packaging. @AakashKalyani @serdarozkanEN

Does worker scarcity push firms to invest more in automation?

Core argument: A one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, is estimated to raise its investment by 28 basis points.

A one-unit increase in a firm’s labor issues [as measured by earnings calls] leads to a 28 basis point increase in its investment. To put this investment effect into perspective, our estimate implies that since 2021, the increase in labor issues (due to, for example, tighter labor markets) has spurred approximately an additional $55 billion in investment in the U.S. economy. This is a significant amount and one that’s similar in size to funding appropriated through the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act for boosting domestic semiconductor research and manufacturing. We also found that the increase in investment has been driven by firms in industries that heavily employ routine manual tasks, such as assembly line work in the manufacturing industry or packaging and labeling in the warehousing sector. Industries that don’t heavily employ routine manual tasks tend not to experience a significant increase in investment resulting from labor issues.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A one-unit increase in a firm's labor issues, as measured by earnings calls, is estimated to raise its investment by 28 basis points.
  2. The authors estimate that rising labor issues since 2021, due to factors such as tighter labor markets, have spurred roughly an additional $55 billion in U.S. investment, similar in size to funding appropriated under the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act.
  3. The investment increase has been driven by industries that heavily employ routine manual tasks, such as manufacturing assembly line work and warehouse packaging and labeling, while other industries tend not to show a significant investment response to labor issues.

Related Articles:

  • Automation and Rent Dissipation: Implications for Wages, Inequality, and Productivity — The authors argue firms inefficiently automate jobs where wages exceed workers' opportunity cost, so new automation technologies that deliver small cost savings can reduce productivity, average real wages, and aggregate consumption. They estimate workers earned an average wage premium of 35% in jobs automated between 1980 and 2016.
  • Business Spending Is Lining Up to Reinforce Growth — Around 70% of sectors are posting positive year-over-year profit growth, with big tech showing the largest acceleration in demand and profits but strength broadening across the economy. Companies are responding with rising capital spending growth and more optimistic investment plans, as firms typically add capacity with a slight lag after real demand picks up.
  • U.S. Business Investment in the Post-COVID Expansion — Business fixed investment has held at roughly the same share of U.S. GDP as before COVID, a better outcome than after every other recession since 1980, when investment typically fell as a share of GDP and contributed less well into the recovery. American businesses invested $430bn more than if investment had followed its usual historical pattern.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Growth
  • Productivity

Society at a Glance 2024

AI Summary. The average fertility rate across OECD countries has declined over the long term, falling to 1.5 children per woman, well below the 2.1 "replacement level," with rates as low as 1.2 in Italy and Spain and an estimated 0.7 in Korea. The average age of mothers at first birth rose from 26.5 years to 29.5 years.

OECD Staff Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Date Posted:
June 21, 2024

The mean number of children per woman across advanced economies has fallen from 3.3 in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022 according to a new @OECD study. The age at which mothers have their first child has climbed from 26.5 in 2000 to 29.5 in 2022.

How far have fertility rates fallen across developed countries?

Core argument: The OECD average total fertility rate fell to 1.5 children per woman in 2022, well below the replacement level of 2.1, continuing a long-term decline that resumed after the 2007–08 financial crisis following a temporary halt in the 2000s.

OECD countries have been experiencing a long-term decline in the total fertility rate (TFR). There was a temporary halt in the decline during the 2000s, but it has since trended downwards again after the great financial crisis of 2007-08. The TFR fell to just 1.5 children per woman in 2022, on average across the OECD, well below the “replacement level” of 2.1 children per woman. Among OECD countries in 2022, the TFR was highest in Israel with 2.9 children per woman followed by Mexico and France with 1.8 children per woman. The TFR was lowest in Italy and Spain with 1.2 children per woman, and particularly in Korea at an estimated 0.7 children per woman in 2023. The decline in the TFR went hand in hand with an increase in the age at which mothers have their first child, which increased from 26.5 years in 2000, on average across the OECD, to 29.5 in 2022.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The OECD average total fertility rate fell to 1.5 children per woman in 2022, well below the replacement level of 2.1, continuing a long-term decline that resumed after the 2007–08 financial crisis following a temporary halt in the 2000s.
  2. Among OECD countries in 2022, Israel recorded the highest total fertility rate at 2.9 children per woman, followed by Mexico and France at 1.8, while Italy and Spain were lowest at 1.2 and Korea was an estimated 0.7 in 2023.
  3. The average age at which mothers in the OECD have their first child rose from 26.5 years in 2000 to 29.5 in 2022, an increase that went hand in hand with the decline in the total fertility rate.

