Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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Friday, February 9, 2024

Interest Costs Will Leapfrog Medicare and Defense This Year

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects net interest payments on federal debt will reach $870bn, or 3.1% of GDP, exceeding spending on national defense ($822bn) and net Medicare ($851bn). That would make interest the second-largest federal budget item after Social Security, up from $223bn in 2015 and $659bn in 2023.

CRFB Staff Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

According to the new @USCBO numbers, in 2024 the US will spend more on interest than on defense or Medicare. Interest on the debt is the fastest-growing part of the budget. @BudgetHawks @MarcGoldwein

Are interest payments on federal debt now exceeding defense and Medicare spending?

Core argument: CBO projects net interest payments will total $870 billion in FY2024, a near-record 3.1% of GDP, exceeding spending on national defense ($822 billion) and net Medicare ($851 billion).

Net interest payments will exceed both defense and Medicare spending this year, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, according to new projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). That will make interest the second largest government expenditure. Net interest has been exploding over the past few years, with payments rising from $223B in 2015 to $352B in 2021 before nearly doubling to $659B in 2023. In 2024, CBO projects net interest will total $870B, a near-record 3.1% of GDP. Spending on interest already topped the Medicaid budget and all spending on children last year. At a projected $870B, interest will surpass total spending on national defense ($822B) in 2024 and grow well beyond the defense budget over time. Interest costs will also slightly exceed net Medicare spending ($851B) this year and remain in line with Medicare costs in future years. That would make interest the second largest line item in the budget after Social Security.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects net interest payments will total $870 billion in FY2024, a near-record 3.1% of GDP, exceeding spending on national defense ($822 billion) and net Medicare ($851 billion).
  2. Net interest would become the second largest line item in the federal budget after Social Security, and CBO projects it will grow well beyond the defense budget over time while remaining in line with Medicare costs.
  3. Net interest payments rose from $223 billion in 2015 to $352 billion in 2021 before nearly doubling to $659 billion in 2023, already topping Medicaid and all spending on children last year.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit will grow from $1.6tn to $2.6tn over a decade, rising from 5.6% to 6.1% of gross domestic product. That end-point is well above the 3.7% average of the past 50 years, as outlays are projected to rise faster than revenues over most of the period.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending

Skilled Immigrants, Firms, and the Global Geography of Innovation

AI Summary. US-based multinational companies account for about one-third of H-1B skilled-worker visa applications and 80% of research and development done by US firms. H-1B use is concentrated in a few industries, led by professional, scientific, and technical services, with five firms accounting for nearly 10% of approvals and California employers 22.5%.

Britta Glennon Journal of Economic Perspectives
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

Firms seeking skilled workers are a key driver of skilled immigration to the US; US-based multinational companies account for about 1/3 of H-1B visa applications. @BrittaGlennon

How concentrated is skilled-worker visa use among firms and industries?

Core argument: US-based multinational companies account for about one-third of H-1B visa applications, excluding foreign multinationals that also hire H-1B workers, and account for 80% of the research and development done by US firms.

In the US economy, US-based multinational companies account for about one-third of H-1B visa applications, not including foreign multinational companies who also hire H-1B workers. Not coincidentally, US multinational companies account for 80% of the research and development done by US firms. A relatively small group of industries accounts for most of the H-1B visas. Figure 1 illustrates that most firms utilizing the program are in the same industry— Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services—with Manufacturing a distant second. In 2022 five firms Tata Consultancy, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Infosys accounted for nearly 10% of all H-1B approvals. This skewness has increased over time. The skewness is apparent geographically as well; 22.5% of approved H-1B petitions were allocated to employers in California alone.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US-based multinational companies account for about one-third of H-1B visa applications, excluding foreign multinationals that also hire H-1B workers, and account for 80% of the research and development done by US firms.
  2. Five firms — Tata Consultancy, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Infosys — accounted for nearly 10% of all H-1B approvals in 2022, and this skewness has increased over time.
  3. California employers received 22.5% of approved H-1B petitions, and most firms using the program are in Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, with Manufacturing a distant second.

