Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, May 22, 2024

AI Summary. The share of US income going to labor reached its lowest level since the Great Depression, falling roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022 across most industries, alongside a worldwide decline of about 6 percentage points since 1980. The author argues the most plausible causes are technological, including capital-augmenting technology.

Loukas Karabarbounis Journal of Economic Perspectives
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Labor’s share of US GDP fell from 64% in 1950 to 59% in 2022, consistent with declines in other countries since 1980. Increasing deployment of capital-augmenting technology appears central to this trend.

Is technology driving the worldwide decline in labor's income share?

Core argument: The U.S. labor share fell roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022, reaching its lowest level since the Great Depression, with declines across the great majority of U.S. industries.

In 2022 the labor share in the United States was at its lowest level since the Great Depression. The headline estimate for the United States is a roughly 5 percentage points decline of the labor share between 1929 and 2022, [across] the great majority of US industries. We observe [more recent] labor share declines in Europe, Asia, and emerging markets - a worldwide decline of roughly 6 percentage points in the labor share since 1980. My view is that the most plausible causes have technological origin. Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for the decline of the labor share is that capital-augmenting technology has increased over time. When factors are substitutes following an increase in capital-augmenting technology, production requires more capital relative to labor to accomplish the same level of output. In this case, the labor share decreases.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. labor share fell roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022, reaching its lowest level since the Great Depression, with declines across the great majority of U.S. industries.
  2. Labor share declines also appear in Europe, Asia, and emerging markets, amounting to a worldwide drop of roughly 6 percentage points since 1980.
  3. The author argues the most plausible causes of the labor share decline are technological, since rising capital-augmenting technology requires more capital relative to labor for the same output when factors are substitutes.

Related Articles:

  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — The authors estimate that post-pandemic labor market tightness compressed the US wage distribution, reducing the college wage premium and offsetting roughly one-quarter of the four-decade rise in 90-10 wage inequality. They attribute this in part to greater labor supply elasticity facing firms in low-wage markets, which reduced employer market power as young non-college workers moved to higher-paying jobs.
  • Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends — Using administrative tax data with the Survey of Consumer Finances, the authors estimate the top 1% pre-tax income share fell from 11.1% in 1962 to 9.4% in 1979, then rose to 13.8% by 2019, a 3 percentage point rise over the full period. Their after-tax measure shows increases of only 1.4 points since 1979 and 0.2 points since 1962.
  • Perspectives on the Labor Share — The share of US income going to labor fell roughly 5 percentage points between 1929 and 2022, with declines across most US industries and in most countries of Europe, Asia, and emerging markets. The author argues the most plausible causes are technological, including the information age and automation.

AI Summary. US growth is projected to slow to about 2.2% from 4.1%, close to potential given the boost to labor force growth from recent immigration, while growth in other advanced G10 economies is projected to pick up from about -0.4% to +1.2%. Core inflation estimates point to two Federal Reserve rate cuts, with timing sensitive to incoming data.

Jan Hatzius Goldman Sachs
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Jan Hatzius @GoldmanSachs argues US Q1 growth of 2.2% is “close to potential given the boost to labor force growth from the recent immigration wave,” and continues to forecast rate cuts in July and November.

How does immigration-boosted labor supply shape US growth and rate cuts?

Core argument: US GDP growth is estimated to slow from 4.1% in 2023H2 to 2.2% in 2024H1, a pace close to potential given the boost to labor force growth from the recent immigration wave.

We estimate that US GDP growth will slow from 4.1% in 2023H2 to 2.2% in 2024H1. This would have looked quite strong prior to the pandemic but is now close to potential given the boost to labor force growth from the recent immigration wave. By contrast, we estimate that growth in other G10 economies will pick up from an average of -0.4% in 2023H2 to an average of +1.2% in 2024H1. Using CPI, PPI, and import prices, we estimate that core PCE increased 0.26% month-on-month, a pace well below the 0.36% average of the prior three months but probably not sufficient for a July cut if maintained in May and June. However, we also estimate that the market-based core PCE index—which was noted by Fed Chair Powell in a talk last week and which excludes imputed items such as portfolio management services and gambling—rose just 0.18%, a pace that would be quite consistent with a July cut if maintained. We continue to forecast cuts in July and November, but the timing remains sensitive to upcoming data.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US GDP growth is estimated to slow from 4.1% in 2023H2 to 2.2% in 2024H1, a pace close to potential given the boost to labor force growth from the recent immigration wave.
  2. Growth in other G10 economies is estimated to pick up from an average of -0.4% in 2023H2 to an average of +1.2% in 2024H1, in contrast to the US slowdown.
  3. Core PCE is estimated to have risen 0.26% month-on-month, below the 0.36% average of the prior three months but probably not low enough for a July cut, while the market-based core PCE index noted by Fed Chair Powell rose 0.18%.

