Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, April 18, 2024

AI Summary. Despite upside inflation surprises, the authors argue the broader disinflation narrative remains intact, citing a labor market that continues to rebalance: a jobs-workers gap of 2.0m, a quits rate below pre-pandemic levels, and wage growth running just over 4% year-on-year. They expect wage growth to converge to 3.5%, the pace they estimate is consistent with 2% inflation.

Jan Hatzius Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

Jan Hatzius @GoldmanSachs forecasts wage growth decelerating to 3.5%, consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target and expects quarterly cuts starting in July.

Does labor market rebalancing keep disinflation on track despite inflation surprises?

Core argument: The jobs-workers gap has fallen to 2.0 million and the quits rate sits below pre-pandemic levels, evidence cited that the labor market continues to rebalance and the disinflationary narrative remains intact despite upside inflation surprises.

Despite the recent upside inflation surprises, we think the broader disinflationary narrative remains intact. One key reason is that the labor market continues to rebalance nicely. Our jobs-workers gap is down to 2.0 million, the quits rate is below pre-pandemic levels, and the wage news remains favorable. As of March, average hourly earnings and the Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker are consistent with year-on-year wage growth of just over 4%, and we expect the more reliable employment cost index to show a similar pace for Q1. Over the next year, we see wage growth converging to 3.5%, the pace we estimate is consistent with 2% assuming a productivity trend of 1.5% and stable profit margins.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The jobs-workers gap has fallen to 2.0 million and the quits rate sits below pre-pandemic levels, evidence cited that the labor market continues to rebalance and the disinflationary narrative remains intact despite upside inflation surprises.
  2. As of March, average hourly earnings and the Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker are consistent with year-on-year wage growth of just over 4%, and the employment cost index is expected to show a similar pace for the first quarter.
  3. Wage growth is projected to converge to 3.5% over the next year, the pace estimated to be consistent with 2% inflation assuming a 1.5% productivity trend and stable profit margins.

Related Articles:

  • Parsing the 2024 Inflation Rebound — Average pay for most workers is rising about 4.5–5% a year, roughly 1.5–2pp faster than the pre-pandemic average, implying an underlying inflation trend about 1–2pp above the pre-pandemic pace absent a surge in productivity or saving. Earlier one-off drops in consumer goods prices held measured inflation below that trend and appear to have ended.
  • Wages Are Rising Faster than We Thought — Core wage growth is running slightly faster than in the late 1990s and 2005-2007, about 2-3 percentage points faster than before the pandemic. The author argues a steady state near 5% annual wage growth need not be inflationary if workers save more or productivity gains let businesses expand output to meet demand.
  • Is Post-Pandemic Wage Growth Fueling Inflation? — A model forecasts no statistically significant additional wage pressure on prices if year-over-year employment cost growth runs between 3.78% and 4.25%, a range above the Federal Reserve's 2% inflation target plus average productivity growth. Because inflation has outpaced productivity-adjusted wages, wages have room to catch up without adding inflation.

AI Summary. U.S. population growth slowed to about 7.4% in the decade to 2020, the slowest since the Great Depression, as the fertility rate fell from above the 2.1 needed for a stable population to 1.67. Because local and regional authorities levy 48% of all U.S. taxes—versus 20% in France and 6% in Britain—shrinking local revenue forces service cuts or tax rises.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Between 2010 and 2020 over half of US counties, representing 25% of the population, saw their populations decline. Rural America’s population decline is set to accelerate this decade as the birth rate declines and immigrants flow to major cities.

Does America's tax decentralization make population decline harder to manage?

Core argument: The U.S. population grew about 7.4% between 2010 and 2020, the slowest decade of growth since the Great Depression's 7.3%, and down from 13% in the 1990s.