Related Articles:

  • Third-Country Effects of U.S. Immigration Policy — U.S. H-1B visa denial rates rose from about 6% to 16%, and the authors estimate a 10 percentage point rise in denials increases Canadian applications by 30%, roughly one Canadian application per four forgone visas. More exposed Canadian firms increased sales and hired about 0.5 native workers per immigrant.
  • Top Talent, Elite Colleges, and Migration: Evidence from the Indian Institutes of Technology — Among top scorers on India's Joint Entrance Exam for the Indian Institutes of Technology, 62% of the top 100 and 36% of the top 1,000 migrated abroad within eight years, primarily to the U.S. for graduate school. The authors argue elite schools shape migration by signaling ability and providing access to networks.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
  • Immigration
  • Workforce

The Seven Samurai: Big Tech to the Rescue!

AI Summary. The seven largest US technology companies — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta, and Tesla — added $5.1tn in combined market value in a single year, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in the entire US equity market's capitalization. US equities returned 23.25% including them and 12.6% without them.

Aswath Damodaran Musings on Markets
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

In 2012 the Magnificent 7 made up 8% of the market capitalization of all US public firms; by the end of 2023 they made up 24%. Their $12T market cap is worth more than all Chinese public equities. @AswathDamodaran

How much of US equity market gains came from seven tech giants?

Core argument: The Magnificent Seven — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta and Tesla — added $5.1 trillion in combined market capitalization in 2023, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in the entire US equity market's value.

Let's look at the performance of the Mag 7 [AAPL, MSFT, GOOGL, AMZN, NVDA, META, TSLA] in 2023 when their collective market capitalization increased by a staggering $5.1T. Nvidia and Meta were the best performers, with the former more than and the latter almost tripling in value over the period. In terms of dollar value added, Microsoft and Apple each added a trillion dollars to their market capitalizations. These seven companies accounted for more than 50% of the increase in market capitalization of the entire US equity market. With them, US equities had price appreciation of 23.25% for the year, but without them, the year would have been an average one, with returns on 12.6%. Over the eleven-year period, the cumulative market capitalization of the seven companies has risen from $1.1 trillion in 2012 to $12 trillion in 2023. To put these numbers in perspective, the Mag Seven companies now have a market capitalization larger than that of all listed stocks in China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Magnificent Seven — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta and Tesla — added $5.1 trillion in combined market capitalization in 2023, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in the entire US equity market's value.
  2. US equities appreciated 23.25% in 2023 with the Magnificent Seven included, versus 12.6% without them, as Nvidia more than tripled and Meta almost tripled in value and Microsoft and Apple each added $1 trillion.
  3. The Magnificent Seven's cumulative market capitalization rose from $1.1 trillion in 2012 to $12 trillion in 2023, exceeding the market capitalization of all listed stocks in China.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • Stocks For The Long Run? Sometimes Yes, Sometimes No — Revised historical data that correct for survivorship bias—most notably including the Second Bank of the United States, which reached nearly 30% of US market capitalization before collapsing—show 19th-century stock returns differed from 20th-century returns, with repeated periods in which stocks underperformed bonds.
  • P/E Ratio for S&P7 vs S&P 493 — The price-to-earnings ratio of the largest seven S&P 500 stocks rose from 29 to 45 while the other 493 fluctuated around 19, with index returns driven by those seven. The author argues that, given higher long-term interest rates, either stock prices or those rates must fall.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Five Easy Pieces

AI Summary. The rally in the seven largest US technology stocks has been driven by earnings rather than valuation: of the group's 28% return, 21 percentage points came from sales growth, 6 from margin expansion, and 1 from multiple expansion. Market concentration has reached its highest level since 1972, and large spikes in concentration have frequently coincided with or preceded prior recessions.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

Michael Cembalest @jpmorgan notes the 28% rally of the Magnificent 7 since 2019 has been driven by earnings: “21% is attributable to sales growth, 6% from margin expansion and just 1% from multiple expansion.”