Related Articles:

  • Global Views: Friendly Baseline, Greater Risks — Despite upside inflation surprises, the authors argue the broader disinflation narrative remains intact, citing a labor market that continues to rebalance: a jobs-workers gap of 2.0m, a quits rate below pre-pandemic levels, and wage growth running just over 4% year-on-year. They expect wage growth to converge to 3.5%, the pace they estimate is consistent with 2% inflation.
  • How Fast Can the Fed Ease? The Private Sector Response to Easier Conditions Will Be a Key Factor — US households have reduced debt over the past 20 years, leaving room to borrow more if incentives improve, while companies that issued debt at low rates hold large liquidity and healthy balance sheets. That gives businesses capacity to raise investment, and business surveys indicate capital-spending sentiment is already improving.
  • Is Nominal Wage Growth Starting to Slow? — Aggregate nominal wage income, which tracks closely with nominal gross domestic product, has grown at a yearly rate of just 4.5%—identical to the pre-pandemic pace—compared with almost 7% over the prior six months. The author argues that several consecutive slow months, rather than a one-off, suggest the deceleration could be significant.

AI Summary. Producer price measures of input costs for manufactured goods have turned positive again, in some cases rising at the fastest rate in more than a year, and this is filtering through to core final demand. US domestic manufacturing production has been flat or slightly down since 2013 despite strong growth in domestic demand for manufactured goods.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
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.@M_C_Klein notes an uptick in the price of multiple manufacturing inputs and suggests that goods inflation may reaccelerate if wage growth reverts from slow year-to-date growth. Domestic US manufacturing production has been flat since 2013.

Are rising producer input costs pushing goods inflation higher?

Core argument: Producer price measures of input costs for manufactured goods have turned positive again, in some cases rising at the fastest rate in more than a year, and are already filtering through to core final demand.

The PPI measures of input costs for manufactured goods have turned positive again, and in some cases are rising at the fastest rate in more than a year. This is already filtering through to core final demand, and while that measure is different from the CPI in several important respects, the direction of travel is significant. If wage growth remains slow, as it has so far this year, then indicators such as retail sales may be more indicative of the change in underlying economic conditions, and may flow through to interest rates. If wage growth reverts, then the recent inflation data are probably more representative of overall trends. Lurking in the background is the depressing fact that domestic American manufacturing production has been either flat or down slightly since 2013, with no growth over the past few years. That is a remarkably poor performance considering the tremendous growth in domestic demand for manufactured goods over that period, even if some of the trouble can be attributed to the specific product and industry mix of what is made in the U.S.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Producer price measures of input costs for manufactured goods have turned positive again, in some cases rising at the fastest rate in more than a year, and are already filtering through to core final demand.
  2. If wage growth remains slow, as it has so far this year, indicators such as retail sales may be more indicative of changing underlying economic conditions, while a reversion in wage growth would make the recent inflation data more representative of overall trends.
  3. Domestic American manufacturing production has been flat or slightly down since 2013 with no growth in the past few years, a poor performance given the growth in domestic demand for manufactured goods over that period.