Related Articles:

  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.
  • The World Is Becoming More African — United Nations forecasts project Africans will rise from 8% of the world's people in 1950 to one-quarter by 2100, with the continent holding the world's largest workforce within a decade. McKinsey & Company estimates Africa's per-person economic growth has averaged 1% annually since 1990, against India's 5% and China's 9%.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

The Cost of Illegal Immigration

AI Summary. The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

Steven Camarota National Affairs
Date Posted:
June 21, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Census Bureau data shows that the foreign-born population of the US rose from 45mm in January 2021 to 51.6mm in March 2024, representing 15.6% of the population, surpassing the 1890 record of 14.8%.

How large has the foreign-born and illegal immigrant population grown?

Core argument: The author estimates that 6–7mm new illegal immigrants settled in the United States during the first three years of the Biden administration, a scale unlike anything previously seen.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, we had a reasonable picture of illegal immigrants in the United States and their fiscal impact. But since President Biden took office, the flow of illegal immigrants into the country has been nothing short of astonishing. All told, during the first three years of the Biden administration, 6 to 7 million new illegal immigrants likely settled in the United States. We have never seen anything like this before. The monthly Current Population Survey shows that the total foreign-born population grew from 45mm in January 2021 to 51.6mm in March 2024 — a 6.6 million-person increase. This is the net increase, not the number of new arrivals, which of course is offset by out-migration and deaths. Immigrants now make up 15.6% of the U.S. population — almost double their share in 1990 and more than triple what it was in 1970. This surpasses the old records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. By March of this year, there were probably 13.7mm illegal immigrants in the United States, a net increase of 3.7mm since January 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author estimates that 6–7mm new illegal immigrants settled in the United States during the first three years of the Biden administration, a scale unlike anything previously seen.
  2. The monthly Current Population Survey shows the foreign-born population rose from 45mm in January 2021 to 51.6mm in March 2024, a net increase of 6.6mm after out-migration and deaths.
  3. Immigrants make up 15.6% of the US population, nearly double their 1990 share and more than triple the 1970 share, surpassing the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910.

Related Articles:

  • Without Immigrants, US Working-Age Population Would Shrink — All net US employment growth since early 2020 has been among foreign-born workers, and without immigration the US working-age population would be shrinking — a pattern likely to persist for the rest of the decade. The jump in immigration appears to be enabling a soft landing that most economists had thought impossible.
  • Immigration and the U.S. Economy Since the Pandemic: An Accounting Exercise — The US native-born labor force fell by about 1.2m over four years, a decline driven overwhelmingly by population aging, while foreign-born labor supply grew by about 3m, leaving the overall labor force up roughly 2m. Without immigration, the total US labor force would have shrunk.
  • Immigration’s Effect on US Wages and Employment Redux — The authors estimate that immigration to the US over 2000-2019 raised wages of natives with a high school degree or less by 1.7% to 2.6%, a period when that group's real wages fell by 5% to 6%. Effects on more-educated natives ranged from -0.5% to +0.7%, with an overall average effect of +0.5% to +0.8% that was not statistically significant.
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Top Dollar

AI Summary. Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets exceed American holdings abroad, making the United States a net debtor whose liabilities are denominated in dollars while its foreign assets are largely in other currencies. U.S. foreign liabilities grew from $30tn to over $51tn while U.S. foreign assets grew from $24tn to $33tn, tripling the net debtor position from $6tn.

Eswar Prasad Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:
June 21, 2024

.@EswarSPrasad argues that there isn’t a viable alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. “The story of the dollar is, ultimately, less about the United States’ strength than about the rest of the world’s weaknesses.”

How has the world's exposure to dollar-denominated assets changed?

Core argument: The U.S. net debtor position to the rest of the world tripled from $6 trillion in 2014, as foreign liabilities rose from $30 trillion to more than $51 trillion by early 2024 while U.S. foreign assets grew from $24 trillion to just $33 trillion.

