Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, February 13, 2024

AI Summary. Computerization concentrated decision-making power and resources among elite experts with college and graduate degrees, while the 60% of U.S. adults without a bachelor's degree were relegated to low-paid service jobs. Because artificial intelligence can combine information and rules with acquired experience, it could enable more workers to perform higher-stakes decision-making tasks.

David Autor National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

.@davidautor argues that AI can help rebuild middle-class jobs by democratizing higher-stakes decision-making tasks to lower and middle-skilled workers that had previously been the providence of elite experts.

.@davidautor argues that AI can help rebuild middle-class jobs by democratizing higher-stakes decision-making tasks to lower...

Can AI extend decision-making work to workers without college degrees?

Core argument: The 60% of U.S. adults without a bachelor's degree have been relegated to non-expert, low-paid service jobs, while computerization concentrated decision-making power and resources among elite experts holding college or graduate degrees.

Information is merely an input for a more consequential economic function, decision making, which is the province of elite experts — typically the minority of U.S. adults who hold college or graduate degrees. By making information and calculation cheap and abundant, computerization catalyzed an unprecedented concentration of decision-making power, and accompanying resources, among elite experts. Meanwhile, lacking better opportunities, the 60% of adults without a bachelor’s degree have been relegated to non-expert, low-paid service jobs. The unique opportunity that AI offers humanity is to push back against the process started by computerization — to extend the relevance, reach and value of human expertise for a larger set of workers. Because artificial intelligence can weave information and rules with acquired experience to support decision-making, it can enable a larger set of workers equipped with necessary foundational training to perform higher-stakes decision-making tasks currently arrogated to elite experts, such as doctors, lawyers, software engineers and college professors. In essence, AI used well can assist with restoring the middle-skill, middle-class heart of the U.S. labor market that has been hollowed out by automation and globalization.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 60% of U.S. adults without a bachelor's degree have been relegated to non-expert, low-paid service jobs, while computerization concentrated decision-making power and resources among elite experts holding college or graduate degrees.
  2. Because AI can weave information and rules with acquired experience to support decision making, it could enable workers with foundational training to perform higher-stakes decisions now reserved for doctors, lawyers, software engineers and college professors.
  3. Information is merely an input to the more consequential economic function of decision making, and AI used well can assist with restoring the middle-skill, middle-class heart of a U.S. labor market hollowed out by automation and globalization.

Related Articles:

  • Generative AI at Work — A study of 5,179 customer support agents finds that access to a generative AI conversational assistant raised issues resolved per hour by 14% on average, with the largest gains for novice and low-skilled workers and minimal effect on experienced, highly skilled ones. The authors also find AI assistance improved customer sentiment, reduced requests for managerial intervention, and improved employee retention.
  • Centaurs and Cyborgs on the Jagged Frontier — In a pre-registered experiment at Boston Consulting Group covering 18 realistic consulting tasks, consultants using ChatGPT-4 completed 12.2% more tasks, worked 25.1% faster, and produced 40% higher quality results than those without it. The tool acted as a skill leveler: the lowest-scoring consultants improved 43%, while top performers gained less.
  • The Short-Term Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Employment: Evidence from an Online Labor Market — Freelancers in occupations most exposed to generative AI saw employment and earnings decline, with the authors estimating a 2% drop in jobs and a 5.2% drop in monthly earnings on an online labor platform. Offering high-quality service did not mitigate the effect, and top-rated freelancers appear disproportionately hurt.

AI Summary. The International Energy Agency reports that data center energy use is growing rapidly in the US, home to a third of the world's 8,000 data centers, and in China, which has a tenth, and projects that global electricity consumption from data centers, cryptocurrencies, and artificial intelligence could double over a four-year span.

Kenza Bryan Financial Times
Date Posted:

Increased electrical demand from data centers is putting stress on electrical grids. Morgan Stanley forecasts that generative AI will drive 3/4 of data center power demand in 2027.

Is data center electricity demand set to double globally?

Core argument: The IEA says global electricity consumption from data centres, cryptocurrencies, and artificial intelligence could double between 2022 and 2026, with energy use from data centres growing rapidly in both the US and China.

Energy use from data centers is growing rapidly in the US, home to a third of the world’s 8,000 data centers, and in China, which has a tenth, according to the IEA. Globally, electricity consumption from data centres, cryptocurrencies, and artificial intelligence could double between 2022 and 2026, the IEA also said last month. Morgan Stanley analysts expect generative AI to drive more than three-quarters of global data center power demands in 2027, based on 2022 numbers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IEA says global electricity consumption from data centres, cryptocurrencies, and artificial intelligence could double between 2022 and 2026, with energy use from data centres growing rapidly in both the US and China.
  2. The US hosts a third of the world's 8,000 data centres and China a tenth, according to the IEA.
  3. Morgan Stanley analysts expect generative AI to drive more than three-quarters of global data centre power demand in 2027, based on 2022 numbers.