Related Articles:

  • An Analysis of Pandemic-Era Inflation In 11 Economies — A cross-country analysis of 11 economies finds wide agreement that global energy and food price increases and supply disruptions in key sectors drove pandemic-era inflation, and that their recession accounts for most of the global cooling of inflation. The authors find tight labor markets had smaller but more persistent inflationary effects, leaving wage inflation as the larger remaining factor.
  • America’s Manufacturing Productivity Problem — Weak US manufacturing productivity growth reflects a compositional shift, as high-tech, fast-productivity-growth industries were increasingly offshored and became a smaller share of US manufacturing, alongside weak manufacturing investment. Capital intensity—fixed assets used per worker—slowed in the 2000s and nearly flatlined in the 2010s, with stagnation in electrical and vehicle manufacturing.
  • Is Nominal Wage Growth Starting to Slow? — Aggregate nominal wage income, which tracks closely with nominal gross domestic product, has grown at a yearly rate of just 4.5%—identical to the pre-pandemic pace—compared with almost 7% over the prior six months. The author argues that several consecutive slow months, rather than a one-off, suggest the deceleration could be significant.

AI Summary. A study of Massachusetts outmigration finds 52% of movers earned 1.3 to over 2.6x the state average, with Florida, New Hampshire, Maine, North Carolina, and Texas the top destinations and southern states capturing most of the transferred income. The study projects net outmigration could cost the state $19.2bn in adjusted gross income and $961m in income taxes annually by 2030.

Mark Williams, Yuhan Liu and Linglan Xu Boston University
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Since 2013, net outmigration from Massachusetts has increased by 1,100% as people move to states with lower income tax, housing, and health care costs. By 2030, net outmigration could cost MA $0.9B in lost income taxes per year.

Are high earners driving Massachusetts outmigration and shrinking its tax base?

Core argument: 52% of those leaving Massachusetts earned 1.3 to more than 2.6 times the state average, with 19% earning $200,000 or more and 33% earning $100,000 to $199,999.

Over half (52%) of those moving earned 1.3 to over 2.6 times the state average. 19% earned $200,000 or more (placing them in at least the top 12% of US household incomes). 33% earned $100,000 to $199,999 (placing them in at least the top 15% of US household incomes). 11 states captured the bulk of MA net outmigration. Top 5 destination states included Florida, New Hampshire, Maine, North Carolina, and Texas. Southern states gained the lion's share of earnings transfer as measured in adjusted gross income. Over half who moved from MA stayed in New England. By 2030, net outmigration could cost MA $19.2 billion in adjusted gross income and $961 million in lost income taxes per year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 52% of those leaving Massachusetts earned 1.3 to more than 2.6 times the state average, with 19% earning $200,000 or more and 33% earning $100,000 to $199,999.
  2. Eleven states captured the bulk of Massachusetts net outmigration, led by Florida, New Hampshire, Maine, North Carolina and Texas, with Southern states gaining the largest share of transferred adjusted gross income even as over half of movers stayed in New England.
  3. Massachusetts net outmigration could cost the state $19.2 billion in adjusted gross income and $961 million in lost income taxes per year by 2030, the study projects.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported more than 37,000 Chinese nationals detained at the border with Mexico in a single year, roughly 10x pre-pandemic levels, with families among the fastest-growing group. United Nations data show China's annual net emigration rose above 300,000, compared with about 190,000 a year over the prior decade.

Marrian Zhou Nikkei Asia
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37,000 largely middle-class Chinese migrants were detained at the US border with Mexico last year, 10x the pre-pandemic level. UN data estimates total annual emigration from China rose to over 300,000 in 2023. @ZhouMarrian

Is Chinese migration to the U.S. border rising sharply?

Core argument: U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained over 37,000 Chinese nationals on the border with Mexico last year, 10 times the level of pre-pandemic years.