Foreign investors hold more financial assets in the United States than American investors hold abroad, meaning the United States is a net debtor to the rest of the world. U.S. liabilities to the rest of the world are denominated in dollars, with many foreign investors willing to accept low returns in exchange for the safety of the dollar. American investors, by contrast, have been willing to bet on foreign assets that are mostly denominated in foreign currencies because those assets yield higher returns even if they are riskier. If the world turned away from the dollar and sent its value plummeting relative to other currencies, foreigners would take a beating on the value of their dollar-denominated assets when converted back to their home currencies. In light of this scary scenario, countries around the world should surely have reduced their exposure to the “dollar trap.” But they have done just the opposite. From 2014 to the beginning of 2024, U.S. foreign liabilities grew from $30T to more than $51T, while U.S. assets grew from $24T to just $33T. In other words, the United States was a net debtor to the rest of the world to the tune of $6T in 2014—and that amount has tripled over the last decade. The United States now has the rest of the world in an even tighter chokehold.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. net debtor position to the rest of the world tripled from $6 trillion in 2014, as foreign liabilities rose from $30 trillion to more than $51 trillion by early 2024 while U.S. foreign assets grew from $24 trillion to just $33 trillion.
  2. U.S. liabilities to the rest of the world are denominated in dollars, with many foreign investors accepting low returns in exchange for the dollar's safety, while American investors hold higher-yielding, riskier assets abroad mostly denominated in foreign currencies.
  3. A world turning away from the dollar and sending its value plummeting would hit foreigners converting dollar-denominated assets back into home currencies, yet countries have increased rather than reduced their exposure to this "dollar trap.".

Related Articles:

  • Taking Stock: Dollar Assets, Gold, and Official Foreign Exchange Reserves — Gold accounts for about 10% of aggregate official foreign exchange reserves, roughly its level in the early 2000s. International Monetary Fund country data indicate most added official gold holdings came from a few central banks, with over half of reported accumulation from China and Russia and about a quarter from several emerging markets.
  • China Sells Record Sum of US Debt Amid Signs of Diversification — China sold a record $53.3bn of US Treasury and agency bonds in a single quarter, a sign of diversification away from American assets amid persistent trade tensions. Belgium, often viewed as a custodian of Chinese holdings, disposed of $22bn of Treasuries over the same period.
  • Power and Financial Interdependence — US-China financial interdependence creates what has been called a "balance of financial terror," in which the US relies on other countries' costs of not financing its current account deficit as assurance that financing continues. Chinese policymakers worry that dollar holdings expose China to financial sanctions, while the US has feared Chinese sales of Treasuries could threaten its financial stability.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Leveraging Killed China’s Bid for Leadership

AI Summary. Bank for International Settlements data show China's outstanding credit to the nonfinancial sector rose 148 percentage points of GDP over 15 years, the worst such stretch recorded for a major economy, while US credit rose less than 15 points to above 256% of GDP. China's reported fiscal deficit grew from $20bn to $820bn.

Derek Scissors American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
June 21, 2024
Is Database:
Database

From 2008-2023 outstanding credit to the Chinese non-financial sector rose 148pp to over 283% of GDP. Over that same period, the corresponding measure for the US rose 15pp to 256% of GDP. @DerekScissors1

How fast has China's debt grown compared with America's?

Core argument: China's outstanding credit to the nonfinancial sector rose 148 points over 15 years, which Bank for International Settlements data record as the worst such stretch for a major economy, with Japan not reporting until 1997.

According to Bank for International Settlements data, China's 148-point increase in outstanding credit to the nonfinancial sector over 15 years is the worst stretch recorded for a major economy. (Japan did not start reporting until 1997.) In contrast, American outstanding credit is said to have risen less than 15 points from 2008 to 2023, passing 256 percent of GDP in 2023. The PRC’s general government debt started deteriorating when Xi took over. The deterioration accelerated in 2016, exactly as corporate debt was reined in. The BIS figures are helpful because American and Chinese fiscal data are not easily compared. The most reliable PRC measure of its fiscal deficits rose from $20 billion in 2008 to $820 billion in 2023. The closest US figure is federal budget deficits, which stood at $460 billion in 2008 and an absurd $1.7 trillion in 2023. America’s 2023 GDP was about 55% higher than China’s. The numbers from national statistics authorities at least appear to confirm the trends shown by BIS.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's outstanding credit to the nonfinancial sector rose 148 points over 15 years, which Bank for International Settlements data record as the worst such stretch for a major economy, with Japan not reporting until 1997.
  2. American outstanding credit rose less than 15 points from 2008 to 2023, passing 256 percent of GDP in 2023.
  3. China's most reliable fiscal deficit measure rose from $20 billion in 2008 to $820 billion in 2023, while US federal budget deficits went from $460 billion to $1.7 trillion, with 2023 American GDP about 55% higher than China's.