Related Articles:

  • Elon Musk’s Latest Mission: Rev Up the Electricity Industry — U.S. electricity demand has grown at an average of 1% a year over the past 20 years, but McKinsey projects it will double by 2050 and PG&E expects a 70% rise over the next 20 years. Deloitte estimates the largest U.S. electric companies will together spend as much as $1.8tn by 2030.
  • Electricity 2024 — More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.
  • Top 10 Charts of 2023 — Goldman Sachs projects that artificial intelligence could drive a capital investment cycle reaching almost 2.5% of US GDP by 2032, up from 0.5% of GDP.

AI Summary. Core consumer price inflation came in hotter than expected at 0.4% in a single month, a 4.8% annual rate, versus 3.9% over 12 months, 3.6% over 6 months and 4.0% over 3 months. Overall inflation also picked up but trailed core, as food prices rose further while energy prices fell for a fourth straight month.

Jason Furman @jasonfurman
Date Posted:

Overall inflation was 3.1% in January. Noting Core CPI was 0.4% in which implies a 4.8% annual rate @jasonfurman expects “PCE inflation to stay within a comfortable range. But more nervous.”

Is core inflation accelerating above its recent annual pace?

Core argument: Core CPI rose 0.4% in January, a 4.8% annualized rate, hotter than expected, with Jason Furman citing annual rates of 3.9% over 12 months, 3.6% over 6 months, and 4.0% over 3 months.

Core CPI comes in hotter than expected, 0.4% in the month of January which is a 4.8% annual rate. I'm not a big fan of second derivative forecasting but those of you who are should be worried. Annual rates: 12 months: 3.9%. 6 months: 3.6%. 3 months: 4.0%. 1 month: 4.8%. Overall inflation also picked up but was below core as already (relatively) high food prices rose further but already low energy prices fell for the fourth straight month. Quick interpretation, this is not a good report. But it is one report, in January (which is hard for seasonal adjustment given the price resets). + is CPI, not the Fed's target for PCE. I still expect PCE inflation to stay within a comfortable range. But more nervous.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Core CPI rose 0.4% in January, a 4.8% annualized rate, hotter than expected, with Jason Furman citing annual rates of 3.9% over 12 months, 3.6% over 6 months, and 4.0% over 3 months.
  2. Overall CPI inflation also picked up but came in below core, as relatively high food prices rose further while already low energy prices fell for a fourth straight month.
  3. Furman calls the report not a good one while cautioning that it is one month, that January is hard to seasonally adjust given price resets, and that CPI is not the Fed's PCE target, and he still expects PCE inflation to stay within a comfortable range.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Economy Refuses to Slow Down — Wages for most U.S. private-sector workers are rising slightly faster than 4.5% a year, even as job-market churn measures such as the quits rate and detrended job openings rate have returned to or fallen below pre-pandemic norms. That income growth coincides with nominal retail spending rising about 6–7% a year.
  • US December CPI — US goods prices excluding used cars and trucks have been in sequential deflation, while services excluding housing, travel and medical care slowed from an annualized pace above 7% to about 4.5% over three months. If those trends persist, core inflation measures running near 1% annualized over three months are expected to weaken further.
  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.

AI Summary. Global insurance losses from natural catastrophes have topped $100bn for four straight years, a level once considered the mark of an exceptionally bad year, and US insurers have repriced risk with significant premium increases. Reinsurer Swiss Re predicts a growing number of areas where buying insurance becomes uneconomical.

Ian Smith, Attracta Mooney, and Aime Williams Financial Times
Date Posted:

The CEO of one of the world’s largest reinsurers described rising premiums after four years of $100B losses as a carbon price, “this is the first time we actually bring a climate change bill back to the consumer.”

Are rising natural catastrophe losses making home insurance uneconomical in some areas?

Core argument: Insurance losses from natural catastrophes have exceeded $100bn for four consecutive years, a level previously marking a remarkably bad year, and the run has spooked insurance executives.