The number of Chinese migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border skyrocketed in 2023. Although the actual total is elusive, over 37,000 Chinese nationals were detained on the border with Mexico last year, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. This figure is 10 times greater than in pre-pandemic years. Among those arriving, families with children are a particularly fast-growing group. U.S. border patrol agents encountered Chinese migrant families 6,645 times in the 2023 fiscal year from Oct. to Sept., and 7,081 times so far since Oct 2023, CBP data shows. That compares to 1,151 encounters in fiscal year 2022. Data compiled by the United Nations shows that in 2022 and 2023 total annual emigration rose to over 300,000, measured in net outflow, compared to an average of about 190,000 annually for the decade through 2019. Emigration plunged in 2020 when the COVID pandemic hit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained over 37,000 Chinese nationals on the border with Mexico last year, 10 times the level of pre-pandemic years.
  2. United Nations data show China's total annual emigration rose above 300,000 in net outflow in 2022 and 2023, compared with roughly 190,000 annually on average in the decade through 2019.
  3. U.S. border patrol agents encountered Chinese migrant families 6,645 times in fiscal year 2023, up from 1,151 encounters in fiscal year 2022.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Southern Border Has Become A Global Crossroads — Migrants from countries other than Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras made up more than half of all people apprehended at the US southern border for the first time, with Venezuelans the largest share. Crossings included 43,000 Russians, 42,000 Indians, and 24,000 Chinese, up from 4,100, 2,600, and 450 two years earlier.
  • 2023 Letter — Rising numbers of Chinese nationals are being apprehended at the US-Mexico border, with US officers encountering around 1,000 in one month early in the year and nearly 5,000 by November. Most Chinese emigrants leave through legal means, going primarily to Singapore, Japan, and Thailand.
  • Living Outside China Has Become More Like Living Inside China — About 10.5m people living outside China are or once were Chinese citizens, a diaspora exceeded only by India's, Russia's, and Mexico's. Chinese citizens received more than 70% of 81,000 American investor visas issued to dollar-millionaires over a decade, and 18% of China's nearly 900 dollar-billionaires now live abroad, up from 6%.

Thursday, May 23, 2024

AI Summary. Mechanization of cotton spinning greatly increased labor productivity, but the authors find factory workers' real weekly wages barely rose and employment gains were modest, with productivity gains not shared with workers in textiles or offset elsewhere. They argue digital technologies, robotics, and office automation have similarly reduced affected workers' real earnings and employment.

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson National Bureau of Economic Research
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.@DAcemogluMIT and @baselinescene cite 19th-century textile automation to argue that AI may raise productivity but fail to increase employment and wages as it displaces workers and degrades the quality of remaining jobs.

Do workers share in the productivity gains from automation?

Core argument: Cotton factory operatives' weekly wages rose only from 121 pence in 1806 to 124 pence in 1820, while employment in the sector grew from 90,000 to 126,000, indicating productivity gains from new machinery were not shared with workers.

The dominant industrial fact of the late 18th century was that the use of machines to spin cotton greatly increased labor productivity. David Ricardo believed machinery would help workers but revised his opinion based on the impact of automation. As shown in Figure 3, from 1806 to 1818–1820 the real wages of cotton workers in factories barely increased, while there was a modest increase in employment in this activity. In 1806, 90,000 factory operatives earned a weekly wage of 121[pence], while in 1820, 126,000 workers earned 124[pence]. Productivity gains due to new machinery in cotton were not shared with the workers in textile production, nor were there compensatory gains in other sectors of employment. Today we are in a similarly transformative and disruptive process of technological change. New digital technologies, including robotics, automated equipment, and office automation, have led to declines in the real earnings and employment of workers who used to specialize in tasks that are now being performed by machinery and algorithms. In the meantime, AI and other new tools are also intensifying surveillance and shifting the balance of power from labor to capital.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cotton factory operatives' weekly wages rose only from 121 pence in 1806 to 124 pence in 1820, while employment in the sector grew from 90,000 to 126,000, indicating productivity gains from new machinery were not shared with workers.
  2. David Ricardo initially believed machinery would help workers but revised that opinion based on the impact of automation, and cotton textile workers saw no compensatory gains in other sectors of employment.
  3. Digital technologies including robotics, automated equipment, and office automation have led to declines in the real earnings and employment of workers specializing in tasks now performed by machinery and algorithms, while AI intensifies surveillance and shifts power from labor to capital.

Related Articles:

  • Navigating the Future of Work — Demographic groups whose work has been more displaced by automation have seen slower real wage growth, and automation is estimated to account for about 70% of between-group wage inequality in the US since 1980. Establishments adopting artificial intelligence have slowed hiring of non-AI workers by more than they have added AI specialists.
  • Assessing the Implications of a Productivity Miracle — If artificial intelligence can perform economically valuable cognitive tasks at very low marginal cost, consumers would buy far more of the cheapened goods and spend the savings in other categories, expanding activity and employment in sectors facing new demand. Where supply is inherently limited, such as real estate, those savings could bid up prices and produce inflation.
  • The Short-Term Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Employment: Evidence from an Online Labor Market — Freelancers in occupations most exposed to generative AI saw employment and earnings decline, with the authors estimating a 2% drop in jobs and a 5.2% drop in monthly earnings on an online labor platform. Offering high-quality service did not mitigate the effect, and top-rated freelancers appear disproportionately hurt.