Is the largest tech stock rally driven by earnings or valuation?

Core argument: Of the Magnificent 7's 28% return since 2019, 21 points came from sales growth, 6 points from margin expansion, and just 1 point from multiple expansion, unlike the margin-less bubble of 2000–2001.

The Mag 7 [AAPL, MSFT, GOOGL, AMZN, NVDA, META, TSLA] rally has been earnings-driven rather than relying on multiple expansion. Of the group’s 28% return since 2019, 21% is attributable to sales growth, 6% from margin expansion, and just 1% from multiple expansion. This is quite different than the margin-less bubble in 2000-2001. But there are challenges as well, market concentration has reached its highest level since 1972. The top 10 stocks have broken away from stocks #11-#50 to an even greater degree than during the tech bubble in 2000-2001. Large spikes in market concentration have frequently coincided with or preceded prior recessions. Antitrust issues are the primary Achilles heel I can imagine that could disrupt the continued domination of the largest stocks. While Tesla has run into a pricing buzzsaw and lower volumes, the rest continue to thrive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the Magnificent 7's 28% return since 2019, 21 points came from sales growth, 6 points from margin expansion, and just 1 point from multiple expansion, unlike the margin-less bubble of 2000–2001.
  2. Market concentration has reached its highest level since 1972, with the top 10 stocks separating from stocks #11–#50 by a wider margin than during the 2000–2001 tech bubble.
  3. Large spikes in market concentration have frequently coincided with or preceded prior recessions, and antitrust is the primary risk identified to continued domination by the largest stocks.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • A Few Stocks Drive the Stock Market: Dot.com Vs. Today Vs. the Last 100 Years — Seven large technology stocks account for nearly 30% of the S&P 500's total value, but the rise of both hyped stocks and the broader market was more extreme during the dot-com era. Historically, only a few stocks have generated most of the stock market's value creation in the US and internationally.
  • Five Lessons From 2023 — The total market value of the S&P 500's 500 companies rose $8tn, or 24.2%, but excluding seven large technology stocks — Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla — the gain was $3tn, or 11.7%. Those seven account for 52% of the index's increase in market value.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Another ‘Great Retirement’ Wave Hits the US After Stocks Rally

AI Summary. The US has roughly 2.7m more retirees than predicted by a Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis model, with the number of retirees reaching a post-pandemic record. Financial market performance appears to have played a role, as stocks rebounded 24% and home prices rose across most US metro areas, bolstering older Americans' wealth.

Alexandre Tanzi Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

Retirements are rising again in line with American equity markets. According to @mfariacastro, the US has seen 2.7mm “excess” retirements.

Are rising stock and home prices pushing more Americans into retirement?

Core argument: The US has roughly 2.7 million more retirees than predicted by a model built by St. Louis Fed economist Miguel Faria-e-Castro, with the number of retirees reaching a post-pandemic record in December.

Economists long expected the share of retirees in the population to soar as baby boomers aged. Covid-19 then caused the number to spike well beyond expectations, a surge dubbed the “Great Retirement Boom.” But just as they seemed to be coming back down, the numbers surged again in recent months, reaching a post-pandemic record in December. The US now has around 2.7 million more retirees than predicted in a model designed by Miguel Faria-e-Castro, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Financial market performance looks to have played a role. The gap in the model appeared to be closing earlier last year following a 19% drop in the S&P 500 in 2022. But in 2023 the index rebounded, jumping 24%, with most of the gain coming in the fourth quarter. On top of that housing across the vast majority of US metro areas continued to rise last quarter, bolstering the wealth of older Americans.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US has roughly 2.7 million more retirees than predicted by a model built by St. Louis Fed economist Miguel Faria-e-Castro, with the number of retirees reaching a post-pandemic record in December.
  2. The gap in Faria-e-Castro's model appeared to be closing after the S&P 500 fell 19% in 2022, but the index rebounded 24% in 2023, with most of that gain in the fourth quarter.
  3. Housing prices across the vast majority of US metro areas continued to rise in the most recent quarter, bolstering the wealth of older Americans.