A run of four consecutive years when overall insurance losses from natural catastrophes have topped $100bn, previously the mark of a remarkably bad year, has spooked executives. In the US, a repricing of risks has sparked a significant rise in premiums. Last year saw a record-breaking number of natural catastrophes causing at least $1bn in insurance losses: 37 separate events, according to data from insurance broker Aon. That included 25 so-called severe convective storms, of which 21 were in the US. The cost of property catastrophe reinsurance cover, which they use to share the burden of natural disaster claims, is at its highest in a generation. If yearly losses stick above the $100bn level, and firms are forced into further price rises and pullbacks to protect their balance sheets, it could “harm the whole proposition of the insurance sector to society”, says one reinsurance chief executive. There will be growing “patches” where buying insurance is uneconomical, Swiss Re has predicted.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Insurance losses from natural catastrophes have exceeded $100bn for four consecutive years, a level previously marking a remarkably bad year, and the run has spooked insurance executives.
  2. Aon data show a record 37 separate natural catastrophes each causing at least $1bn in insurance losses, including 25 severe convective storms, 21 of them in the US.
  3. The cost of property catastrophe reinsurance cover stands at its highest in a generation, US premiums have risen significantly as risks are repriced, and Swiss Re predicts growing "patches" where buying insurance is uneconomical.

Related Articles:

  • Parts of America are Becoming Uninsurable — Florida's average home insurance premium reached about $6,000, over 3x the national average and up 42% year-on-year, yet insurers are exiting, leaving the state-backed insurer of last resort with the largest market share and $608bn of insured assets. In California, consumer-protection rules prevent premiums from covering rising wildfire and reinsurance costs.
  • The Insurance Market Is Healing — Higher returns are drawing capital into reinsurance, which is likely to ease pressure on coverage pricing. Catastrophe bond issuance hit a record $15bn, global property catastrophe reinsurance pricing rose about 5% at January renewals versus closer to 30% a year earlier, and risk-adjusted prices for reinsurance bought by reinsurers fell as much as 15%.
  • Why California and Florida Have Become Almost Uninsurable — Wildfires in California and hurricanes in Florida have generated large volumes of insurance claims, while higher housing prices and construction and repair costs have made each claim more expensive. Insurers have also faced costlier reinsurance, with worldwide average reinsurance rates up about a quarter in one year and another third the next, according to reinsurance broker Howden Tiger.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects the U.S. primary deficit will rise gradually until the early 2040s before plateauing near 2.7% of GDP, driven mainly by mandatory spending such as Social Security and Medicare. Limiting both health-care and Social Security spending to grow no faster than GDP would not produce a primary surplus until 2036.

Daniel Wilson and Brigid Meisenbacher Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:

The primary source of long-run pressure on the primary deficit is funding Social Security and Medicare obligations. @sffed highlights stabilizing that spending at 2023 levels would not balance the primary deficit for decades.

What drives the long-run rise in the US primary deficit?

Core argument: CBO projects the U.S. primary deficit will rise gradually until the early 2040s before plateauing around 2.7% of GDP, with mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare the main source of long-run upward pressure.

Figure 3 shows the CBO’s projections of the primary deficit (blue line) over the next 30 years. Over the long run, the primary deficit is projected to increase gradually until the early 2040s before plateauing around 2.7% of GDP. The main source of the long-run upward pressure on the primary deficit is spending on mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare. The red line shows a projection of the primary deficit in which government health-care spending is assumed to grow at the same rate as GDP from fiscal years 2024 to 2054.The green line is similar but assumes government health-care and Social Security spending grow at the same pace as GDP. The projection shows that limiting spending on these programs to grow no faster than the economy would eventually lead to a primary surplus. However, even imposing this restriction on both health-care programs and Social Security would not eliminate the primary deficit until 2036. Imposing the restriction just on health-care programs would not eliminate it until 2044.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects the U.S. primary deficit will rise gradually until the early 2040s before plateauing around 2.7% of GDP, with mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare the main source of long-run upward pressure.
  2. Holding both government health-care and Social Security spending to grow no faster than GDP from fiscal years 2024 to 2054 would not eliminate the primary deficit until 2036.
  3. Limiting only government health-care spending to grow at the same rate as GDP would not eliminate the primary deficit until 2044.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit will grow from $1.6tn to $2.6tn over a decade, rising from 5.6% to 6.1% of gross domestic product. That end-point is well above the 3.7% average of the past 50 years, as outlays are projected to rise faster than revenues over most of the period.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects federal debt held by the public to rise from roughly 97% of GDP to 106.3% and then 116% of GDP over the following decade under current law. Stabilizing debt near 97% of GDP is estimated to require $7.9tn of deficit reduction over ten years, while cutting it to 80% would require $15tn.

Marc Goldwein Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Date Posted:

.@MarcGoldwein projects achieving primary balance, in which revenue would fund spending excluding interest, would require about $3T of savings over 5 years.