Between 2010 and 2020 the number of people in the country grew by around 7.4%. That was the slowest decade of growth since the Great Depression (when the population grew by 7.3%). In the 1990s the growth rate was 13%. The main culprit is falling birth rates. The total fertility rate—a measure of how many children a typical woman will have in her lifetime—was steady or rising for 30 years from the mid-1970s. In 2008, however, it fell below 2.1, the level needed to keep the population stable, and has since declined to 1.67. Death spirals [of declining population leading to declining tax revenues and public services] tend to be worse in America because of the remarkable level to which the government is decentralised. Local and regional authorities levy 48% of all tax collected in America, compared with just 20% in France and 6% in Britain. And even America’s federal spending typically comes in the form of grants linked to population levels. So when local tax revenues shrink, services must be cut or taxes must rise.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. population grew about 7.4% between 2010 and 2020, the slowest decade of growth since the Great Depression's 7.3%, and down from 13% in the 1990s.
  2. The U.S. total fertility rate held steady or rose for 30 years from the mid-1970s, fell below the population-stabilising level of 2.1 in 2008, and has since declined to 1.67.
  3. Local and regional authorities levy 48% of all tax collected in America, versus 20% in France and 6% in Britain, so shrinking local tax revenues force service cuts or tax increases.

Related Articles:

  • Economic Prosperity is Shifting Toward the Mountain West and Southeast — The most economically prosperous U.S. zip codes house 80.6m residents and averaged nearly 3x the job growth of "comfortable" zip codes and 10x that of "at-risk" ones. In several Southeast and Mountain West states, a much greater share of the population now lives in top-ranked prosperous zip codes than a decade earlier.
  • Without Immigrants, US Working-Age Population Would Shrink — All net US employment growth since early 2020 has been among foreign-born workers, and without immigration the US working-age population would be shrinking — a pattern likely to persist for the rest of the decade. The jump in immigration appears to be enabling a soft landing that most economists had thought impossible.
  • Immigration and the U.S. Economy Since the Pandemic: An Accounting Exercise — The US native-born labor force fell by about 1.2m over four years, a decline driven overwhelmingly by population aging, while foreign-born labor supply grew by about 3m, leaving the overall labor force up roughly 2m. Without immigration, the total US labor force would have shrunk.

AI Summary. Higher average temperatures put over half of US counties at risk of rising energy consumption costs, with Bank of America internal data showing average total utility payments per customer near $300, up almost 25% since 2019 and 38% higher for lower-income customers. The same data show heat-exposed sectors have weaker cash inflow-to-outflow ratios during warmer months.

Taylor Bowley Bank of America
Date Posted:

Warming average temperatures in most of the US are contributing to rising utility costs. In March, @BankofAmerica’s internal data showed $300 mean monthly utility payments per customer, up nearly 25% from 2019.

Are rising temperatures raising utility costs and squeezing heat-exposed businesses?

Core argument: Average total utility payments per customer reached nearly $300 as of March, a nearly 25% rise since 2019, according to Bank of America internal data.

Higher average temperatures put over half of US counties at risk for increasing energy consumption costs and associated expenses such as utility payments. As of March, the average total utility payments per customer was nearly $300 per Bank of America internal data, a nearly one-quarter rise in cost since 2019. Many households are impacted by climate hazards, but certain households are particularly susceptible to experiencing financial strain. Lower-income customers' average utility payments are 38% higher in March than the 2019 average, and people in the Northeast and West are facing increasing financial pressure. Rising temperatures are also taking a toll on workers, especially those working outdoors in heat-exposed industries. Bank of America internal data finds, during warmer months, heat-exposed sectors have a lower inflow-to-outflow ratio, which we view as a proxy for profits. Long-term, high heat could reduce available jobs in certain sectors, amplifying economic costs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average total utility payments per customer reached nearly $300 as of March, a nearly 25% rise since 2019, according to Bank of America internal data.
  2. Lower-income customers' average utility payments in March were 38% above their 2019 average, with people in the Northeast and West facing increasing financial pressure.
  3. Bank of America internal data show heat-exposed sectors have a lower inflow-to-outflow ratio during warmer months, viewed as a proxy for profits, and high heat could reduce available jobs in certain sectors over the long term.

