Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, May 8, 2024

AI Summary. Immigrants account for about a quarter of new employer businesses in the United States, and firms with immigrant owners are more likely to hold patents and hold more patents per employee. This higher propensity toward innovation is only partly explained by differences in owners' education levels and fields of study.

Saheel Chodavadia, Sari Pekkala Kerr, William Kerr et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Immigrants accounted for 15% of the 2020 US population, but 27% of new businesses formed in 2021-23. Differences in education and fields of study only partly explain immigrant firms’ high rates of patenting and innovation. @william_r_kerr @schodavadia

How much do immigrants contribute to new business formation and patenting?

Core argument: Immigrants account for about a quarter of new employer businesses in the United States and play outsized roles in entrepreneurship in many countries.

Immigrants play outsized roles in entrepreneurship in many countries, accounting for about a quarter of new employer businesses in the United States. In 2022, the four most valuable private, venture-backed US companies (SpaceX, Stripe, Instacart, Databricks) had immigrant founders, along with three of the ten most valuable public companies globally (Alphabet, Nvidia, Tesla) (Crunchbase, 2022). We utilize the Annual Business Survey (ABS) to quantify the greater rates of patenting and innovation in immigrant-founded firms. Figure 1b compares the 2019 ABS estimate to alternatives from the same period, some of them for specific type of entrepreneurship and prominent artificial intelligence startups. [Regressions] show that a firm is more likely to have a patent and more patents per employee if the owner is an immigrant. This result is quite robust to controlling for education and other traits of the owner and firm. Immigrants are over-represented as founders of innovative firms and in the high-tech industry. This higher propensity towards innovation is only partly explained by differences in education levels and fields of study.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigrants account for about a quarter of new employer businesses in the United States and play outsized roles in entrepreneurship in many countries.
  2. In 2022, the four most valuable private venture-backed US companies — SpaceX, Stripe, Instacart, and Databricks — had immigrant founders, as did three of the ten most valuable public companies globally: Alphabet, Nvidia, and Tesla, per Crunchbase.
  3. Annual Business Survey regressions indicate that firms with immigrant owners are more likely to hold a patent and have more patents per employee, a result robust to controls for owner education and other owner and firm traits.

Related Articles:

  • Latinos Are Starting U.S. Businesses at a Torrid Pace — Immigrants accounted for 36% of new U.S. business launches last year, up from 25% in 2019, driven by a rise in Latino entrepreneurship, while business creation by white and native-born Americans has slowed. Hispanic-owned startups tend to be smaller, with 46% reporting over $100,000 in annual revenue versus 62% of white-owned firms.
  • High Tech Business Entry In The Pandemic Era — High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.
  • Top Talent, Elite Colleges, and Migration: Evidence from the Indian Institutes of Technology — Among top scorers on India's Joint Entrance Exam for the Indian Institutes of Technology, 62% of the top 100 and 36% of the top 1,000 migrated abroad within eight years, primarily to the U.S. for graduate school. The authors argue elite schools shape migration by signaling ability and providing access to networks.

AI Summary. All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures price index, but show smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one when adjusted using the consumer price index. This pattern of smaller gains under consumer price index adjustment holds across time periods.

Wendy Edelberg and Noadia Steinmetz-Silber Brookings Institution
Date Posted:

Between Q4 2019 and Q1 2024, 7 out of 8 measures of real wage growth were positive, ranging from 0.1% to 1.8% per annum over the period. @WendyEdelberg

Does the inflation measure used change whether pay has kept up?

Core argument: All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when deflated by PCE prices, indicating nominal pay has kept up relatively well with overall costs of living on that measure.