How much deficit reduction would it take to stabilize federal debt?

Core argument: CBO projects federal debt held by the public will rise from roughly 97% of GDP to a record 106.3% by the end of FY 2028 and 116% by the end of FY 2034 under current law.

Under current law, CBO projects federal debt held by the public to rise from roughly 97% of GDP to a record 106.3% by the end of FY 2028 and further to 116% by the end of FY 2034. Policymakers should set a fiscal goal to stabilize or reduce the debt to prevent substantial risks and threats to the budget and economy. Stabilizing debt at roughly 97% of GDP would require $3.6 trillion of deficit reduction over five years or $7.9 over ten years. Reducing debt to 80% of GDP would require $9.4 trillion over five years or $15 trillion over ten years. Balancing the budget would require about $7.5 trillion of five-year savings or $15 trillion over ten years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects federal debt held by the public will rise from roughly 97% of GDP to a record 106.3% by the end of FY 2028 and 116% by the end of FY 2034 under current law.
  2. Stabilizing debt at roughly 97% of GDP would require $3.6 trillion of deficit reduction over five years or $7.9 trillion over ten years, while reducing debt to 80% of GDP would require $9.4 trillion over five years or $15 trillion over ten.
  3. Balancing the federal budget would require about $7.5 trillion of five-year savings or $15 trillion over ten years, and policymakers should set a fiscal goal to stabilize or reduce the debt to prevent substantial risks to the budget and economy.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit will grow from $1.6tn to $2.6tn over a decade, rising from 5.6% to 6.1% of gross domestic product. That end-point is well above the 3.7% average of the past 50 years, as outlays are projected to rise faster than revenues over most of the period.
  • Why We Should, but Won’t, Reduce the Budget Deficit — High interest rates will likely crowd out private investment and weaken long-term growth prospects. Because Social Security, health care, other safety-net programs, defense, and interest payments make up most federal spending, leaving only a small and already squeezed slice of nondefense discretionary spending, deficit reduction requires either cutting popular benefits or raising taxes.
  • The Limits of Taxing the Rich — Stabilizing US federal debt at 100% of GDP would require non-interest savings starting at 2% of GDP and rising to 5% of GDP over three decades, assuming no new spending, tax cuts, or crises. Taxing the rich cannot close more than a small fraction of this gap.

AI Summary. China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output, while Europe accounts for about 5% and the US next to nothing, with most of the remainder built in South Korea and Japan. Analysts argue that in a protracted conflict China's wartime-scale yards could quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones.

Niharika Mandhana Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

China dominates global shipbuilding, producing over half of all commercial ships relative to 5% for Europe and “next to nothing” in the US. China’s prowess could tip naval conflicts in its favor, with rapid production and repair capabilities. @WSJ

How does China's shipbuilding capacity compare with America's in a prolonged war?

Core argument: China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output last year, making it the top global shipmaker by a wide margin, while Europe accounted for 5% and the U.S. contributed next to nothing.

More than half of the world’s commercial shipbuilding output came from China last year—making it the top global shipmaker by a wide margin. The once-prolific shipyards of the West that helped forge empires, expand trade, and win wars have shriveled. Europe accounts for just 5% of the world’s output, while the U.S. contributes next to nothing. Most of what China doesn’t build comes from South Korea and Japan. “The scale [of China’s shipbuilding] is just almost hard to fathom,” said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security whose research focuses on maritime competition. “The degree to which it dwarfs American shipbuilding is just unbelievable.” In a protracted conflict, China’s shipyards would give its navy a significant upper hand. Sized to build at wartime rates, they would be able to quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones. That is a capability U.S. shipyards brought to the fight during World War II, building Allied vessels faster than German U-boats could sink them.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output last year, making it the top global shipmaker by a wide margin, while Europe accounted for 5% and the U.S. contributed next to nothing.
  2. China's shipyards, sized to build at wartime rates, would give its navy a significant upper hand in a protracted conflict by quickly accelerating production, replacing lost ships, and repairing damaged ones.
  3. U.S. shipyards brought surge capability to World War II, building Allied vessels faster than German U-boats could sink them.