Related Articles:

  • Electricity 2024 — More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.
  • Elon Musk’s Latest Mission: Rev Up the Electricity Industry — U.S. electricity demand has grown at an average of 1% a year over the past 20 years, but McKinsey projects it will double by 2050 and PG&E expects a 70% rise over the next 20 years. Deloitte estimates the largest U.S. electric companies will together spend as much as $1.8tn by 2030.
  • Climate Change and the Geography of the U.S. Economy — The positive association between extreme heat and U.S. county population growth weakened over recent decades and disappeared entirely in the 2010s, as hot counties grew hotter. Projected climate change is predicted to shift population from the Southeast and parts of the Southwest toward the North, Mountain West, and Pacific coast.

AI Summary. US manufacturing output is rising 5.7% year-on-year while foreign factory output has picked up only marginally, up 0.3% year-on-year after stagnating. Contributors include a waning drag from inventory drawdowns as inventory ratios normalize, easing financial conditions, and rising national defense budgets lifting arms and ammunition production.

Spencer Hill and Jessica Rindels Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

US manufacturing output is growing 5.7% y/y, aided by reduced inventory drawdowns, easing global financial conditions, and increased national defense spending. @GoldmanSachs

Is US manufacturing output growing faster than foreign factory output?

Core argument: US manufacturing output is rising 5.7% year-on-year, while foreign factory output rose only 0.3% year-on-year in the first quarter after stagnating in 2022 and 2023.

US manufacturing output is currently rising at a fairly strong pace of 5.7% year-on-year, whereas the level of foreign factory output has picked up only marginally—up +0.3% year-on-year in Q1—after stagnating in 2022 and 2023. The nascent rebound has multiple causes, including a waning drag from inventory drawdowns after they became bloated in 2022 in a hangover from the pandemic goods demand boom. Inventory ratios are nearly back to normal in the US and they have partially normalized in East Asia where the consumer goods and technology inventory overhang was particularly severe. The easing in financial conditions over the last 6 months has also supported factory activity and consumer demand (Global FCI ex-Russia -0.65pt from the peak). Rising national defense budgets and the related increase in arms and ammunition production and exports are also boosting industrial demand in some industries and countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US manufacturing output is rising 5.7% year-on-year, while foreign factory output rose only 0.3% year-on-year in the first quarter after stagnating in 2022 and 2023.
  2. The nascent factory rebound stems partly from a waning drag from inventory drawdowns, with inventory ratios nearly back to normal in the US and partially normalized in East Asia, where the consumer goods and technology overhang was particularly severe.
  3. Easing financial conditions, with the global financial conditions index excluding Russia down 0.65 point from its peak, have supported factory activity and consumer demand, while rising national defense budgets lift arms and ammunition production and exports.

Related Articles:

  • The US and Its Allies Face a $10 Trillion Reckoning in the Race to Rearm — World defense spending reached a record $2.2tn, and security officials say military budgets may need to reach Cold War levels of as high as 4% of economic output to deliver on NATO's plans. Bloomberg Economics calculates that US and Group of Seven allies hitting that level would mean over $10tn in additional commitments over a decade.
  • Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles? — The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.
  • U.S. Seeks To ‘Integrate’ Japan Into Defense Industrial Base — The U.S. and Japan are formalizing arrangements for U.S. Navy warships to undergo maintenance, repair, and overhaul at Japanese private shipyards, initially limited to the roughly two dozen ships forward-deployed to Japan. Expanding the work to U.S.-based ships, which could ease American maintenance bottlenecks, may require congressional action.

AI Summary. China's overall fiscal deficit remained above 7% of GDP, as a modest increase in revenues offset higher spending, and is projected to rise gradually to about 8% of GDP by 2029 as pension and interest costs increase. Persistently large primary deficits are projected to keep raising public debt despite very favorable interest-growth differentials.

