Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, March 13, 2024

AI Summary. Banks' Treasury holdings have fallen as a share of assets to historically low levels, with banks preferring loans, higher-yielding securities, reserves, and agency mortgage-backed securities to meet liquidity requirements. Revising bank capital rules to revamp the leverage calculation could boost market liquidity and make banks significant Treasury buyers.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
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.@FedGuy12 endorses a proposed adjustment to the Basel III leverage calculations that would increase demand for Treasuries from US banks as future issuances surge.

Would changing bank capital rules turn banks into major Treasury buyers?

Core argument: Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.

Banks were huge investors in Treasuries during World War II, but steadily reduced their holdings even as Treasury issuance climbed. The share of bank assets in Treasuries remains historically low as banks have preferred to make loans or invest in higher yielding securities. While banks are required to hold high quality liquid assets, they have chosen to meet those requirements with reserves and Agency MBS rather than Treasuries. A revision to Basel in the form of a revamped leverage calculation would not only boost liquidity across markets, but also potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries just in time to meet increased future issuance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.
  2. Banks have preferred making loans or buying higher yielding securities over Treasuries, and have satisfied their high quality liquid asset requirements with reserves and Agency mortgage-backed securities instead.
  3. A revamped leverage calculation under a Basel revision could boost liquidity across markets and potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries in time to meet increased future issuance.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.
  • In 2023 Foreign Demand for Long Term Treasuries Exceed Net Issuances — Foreign demand for long-term US Treasuries, at just over $450bn, exceeded the Treasury's net long-term issuance of just over $400bn, with that demand not coming from China. Net long-term issuance lagged the fiscal deficit—roughly 1.5% of GDP versus 6%—leaving the increase in the stock of long-term "safe" US assets modest.

AI Summary. An analysis of American National Election Studies survey data finds homeowners are about twice as likely as renters to identify as strongly Republican (27% vs 13%), while renters more often identify as strongly Democratic (30% vs 20%) or independent (15% vs 9%). The 14-point owner/renter gap in strong Republican identification exceeds the 6-point gap between non-college and college-educated respondents.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
Date Posted:

Homeowners are 2x as likely as renters to identify as “strongly Republican:” 27% to 13%. This is larger than the gap based on education: 23% of non-college-educated people identify as “strongly Republican” vs. 17% of college-educated. @AzizSunderji.

Does homeownership divide voters more sharply than education does?

Core argument: Homeowners are twice as likely as renters to identify as strongly Republican, 27% versus 13%, in an analysis of American National Election Studies data covering over 68,000 households.

The American National Election Studies (ANES) has surveyed over 68,000 households every 2 years (since 2004, every 4 years). It’s a big and powerful dataset, with over 1000 variables. Here I looked at two—home tenure (owner/renter) and party affiliation (a scale from 1-7). My analysis shows that homeowners and renters are deeply polarized, with owners twice as likely to identify as strongly Republican than renters (27% vs 13%). Conversely, renters identify as strongly Democrat far more frequently than owners (30% vs 20%). A higher proportion of renters than owners also identify as independents (15% vs 9%). For context, the 14% gap between homeowners identifying as strongly Republican (27%) compared to renters (13%) is a far larger gap than between other demographics. Take education, for example: there is only a 6% gap between non-college-educated (23.2%) and college-educated people (17%) identifying as strongly Republican.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Homeowners are twice as likely as renters to identify as strongly Republican, 27% versus 13%, in an analysis of American National Election Studies data covering over 68,000 households.
  2. Renters identify as strongly Democratic more often than owners, 30% versus 20%, and also identify as independents more often, 15% versus 9%.
  3. The 14-point owner/renter gap in strong Republican identification exceeds the 6-point gap between non-college-educated respondents (23.2%) and college-educated respondents (17%).