Related Articles:

  • Why Xi Can No Longer Brag About the Chinese Economy — China's shipyards build 46% of the world's ships, letting it produce several warships and submarines a year, while the U.S. holds under 1% of capacity and its Navy faces late, over-budget deliveries from a few yards lacking workers. China is also the largest drone producer.
  • Nearly 40% of US Attack Submarines Are Out of Commission for Repairs — US Navy data show 18 of its 49 attack submarines — 37% — are out of commission for repairs because of naval shipyard delays, up from 28% and well above the 20% industry best practice. The report argues this leaves the US at a disadvantage against China's numerically larger fleet.
  • U.S. Weapons Industry Unprepared for a China Conflict, Report Says — A Center for Strategic and International Studies report argues the U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for the current security environment and operates in a manner better suited to peacetime. The study recommends reassessing total munitions requirements and stockpile replenishment needs, creating a strategic munitions reserve, and setting a sustainable procurement plan.

Wednesday, February 14, 2024

AI Summary. A proposed mathematical approach to choosing a spouse starts with a wide "calibration" pool of suitable candidates, dating a third of them at random without marrying any, to set a standard. In the evaluation phase, you marry the first person who exceeds that standard, or the last candidate if none does.

Justin Rowlatt BBC
Date Posted:

Happy Valentine’s Day! @EdwardConard explains the optimal process for finding love, “sequential selection, no turning back” to the @BBCWorld.

Happy Valentine’s Day! @EdwardConard explains the optimal process for finding love, “sequential selection, no...

How can a mathematical rule guide choosing a spouse?

Core argument: Conard's mate-selection formula begins with a "calibration" phase in which a person dates roughly a third of a pool of promising candidates chosen at random, marrying none of them and treating the best among them as the benchmark.

You start off by "calibrating" your choice. That means meeting as many suitable partners as possible. Cast your net wide, he urges, but initially you must forget about lust and even love: "That's evolution trying to get us to have babies," cautions Mr Conard. You won't date anyone now, you are just gathering people who might make the grade. There probably won't be that many, maybe a handful or two. Once you've got a set of promising candidates, you move to phase two. You're going to date a third of this subset, choosing them pretty much at random. You won't marry any of these people, according to his rules, so be prepared to be hard-hearted, moving on however attractive a potential partner seems. The most suitable person in this period "calibrates" your choice, setting the standard for the next stage in the process. What follows is what Mr Conard calls the "evaluation" period: this is when you actually choose your future spouse. Once again, you've got to drop potential partners like a stone if you can't resolve problems fairly easily. "You have to be ruthless," he insists. "If you are not highly confident that that person is a person you can be successfully married to… you have to get rid of them." Here's Mr Conard's key rule: "When you find someone better than the best person in the calibration period, you marry them. And if you haven't found anyone by the end, you marry the last person."

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Conard's mate-selection formula begins with a "calibration" phase in which a person dates roughly a third of a pool of promising candidates chosen at random, marrying none of them and treating the best among them as the benchmark.
  2. In Conard's "evaluation" period, a person marries the first candidate who surpasses the best partner from the calibration phase, and marries the last person encountered if no one surpasses that standard.
  3. Conard urges casting a wide net while setting aside lust and love during initial screening, calling those impulses "evolution trying to get us to have babies," and insists on being "ruthless" in dropping partners whose problems cannot be resolved easily.

Related Articles:

  • Intermarriage in America Post-Loving v. Virginia — US interracial marriage rates showed no decline despite heightened public discourse about racial tension, a metric where increased racial tension would be expected to register. The author argues America's ethnoracial composition is more mixed than it has ever been, resembling a Latin American country more than a European one.
  • Fortunate Families? The Effects of Wealth on Marriage and Fertility — Using lottery winners, the authors estimate that wealth windfalls raise the short- and medium-run probability of marriage, an effect driven by male winners. The estimated average effect on marriage dissolution is not statistically distinguishable from zero, but for married women a 1M-SEK windfall nearly doubles the short-run divorce rate, with the effect fading over the long run.
  • China’s Collapsing Birth and Marriage Rates Reflect a People’s Deep Pessimism — China recorded about 9.6m births, roughly half the 17.9m recorded six years earlier, and millions of young people have joined movements expressing alienation from work ("lying flat") and from Chinese society itself ("let it rot"). A viral video of a man telling pandemic enforcers "we are the last generation" spread the despairing hashtag #Lastgeneration.

AI Summary. A survey of 552 heterosexual college students found that men paid for all or most first dates about 90% of the time, women about 2%, with costs split around 8% of the time. The authors report that traditional or progressive views on gender roles made little difference to these expectations.

Santul Nerkar New York Times
Date Posted:

Tonight American men will likely be reaching for the check. According to a 2023 survey of heterosexual college students, men paid for dates 90% of the time, couples split the check 8% of the time and women picked up the check 2% of the time.

Tonight American men will likely be reaching for the check. According to a 2023 survey of heterosexual college students, men...