Related Articles:

  • Excess Retirements Continue Despite Ebbing COVID-19 Pandemic — The share of U.S. adults who are retired rose above its predicted trend during the COVID-19 pandemic, with excess retirees peaking at an estimated 2.95m and standing at roughly 2.4m thereafter. The authors suggest these excess retirements may be contributing to continued labor market tightness and a low unemployment rate.
  • Pandemic Labor Force Participation and Net Worth Fluctuations — The shortfall in U.S. labor force participation relative to its pre-pandemic peak is attributed mostly to a decline in participation among workers older than 55. The authors estimate that wealth effects from rising net worth can explain between 20% and 36% of the 3.3m excess retirements over the full period studied.
  • Retirements, Net Worth, and the Fall and Rise of Labor Force Participation — Households aged 55–74 lost an average of over $100,000 in net worth amid falling asset returns, reversing part of their earlier gains, reflecting their large holdings of stocks and bonds. The authors estimate this decline in asset values may have drawn an extra 170,000 people aged 51–65 back into the labor force.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Outlook for China: Slowing Exports, Housing Deflating, and Demographics Deteriorating

AI Summary. China's number of workers per retiree fell from 10 in 2000 to 5 in 2024 and is projected to fall to 3 by 2034, matching the current US level.

Torsten Sløk, Jyoti Agarwal, and Rajvi Shah Apollo
Date Posted:
February 9, 2024

A Torsten Sløk chart shows the number of workers per retiree in China has fallen from 10 in 2000 to 5 in 2024. By 2034, this is projected to fall to 3, the current level in the US.

Related Articles:

  • Can China Catch Up with Greece? — Declining contributions from labor and capital are projected to hold China's income growth below 4% unless total factor productivity growth accelerates, which the authors argue is unlikely given that China's productivity growth has already averaged 1.8% since 2009. Only five of the 43 countries that previously reached China's income level sustained that pace over the following 13 years.
  • A Brighter Demographic Story for China — China's annual college graduates rose from about 1m at the turn of the century, roughly 6% of the age cohort, to 11.6m, about 63% of the cohort, with over 40% studying science, technology, engineering, or math, compared with 18% in the US, 35% in Germany, and 26% across the OECD.
  • China Economy Memo: Tempest in a Teapot or Crisis A-Brewing? — The authors argue China is heading into a protracted debt crisis in which about 40% of local government financing vehicles default, hitting regional banks most exposed to such lending. They estimate total losses for these creditors at roughly $5tn, or about 30% of China's GDP.
  • China
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Monday, February 12, 2024

Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California

AI Summary. A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.

Joshua Rauh and Ryan Shyu American Economic Journal
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

After a 2012 increase in marginal tax rates of up to 3% for high-income California households 0.8% of the impacted tax base left the state in 2013 and others restructured income, eroding 61% of “windfall revenues” within the first 2 years. @joshrauh

How much revenue do high earners' responses erode after tax increases?

Core argument: Behavioral responses to California's Proposition 30, a 2012 measure that raised marginal tax rates by up to 3 percentage points on high-income households, eroded 45.2% of state windfall tax revenues within one year and 60.9% within two years, driven largely by the intensive margin.