Related Articles:

  • Canadian Conservatives Have Found A Way To Win Back Young Voters — Canada's Conservative Party has doubled its vote share and moved into the lead, which the author attributes to an explicitly pro-youth platform centered on housebuilding, including proposals to withhold funds from cities that don't build enough housing and reward those that do. Housing affordability ranks as the second most important issue in Canada, behind the broader cost-of-living crisis.
  • The Determinants Of Declining Internal Migration — A 10% increase in wages where people live is associated with 3.5% less migration, while a 10% increase in destination wages is associated with 7.8% more migration; a 10% rise in destination home prices is associated with 2.6% less migration. The authors find wage responses alone would have raised migration rates, but housing-related factors more than offset them.
  • The US Housing Market Is Very Quickly Becoming Unaffordable — Home prices in Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando, and Tampa now stand at 6 to 7x incomes, exceeding the ratios reached at the peak of the early 2000s housing bubble in each of those metro areas. All four shifted from affordable, to unaffordable, back to affordable, and into unaffordable territory again.

AI Summary. In developed countries, men's income and education are now generally positively associated with fatherhood, with 70.1% of US men holding graduate or professional degrees having children versus 48.8% of those without a high school diploma. Among advanced economies, those where men take on more housework and child care have higher fertility rates.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:

In the US, the relationship between income/education and births is becoming U-shaped for white non-Hispanic women: those with bachelor’s degrees or higher are having more kids than those with just some college. @foxjust

Are higher-income, better-educated men now more likely to have children?

Core argument: In a 2014 US Census Bureau survey, 70.1% of men with graduate or professional degrees had children versus 48.8% of men without a high school diploma, part of a generally positive income/education–fatherhood relationship within developed countries.

Within developed countries, there’s now generally a positive relationship between men’s income and education level, and fatherhood. In a US Census Bureau survey conducted in 2014, 70.1% of men with graduate or professional degrees had children while only 48.8% of those without a high school diploma did. In the US, the overall relationship between income/education and births remains negative for women (for whom the most recent data are from 2022), but among White, non-Hispanic women the curve is becoming U-shaped, with those with bachelor’s degrees or higher having more kids than those with some college. While the growth in career and educational opportunities for women drove fertility declines in the past, there are signs that accommodating women’s career ambitions might be essential to staving off further declines. Among a sample of advanced economies, those where men take on more housework and child care responsibilities have higher fertility rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a 2014 US Census Bureau survey, 70.1% of men with graduate or professional degrees had children versus 48.8% of men without a high school diploma, part of a generally positive income/education–fatherhood relationship within developed countries.
  2. In the US, the overall relationship between income or education and births remains negative for women, though among White, non-Hispanic women the curve is becoming U-shaped, with those holding bachelor's degrees or higher having more children than those with some college.
  3. Among a sample of advanced economies, those where men take on more housework and child care responsibilities have higher fertility rates.

Related Articles:

  • Fortunate Families? The Effects of Wealth on Marriage and Fertility — Using lottery winners, the authors estimate that wealth windfalls raise the short- and medium-run probability of marriage, an effect driven by male winners. The estimated average effect on marriage dissolution is not statistically distinguishable from zero, but for married women a 1M-SEK windfall nearly doubles the short-run divorce rate, with the effect fading over the long run.
  • A Visual Breakdown of America’s Stagnating Number of Births — About 3.66m babies were born in the U.S. in 2022, essentially unchanged from 2021 and 15% below the 2007 peak, with birthrates falling 3% among teens aged 15–19 and 2% among women aged 20–24. Increases were concentrated among women aged 35 to 44.
  • Birth Rates Are Falling In The Nordics. Are Family-Friendly Policies No Longer Enough? — Falling Nordic birth rates are now driven by childlessness rather than smaller families, with roughly three-quarters of Finland's recent fertility decline attributable to people who have no children. Nearly 40% of Finnish men with low education are childless at 45, and most have no partners.

AI Summary. Using a new method to adjust survey incomes for underreporting, the authors estimate that global poverty and inequality declined substantially over recent decades and that inequality within countries is falling on average, having been largely constant since the 1990s.

Maxim Pinkovskiy, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Kasey Chatterji-Len, and William Nober National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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A recent @NBERpubs paper confirms that global poverty and inequality declined dramatically between 1980 and 2019 and that “within-country inequality is falling on average, and has been largely constant since the 1990s” @XSalaimartin

Is inequality within countries falling on average?

Core argument: Adjusting survey incomes for underreporting, the authors find that within-country income inequality is falling on average and has been largely constant since the 1990s.