All four measures of typical and aggregate pay, adjusted by PCE, have grown since 2019. When deflating using CPI, we find smaller increases across three of the four measures and a decline in one measure. In other words, nominal pay by these measures has done relatively well in keeping up with overall costs of living since 2019, measured by PCE. Nominal pay has done somewhat less well in keeping up with increases in the costs of goods and services that are much more salient to consumers, measured by CPI. This pattern is consistent across time periods, with pay deflated by CPI experiencing smaller increases—or instead decreases—relative to pay deflated using PCE.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. All four measures of typical and aggregate pay have grown since 2019 when deflated by PCE prices, indicating nominal pay has kept up relatively well with overall costs of living on that measure.
  2. Deflating the same four pay measures by CPI yields smaller increases in three measures and a decline in one, indicating pay has kept up less well with the costs of goods and services more salient to consumers.
  3. The pattern holds across time periods, with pay deflated by CPI showing smaller increases—or decreases—relative to pay deflated using PCE.

Related Articles:

  • Credit Bidenomics for Rising US Wages — Inflation-adjusted wages for US workers in the middle pay range, between the 40th and 60th percentiles, were 6.6% higher than before the pandemic, slightly above what 2015-19 trends would predict. The US is the only G7 country with substantial real wage gains, ranging elsewhere from a 0.2% rise in Canada to a 9% decline in Italy.
  • Why Americans Dislike the Economy — The Employment Cost Index, which adjusts for shifts in the mix of jobs and industries, shows inflation-adjusted wages have fallen 3.7% since the end of 2020, erasing the gains of the late 2010s. Real wages stand at 2015 levels, so American paychecks buy no more than they did eight years earlier.
  • Are You Better Off Than You Were Four Years Ago? — Inflation-adjusted wages rose over the past four years, including when measured from just before the pandemic, at roughly the same pace as in the preceding years: about 3% cumulative growth adjusted by the consumer price index versus about 4% in 2015-2019, and about 5% growth adjusted by personal consumption prices.

AI Summary. United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.

Nicholas Eberstadt Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:

Nicholas Eberstadt @AEIecon notes East Asia is depopulating; over the next 26 years Japan’s population is projected to fall by 18%, China’s by 8%, South Korea’s by 12% and Taiwan’s by 8%. The US population is projected to grow by 12%.

How sharply will East Asia's population and working-age support ratios fall?

Core argument: UN Population Division projections show Japan's population falling 18% and South Korea's 12% between 2020 and 2050, with China's and Taiwan's each down 8%, while the U.S. population rises 12%.

According to projections from the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic Social Affairs, China’s and Japan’s populations are set to fall by 8% and 18%, respectively, between 2020 and 2050. South Korea’s population is poised to shrink by 12%. And Taiwan’s will go down by an estimated 8%. The U.S. population, by contrast, is on track to increase by 12%. The region’s “potential support ratios”—that is, the number of people who are between 20 and 64 relative to those who are 65 and older—are expected to plunge in the years ahead. In 2020, that ratio was 5.1 to 1 for China, 4.4 to 1 for Taiwan, 4.2 to 1 for South Korea, and 1.8 to 1 for Japan. In 2050, it will be 1.8 to 1 for China, 1.4 to 1 for Taiwan, and an almost unfathomable 1.2 to 1 in Japan and South Korea—meaning that, in Japan and South Korea, there will be almost as many people over 65 as between 20 and 64. This transformation will likely depress individual productivity, savings, and investments, as workers and their parents devote ever more time and money to elder care.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. UN Population Division projections show Japan's population falling 18% and South Korea's 12% between 2020 and 2050, with China's and Taiwan's each down 8%, while the U.S. population rises 12%.
  2. China's potential support ratio of people aged 20–64 to those 65 and older is projected to fall from 5.1:1 in 2020 to 1.8:1 in 2050, with Taiwan going from 4.4:1 to 1.4:1.
  3. Japan and South Korea are projected to reach potential support ratios of 1.2:1 by 2050, leaving almost as many people over 65 as aged 20–64, a shift likely to depress individual productivity, savings, and investment as elder-care burdens grow.