Using administrative data, we analyze the response to Proposition 30, a 2012 measure that increased California marginal tax rates by up to 3 percentage points for high-income households. Relative to baseline departure rates, an additional 0.8 percent of the residential tax base that landed in the top bracket left California in 2013. Using matched out-of-state taxpayers as controls reveals an income elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. These responses eroded 45.2 percent of state windfall tax revenues within the first year and 60.9 percent within 2 years, driven largely by the intensive margin.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Behavioral responses to California's Proposition 30, a 2012 measure that raised marginal tax rates by up to 3 percentage points on high-income households, eroded 45.2% of state windfall tax revenues within one year and 60.9% within two years, driven largely by the intensive margin.
  2. An additional 0.8% of the residential tax base landing in California's top bracket left the state in 2013 relative to baseline departure rates, according to an analysis of administrative data.
  3. Using matched out-of-state taxpayers as controls, the analysis finds an income elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who remained in California.

Related Articles:

  • Taxing Billionaires: Estate Taxes and the Geographical Location of the Ultra-Wealthy — The authors estimate that US billionaires move to states without estate taxes as they age, with $80.7bn of Forbes 400 wealth escaping estate taxation as a result. They find that for the average state the added estate tax revenue exceeds forgone income tax revenue by 31%, with California a notable exception.
  • The Limits of Taxing the Rich — Stabilizing US federal debt at 100% of GDP would require non-interest savings starting at 2% of GDP and rising to 5% of GDP over three decades, assuming no new spending, tax cuts, or crises. Taxing the rich cannot close more than a small fraction of this gap.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
  • Taxation
  • Fiscal Policy

Making Sense of the GDP-GDI Gap

AI Summary. Real gross domestic product and real gross domestic income, an income-based alternative measure of economic activity, have diverged to their widest gap since the early 1990s, with output growth well above and income growth slightly negative. Averaging the two measures after adjusting for distortions yields an estimated 2.1% growth pace, close to potential.

Manuel Abecasis Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024

Taking into account both GDP and GDI @GoldmanSachs argues year-over-year US growth was 2.1% through Q3 of last year, modestly above potential.

What does the gap between output and income measures say about growth?

Core argument: Real GDP grew 3.3% year-over-year in 2023Q4, well above expectations and the authors' estimate of potential growth, while real gross domestic income fell 0.1% year-over-year in 2023Q3.

Real GDP grew by 3.3% year-over-year in 2023Q4, well above expectations and our estimate of potential growth. However, real gross domestic income (GDI), an alternative measure of economic activity derived from income rather than expenditure data, declined by 0.1% year-over-year in 2023Q3, and the gap between the levels of GDP and GDI is now at its highest level since the early 1990s. To gauge “true” growth in the four quarters to 2023Q3, we would use the average of GDP (2.9%) and GDI adjusted for four distortions (1.3%). The resulting 2.1% estimate implies that the US economy grew at a pace close to or very slightly above potential. This is also consistent with the performance of the labor market over the past 12-18 months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real GDP grew 3.3% year-over-year in 2023Q4, well above expectations and the authors' estimate of potential growth, while real gross domestic income fell 0.1% year-over-year in 2023Q3.
  2. The gap between the levels of GDP and GDI stands at its highest since the early 1990s, with GDI derived from income rather than expenditure data.
  3. Averaging GDP growth of 2.9% with GDI adjusted for four distortions at 1.3% yields a 2.1% estimate of "true" growth in the four quarters to 2023Q3, close to or slightly above potential and consistent with labor market performance.

Related Articles:

  • Global Views: Too Much of a Good Thing? — Two alternative gauges of US growth — gross domestic income, which sums all income rather than all spending, and a current activity indicator — show growth of 1.5% and 0.8% at annualized rates, well below corresponding GDP figures. The authors conclude real output is at most growing modestly above potential despite stronger GDP data.
  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • Macro Outlook 2024: The Hard Part Is Over — Goldman Sachs projects limited recession risk, holding a 15% US recession probability, and expects tailwinds to global growth including strong real household income growth, a smaller drag from monetary and fiscal tightening, recovering manufacturing, and central banks more willing to cut rates if growth slows. It projects core inflation falling to 2–2½%.
  • Growth
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle

Magnificently Concentrated

AI Summary. Since 1957, the 10 largest stocks in the S&P 500 have trailed an equal-weighted index of the remaining 490 stocks by 2.4% per year on average, though over the past decade the largest 10 outperformed by 4.9% per year. The authors argue history suggests the capitalization-weighted S&P 500 is likely to underperform the equal-weighted version over the next decade.