IMF Staff International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:

The IMF notes that China’s public debt as a % of GDP (including local governments and government-guided funds) surpassed the US in 2020, and is expected to reach almost 250% of GDP in 2053.

Will China's large deficits keep raising public debt despite favorable interest-growth differentials?

Core argument: China's overall fiscal deficit remained above 7% of GDP in 2023, as a modest increase in revenues offset increases in spending.

The overall fiscal deficit in China remained above 7% of GDP in 2023, as a modest increase in revenues offset spending increases. The fiscal deficit is projected to stay elevated and even to gradually rise to about 8% of GDP by 2029 as pension spending and interest expenses gradually rise over the medium term. Despite very favorable interest-growth differentials, persistently large primary deficits are projected to continue raising public debt in the country.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's overall fiscal deficit remained above 7% of GDP in 2023, as a modest increase in revenues offset increases in spending.
  2. China's fiscal deficit is projected to stay elevated and gradually rise to about 8% of GDP by 2029, as pension spending and interest expenses rise over the medium term.
  3. Persistently large primary deficits are projected to keep raising China's public debt, despite very favorable interest-growth differentials.

Related Articles:

  • China Economy Memo: Tempest in a Teapot or Crisis A-Brewing? — The authors argue China is heading into a protracted debt crisis in which about 40% of local government financing vehicles default, hitting regional banks most exposed to such lending. They estimate total losses for these creditors at roughly $5tn, or about 30% of China's GDP.
  • The Debt Supercycle Comes to China — China's property sector, which accounts for 23% of GDP (26% counting imports), is yielding diminishing returns after a construction boom driven by the country's massive post-2008 investment stimulus. The author argues this debt supercycle is the best explanation for China's faltering economy and what comes next.
  • China’s Debt Isn’t The Problem — China's roughly $47.5tn debt pile is a symptom rather than the core problem, which is the unrecognized losses from a decade of misallocated investment into excess property, infrastructure, and manufacturing. Resolving it requires distributing asset-side losses quickly in ways that minimize financial distress costs, not just restructuring liabilities to protect the financial system.

Friday, April 19, 2024

AI Summary. High-tech industries accounted for a disproportionate share of the surge in net new business establishments after 2019, with net entry higher in tech than non-tech industries. The authors find suggestive evidence that tech establishment births rose more for existing firms than new firms, though both categories saw elevated openings.

Ryan Decker and John Haltiwanger Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:
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Database

New high-tech establishments were founded at a disproportionately high rate after 2019; the uptick in this sort of firm could imply future productivity gains. @UpdatedPriors @JHaltiwanger_UM

Did high tech drive the surge in new business establishments?

Core argument: High tech industries made a disproportionately large contribution to the surge in aggregate net establishment entry after 2019, with net entry exceeding that of non-tech industries even relative to pre-pandemic levels.

High tech industries made a large, disproportionate contribution to the aggregate net establishment entry surge after 2019. Net entry in high tech industries was higher than in non-tech industries during the post-2019 period, even relative to the time before the pandemic; this can be seen in figure 1. We find suggestive evidence that, at least through early 2023, high tech establishment births rose more for incumbent firms than for new firms. However, both kinds of firms saw elevated tech births, and timely business application data suggest new firm creation in key tech industries has remained strong through early 2024—pointing to high anticipated new firm entry over the next couple of years. Both kinds of investment can be thought of as an extensive margin of business activity. Such investments, regardless of organizational form, could be important contributors to aggregate productivity growth over time and may provide hints into the dynamics of high tech investments in the pandemic and post-pandemic economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High tech industries made a disproportionately large contribution to the surge in aggregate net establishment entry after 2019, with net entry exceeding that of non-tech industries even relative to pre-pandemic levels.
  2. Suggestive evidence indicates that, through early 2023, high tech establishment births rose more for incumbent firms than for new firms, though both types of firms saw elevated tech births.
  3. Business application data suggest new firm creation in key tech industries remained strong through early 2024, pointing to high anticipated new firm entry over the next couple of years, which could contribute to aggregate productivity growth over time.