Do views on gender roles change who pays for dates?

Core argument: In Dr. Shanhong Luo's survey of 552 heterosexual college students, published in Psychological Reports in 2023, young men paid for all or most first dates about 90% of the time, women about 2%, and couples split roughly 8%.

In a paper published in 2023 in Psychological Reports, a peer-reviewed journal, Dr. Shanhong Luo surveyed 552 heterosexual college students and asked them whether they expected men or women to pay for dates — and whether they, as a man or a woman, typically paid more. The researchers found that young men paid for all or most of the dates around 90% of the time, while women paid only about 2% (they split around 8% of the time). On subsequent dates, splitting the check was more common, though men still paid a majority of the time while women rarely did. Nearly 80% of men expected that they would pay on the first date, while just over half of women (55%) expected men to pay. Surprisingly, views on gender norms didn’t make much of a difference: On average, both men and women in the sample expected the man to pay, whether they had more traditional views of gender roles or more progressive ones.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In Dr. Shanhong Luo's survey of 552 heterosexual college students, published in Psychological Reports in 2023, young men paid for all or most first dates about 90% of the time, women about 2%, and couples split roughly 8%.
  2. Nearly 80% of the men surveyed expected to pay on the first date, compared with 55% of women who expected the man to pay.
  3. Both men and women in the sample expected the man to pay on average, whether their views of gender roles were traditional or progressive, and splitting the check became more common on subsequent dates.

Related Articles:

  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
  • Men’s Falling Labor Force Participation Across Generations — Each successive generation of prime-age men has shown higher rates of not participating in the labor force, with millennials starting at a higher level and declining more steeply into their mid-30s, a pattern driven by school enrollment. Given rising educational attainment, the authors suggest the sustained rise in male nonparticipation may slow, which could benefit economic growth.
  • Econ Focus: Melissa Kearney — The decline in marriage and the rise in children raised in one-parent homes have occurred predominantly outside the college-educated class, whose members continue to marry, often to each other, while earnings for adults without a college degree have stagnated or risen only slightly. These divergent family-structure trends mean household inequality has widened by more than earnings inequality alone would imply.

AI Summary. A “cost-of-loving index” built from the Economist Intelligence Unit's cost-of-living data ranks Shanghai as the world's most expensive city for a romantic night out, at roughly $600 for hotel drinks, a two-course meal, cinema, a taxi home and a bottle of wine. The underlying prices are gathered with expatriates and business travellers in mind rather than local residents.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

According to @TheEconomist’s “cost of loving index,” a night out in NYC starting with drinks at a swanky hotel, a two-course meal and a movie, and a taxi home followed by a bottle of wine will set you back $567 dollars tonight.

Which city is the world's most expensive for a romantic night out?

Core argument: Shanghai ranks as the world's most expensive city for a date night, where couples might spend roughly $600, according to Economist Intelligence Unit data.

Using data from the latest cost-of-living index by the Economist Intelligence Unit, our sister company, we created our own “cost-of-loving index”. It ranks the world’s most expensive cities in which to go on a romantic night out: we start with drinks at a swanky hotel, followed by a lavish two-course meal and a trip to the cinema, a taxi home, and a nice bottle of wine to cap things off. (Before you swear off dating, remember that EIU gathers prices with expatriates and business travellers in mind, not local love birds grabbing a cheap bite.) Couples in Shanghai spend the most on a date night, according to EIU data. Residents there might expect to blow roughly $600 on our fancy evening.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Shanghai ranks as the world's most expensive city for a date night, where couples might spend roughly $600, according to Economist Intelligence Unit data.
  2. The Economist's "cost-of-loving index" prices a romantic evening as drinks at a swanky hotel, a lavish two-course meal, a cinema trip, a taxi home, and a bottle of wine.
  3. The Economist Intelligence Unit gathers its price data with expatriates and business travellers in mind, not local couples grabbing a cheap bite.

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AI Summary. Applying the pre-pandemic peak labor force participation rate to the adult population implies about 3.73m "missing workers" and 3.27m "excess retirees" in the US economy. The authors estimate that wealth effects on retirement decisions among those aged 55 and over account for over 50% of the aggregate participation decline and more than 80% of excess retirements.

Miguel Faria-e-Castro and Samuel Jordan-Wood Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

In December of 2022, the US LFP rate was 62.2%, 1.4pp under its pre-pandemic peak, driven by exits of workers >55. @mfariacastro @samajordanwood argue that a wealth effect explain 80% of “excess retirements” among older workers.

How much of the labor force participation decline reflects wealth-driven retirements?