Related Articles:

  • China Economy Memo: Tempest in a Teapot or Crisis A-Brewing? — The authors argue China is heading into a protracted debt crisis in which about 40% of local government financing vehicles default, hitting regional banks most exposed to such lending. They estimate total losses for these creditors at roughly $5tn, or about 30% of China's GDP.
  • Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year — China's overall fiscal deficit remained above 7% of GDP, as a modest increase in revenues offset higher spending, and is projected to rise gradually to about 8% of GDP by 2029 as pension and interest costs increase. Persistently large primary deficits are projected to keep raising public debt despite very favorable interest-growth differentials.
  • The Rise and Fall of LGFVs — China has nearly 12,000 local government financing vehicles whose aggregated assets and liabilities equal roughly 120% and 75% of national GDP, and whose earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation do not cover their interest payments. Their average borrowing cost of about 5% far exceeds their 1% return on assets, and 80–90% of their annual spending is funded by new debt.
  • China
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Growth

Monday, June 24, 2024

Trump and Biden: The National Debt

AI Summary. An analysis of the estimated ten-year debt impact of enacted policies finds the Trump administration approved $8.4tn of new ten-year borrowing over a full term, or $4.8tn excluding COVID relief, while the Biden administration approved $4.3tn over three years and five months, or $2.2tn excluding the American Rescue Plan.

CRFB Staff Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A new @MarcGoldwein @BudgetHawks analysis finds that Trump approved $2.9T of net non-Covid related borrowing, plus $1.9T for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. So far Biden has approved $2.2T of net borrowing, plus $2.1T for the American Rescue Plan.

How much new ten-year borrowing did recent administrations approve?

Core argument: President Trump approved an estimated $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing over his full term, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief, based on policy costs scored around the time of enactment.

This analysis focuses on the estimated ten-year debt impact of policies approved by Presidents Trump and Biden around the time of enactment. In this analysis, we find: President Trump approved $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing during his full term in office, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief. President Biden, in his first three years and five months in office, approved $4.3 trillion of new ten-year borrowing, or $2.2 trillion excluding the American Rescue Plan. President Trump approved $8.8 trillion of gross new borrowing and $443 billion of deficit reduction during his full presidential term. President Biden has so far approved $6.2 trillion of gross new borrowing and $1.9 trillion of deficit reduction.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Trump approved an estimated $8.4 trillion of new ten-year borrowing over his full term, or $4.8 trillion excluding the CARES Act and other COVID relief, based on policy costs scored around the time of enactment.
  2. President Biden approved an estimated $4.3 trillion of new ten-year borrowing in his first three years and five months in office, or $2.2 trillion excluding the American Rescue Plan.
  3. President Trump approved $8.8 trillion of gross new borrowing and $443 billion of deficit reduction during his full term, while President Biden has so far approved $6.2 trillion of gross new borrowing and $1.9 trillion of deficit reduction.

Allysia Finley commented, “…We could spend all night fact-checking both candidates, but a brief note on a tendentious question on the national debt posed by CNN moderator Jake Tapper. He referred to a study by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, which purportedly found that Donald Trump approved $8.4 trillion of new 10-year borrowing, while Joe Biden added only $4.3 trillion. The study inflates the cost of Mr. Trump’s tax cuts—including bipartisan efforts that repealed the Affordable Care Act’s medical device and Cadillac insurance taxes—while low-balling the costs of Mr. Biden’s spending increases and regulations. For example, the study dings Mr. Trump for adding to the debt by ending certain Affordable Care Act cost subsidies, which it says caused insurers to raise premiums and thereby increased other insurance subsidies. The outfit says Mr. Trump added to the deficit with a 2020 rule that restricted drug-maker rebates in Medicare, though that rule never took effect. Then the study claims that Mr. Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act reduced the national debt by delaying the same rebate rule and increasing IRS funding. All of which is to say that the figures cited by Mr. Tapper include subjective judgments that are biased in favor of Mr. Biden. But for the record, the national debt increased by $2.6 trillion during Mr. Trump’s first three years before Covid and $5.2 trillion during Mr. Biden’s first three….”