Ben Inker and John Pease GMO
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024

Ben Inker and John Pease note that large-cap stocks have historically underperformed the market, and argue the Magnificent 7 stocks that currently make up 28% of the S&P 500’s market cap will underperform going forward. @GMOInsights

Will the largest stocks underperform the average S&P 500 stock ahead?

Core argument: Since 1957, the 10 largest S&P 500 stocks have underperformed an equal-weighted index of the remaining 490 stocks by 2.4% per year on average, though the largest stocks do not trail in every period.

The largest stocks certainly don’t underperform all of the time, but on average, they have substantially trailed the average S&P 500 stock, as we can see in Exhibit 2. Since 1957, the 10 largest stocks in the S&P 500 have underperformed an equal-weighted index of the remaining 490 stocks by 2.4% per year. But the last decade has been a very notable departure from that trend, with the largest 10 outperforming by a massive 4.9% per year on average. History suggests that the next decade is likely to see a reversal of the recent pattern with the capitalization-weighted version of the S&P 500 underperforming the equal-weighted version. In such an environment, active managers will suddenly look much better versus the S&P 500 and other capitalization-weighted benchmarks.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since 1957, the 10 largest S&P 500 stocks have underperformed an equal-weighted index of the remaining 490 stocks by 2.4% per year on average, though the largest stocks do not trail in every period.
  2. Over the past decade, the 10 largest S&P 500 stocks outperformed by 4.9% per year on average, a notable departure from the pattern since 1957.
  3. History suggests the next decade is likely to reverse the recent pattern, with the capitalization-weighted S&P 500 underperforming the equal-weighted version and active managers looking much better against capitalization-weighted benchmarks.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • The Seven Samurai: Big Tech to the Rescue! — The seven largest US technology companies — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta, and Tesla — added $5.1tn in combined market value in a single year, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in the entire US equity market's capitalization. US equities returned 23.25% including them and 12.6% without them.
  • Five Easy Pieces — The rally in the seven largest US technology stocks has been driven by earnings rather than valuation: of the group's 28% return, 21 percentage points came from sales growth, 6 from margin expansion, and 1 from multiple expansion. Market concentration has reached its highest level since 1972, and large spikes in concentration have frequently coincided with or preceded prior recessions.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Germany’s Days as an Industrial Superpower Are Coming to an End

AI Summary. Germany's industrial base faces mounting pressure as the US competes with Europe for climate investment, China shifts from customer to rival, and cheap Russian natural gas has ended. In chemicals, nearly one in 10 companies plan to permanently halt production processes, according to an industry association survey, while BASF is cutting 2,600 jobs and Lanxess is reducing staff by 7%.

Wilfried Eckl-Dorna, Jana Randow, Carolynn Look, and Petra Sorge Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024

Germany’s economic model is under threat as its manufacturing sector reels from higher energy prices driven by the end of cheap Russian natural gas.

Is Germany's industrial base losing the foundations that supported it?

Core argument: Nearly one in 10 German chemical companies plan to permanently halt production processes, according to a survey by the VCI industry association, in a sector hit hard by Germany's loss of cheap Russian natural gas.