Related Articles:

  • Thoughts and Comments on Demographic Aging and Shrinking — As an arithmetic matter, the greying of societies is driven much more by smaller families than by longer lives, which the author attributes to a withering away of the family. Demographic simulations project that by 2040 couples in their 60s in China will likely have at least one living parent to care for, and many will have two or three.
  • A Revolution Is Coming for China’s Families — Prolonged below-replacement fertility in China is projected to produce a "kin crash" in which rising generations have fewer living relatives than ever before in Chinese history. The authors argue this shrinking of extended family networks will erode the Chinese family's role in protecting people from adversity and helping them seize opportunity.
  • Exploring the Implications of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Demographic Explosion — Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to hold a quarter of the world's working-age population within a few decades and to surpass China's working-age population in roughly a decade. Even with modest productivity growth near 2%, the region's growth is estimated at 4.5–5.5%, raising its share of global output from about 3% while remaining small.

AI Summary. Metro areas still short of their pre-pandemic employment levels saw steeper job losses during the pandemic recession (16.1% on average versus 13.4% for recovered areas) and slower job growth beforehand (0.5% average annual growth over the prior five years versus 1.5%). Worker shortages have been especially acute in these lagging areas.

Jaison Abel, Richard Deitz, Jonathan Hastings, et al. Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:

A @NewYorkFed analysis notes that while the US overall has recovered from the pandemic, metro areas in the Rust Belt with slow growth before the pandemic and most of upstate New York have not, driven in part by persistent worker shortages.

Why have some metro areas not regained pre-pandemic employment levels?

Core argument: Metro areas that have not regained pre-pandemic employment saw an average 16.1% employment decline during the pandemic recession, versus 13.4% in metros that have recovered, leaving a bigger hole to dig out of.

The metro areas that are lagging in the jobs recovery share some common features. First, many of them were hit particularly hard during the initial shock, leaving a bigger hole to dig out of. On average, the places that have not yet recovered experienced an employment decline of 16.1% during the pandemic recession compared to a 13.4% decline in the places that have recovered. In addition, many of the places that have not recovered were slow-growth economies heading into the pandemic, leaving less momentum to grow and recover coming out of it. Indeed, the metro areas with job deficits saw average annual job growth of just 0.5% in the five years leading up to the pandemic, compared to 1.5%, on average, for those that have recovered. Over the past year, slower job growth in the areas that have not yet recovered has resumed. Further, many places that have not recovered just don’t have the workers to allow their local economies to grow. With persistent worker shortages across the country since the pandemic, labor has often been hard to find, and that’s been especially true in places that still have job deficits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Metro areas that have not regained pre-pandemic employment saw an average 16.1% employment decline during the pandemic recession, versus 13.4% in metros that have recovered, leaving a bigger hole to dig out of.
  2. Metro areas still running job deficits averaged just 0.5% annual job growth in the five years before the pandemic, compared with 1.5% for those that have recovered, leaving less momentum for recovery.
  3. Slower job growth has resumed in metro areas that have not yet recovered, where worker shortages persisting since the pandemic have made labor especially hard to find.

Related Articles:

  • America Is Uniquely Ill-Suited To Handle a Falling Population — U.S. population growth slowed to about 7.4% in the decade to 2020, the slowest since the Great Depression, as the fertility rate fell from above the 2.1 needed for a stable population to 1.67. Because local and regional authorities levy 48% of all U.S. taxes—versus 20% in France and 6% in Britain—shrinking local revenue forces service cuts or tax rises.
  • Movers And Money: Mapping the Flow of Income During the Pandemic — Manhattan recorded the largest county-level income outflow to other states at $16.5bn, with 27.7 cents of every dollar leaving—$4.6bn—going to Florida, including $2.9bn to Miami-Dade County and $1.1bn to Palm Beach County. California had the largest state-level losses, while Florida was the biggest beneficiary with a net gain of $39bn.
  • Economic Prosperity is Shifting Toward the Mountain West and Southeast — The most economically prosperous U.S. zip codes house 80.6m residents and averaged nearly 3x the job growth of "comfortable" zip codes and 10x that of "at-risk" ones. In several Southeast and Mountain West states, a much greater share of the population now lives in top-ranked prosperous zip codes than a decade earlier.