AI Summary. Falling fertility in rich countries is driven by younger women having fewer children, with more than half the drop in the US total fertility rate explained by women under 19 now having almost no children, while women aged 30 and above are having more. College-educated American women at 24 still want about 2.2 children, roughly as many as earlier generations.

Economist Staff The Economist
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In 1960 the mean US woman had 3.6 children; in 2023, this had fallen to 1.6, driven by declining birth rates among women under 30, while birth rates among women 30 and above have risen.

Are falling birth rates in rich countries driven by younger women?

Core argument: American women's average number of children fell from 3.6 in 1960 to 1.6 in 2023, with the decline concentrated among younger women, while women aged 30 and above are having more children.

Birth rates have collapsed because young women are not having as many children. In 1960 American women had on average 3.6 children. In 2023 they had 1.6. Remarkably, women aged 30 and above are having more children. It is only younger women who are having fewer. The decline among younger women is itself concentrated among teenagers. More than half the drop in America’s total fertility rate is explained by women under the age of 19 now having next to no children. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that middle-class women wish they had many more children, which would at least suggest they might be open to official persuasion. Today, at the age of 24, college-educated American women want on average 2.2 children roughly as many as previous generations. They will now have these children a little later than before, with the first arriving at the age of 30, compared with 28 in 2000. Although trends suggest that they will fall short of their ideal family size, the gap may be the same as for women in previous generations, who missed the target by an average of 0.25 children.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American women's average number of children fell from 3.6 in 1960 to 1.6 in 2023, with the decline concentrated among younger women, while women aged 30 and above are having more children.
  2. More than half the drop in America's total fertility rate is explained by women under 19 now having next to no children.
  3. College-educated American women at age 24 want an average of 2.2 children, roughly as many as previous generations, though their first child now arrives at 30, compared with 28 in 2000.

Related Articles:

  • US Births Are Down Again, After the COVID Baby Bust and Rebound — US births declined steadily for years before the pandemic, with almost 600,000 fewer annual births in 2019 than in 2007, a 13% drop. The pandemic-related baby bust and subsequent rebound were short-term deviations from that longer trend, and 2022 birth counts remained below 2019 levels.
  • Why Family-Friendly Policies Don’t Boost Birth Rates — Developed countries roughly tripled real per capita spending on child benefits, subsidised childcare, and parental leave between 1980 and 2019 while birth rates fell from 1.85 to 1.53 per woman. Finland's fertility rate has fallen by a third since 2010, and Korea's "baby bonus" mainly paid women already planning children.
  • The Wealthy Are Starting to Have More Babies Than the Poor Again — In developed countries, men's income and education are now generally positively associated with fatherhood, with 70.1% of US men holding graduate or professional degrees having children versus 48.8% of those without a high school diploma. Among advanced economies, those where men take on more housework and child care have higher fertility rates.

AI Summary. China's shrinking labor force, the shift of industrial supply chains to Belt and Road countries, and Western efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese suppliers are expected to erode its trade surplus, while slowing growth, local-government debt, and deflationary pressure from low fertility push interest rates down. These forces are expected to weaken the renminbi, complicating China's escape from middle-income status.

Yi Fuxian Project Syndicate
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.@fuxianyi argues that China’s rapidly shrinking workforce and government debt crisis mean the country is unlikely to escape the “middle-income trap.” He forecasts the PRC’s growth rate slowing to 3% by 2028 and lower growth than the US from 2031-35.

Will an aging population keep China from becoming rich?

Core argument: China's shrinking labor force and the shift of its industrial value chain toward Belt and Road Initiative countries are expected to push the renminbi lower, complicating China's efforts to escape the middle-income trap.