Related Articles:

  • Surging Business Formation in the Pandemic: Causes and Consequences? — Shifts in consumer demand and in preferences for work and lifestyle during the pandemic created entrepreneurial opportunities, and applications to start businesses produced new firms and establishments that hired workers in large numbers. The authors argue these new businesses drew in quitting workers as founders or hires, implying economic restructuring across industry, geography, and firm size and age.
  • The Startup Surge Continues: Business Applications on Track for Second-Largest Annual Total on Record — Americans filed nearly 2.7m business applications in the first half of the year, up 5% from the prior year and 52% above the same period in 2019. One-third were applications with a high likelihood of hiring employees, 36% above the comparable 2019 total.
  • Latinos Are Starting U.S. Businesses at a Torrid Pace — Immigrants accounted for 36% of new U.S. business launches last year, up from 25% in 2019, driven by a rise in Latino entrepreneurship, while business creation by white and native-born Americans has slowed. Hispanic-owned startups tend to be smaller, with 46% reporting over $100,000 in annual revenue versus 62% of white-owned firms.

AI Summary. Research finds that most of the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve announcements is explained by changes in default-free bond yields rather than shifts in the equity risk premium, contradicting earlier work that attributed much of the response to risk premium effects.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:

.@JohnHCochrane cites research by @ProfStefanNagel and Serhiy Kozak that almost all of the entire effect of policy-driven interest-rate movements on stock prices comes from riskless rates with no effect on risk premia.

.@JohnHCochrane cites research by @ProfStefanNagel and Serhiy Kozak that almost all of the entire effect of policy-driven...

Do bond yields, not risk premiums, drive stocks after Fed announcements?

Core argument: Stefan Nagel and Zhengyang Xu find that the bulk of the stock market reaction in FOMC announcement windows is explained by changes in the default-free term structure of yields, without equity premium effects.

It’s perfectly natural that lower interest rates lower stock expected returns and raise stock prices. The question is, how much. Is there a “risk premium” [or “reach for yield”] effect in addition to the “interest rate” effect? If the Fed lowers the risk free rate, stock prices do go up. But in the Wall Street view, the risk premium goes down with the risk free rate and stocks go up even more. Not so, says a recent excellent paper, “Movements in Yields, not the Equity Premium: Bernanke-Kuttner Redux” by Stefan Nagel and Zhengyang Xu. The bulk of the stock market reaction in FOMC announcement windows is explained by changes in the default-free term structure of yields, without equity premium effects. The previous famous result on this question, by Bernanke and Kuttner, came to the opposite conclusion. Nagel and Xu explain the difference. By using a VAR, Bernanke, and Kuttner use how all stock price changes represent risk premiums (a lot) and interest rates (not so much) to estimate that decomposition on announcement days. But Fed shocks may be different from the shocks that move asset prices on other days.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Stefan Nagel and Zhengyang Xu find that the bulk of the stock market reaction in FOMC announcement windows is explained by changes in the default-free term structure of yields, without equity premium effects.
  2. The Nagel-Xu finding contradicts Bernanke and Kuttner's earlier conclusion that Fed rate cuts lower the equity risk premium, raising stock prices beyond the interest-rate effect alone.
  3. Nagel and Xu attribute the difference to Bernanke and Kuttner's VAR approach, which applies the decomposition of stock price moves on ordinary days to announcement days, though Fed shocks may differ from other shocks.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Data from Cambridge Mobile Telematics show US drivers spend more than twice as much time using phones at the wheel as Canadians, and Americans are twice as likely to say phone use while driving is acceptable. Americans are also less likely to wear seat belts than most Europeans and have higher drink-driving rates.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
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Database

US fatalities per mile driven are double that of other advanced economies, and the US road mortality rate is up 25% over the last decade; @jburnmurdoch suggests American attitudes toward alcohol and cell phone use are the driver.