AI Summary. The US Department of Commerce has revoked certain export licences allowing American firms to supply semiconductors to Chinese telecoms equipment maker Huawei, affecting chips used in Huawei laptops and mobile phones.

Demetri Sevastopulo Financial Times
Date Posted:

The Biden administration has revoked export licences that allow Intel and Qualcomm to supply Huawei with semiconductors used in laptops and mobile phones, extending export controls targeting high-tech sectors of the PRC’s economy.

Is the US tightening chip export licences for Huawei?

Core argument: The Biden administration has revoked export licences permitting Intel and Qualcomm to supply semiconductors to Huawei, increasing US pressure on the Chinese telecoms equipment maker.

The Biden administration has revoked export licences that allow Intel and Qualcomm to supply Huawei with semiconductors as Washington increases the pressure on the Chinese telecoms equipment company. The move by the US Department of Commerce affects the supply of chips for Huawei’s laptop computers and mobile phones, according to people familiar with the situation. The commerce department confirmed to the Financial Times that it had “revoked certain licences for exports to Huawei” but did not name which US companies would be affected.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Biden administration has revoked export licences permitting Intel and Qualcomm to supply semiconductors to Huawei, increasing US pressure on the Chinese telecoms equipment maker.
  2. The US Department of Commerce action affects chips used in Huawei's laptop computers and mobile phones, according to people familiar with the situation.
  3. The commerce department confirmed to the Financial Times that it had "revoked certain licences for exports to Huawei" without naming which US companies would be affected.

Related Articles:

  • China AI & Semiconductors Rise: US Sanctions Have Failed — China's Kirin 9000S is a better-designed, leading-edge chip than the West realizes, developed without access to extreme ultraviolet lithography or cutting-edge US intellectual property, indicating existing export controls have not worked. The authors argue only decisive, full-scale measures—not half measures—could prevent China from mass-manufacturing chips needed for high-end military applications.
  • Chinese Companies Resort To Repurposing Nvidia Gaming Chips For AI — Chinese firms are developing artificial intelligence tools using processors stripped from Nvidia consumer gaming graphics cards and remounted on new circuit boards, after US export controls blocked sales of high-performance chips. Industry experts describe the practice as a rough workaround for China's shortage of high-end processors.
  • China On Cusp Of Next-Generation Chip Production Despite US Curbs — China's largest chipmaker, SMIC, has assembled new production lines in Shanghai to mass-produce 5-nanometre smartphone processors designed by Huawei, using its existing stock of US- and Dutch-made equipment. Though 5nm remains a generation behind cutting-edge 3nm chips, the move indicates China's semiconductor industry is still progressing despite US export controls.

Thursday, May 9, 2024

AI Summary. Studying changes in six U.S. state corporate income taxes, the authors find that higher corporate taxes on average depress leverage at small private firms, whose borrowing rises after tax cuts, while large private firms' leverage does not respond. Bank assessments of loan default rates fall 20–30 basis points following tax cuts.

Ivan Ivanov, Luke Pettit, and Toni Whited National Bureau of Economic Research
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.@toniwhited and @ivan_t_ivanov find that state tax cuts “make capital more productive and spur borrowing” by small private firms, as investment opportunities and lower credit spreads outweigh the reduced tax subsidy to borrowing.

Do higher corporate taxes reduce borrowing at small private firms?

Core argument: Studying changes in 6 state corporate income taxes since the 1990s across private and public companies, the authors find corporate taxes on average depress leverage at small private firms, while large private firms' leverage does not respond to tax legislation.