We propose a novel procedure to adjust reported survey incomes for underreporting. Underreporting of income by the bottom 50% of the world income distribution has become particularly important in recent decades. We reconfirm the findings of the literature that global poverty and inequality have declined dramatically between 1980 and 2019. Finally, we find that within-country inequality is falling on average, and has been largely constant since the 1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting survey incomes for underreporting, the authors find that within-country income inequality is falling on average and has been largely constant since the 1990s.
  2. Applying a novel procedure to correct for income underreporting, the authors reconfirm that global poverty and inequality declined dramatically between 1980 and 2019.
  3. Underreporting of income by the bottom 50% of the world income distribution has become particularly important in recent decades.

Related Articles:

Thursday, March 14, 2024

AI Summary. Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.

Victoria Ivashina, Ṣebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Luc Laeven and Karsten Müller National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Corporate debt plays a key role in amplifying boom-bust cycles; expansions in non-financial corporate credit, particularly when backed by real estate, are associated with a higher probability of a future financial crisis. @skalemliozcan @KarstenMueIIer

Does corporate debt predict financial crises as strongly as household debt?

Core argument: Using a new dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies over 1940–2014, the authors document that corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of aggregate credit expansion before crises and three-quarters of total nonperforming loans during the bust.

Using a new dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies over the period 1940–2014, we document that (i) corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of the aggregate credit expansion before crises and three-quarters of total nonperforming loans during the bust; (ii) expansions in corporate debt predict crises similarly to household debt; (iii) a measure of imbalance in credit growth flowing disproportionately to some sectors, such as construction and non-bank financial intermediation, is associated with crises; and (iv) the recovery from financial crises is slower after a boom in corporate debt. Given the usual focus on household debt, our findings underscore the importance of monitoring firm credit for financial stability purposes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using a new dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies over 1940–2014, the authors document that corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of aggregate credit expansion before crises and three-quarters of total nonperforming loans during the bust.
  2. Expansions in corporate debt predict crises similarly to household debt, and a measure of credit growth flowing disproportionately to sectors such as construction and non-bank financial intermediation is associated with crises.
  3. Recovery from financial crises is slower after a boom in corporate debt, which the authors argue underscores the importance of monitoring firm credit, not household debt alone, for financial stability.

Related Articles:

  • The Corporate Debt Maturity Wall: Implications for Capex and Employment — The authors estimate the average interest rate on outstanding corporate debt will rise from 4.20% to 4.50%, lifting private sector interest expense as a share of gross output by 0.25 percentage points. They project this would reduce capital spending growth by up to 0.25 percentage points and labor cost growth by up to 0.15.
  • Rates Are Up. We’re Just Starting to Feel the Heat — U.S. companies have $600bn in corporate debt maturing this year, a total Goldman Sachs data show rising to more than $1tn a year from 2025 through 2028. Those debt loads, combined with higher financing costs, may cut into corporate profits, investor returns, innovation spending, and hiring, with some analysts expecting credit-rating downgrades.
  • Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations — Credit expansions disproportionately channel credit to non-tradable sector firms and households, and the authors find that the sectoral allocation of credit predicts future GDP paths and the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Credit growth to non-tradable industries predicts boom-bust output patterns and elevated financial fragility, while credit to tradable industries is associated with higher future productivity growth.

AI Summary. Average pay for most workers is rising about 4.5–5% a year, roughly 1.5–2pp faster than the pre-pandemic average, implying an underlying inflation trend about 1–2pp above the pre-pandemic pace absent a surge in productivity or saving. Earlier one-off drops in consumer goods prices held measured inflation below that trend and appear to have ended.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Nominal annual wage growth is 4.5-5%, 1.5-2pp faster than pre-pandemic. Absent a surge in productivity and/or the personal saving rate, @M_C_Klein argues that inflation will remain above the Fed’s 2% target.

Does faster pay growth keep underlying inflation above the pre-pandemic trend?

Core argument: Average pay for most workers is rising about 4.5–5% a year, 1.5–2 points faster than the pre-pandemic average, leaving the underlying inflationary trend roughly 1–2 points above its pre-pandemic pace absent faster productivity or a higher saving rate.