The underpinnings of Germany’s industrial machine have fallen like dominoes. The US is drifting away from Europe and is seeking to compete with its transatlantic allies for climate investment. China is becoming a bigger rival and is no longer an insatiable buyer of German goods. The final blow for some heavy manufacturers was the end of huge volumes of cheap Russian natural gas. One of the hardest-hit sectors has been chemicals — a direct result of Germany’s loss of cheap Russian gas. With the transition to clean hydrogen still uncertain, nearly one in 10 companies are planning to permanently halt production processes, according to a recent survey by the VCI industry association. BASF SE, Europe’s biggest chemical producer, is cutting 2,600 jobs and Lanxess AG is reducing staff by 7%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly one in 10 German chemical companies plan to permanently halt production processes, according to a survey by the VCI industry association, in a sector hit hard by Germany's loss of cheap Russian natural gas.
  2. BASF SE, Europe's biggest chemical producer, is cutting 2,600 jobs and Lanxess AG is reducing staff by 7%, with the transition to clean hydrogen still uncertain.
  3. Germany's industrial model has been undermined by a US drifting away from Europe and competing for climate investment, a China that is a bigger rival and no longer an insatiable buyer of German goods, and the end of cheap Russian gas.

Related Articles:

  • Germany’s Industrial Slowdown — German output remains barely above pre-pandemic levels, with cumulative GDP growth of less than 0.5% over roughly five years. German industrial investment has not recovered to pre-pandemic levels, and real fixed investment in equipment remains below its 2018 level, even as the US devotes record resources to factory construction and equipment purchases.
  • Can Volkswagen Win Back China? — Volkswagen relies on China for at least half its annual profits, but its flagship VW brand has been displaced as China's best-selling car by BYD and holds just 2% of the electric vehicle market, ninth place, versus nearly 40% for BYD and over 10% for Tesla.
  • Comparing EU-to-US Output Per Hour — European Union output per hour worked has risen from about 72% of the US level in the early 2000s to about 82%. The EU's 28% shortfall in GDP per capita versus the US is roughly two-thirds attributable to lower output per hour and one-third to fewer hours worked; Germany's shortfall reflects fewer hours alone.
  • Growth
  • GDP

Pettis On Germany

AI Summary. Manufacturing accounts for 18% of Germany's GDP, versus 16% globally and 11% in the US, and an even larger share in Japan (20%), Singapore (21%), South Korea (26%), China (28%) and Taiwan (34%). These economies combine high manufacturing shares with low consumption shares and reliance on trade surpluses, leaving them vulnerable if protectionism rises globally.

Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024

.@michaelxpettis argues German malaise will soon spread to other countries with large manufacturing shares of GDP as the global “consumers of last resort” reduce their role in absorbing excess production.

.@michaelxpettis argues German malaise will soon spread to other countries with large manufacturing shares of GDP as the...

Are high-manufacturing, surplus-reliant economies vulnerable to rising protectionism?

Core argument: Manufacturing accounts for 18% of German GDP versus 16% globally and 11% in the US, and larger shares in Japan (20%), Singapore (21%), South Korea (26%), China (28%) and Taiwan (34%), per Pettis.

As the world changes, with the global "consumers of last resort" determined to reduce their roles in absorbing excess production abroad, and manufacturing powers determined to double down on their manufacturing sectors, this might become a wider problem. That's because Germany is not the only vulnerable large economy. While manufacturing comprises 18% of its GDP (compared to 16% globally and 11% in the US) it comprises 20% of Japan's, 21% of Singapore’s, 26% of South Korea's, 28% of China's, and 34% of Taiwan’s. These economies all combine a disproportionately large manufacturing share of GDP, a disproportionately low consumption share and, as a direct consequence, an historical reliance on trade surpluses to resolve the imbalances between the two. As we saw in the 1930s, a global rise in protectionism is likely to be especially painful for the manufacturing sectors in persistent surplus countries. If we do indeed see this rise, Germany may become more of an example than an exception.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Manufacturing accounts for 18% of German GDP versus 16% globally and 11% in the US, and larger shares in Japan (20%), Singapore (21%), South Korea (26%), China (28%) and Taiwan (34%), per Pettis.
  2. Pettis argues these economies combine disproportionately large manufacturing shares of GDP with disproportionately low consumption shares, and as a direct consequence have historically relied on trade surpluses to resolve the imbalance.
  3. Pettis contends that, as in the 1930s, a global rise in protectionism would be especially painful for manufacturing sectors in persistent surplus countries, leaving Germany as more of an example than an exception.