[Miller-Modigliani theory says] the benefit from the interest tax deduction is larger than countervailing costs of debt related to financial distress, and prior empirical work finds a positive relation between debt and taxes. Using comprehensive samples of both private and public companies, we study the evolution of corporate borrowing around changes in 6 state corporate income taxes since the 1990s. For small private firms corporate taxes, on average, depress leverage. The leverage of large private firms does not change in response to tax legislation. Small firms' leverage first responds to the tax cuts in the enactment year with no significant reaction before enactment. The event study coefficients on or after the enactment dates [Figure a, panels A and B] are precisely estimated, ranging from approximately 4% in the enactment year to about 2% four years later. We find that bank assessments of loan default rates fall by 20-30bps after tax cuts. This last result supports the notion that default risk [is] also tax-sensitive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Studying changes in 6 state corporate income taxes since the 1990s across private and public companies, the authors find corporate taxes on average depress leverage at small private firms, while large private firms' leverage does not respond to tax legislation.
  2. Small private firms' leverage first responds in the enactment year of tax cuts, with event-study coefficients ranging from roughly 4% in the enactment year to about 2% four years later and no significant reaction beforehand.
  3. Bank assessments of loan default rates fall by 20–30bps after tax cuts, which the authors take as support for the notion that default risk is tax-sensitive.

Related Articles:

  • Tax Policy and Investment in a Global Economy — Using administrative tax data, the authors estimate that firms experiencing the mean corporate tax change under the 2017 US tax law increased investment by 20% relative to firms with no change, with long-run domestic and total capital up 7% and 13%. They find higher depreciation deductions largely offset added revenue from capital accumulation.
  • Who Gains from Corporate Tax Cuts? — The authors estimate that corporate tax cuts boost overall investment and employment, with goods-producing firms such as manufacturers raising capital expenditure and wage bills without changing dividends, and a 1% cut in the marginal tax rate lifting their capital spending by as much as 8%. Service-sector firms instead direct most of the windfall to dividends.
  • End of an Era: The Coming Long-Run Slowdown in Corporate Profit Growth and Stock Returns — The authors estimate that declining interest and corporate tax rates accounted for over 40% of real corporate profit growth from 1989 to 2019, while falling risk-free rates explain the entire expansion in price-to-earnings multiples. Real earnings before interest and taxes grew slightly more slowly than in 1962–1989, at 2.2% versus 2.4% per year.

AI Summary. China's outward investment flows show rising outflows to countries across Asia and, on a smaller scale, Europe, consistent with shifting production to third countries whose exports are not automatically subject to U.S. tariffs. Gaps between China's two official foreign direct investment series may reflect losses at foreign-owned subsidiaries rather than asset sales by foreigners.

Robin Brooks Brookings Institution
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.@robin_j_brooks argues the reduction in net Chinese FDI since 2021 was driven primarily by an increase in outbound Chinese FDI in countries not subject to US tariffs, not by repatriation of capital by foreign investors in China.

Do China's outward investment flows show production shifting to other countries?

Core argument: Reinvested earnings accounted for 80% of the gap between China's broader SAFE foreign direct investment data and the Ministry of Commerce's narrower greenfield proxy in the few years for which such data are available.

China is likely diversifying its manufacturing base, shifting production to third countries where exports will not automatically be subject to U.S. tariffs. This is apparent in China’s outward investment flows, which show a rise in outflows to countries across Asia and—on a smaller scale—to countries in Europe. This shift is consistent with China financially decoupling from the U.S. and diversifying manufacturing supply chains at the same time. Nick Lardy has flagged that the difference between non-resident FDI flows from SAFE versus FDI data from the Ministry of Commerce implies large asset sales in 2023, as MofCom data proxy for “greenfield” FDI while SAFE data are broader. However, for the few years in which data on reinvested earnings are available they accounted for 80% of the gap between SAFE and MofCom data. As reinvested earnings are not an actual capital flow—they are booked as an offsetting dividend payment in the current account and an FDI inflow in the financial account—it is possible that a big part of the 2023 outflow reflects losses at foreign-owned subsidiaries, consistent with lingering effects from China’s COVID lockdowns, and thus has nothing to do with asset sales by foreigners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Reinvested earnings accounted for 80% of the gap between China's broader SAFE foreign direct investment data and the Ministry of Commerce's narrower greenfield proxy in the few years for which such data are available.
  2. China's outward investment flows show rising outflows to countries across Asia and, on a smaller scale, to Europe, consistent with shifting production to third countries whose exports are not automatically subject to U.S. tariffs.
  3. Nick Lardy has flagged that the SAFE–Ministry of Commerce divergence implies large asset sales in 2023, though a big part of that outflow may instead reflect losses at foreign-owned subsidiaries, consistent with lingering effects of China's COVID lockdowns.