Core argument: Applying the pre-pandemic peak labor force participation rate to the December 2022 civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over implies about 3.73 million "missing workers," while a statistical model of retirement trends implies 3.27 million "excess retirees.".

Applying the pre-pandemic peak LFPR to the level of the civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over as of December 2022 suggests that there were about 3.73 million “missing workers” in the US economy. Comparing actual retirements with those predicted by a statistical model that allows for such trends leads us to conclude that there were 3.27 million “excess retirees” in the US economy as of December 2022. In our baseline, most conservative exercise, we focus on people aged 55-70, whose retirement decision is plausibly more sensitive to wealth effects. We find that the predicted change in the LFPR for this group accounts for almost 30% of the drop in aggregate LFPR between 2020 and 2021. If we expand the analysis to all those 55 and older, we can explain over 50% of the drop in aggregate LFPR over the same period. In terms of “excess retirements,” we can explain close to half of the observed excess retirements by considering only the 55-70 age group and close to more than 80% when focusing on all those 55 and older.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Applying the pre-pandemic peak labor force participation rate to the December 2022 civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over implies about 3.73 million "missing workers," while a statistical model of retirement trends implies 3.27 million "excess retirees.".
  2. Predicted changes in labor force participation for those aged 55–70, whose retirement decisions are plausibly more sensitive to wealth effects, account for almost 30% of the aggregate LFPR drop between 2020 and 2021.
  3. Expanding the analysis to all those aged 55 and older explains over 50% of the 2020–2021 aggregate LFPR decline and more than 80% of observed excess retirements, versus close to half for the 55–70 group.

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  • Pandemic Labor Force Participation and Net Worth Fluctuations — The shortfall in U.S. labor force participation relative to its pre-pandemic peak is attributed mostly to a decline in participation among workers older than 55. The authors estimate that wealth effects from rising net worth can explain between 20% and 36% of the 3.3m excess retirements over the full period studied.
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AI Summary. Florida homeowners paid about $6,000 a year for insurance on average, roughly triple what they paid in 2019 and compared with about $1,700 for the average US homeowner. Insurers and state regulators attribute the increases to widespread lawsuits and fraud, and a Category 5 hurricane led some insurers to exit the state or limit new policies.

Michael Sasso Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Housing prices are falling in southwest Florida as higher insurance costs start to bite; the mean Florida homeowners insurance premium has tripled since 2019 to $6,000/year.

Are rising home insurance costs deterring homebuyers in hurricane-prone states?

Core argument: Florida homeowners paid an average of about $6,000 for insurance last year, roughly triple their 2019 cost, while the average US homeowner paid about $1,700 in 2023, according to the Insurance Information Institute.

Homeowners policies across Florida started soaring in 2020 because of what insurers and state regulators attributed to rampant lawsuits and fraud. Rates in the state climbed as much as 33% annually, then shot up another 42% last year in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian, according to the industry-funded Insurance Information Institute. Ian, a Category 5 storm that was the third-costliest in US history, led some insurers to pull out of the state or limit new policies. Floridians paid $6,000 on average for insurance last year, about triple what they paid in 2019. By comparison, the average US homeowner paid about $1,700 in 2023, the III said. In Fort Myers, where hundreds of homes and businesses were destroyed by Ian, “we’re seeing anywhere from a 50-to-100% increase in spending depending on the age of the home,” said Marlissa Gervasoni, head of that area’s Realtors board.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Florida homeowners paid an average of about $6,000 for insurance last year, roughly triple their 2019 cost, while the average US homeowner paid about $1,700 in 2023, according to the Insurance Information Institute.
  2. Florida homeowners policy rates climbed as much as 33% annually beginning in 2020, which insurers and state regulators attributed to rampant lawsuits and fraud, then rose another 42% last year in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian.
  3. Hurricane Ian, a Category 5 storm and the third-costliest in US history, led some insurers to pull out of Florida or limit new policies, and Fort Myers Realtors board head Marlissa Gervasoni reports 50-to-100% increases in spending depending on a home's age.

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AI Summary. Home prices in Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando, and Tampa now stand at 6 to 7x incomes, exceeding the ratios reached at the peak of the early 2000s housing bubble in each of those metro areas. All four shifted from affordable, to unaffordable, back to affordable, and into unaffordable territory again.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:

The recent housing market boom has driven median home values in four “housing bubble” cities to over 6 times median income, higher than the “bubble” era peak. @jmhorp

Are home price-to-income ratios now higher than at the bubble's peak?

Core argument: Home prices in Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando and Tampa stand at 6 to 7 times incomes, higher than the peak price-to-income ratios those four metros reached during the 2003–2007 housing bubble.