Do driver behaviors explain why American roads are more dangerous?

Core argument: Americans are twice as likely as Canadians or Europeans to say using a phone while driving is acceptable, and Canadian drivers spend less than half as much time on their devices at the wheel, according to Cambridge Mobile Telematics data.

Using phones at the wheel is a big problem in the US, according to data from Cambridge Mobile Telematics. But just across the border, Canadians, who also drive automatics, spend less than half as much time using their devices while driving. The determining factor seems to be different attitudes to safety, with Americans twice as likely as Canadians or Europeans to say they find it acceptable to use a phone while driving. The same pattern shows up in other behaviours. Americans are much less likely to wear seat belts than most Europeans and also have higher rates of drink-driving. Given that studies find a lack of seat belts, alcohol, and distracted driving all increase either the likelihood or lethality of a collision by a greater amount than vehicle size or shape — and that American drivers are more exceptional in these behaviours than in their car size — these factors may be the determining ones.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Americans are twice as likely as Canadians or Europeans to say using a phone while driving is acceptable, and Canadian drivers spend less than half as much time on their devices at the wheel, according to Cambridge Mobile Telematics data.
  2. American drivers are much less likely to wear seat belts than most Europeans and have higher rates of drink-driving, echoing the pattern seen in phone use behind the wheel.
  3. Studies find that a lack of seat belts, alcohol, and distracted driving each raise the likelihood or lethality of a collision by more than vehicle size or shape, and American drivers are more exceptional in those behaviours than in their car size.

Related Articles:

  • Is Life Expectancy Really Falling? — Cohort life expectancy projects the average age of death for people born or turning 65 in a given year: those born in 1940 had a cohort life expectancy of 73, those born today about 85, and those born in 2100 a projected 89. Life expectancy is higher still for people who reach age 65.
  • The (Surprisingly) Good News on Life Expectancy: It’s Still Going Up — Commonly reported "period" life expectancy assumes current age-specific death rates persist for a newborn's entire life, while "cohort" life expectancy better measures how long a child born today will actually live. Death rates from cancer, heart disease, and stroke have fallen substantially over the past two decades, and the author argues that progress should continue.
  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.

AI Summary. Recent polling averages show the Democratic presidential candidate winning white college-educated voters by 18 points and losing white voters without college degrees by 27 points, a 45-point education gap. Earlier decades saw the two groups vote much more similarly, with one election producing a divide of just two points.

Nate Moore The Liberal Patriot
Date Posted:
Is Database:
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Polling suggests Biden has increased his advantage over Trump with college-educated white voters from 9ppt in 2016 to 18ppt in 2024 while increasing his disadvantage among non-college white voters from 26ppt to 27ppt. @NateMoore1287

Has the education divide among white voters widened dramatically?

Core argument: An average of recent polls finds Joe Biden leading white college-educated voters by 18 points while trailing among white non-college voters by 27 points, a 45-point education gap.

An average of recent polls finds Joe Biden winning white college-educated voters by 18 points and losing white non-college voters by 27 points—a colossal gap of 45 points. Compared to 2020 results, Trump’s margin with non-college whites is holding steady, while Biden has significantly improved his standing with degree-holding whites. White voters were not always polarized by education level. Throughout the 1980s and '90s, the white college and non-college vote tracked relatively closely. In 1992, for example, the divide was just two points: Bill Clinton lost college whites by one point and won non-college whites by one point. Such margins are unthinkable today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An average of recent polls finds Joe Biden leading white college-educated voters by 18 points while trailing among white non-college voters by 27 points, a 45-point education gap.
  2. Compared with 2020 results, Trump's margin among non-college whites is holding steady while Biden has significantly improved his standing among white degree-holders.
  3. White voters were not always split by education: in 1992 the divide was two points, with Bill Clinton losing college whites by one point and winning non-college whites by one point.