Related Articles:

  • Foreign Direct Investment is Exiting China, New Data Show — Two official Chinese data series—one measuring gross foreign direct investment inflows and one measuring inflows minus outflows—both show foreign direct investment exiting China. The author attributes most of the $113bn gap between the two measures to net sales of direct investment assets by foreign investors.
  • The Rise & Fall of Foreign Direct Investment in China — Net foreign direct investment into China has been negative for four consecutive quarters, as foreign investors shifted from reinvesting earnings from their Chinese operations to repatriating them. Whether this reflects cash management or signals a future slowdown in foreign direct investment is unclear, but the repatriation of profits is negative for China's currency.
  • China’s Unremitted Export Earnings — A substantial share of China's net export proceeds is never repatriated and cannot be accounted for; the authors attribute this to offshore holdings by private Chinese firms, overseas accumulation by state-owned entities, and reduced reinvestment by foreign exporters. They argue state-linked funds could be repatriated in a crisis, while lower foreign reinvestment is more structural.

AI Summary. An analysis of over one million television transcripts finds that coverage of gasoline prices shows a negative news bias, ramping up sharply once the nominal price reaches $3.50 a gallon, most steeply at Fox News. Because that threshold is fixed in nominal terms, the inflation-adjusted trigger has fallen by one-third.

Ryan Cummings, Giacomo Fraccaroli, and Neale Mahoney 
Date Posted:

.@weakinstrument @nealemahoney @giacomofcr find that between 2004-23, US television ramps up coverage of gas prices when they hit $3.50/gallon. Currently, the mean price of a gallon of gas is $3.60 nationally.

Does television coverage of gasoline prices show a negative news bias?

Core argument: An analysis of over one million TV transcripts finds that coverage of gasoline prices ramps up sharply once the nominal price hits $3.50 per gallon, which the authors characterize as a negative news bias.

We analyzed over one million transcripts and found that TV coverage of gas prices exhibits a negative news bias. TV coverage sharply ramps up when the nominal gas price hits $3.50 per gallon. The ramp-up is steeper for cable than network outlets, and among cable outlets, steepest for Fox News. Because the $3.50 threshold is stable in nominal terms, the real threshold at which the media ramps up their coverage of gas prices has decreased by one-third over time.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An analysis of over one million TV transcripts finds that coverage of gasoline prices ramps up sharply once the nominal price hits $3.50 per gallon, which the authors characterize as a negative news bias.
  2. The ramp-up in gas price coverage at the $3.50 nominal threshold is steeper for cable than for network outlets, and steepest among cable outlets for Fox News.
  3. Because the $3.50 threshold is stable in nominal terms, the real gas price threshold at which the media ramps up coverage has decreased by one-third over time.

Related Articles:

  • Americans Are Suddenly a Lot More Upbeat About the Economy — The University of Michigan's consumer sentiment survey recorded a 29% rise over two months, the largest two-month increase since 1991. The improvement was broad-based across consumers of different ages, incomes, education levels, and regions.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.

AI Summary. Encounters between migrants and US immigration authorities fell to about 190,000 per month in February and March from a record of more than 300,000 in December, after Mexico restored funding for migration services and increased deportations. Administration officials say encounters over four months were down 40% from the prior four-month period.

Eric Martin Bloomberg
Date Posted:

CBP data show border encounters fell from 300,000 in December to about 190,000 monthly in the first four months of 2024 after Mexico stepped up enforcement measures.

Have regional enforcement efforts reduced migrant encounters at the southern border?

Core argument: Migrant encounters at the US southern border in the first four months of this year fell 40% versus the final four months of last year, according to senior administration officials speaking on condition of anonymity.