The old “zone of affordability” is largely gone. Let's consider four cities that are generally considered the epicenter of the early 2000s “housing bubble” in the US [Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando and Tampa]. These MSAs went from affordable in 1999, to unaffordable in 2003-2007, then back to affordability for a few years. Now they are clearly back to unaffordable territory, with home prices at 6 or even 7 times incomes. For each of these four cities, that’s even higher than the peak of “housing bubble.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Home prices in Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando and Tampa stand at 6 to 7 times incomes, higher than the peak price-to-income ratios those four metros reached during the 2003–2007 housing bubble.
  2. Las Vegas, Phoenix, Orlando and Tampa were affordable in 1999, unaffordable from 2003 to 2007, affordable again for a few years, and are now back in unaffordable territory.
  3. The old "zone of affordability" in the US housing market is largely gone, based on the four metros considered the epicenter of the early 2000s housing bubble.

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AI Summary. Violent crime in large US cities and some of the largest suburban counties fell 2.6% and homicides fell 10.4% after three straight years of increases, but both remained above pre-pandemic levels, according to the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Federal Bureau of Investigation data show a milder pattern because they also cover suburbs, small towns, and rural areas.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The uptick in violent crime associated with the pandemic is receding but homicide rates remain above pre-pandemic levels. @foxjust

Has falling violent crime returned big cities to pre-pandemic levels?

Core argument: Violent crime in big US cities and some of the largest suburban counties fell 2.6% in 2023 after three consecutive years of increases, with homicides down 10.4%, according to Major Cities Chiefs Association statistics.

Violent crime fell 2.6% in big US cities and a few of the largest suburban counties in 2023 after three consecutive years of increases, with homicides down 10.4%. But both remained higher than before the pandemic in 2019. That’s according to new statistics from the Major Cities Chiefs Association, which paint a somewhat different picture of the past few years than the crime data maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. According to the FBI, total violent crime — homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault — rose in 2020 but fell in 2021 and 2022, and if it falls at the 8.2% rate it did over the first nine months of 2023 (full-year FBI data won’t be available for a while yet), it will hit its lowest level relative to population since 1969. The difference is mainly because the pandemic crime wave was concentrated in big cities while the FBI data cover suburbs, small towns, and rural areas, too.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Violent crime in big US cities and some of the largest suburban counties fell 2.6% in 2023 after three consecutive years of increases, with homicides down 10.4%, according to Major Cities Chiefs Association statistics.
  2. Violent crime and homicides in those big cities and suburban counties remained higher in 2023 than in 2019, before the pandemic.
  3. FBI data show total violent crime rose in 2020 but fell in 2021 and 2022, and if it falls at the 8.2% rate recorded over the first nine months of 2023, it will reach its lowest level relative to population since 1969.

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AI Summary. The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.

Mackenzie Eaglen The National Interest
Date Posted:

The US Navy has been depleting its Tomahawk stockpile by firing the missiles faster than it can replace them. On the first day of strikes in Yemen it used 80 missiles relative to the 55 procured in 2023. @MEaglen @AEI

Is the Navy firing cruise missiles faster than it can replace them?

Core argument: The U.S. Navy expended more than 80 Tomahawks against 30 targets in Yemen on opening day of strikes, exceeding its entire prior-year purchase of 55 Tomahawks.

While the Navy does have a large existing stockpile of Tomahawks to sustain its land-attack capability, it has recently been firing the missiles faster than it can replace them. According to the Navy, opening day strikes alone expended more than 80 Tomahawks to hit 30 targets within Yemen. Last year’s entire Tomahawk purchase of 55 missiles accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in one day. This is an unsustainable rate of expenditure. However, this represents adherence to, rather than deviation from, the norm. Prior strikes in Syria expended fifty-nine Tomahawks in 2017 and an additional sixty-six in 2018. The Navy bought just 100 Tomahawks in 2018 and then zero Tomahawks in 2019—failing to offset the expenditure rate of the Syria strikes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. Navy expended more than 80 Tomahawks against 30 targets in Yemen on opening day of strikes, exceeding its entire prior-year purchase of 55 Tomahawks.
  2. Last year's full Tomahawk buy of 55 missiles equaled 68% of the precision munitions the Navy fired at the Houthis in a single day, an unsustainable rate of expenditure.
  3. Strikes in Syria consumed 59 Tomahawks in 2017 and 66 in 2018, while the Navy purchased 100 Tomahawks in 2018 and none in 2019, failing to offset that expenditure rate.

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