Related Articles:

  • Germany’s Days as an Industrial Superpower Are Coming to an End — Germany's industrial base faces mounting pressure as the US competes with Europe for climate investment, China shifts from customer to rival, and cheap Russian natural gas has ended. In chemicals, nearly one in 10 companies plan to permanently halt production processes, according to an industry association survey, while BASF is cutting 2,600 jobs and Lanxess is reducing staff by 7%.
  • EU to Press China On Industrial Overcapacity at Beijing Summit — European Union leaders are pressing China over its expansion of industrial capacity, particularly in renewable energy products, at a time of weak Chinese domestic demand and tightening access to markets such as the US, leaving Europe a target for excess exports. EU officials say the bloc's trade deficit with China is just below $400bn and has doubled within two years.
  • Pettis On China’s Export Strategy — China is shifting investment from its weakened property sector toward manufacturing, which already accounts for 27% of Chinese GDP versus 14% elsewhere and is constrained by weak demand rather than scarce capital. Since China holds about 18% of global GDP but 30% of global manufacturing, added output must be absorbed abroad absent higher consumption.
  • Growth
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Sea Change

AI Summary. The rising US fiscal deficit is attributed largely to a secular increase in spending — driven by retirement-related outlays and interest expense that are politically difficult to change — rather than to revenue changes. The author argues the resulting growth in Treasury supply will weigh on long-dated interest rates while adding upward pressure on consumer and asset prices.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
February 12, 2024

.@FedGuy12 notes that fiscal deficits could exceed the new CBO projections of 5.5% of GDP and argues, “We are in the early innings of an era with strong nominal growth and surging equity markets” driven by fiscal stimulus.

Is rising government spending driving long-term interest rates and inflation higher?

Core argument: The rise in the fiscal deficit stems largely from a secular increase in spending rather than changes in revenue, driven by rising retirement-related outlays and interest expense, both politically very difficult to change.

The steady rise in the fiscal deficit is largely due to a secular rise in spending rather than changes in revenue. This structural change is largely driven by rising retirement related spending and interest expense, both of which are politically very difficult to change. The fiscal authorities are essentially on track to print trillions in Treasuries for the foreseeable future. Recall that Treasuries are essentially money that pays interest. The increase in Treasury supply will continue to weigh on long-dated interest rates, and the increase in private sector purchasing power will continue to place upward pressure on inflation – including asset inflation. Fiscal spending is not the only thing that matters, but the current trajectory strongly argues we are in the early innings of an era with strong nominal growth and surging equity markets. There will be periods of over extension and pull backs along the way.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rise in the fiscal deficit stems largely from a secular increase in spending rather than changes in revenue, driven by rising retirement-related outlays and interest expense, both politically very difficult to change.
  2. Fiscal authorities are on track to issue trillions in Treasuries for the foreseeable future, and the added supply will continue to weigh on long-dated interest rates while increasing private sector purchasing power.
  3. The current fiscal trajectory argues that an era of strong nominal growth and surging equity markets is in its early innings, with upward pressure on inflation including asset inflation, punctuated by periods of overextension and pullbacks.

Related Articles:

  • The Curious Incident of the Elevated Profit Margins — The US fiscal deficit averaged just under 3% of gross national product from 1950 to 2011 but 6.6% from 2012 to 2022, driven mainly by health and social security spending, a pattern that holds excluding pandemic years. Even assuming permanently elevated profit margins, US equity valuations imply low long-run returns.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit will grow from $1.6tn to $2.6tn over a decade, rising from 5.6% to 6.1% of gross domestic product. That end-point is well above the 3.7% average of the past 50 years, as outlays are projected to rise faster than revenues over most of the period.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets


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