Marc Goldwein commented, Re: “But for record, the national debt increased by $2.6T during Mr. Trump’s first three years before Covid and $5.2T during Mr. Biden’s first three.” That’s true, but says nothing about how much debt each approved over a ten year period.   “…1) Their response over-estimates Biden executive orders by $800 billion — mainly because it counts proposals that haven’t been finalized ($150b) or even introduced ($350b), but also because they overestimate some provisions (~$200b) and don’t count deficit reducing executive orders (~$100b) 2) There is no “Extra $1.1 trillion” from the infrastructure bill. What they are referring to is a weird baseline budget rule quirk that required CBO to assume $1.1 trillion of extra costs in their 2022 baseline and then remove $1 trillion of that in their 2023 baseline 3) IRA does indeed save less/cost more, which we discuss in our paper. But our paper is based off of prospective estimates. And House budget overstates the difference — its probably about $250 billion worse than we say 4) TCJA also costs more, even though house budget says it costs less. Heck, estimates of extending TCJA have gone up 50%!. The extra $1 trillion they point to has nothing to do with TCJA, and was a one-time revenue surge from the big surprise inflation and capital gains during and after the pandemic.”

Related Articles:

  • An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects a federal budget deficit of $1.9tn in fiscal 2024, or $2tn excluding payment-timing shifts, rising to $2.8tn by 2034. On that adjusted basis, deficits equal 7% of gross domestic product in 2024, dip to 5.5% by 2027, and reach 6.9% by 2034, versus a 3.7% average over the past 50 years.
  • CBO Releases June 2024 Baseline Update — The Congressional Budget Office projects federal spending of $84.9tn (24.1% of GDP) over the next decade against revenue of $62.8tn (17.8% of GDP), compared with 50-year averages of 21% and 17.3%. Interest costs are projected to reach $892bn, more than defense or Medicare, and grow to $1.7tn (4.1% of GDP).
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget — The Congressional Budget Office projects that if private investment were more sensitive to federal deficits, debt held by the public would exceed 250% of GDP and real national income per person would be 18% ($21,300) lower than its baseline, with the average interest rate on federal debt 2pp higher.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics

Creating Shortages

AI Summary. Shelter inflation remains higher than before the pandemic and accounts for much of the remaining inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs. Tighter bank lending standards have stalled construction loans while high mortgage rates keep prospective buyers in the rental market, adding upward pressure on rents.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@FedGuy12 notes “the last mile of inflation has largely come down to shelter inflation” and argues that higher rates are counterproductive, reducing new supply.

Do higher financing costs restrict housing supply and keep shelter inflation elevated?

Core argument: Shelter inflation, which remains higher than pre-pandemic levels, accounts for much of the last mile of inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs that appear likely to remain structurally higher.

The last mile of inflation has largely come down to shelter inflation, which remains stubbornly higher than pre-pandemic. The reduced construction of housing appears to be due to higher financing costs, which look to remain structurally higher. From a supply perspective, the rapid rate hiking cycle quickly led to tightening of bank lending standards as banks anticipated higher default risk from a slowing economy. Bank loans to finance construction came to a standstill and have even slightly declined. Homebuilders report difficulty in getting financing for projects, though the largest home builders appear to be less affected. From a demand perspective, multi-decade high mortgage rates have reduced the ability of buyers to pay higher prices. Prospective buyers thus stay in the rental market and contribute to upward pressure on rents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Shelter inflation, which remains higher than pre-pandemic levels, accounts for much of the last mile of inflation, with reduced housing construction attributed to higher financing costs that appear likely to remain structurally higher.
  2. The rapid rate hiking cycle tightened bank lending standards as banks anticipated higher default risk from a slowing economy, bringing bank construction loans to a standstill and slight decline, with homebuilders reporting difficulty financing projects.
  3. Multi-decade high mortgage rates have reduced buyers' ability to pay higher prices, keeping prospective buyers in the rental market and adding upward pressure on rents, while the largest homebuilders appear less affected.