[Inflation] is probably still 1-2pp faster than the 2% yearly inflation rate target. Average pay for most workers is still rising about 4.5-5% a year, which is still 1.5-2pp faster than the pre-pandemic average. Absent a surge in productivity and/or the personal saving rate, the underlying inflationary trend therefore remains about 1-2pp faster than before the pandemic. For much of 2023, the CPI rose slower than this implied underlying trend, thanks in large part to big one-off drops in consumer goods prices that seem to have stopped. The recent acceleration in observed inflation may therefore reflect a convergence to its “true”, faster value. If the extra income growth continues to translate into faster spending growth (as opposed to higher saving), inflation will not stabilize at the pre-pandemic rate unless businesses consistently increase their production of goods and services almost 2 percentage points faster than they did in 2018-2019.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average pay for most workers is rising about 4.5–5% a year, 1.5–2 points faster than the pre-pandemic average, leaving the underlying inflationary trend roughly 1–2 points above its pre-pandemic pace absent faster productivity or a higher saving rate.
  2. The CPI rose slower than this implied underlying trend for much of 2023, largely because of big one-off drops in consumer goods prices that appear to have stopped, so the recent acceleration may reflect convergence to inflation's faster "true" value.
  3. If faster income growth keeps feeding into spending rather than saving, inflation will not settle back at the pre-pandemic rate unless businesses consistently expand output of goods and services almost 2 points faster than in 2018–2019.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • The Price of Money Is Going Up, and It’s Not Only Because of the Fed — A model projects the inflation-adjusted natural interest rate rising about a percentage point from a 1.7% trough to 2.7% by 2050, implying 10-year US Treasury yields of 4.5%–5%. The authors estimate wide fiscal deficits, climate investment, and faster growth could lift the natural rate to 4%, implying roughly 6% yields.
  • The Future Of r* — Long-run equilibrium interest rates are argued to stay low relative to recent decades' historical average but above pre-pandemic lows, implying rates only slightly below current levels, with a nominal neutral rate near 3.5% offered as illustration. Rising government debt, particularly in the US, is identified as the main risk to that view.

AI Summary. Nonfinancial corporate profit margins rose from 13.4% to 17% before easing to 16.4%, the highest outside the pandemic period since the 1960s, with prices up 17% and profits up 41%. Had profits grown at the slower pace of labor costs, cumulative price increases would have been 12.5%.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

At 16.4% in Q3 ‘23, US corporate profit margins have remained elevated relative to the pre-pandemic level of 13.4%. @greg_ip notes prices are up 17%, outpacing both labor and nonlabor costs.

Did rising corporate profit margins contribute to higher consumer prices?

Core argument: Nonfinancial corporate pretax profit margins rose from 13.4% in late 2019 to 17% by the second quarter of 2022, and stood at 16.4% in the third quarter of 2023 after supply problems were largely fixed — the highest outside the pandemic period since the 1960s.

Between late 2019 and the second quarter of 2022, corporate profit margins shot up to 17% from 13.4%. (These are pretax profits as a share of revenue, minus inputs such as imported parts, and excludes financial companies.) As of the third quarter of 2023, the supply problems had largely been fixed, and profit margins had fallen, but only to 16.4%. Outside the pandemic period, that is the highest since the 1960s. Do higher margins contribute to inflation? Since the end of 2019, prices are up 17%, outpacing both labor and nonlabor costs. The result: Profit grew by 41%. If profits had grown at the same, slower rate as labor costs, that would have translated to a cumulative price increase of only 12.5%, and an average annual inflation rate roughly 1pp lower.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nonfinancial corporate pretax profit margins rose from 13.4% in late 2019 to 17% by the second quarter of 2022, and stood at 16.4% in the third quarter of 2023 after supply problems were largely fixed — the highest outside the pandemic period since the 1960s.
  2. Since the end of 2019, prices are up 17%, outpacing both labor and nonlabor costs, while profits grew 41%.
  3. Had profits grown at the same slower rate as labor costs, the cumulative price increase would have been 12.5% rather than 17%, implying an average annual inflation rate roughly 1 percentage point lower.