The number of encounters between migrants and immigration authorities during the first four months of this year is down 40% compared with the final four months of last year, according to senior administration officials, who spoke on the condition they not be identified. The decline implies that the number of arrivals by undocumented migrants has continued to slide from March into April, the first time during the Biden administration that the figures slowed during that span despite warmer weather, when the figures would typically rise. Customs and Border Protection data show that border encounters fell to about 190,000 per month in February and March, down from a record of more than 300,000 in December, after Mexico restored funding for migration services and ramped up deportations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Migrant encounters at the US southern border in the first four months of this year fell 40% versus the final four months of last year, according to senior administration officials speaking on condition of anonymity.
  2. Customs and Border Protection data show border encounters dropped to about 190,000 per month in February and March from a record of more than 300,000 in December, after Mexico restored funding for migration services and increased deportations.
  3. The decline implies undocumented arrivals kept falling from March into April, the first slowdown over that span during the Biden administration despite warmer weather, when the figures would typically rise.

Related Articles:

  • Illegal US Border Crossings Aren’t Really Breaking Records — Official US border encounter statistics exclude people who evade Border Patrol agents, who in past decades made up the majority of illegal crossers. The Department of Homeland Security estimated apprehension rates of 33%–43% in the 2000s versus 81% more recently, a shift attributed mainly to most crossers intending to turn themselves in and apply for asylum.
  • Immigration and the U.S. Economy Since the Pandemic: An Accounting Exercise — The US native-born labor force fell by about 1.2m over four years, a decline driven overwhelmingly by population aging, while foreign-born labor supply grew by about 3m, leaving the overall labor force up roughly 2m. Without immigration, the total US labor force would have shrunk.
  • Immigration’s Effect on US Wages and Employment Redux — The authors estimate that immigration to the US over 2000-2019 raised wages of natives with a high school degree or less by 1.7% to 2.6%, a period when that group's real wages fell by 5% to 6%. Effects on more-educated natives ranged from -0.5% to +0.7%, with an overall average effect of +0.5% to +0.8% that was not statistically significant.

AI Summary. In a randomized trial of 15,965 hospitalized patients, an artificial-intelligence electrocardiogram system that flagged patients predicted to be at high risk of death and sent warning messages to physicians was associated with lower 90-day all-cause mortality, 3.6% in the intervention group versus 4.3% in the control group.

Chin-Sheng Lin, Wei-Ting Liu, Dung-Jang Tsa, et al. Nature Medicine
Date Posted:

A study of 15,965 cardiac patients in Taiwan found that AI-enabled electrocardiogram alerts to physicians reduced the 90-day mortality of high-risk patients from 4.3% in a control group to 3.6% in the AI-ECG group.

Do AI risk alerts sent to physicians reduce patient mortality?

Core argument: In a multisite randomized controlled trial, an AI-enabled ECG alert was associated with 90-day all-cause mortality of 3.6% in the intervention group versus 4.3% in the control group, meeting the trial's primary outcome.

This study evaluated the ability of an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled electrocardiogram (ECG) to identify hospitalized patients with a high risk of mortality in a multisite randomized controlled trial involving 39 physicians and 15,965 patients. The AI-ECG alert intervention included an AI report and warning messages delivered to the physicians, flagging patients predicted to be at high risk of mortality. The trial met its primary outcome, finding that implementation of the AI-ECG alert was associated with a significant reduction in all-cause mortality within 90 days: 3.6% of patients in the intervention group died within 90 days, compared to 4.3% in the control group (4.3%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a multisite randomized controlled trial, an AI-enabled ECG alert was associated with 90-day all-cause mortality of 3.6% in the intervention group versus 4.3% in the control group, meeting the trial's primary outcome.
  2. The trial involved 15,965 hospitalized patients and 39 physicians, with the intervention delivering an AI report and warning messages flagging patients predicted to be at high risk of mortality.

Related Articles:

  • Assessing the Implications of a Productivity Miracle — If artificial intelligence can perform economically valuable cognitive tasks at very low marginal cost, consumers would buy far more of the cheapened goods and spend the savings in other categories, expanding activity and employment in sectors facing new demand. Where supply is inherently limited, such as real estate, those savings could bid up prices and produce inflation.