Related Articles:

  • The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy Is Much Slower than Normal — The share of outstanding US mortgages with interest rates below 4% has risen from 38% before the pandemic to 63%, leaving millions of households insulated from Federal Reserve rate increases. The author argues this slows the transmission of monetary policy and will require the Federal Reserve to hold rates higher for longer to contain inflation.
  • It’s All About Shelter — Producer price inflation for final demand tracks consumer price inflation excluding shelter closely, and both show inflation under control; overall consumer inflation looks hot only because the shelter component is up 5.6%. That shelter measure lags rents by construction, and more current rent series show no recent inflation.
  • Importing Shelter Inflation — Shelter costs make up about 30% of the consumer price index, and their monthly inflation appears to be stabilizing above pre-pandemic rates rather than delivering the disinflation forward-looking data had implied. The author suggests this may be related to a surge in migration, estimated at 3.3m migrants in a year.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Housing

The Calm Before the Storm

AI Summary. Private credit and direct lending have not rewritten the rules of credit risk, and much financial innovation amounts to repackaging risk in higher-fee wrappers. High-yield bonds followed a comparable path: after the 1980s boom, below-investment-grade default rates reached roughly 10.4% and 9.1% before the market matured.

Greg Obenshain Verdad
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@GregObenshain argues direct lending, at $574B in June ‘23, 46% as large as the $1.25T high-yield market, is in “the calm before the storm,” that will be followed by a “default spiral.”

Has private credit rewritten the rules of credit risk?

Core argument: Moody's below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% in 1990 and 9.1% in 1991, following the junk bond boom of the 1980s.

In our view, neither private credit nor direct lending have rewritten the rules of credit risk. We’d argue that what passes for innovation in finance is often just repackaging risk in more convenient and higher-fee wrappers. To cite just one example of risky lending that grew rapidly, faced a reckoning and then developed into a more stable, mature market, look no further than high yield. The junk bond boom of the 1980s was built on the idea that the historical performance of high-yield bonds more than compensated for their higher risk. At its core, this idea has proved to be correct, but it was taken to extremes. After the boom in the 1980s, the Moody’s below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% and 9.1% in 1990 and 1991. But what developed afterwards was a mature market that is now tame compared with its history. We suspect that private credit will follow a similar path.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Moody's below–investment grade default rate hit 6% starting in 1989 and spiked to 10.4% in 1990 and 9.1% in 1991, following the junk bond boom of the 1980s.
  2. The authors argue that neither private credit nor direct lending has rewritten the rules of credit risk, and that much of what passes for financial innovation is risk repackaged in more convenient, higher-fee wrappers.
  3. High yield matured after its 1980s boom and reckoning into a market now tame relative to its own history, a path the authors suspect private credit will follow.

Related Articles:

  • Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks — Private credit loans are negotiated bilaterally outside traditional regulatory requirements and are illiquid because no secondary market exists, leaving investors expected to hold them to maturity or face steep losses if they need to exit. Scarce data on this growing form of nonbank lending makes assessing its risks difficult.
  • Where Are All the Defaults? — One explanation for subdued high-yield bond spreads is that the lowest-quality borrowers, those most likely to default, have migrated from high-yield markets into private credit. Moody's reports the number of issuers with its lowest speculative-grade ratings has fallen, and that 62% of its rated universe is rated single-B or below.
  • Corporate Debt, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Financial Crises — Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

AI’s $600B Question

AI Summary. Comparing spending on AI chips to historical railroad construction overlooks that high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost businesses without monopoly or oligopoly power tend to see prices competed down to marginal cost, and that semiconductors continually improve in cost versus performance, unlike physical infrastructure. Speculative frenzies accompany technology, but the payoff will take a long time.

David Cahn Sequoia Capital
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

.@DavidCahn6 at @sequoia argues that because of lack of pricing power and rapidly improving chip technologies, multi-$B investments in current-generation GPUs run the risk of “investment incineration.”

Is AI chip spending really comparable to building railroads?

Core argument: The author argues the "GPU CapEx is like building railroads" analogy misses that, absent a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost and low marginal cost businesses such as airlines see prices competed down to marginal cost.