Several factors are expected to put downward pressure on the renminbi, complicating China’s efforts to escape the middle-income trap. First, China’s labor force is shrinking rapidly, and its industrial value chain is shifting to countries participating in the government’s Belt and Road Initiative. Western countries’ attempts to reduce their dependency on Chinese supply chains could further weaken China’s manufacturing sector, eroding the country’s trade surplus. Second, as economic growth slows and local governments grapple with an escalating debt crisis, Chinese interest rates are expected to fall. Lastly, low fertility rates around the world could lead to low inflation and even outright deflation. China’s persistent low fertility rate, combined with insufficient domestic demand and excess capacity, is likely to intensify deflationary pressures, widening the interest-rate gap between the renminbi and the US dollar.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's shrinking labor force and the shift of its industrial value chain toward Belt and Road Initiative countries are expected to push the renminbi lower, complicating China's efforts to escape the middle-income trap.
  2. Western efforts to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains could further weaken China's manufacturing sector and erode its trade surplus.
  3. China's persistent low fertility rate, insufficient domestic demand, and excess capacity are likely to intensify deflationary pressures, while slowing growth and an escalating local-government debt crisis are expected to push Chinese interest rates down, widening the renminbi-dollar rate gap.

Related Articles:

  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.
  • A Revolution Is Coming for China’s Families — Prolonged below-replacement fertility in China is projected to produce a "kin crash" in which rising generations have fewer living relatives than ever before in Chinese history. The authors argue this shrinking of extended family networks will erode the Chinese family's role in protecting people from adversity and helping them seize opportunity.
  • The Neoclassical Growth of China — China's per capita GDP growth path closely tracks those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from similar starting income levels, indicating nothing unusual about its growth rate. The authors' model projects China's per capita GDP will level off at about 41% of the US level, reflecting a slowdown in productivity catch-up.

AI Summary. US survey data show per capita reports of past-year cannabis use rose 120% and reported days of use rose 218% over a recent 14-year span, with a 15-fold increase in daily or near-daily use reported over three decades. Daily or near-daily cannabis users now outnumber comparable alcohol users (17.7m vs 14.7m), though far more people drink.

Jonathan Caulkins Addiction
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A 2022 Federal survey recorded more daily and near-daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7M vs. 14.7 M.) 40% of Americans who used marijuana in the past month consumed it daily or near-daily.

How much has reported US cannabis use risen over recent decades?

Core argument: Self-reported per capita past-year cannabis use rose 120% between 2008 and 2022, while reported days of use per capita rose 218%, from the annual equivalent of 2.3 billion to 8.1 billion days.

Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4–5 days in the past month, versus 15–16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Self-reported per capita past-year cannabis use rose 120% between 2008 and 2022, while reported days of use per capita rose 218%, from the annual equivalent of 2.3 billion to 8.1 billion days.
  2. The 2022 survey recorded more daily or near daily cannabis users than alcohol users for the first time (17.7 million vs. 14.7 million), compared with a 10-to-1 alcohol margin in 1992 (8.9 million vs. 0.9 million).
  3. In 2022, the median cannabis consumer reported use on 15–16 days in the past month versus 4–5 days for the median drinker, and past-month cannabis users were 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Overdose Deaths Decline for First Time Since 2018 — U.S. overdose deaths fell about 3% to roughly 107,500, the first annual decline in five years, according to preliminary Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates. Deaths involving synthetic opioids, a category largely fueled by fentanyl, fell 2% to about 74,700 and accounted for 7 of every 10 overdose deaths.
  • American Workers Testing Positive for Marijuana Reaches 25-Year Record — Marijuana positivity in U.S. workplace drug tests rose to 4.3% of more than 6m general workforce tests, up from 3.9%, the highest rate since 1997, while positivity for some opioids and barbiturates declined. Positive tests following on-the-job accidents reached 7.3%, tripling over a decade as more than two-thirds of U.S. states legalized recreational or medicinal use.
  • How Fentanyl Laid Waste to Guatemala’s Time-Worn Opium Trade — Opium prices in Guatemala's poppy-growing highlands have collapsed from $64 an ounce to about $9.60, with growers reporting a fall from roughly $2,310 to $256 per kilo. Eradication patrols now find only scattered small plots where cultivation once blanketed the land.