Related Articles:

  • The Road to A Political Realignment in American Politics — College-educated voters are now more likely to identify as Democrats while those without degrees back Republicans, with educational attainment increasingly correlated with views on abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, and religion's relationship to government. This sorting leaves most states politically uncompetitive, with eight states near the national average in education levels holding 97 electoral votes in play.
  • American Politics Is Undergoing A Racial Realignment — National election surveys and Gallup polling show the Democratic Party's advantage among Black, Latino, and Asian voters at its lowest level since 1960. The article argues this shift reflects fading civil rights-era ties, a weakening link between income and party choice, and non-white voters with long-held conservative views aligning their votes with those views.
  • How ‘All in the Family’ Explains Biden’s Strength Among Seniors — Baby boomers are more liberal than voters older than them, and their aging into the 65-and-older group — alongside the shrinking ranks of those older — helps explain Democratic gains among seniors. Because the relatively conservative Gen X now dominates ages 45 to 64, that group has become more conservative.

AI Summary. Chinese authorities ordered Apple to remove WhatsApp, Threads, Signal and Telegram from its App Store in China, citing national security concerns. The apps, which together have roughly 3bn users globally, were already accessible in China only through virtual private networks but remained commonly used.

Aaron Tilley, Liza Lin and Jeff Horwitz Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Citing national security concerns, China ordered Apple to remove Meta’s WhatsApp and Threads, as well as Signal and Telegram, from the Apple store. Apple has 17% of the Chinese smartphone market.

Citing national security concerns, China ordered Apple to remove Meta’s WhatsApp and Threads, as well as Signal and...

Is China removing foreign messaging apps from its app stores?

Core argument: WhatsApp, Threads, Signal and Telegram, which together have around three billion users globally, were removed from Apple's Chinese App Store on Friday after Apple was told to take down certain apps over national security concerns.

Meta Platforms’ WhatsApp and Threads as well as messaging platforms Signal and Telegram were taken off the Chinese App Store Friday. Apple said it was told to remove certain apps because of national security concerns, without specifying which. “We are obligated to follow the laws in the countries where we operate, even when we disagree,” an Apple spokesperson said. These messaging apps, which allow users to exchange messages and share files individually and in large groups, combined have around three billion users globally. They can only be accessed in China through virtual private networks that take users outside China’s Great Firewall, but are still commonly used. Beijing has often viewed such platforms with caution, concerned that these apps could be used by its citizens to spread negative content and cause social unrest. Much of the news China censors at home often makes it beyond the Great Firewall through such channels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. WhatsApp, Threads, Signal and Telegram, which together have around three billion users globally, were removed from Apple's Chinese App Store on Friday after Apple was told to take down certain apps over national security concerns.
  2. Apple said it is obligated to follow the laws of countries where it operates even when it disagrees, after being told to remove certain apps from the Chinese App Store.
  3. The removed messaging apps can be reached in China only through virtual private networks that take users beyond the Great Firewall, yet remain commonly used, and much of the news China censors at home travels through such channels.

Related Articles:

  • Apple’s India iPhone Output Hits $14 Billion in China Shift — Apple assembled $14bn of iPhones in India in its last fiscal year, doubling output there to roughly 14%, or about 1 in 7, of its iPhones. China remains Apple's largest iPhone-making hub and biggest overseas market, though its revenue there is falling amid competition from rivals such as Huawei.
  • China Blocks Use of Intel and AMD Chips in Government Computers — China has issued government procurement guidelines that phase out US microprocessors from Intel and AMD in state PCs and servers and sideline Microsoft's Windows and foreign database software in favor of domestic alternatives. China accounted for 27% of Intel's $54bn in sales and 15% of AMD's $23bn.
  • TikTok Crackdown Shifts Into Overdrive, With Sale or Shutdown on Table — U.S. legislation that would ban TikTok or force its sale by Chinese parent ByteDance advanced out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on a 50-0 vote. TikTok's campaign urging users to call their congressional representatives against the bill appeared to harden supporters' resolve.