One of the major rebuttals to my last piece was that “GPU CapEx is like building railroads.” I actually agree with this, but I think it misses a few points: Lack of pricing power: Without a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost + low marginal cost businesses almost always see prices competed down to marginal cost (e.g., airlines). Depreciation: We know from the history of technology that semiconductors tend to get better and better. Again, this parallel doesn’t exist for physical infrastructure, which does not follow any “Moore’s Law” type curve, such that cost vs. performance continuously improves. Speculative frenzies are part of technology, and so they are not something to be afraid of. But we need to make sure not to believe in the delusion that says that we’re all going to get rich quick, because AGI is coming tomorrow, and we all need to stockpile the only valuable resource, which is GPUs. In reality, the road ahead is going to be a long one. It will have ups and downs. But almost certainly it will be worthwhile.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the "GPU CapEx is like building railroads" analogy misses that, absent a monopoly or oligopoly, high fixed cost and low marginal cost businesses such as airlines see prices competed down to marginal cost.
  2. Depreciation is the author's second objection to the railroad comparison: semiconductors historically keep improving on cost versus performance, while physical infrastructure follows no such "Moore's Law" type curve.
  3. The author frames speculative frenzies as part of technology rather than something to fear, while rejecting the delusion of getting rich quick because AGI is coming tomorrow and GPUs are the only valuable resource to stockpile.

Related Articles:

  • Are We on the Brink of an AI Investment Arms Race? — Spending on AI chips and data centers was a bit below $100bn in 2023, around 0.4% of US GDP, and the broader set of companies exposed to AI-related investment has not yet seen a major jump in sales. The authors argue the underlying dynamics point to a spending surge large enough to shape the business cycle.
  • The AI Transition One Year Later: On Track, but Macro Impact Still Several Years Off — Investment in AI hardware is projected to rise substantially as a precursor to integrating AI into business processes, with the investment cycle estimated to peak at 2–2½% of GDP and early signs visible among AI-enabling companies. The authors estimate generative AI could raise developed-market labor productivity growth by 1.5pp annually over a 10-year adoption period, roughly 15% cumulatively.
  • Measuring Trends in AI — The United States led the world in private artificial intelligence investment with $67.2bn, roughly 8.7x China's $7.8bn and 17.8x the United Kingdom's $3.8bn. Cumulative private AI investment over the prior decade shows the same ranking: $335.2bn for the United States, $103.7bn for China, and $22.3bn for the United Kingdom.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Europe’s Response to China Shock 2.0: Hold China Closer

AI Summary. European officials have largely welcomed greenfield investment from Chinese battery and electric-vehicle makers, including CATL, BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain. Chinese purchases of existing European businesses have collapsed, partly because of growing European scrutiny, while newly built plants and companies reached 78% of Chinese direct investment in Europe.

Tom Fairless and Bertrand Benoit Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 24, 2024

Chinese-made EVs have risen from 2.9% of the EU’s EV market in 2020 to 21.7% last year; in response, European governments are encouraging greenfield investment by Chinese battery and EV makers.

Is Europe welcoming Chinese factory investment while blocking company takeovers?

Core argument: Greenfield projects reached 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.

European officials have largely been in favor of investments from Chinese battery makers such as CATL and from Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturers such as BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain. While Chinese purchases of existing European businesses have collapsed in recent years, in part because of growing European scrutiny, greenfield investment—i.e. newly created companies or plants—has risen rapidly, reaching 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Greenfield projects reached 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.
  2. Chinese acquisitions of existing European businesses have collapsed in recent years, in part because of growing European scrutiny, while newly built Chinese plants and companies in Europe have risen rapidly.
  3. European officials have largely favored investments from Chinese battery maker CATL and Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturers including BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain.

Related Articles:

  • The World Is In For Another China Shock — Weak demand and overcapacity have pushed Chinese producer prices down for 16 months, and that disinflationary impulse is spreading abroad: US import prices from China fell 2.9% year over year while prices of imports from the European Union, Japan, and Mexico rose. Western protectionism could redirect the deflationary impact toward poorer markets.
  • EU To Hit Chinese Electric Cars With Tariffs Of Up To 48% — The European Commission will provisionally apply additional duties of 17–38% on imported Chinese electric vehicles, on top of an existing 10% tariff, with the rate depending on how far each carmaker cooperated with an EU subsidy investigation. EU officials say heavily subsidized Chinese imports put European industry at risk of injury.
  • Can Trade Intervention Lead to Freer Trade? — China accounts for over 31% of global manufacturing but under 13% of global consumption, while the United States accounts for under 17% of manufacturing and nearly 27% of consumption. The author argues persistent surpluses reflect household subsidies to producers, and that the US could counter them with tariffs or taxes on capital inflows.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit


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