Related Articles:

  • Corporate Profits in the Aftermath of COVID-19 — Nonfinancial corporate profit margins—profits as a share of gross value added—rose to about 19% before easing to 15%, compared with about 13% before the pandemic. The authors attribute much of the increase to large direct government support for small and medium-sized U.S. businesses and to lower net interest expenses under accommodative monetary policy.
  • The Curious Incident of the Elevated Profit Margins — The US fiscal deficit averaged just under 3% of gross national product from 1950 to 2011 but 6.6% from 2012 to 2022, driven mainly by health and social security spending, a pattern that holds excluding pandemic years. Even assuming permanently elevated profit margins, US equity valuations imply low long-run returns.
  • The Wealth of Greedflations — A screen of more than 1,000 global large-cap companies shows net profit margins returning to their long-run average of 13.5%, after being suppressed earlier and inflated during the later stages of the pandemic. On a company-by-company view, 52% still earn above their 10-year average margin, by an average of 2.15 percentage points.

AI Summary. Lower-density suburbs of large metropolitan areas grew faster than urban cores, mid-size and small metros, and non-metropolitan areas, as domestic out-migration from urban counties more than offsets population gains from international immigration. Nine of the ten most expensive metropolitan areas, many in California, recorded population declines, with Seattle the exception.

Jed Kolko JedKolko.com
Date Posted:

Expensive urban counties continued to lose population in 2023 despite the uptick in immigration. The American population continues to shift to the south. @JedKolko

Are people still leaving big cities for lower-density suburbs?

Core argument: Nine of the ten U.S. metros with the highest cost of living, many of them in California, recorded population declines in 2023, with Seattle the one expensive metro that grew.

Lower-density suburbs of large metros grew faster than other parts of large metros, mid-size and small metros, and non-metropolitan areas. Urban populations are shrinking despite rising immigration. Net international migration added more growth to urban counties in 2023 than in any year since at least 2010. However, urban counties lost more people due to domestic migration in 2023 than in the years before the pandemic. Domestic out-migration accelerated throughout the 2010s, spiked during pandemic, and continues to more than offset the urban population boost from immigration. Expensive metros lost people. Of the ten metros with the highest cost of living – many of which are in California – nine had population declines in 2023; Seattle was the one expensive metro that grew.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nine of the ten U.S. metros with the highest cost of living, many of them in California, recorded population declines in 2023, with Seattle the one expensive metro that grew.
  2. Urban counties lost more people to domestic migration in 2023 than in the years before the pandemic, more than offsetting the boost from immigration, even as net international migration added more growth to urban counties than in any year since at least 2010.
  3. Lower-density suburbs of large metros grew faster than other parts of large metros, mid-size and small metros, and non-metropolitan areas, while domestic out-migration from urban counties accelerated through the 2010s and spiked during the pandemic.

Related Articles:

  • Southern Comforts — Migration into southern metropolitan areas such as Austin, San Antonio, Jacksonville, and Tampa has continued, and the South also has a higher birth rate than other census regions. Growth has been uneven: Florida's GDP rose 20% and Texas and Tennessee 15% against a US average of 11%, while Oklahoma and Louisiana contracted.
  • A $100 Billion Wealth Migration Tilts US Economy’s Center of Gravity South — Six fast-growing Southern states — Florida, Texas, Georgia, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee — now contribute more to US GDP than the Northeast, including the Washington-New York-Boston corridor. The Southeast accounted for more than two-thirds of US job growth since the pandemic began, nearly double its pre-pandemic share, and housed 10 of the 15 fastest-growing large American cities.
  • The Long-Term Housing and Population Shift — The median center of the US population has been moving southwest, but the author argues that trend will slow or reverse without more water supply, more affordable housing policies, and progress on climate change. Areas from Missouri to West Virginia and the Great Lakes could become more attractive.

AI Summary. An analysis of polling from 20 rich countries found that a political gap between men and women aged 18-29 that was negligible two decades ago reached 0.75 points on a 1-10 liberal-conservative scale by 2020, roughly twice the gap between graduates and non-graduates. Young men were more conservative than young women in every large country examined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

According to an @TheEconomist analysis, in 2002 there was little difference in political attitudes of 18-29 year olds in rich countries, but by 2020 females were 0.75 more liberal than males on a scale of 0-10.

Are young men and women diverging politically across rich countries?

Core argument: The Economist's analysis of polling from 20 rich countries found the ideological gap between men and women aged 18-29 reached 0.75 points on a 1-10 liberal-conservative scale by 2020, up from little difference two decades earlier.

The Economist analyzed polling data from 20 rich countries, using the European Social Survey, America’s General Social Survey, and the Korean Social Survey. Two decades ago there was little difference between men and women aged 18-29 on a self-reported scale of 1-10 from very liberal to very conservative. But our analysis found that by 2020 the gap was 0.75. For context, this is roughly twice the size of the gap in opinion between people with and without a degree in the same year. Put another way, in 2020 young men were only slightly more likely to describe themselves as liberal than conservative, with a gap of just two percentage points. Young women, however, were much more likely to lean to the left than the right, with a gap of a massive 27 percentage points. In all the large countries we examined, young men were more conservative than young women. In Poland, the gap was 1.1 points on a scale of 1-10. It was a hefty 1.4 in America, 1 in France, 0.75 in Italy, 0.71 in Britain and 0.74 in South Korea.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist's analysis of polling from 20 rich countries found the ideological gap between men and women aged 18-29 reached 0.75 points on a 1-10 liberal-conservative scale by 2020, up from little difference two decades earlier.
  2. The Economist's analysis found that in 2020 young women were more likely to lean left than right by 27 percentage points, while young men described themselves as liberal rather than conservative by just two percentage points.
  3. Young men were more conservative than young women in every large country The Economist examined, with gaps of 1.4 points in America, 1.1 in Poland, 1 in France, 0.75 in Italy, 0.74 in South Korea and 0.71 in Britain.

Related Articles:

  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
  • A New Global Gender Divide Is Emerging — Gallup data show women aged 18–30 in the US are 30 percentage points more liberal than young men, a gap that opened in six years, with similar divides in Germany (30 points), the UK (25 points), South Korea and China. In South Korea, marriage rates have plummeted and births fell to 0.78 per woman, the world's lowest.
  • The Data is Clear: People Are Having Less Sex — Survey data show every age group now reports less frequent sexual activity than counterparts in earlier decades, with roughly an 8 percentage point decline across age groups. Among people around age 25, the share reporting sex at least monthly fell from over 80% to 72%, while the peak years remain ages 30 to 40.

AI Summary. SpaceX's Starship rocket flew farther and faster than in its previous test flights, separating from its Super Heavy booster and reaching near-orbit before contact was lost during its return to Earth. SpaceX confirmed the vehicle was lost, likely destroyed, cutting the mission short.

Loren Grush Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The largest rocket ever sent into space, @SpaceX’s Starship successfully reached near orbit Thursday, before it was lost while returning to Earth.

The largest rocket ever sent into space, @SpaceX’s Starship successfully reached near orbit Thursday, before it was lost...

Did the largest rocket ever built survive its return to Earth?

Core argument: SpaceX's Starship flew farther and faster than in any prior flight, separating from its Super Heavy booster as planned and reaching near-orbit, surpassing the length of its previous two test missions.

SpaceX launched its Starship rocket into space in a critical test, sending the colossal craft farther and faster than it had ever flown before it was lost while returning to Earth. The craft successfully separated from its Super Heavy booster as planned and reached near-orbit in space, surpassing the length of its prior two test missions. SpaceX said it lost signal connection with Starship and later confirmed the vehicle was “lost” — likely destroyed — as it plummeted back to Earth, cutting the mission short.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. SpaceX's Starship flew farther and faster than in any prior flight, separating from its Super Heavy booster as planned and reaching near-orbit, surpassing the length of its previous two test missions.
  2. SpaceX lost signal connection with Starship as the craft plummeted back to Earth and later confirmed the vehicle was "lost" — likely destroyed — cutting the test mission short.

Related Articles:

  • SpaceX Rocket Explodes Before Reaching Orbit — SpaceX's Starship, a nearly 400-foot rocket described as the most powerful ever launched, exploded after reaching an altitude of nearly 40km on its first launch, setting back the company's effort to build a spacecraft capable of flying to Mars.
  • Space: The Missing Element of Your Strategy — Private-sector funding of space-related companies has topped $10bn, close to a tenfold rise over the past decade, though the US government remains the largest source of space funding. If current momentum continues, commercial funding for space ventures could surpass government funding within 20 years.
  • Despite An Explosion, Elon Musk Is Closer to His New Space Age — SpaceX says it is producing Super Heavy boosters and Starships at a healthy pace, though damage to the launch support structure may require a significant redesign and cause delays. A Starship launched by a Super Heavy would lift 100-150 tonnes to orbit, against 64 tonnes for Falcon Heavy and 24 for the space shuttle.