Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, January 24, 2024

AI Summary. Wealth data for young people comes from the Federal Reserve's quarterly Distributional Financial Accounts, which project forward results from the Survey of Consumer Finances conducted every three years. When newer survey results were released, young people turned out to hold considerably more wealth than the projections based on the prior survey had indicated.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:

Based on new Federal Reserve data, 2023 wealth per capita for 30-year-old Millennials is outpacing their Gen X counterparts when they were 30 years old. @jmhorp

Do young people hold more wealth than earlier projections showed?

Core argument: The Federal Reserve's 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances showed that young people held more wealth than estimates derived from projecting 2019 survey data forward had indicated.

The two dollar figures I highlighted are at the median age of 30 for Millennials & Gen Z and Generation X age cohorts (unfortunately we don’t have data for Boomers at that age). The data I have always used in this chart comes from the Fed’s DFA which is updated quarterly. But that data is based on another Fed survey called the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a large survey done every 3 years. The DFA data just projects the SCF data forward based on some assumptions. It turns out that when the 2022 survey data was released, young people had a lot more wealth than we thought based on just projecting the 2019 data forward.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Federal Reserve's 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances showed that young people held more wealth than estimates derived from projecting 2019 survey data forward had indicated.
  2. The Fed's Distributional Financial Accounts, updated quarterly, projects Survey of Consumer Finances data forward using assumptions, with the underlying survey conducted every three years.
  3. Wealth comparisons between the Millennial and Gen Z cohort and Generation X are drawn at the median age of 30, with no comparable data available for Boomers at that age.

Related Articles:

  • With Housing, Millennials Have Much to Complain About — The Census Bureau's customary homeownership rate is measured by household, showing 52.7% of 25-to-34-year-old household heads own homes, but only 32.6% of all Americans in that age group do — down 20 percentage points from the late 1970s and nearly 10 points since the mid-2000s. Young-adult homeownership has seen a modest resurgence since 2016.
  • Young Adults in the U.S. Are Reaching Key Life Milestones Later Than in the Past — Pew Research Center analysis of Census Bureau data finds 21-year-olds in the US are less likely than their counterparts four decades earlier to have a full-time job, be financially independent, live on their own, be married, or have a child. Among 21-year-olds, 39% worked full time versus 64% four decades earlier, and a quarter were financially independent versus 42%.
  • Nearly Half of All Young Adults Live With Mom and Dad — and They Like It — About 45% of Americans ages 18 to 29, roughly 23m people, live with family, a share comparable to the 1940s. A Harris Poll survey of 4,106 US adults found nearly 90% say people shouldn't be judged for moving back home, viewing it as a pragmatic way to get ahead.

AI Summary. More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.

Eren Çam, Zoe Hungerford, Niklas Schoch, Francys Pinto Miranda and Carlos David Yáñez de León International Energy Agency
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Rising electrical consumption from data centers, in part driven by AI demand, will be almost 6% of US electricity demand by 2026 according to @IEA forecast.

How much US electricity will data centers consume?

Core argument: US data center electricity consumption is projected to rise from about 200 TWh in 2022, roughly 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh in 2026, or 6% of total demand.

There are currently more than 8,000 data centers globally, with about 33% of these located in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity consumption is expected to grow at a rapid pace in the coming years, increasing from around 200 TWh in 2022 (~4% of US electricity demand), to almost 260 TWh in 2026 to account for 6% of total electricity demand. Growth will be driven by increased adoption of 5G networks and cloud-based services [including AI], as well as competitive state tax incentives.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US data center electricity consumption is projected to rise from about 200 TWh in 2022, roughly 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh in 2026, or 6% of total demand.
  2. Of the more than 8,000 data centers globally, about 33% are located in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China.
  3. Growth in US data center electricity demand is attributed to increased adoption of 5G networks and cloud-based services, including AI, alongside competitive state tax incentives.

Related Articles:

  • Top 10 Charts of 2023 — Goldman Sachs projects that artificial intelligence could drive a capital investment cycle reaching almost 2.5% of US GDP by 2032, up from 0.5% of GDP.
  • Elon Musk’s Latest Mission: Rev Up the Electricity Industry — U.S. electricity demand has grown at an average of 1% a year over the past 20 years, but McKinsey projects it will double by 2050 and PG&E expects a 70% rise over the next 20 years. Deloitte estimates the largest U.S. electric companies will together spend as much as $1.8tn by 2030.
  • Resurgent US Electricity Demand Sparks Power Grid Warnings — US electricity demand is growing after years of stagnation, driven by artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and announced industrial projects, prompting warnings about power grid stability. Nationwide forecasts for five-year electricity demand growth rose from 2.6% to 4.7%, based on utility filings to federal regulators, with retail sales projected at a record.

AI Summary. Protection against serious Covid illness from the original vaccines and Omicron boosters declined as the virus mutated, falling to levels not much different from that of unvaccinated people with prior infection. With 99% of people having been vaccinated, infected, or both, the XBB booster remains highly effective against serious disease and reduces long Covid risk.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:

Michael Cembalest @jpmorgan notes that ongoing hospitalizations are much lower than in prior Covid waves as both “vaccine-induced and acquired immunity from prior infection are holding up well.”

Does vaccine protection against serious Covid illness decline as the virus mutates?

Core argument: By the end of 2023, protection against serious illness from the original Covid vaccines and Omicron boosters had declined to a level not much different from that of unvaccinated people with prior infection.

Original Covid vaccines and Omicron boosters were highly effective in preventing serious illness in 2021 and 2022, but protection waned over time as the virus mutated. At the end of 2023, the protection against serious illness from the original vaccine and Omicron boosters had declined and was not much different from protection present in unvaccinated, previously infected people. But this framing may overstate the risks to public health. At this point, 99% of people have had at least one vaccine dose, have been infected, or have had both an infection and a vaccine; and so far, both vaccine-induced and acquired immunity from prior infection are holding up well. While the latest XBB booster is not protective against infection it is still highly effective at preventing serious disease, and more protective than being unboosted and Covid vaccines/boosters also reduce risks of long Covid, which you do not want to get.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By the end of 2023, protection against serious illness from the original Covid vaccines and Omicron boosters had declined to a level not much different from that of unvaccinated people with prior infection.
  2. About 99% of people have had at least one vaccine dose, a prior infection, or both, and both vaccine-induced and infection-acquired immunity are holding up well.
  3. The XBB booster does not protect against infection but remains highly effective at preventing serious disease and more protective than being unboosted, and Covid vaccines and boosters also reduce the risk of long Covid.

Related Articles:

  • Why Is the Labor Market so Tight? — US foreign-born employment has returned to its pre-pandemic trend while native-born employment remains about 6m jobs below trend, leaving roughly 5m native-born workers missing even after accounting for about 1m Covid deaths. The author argues these missing workers explain the tight labor market and that wage inflation is likely to remain elevated.
  • NAEP Long-Term Trend Assessment Results: Reading and Mathematics — U.S. national assessment scores for 13-year-olds declined 4 points in reading and 9 points in mathematics from the prior assessment, and 7 and 14 points respectively compared with a decade earlier. Mathematics declines were larger for lower-performing students (12–14 points) than for middle- and higher-performing students (6–8 points).
  • ACT Scores Fell for Class of 2023, Sixth Consecutive Decline — The average ACT college admissions test score fell to 19.5 out of 36, a 30-year low and a sixth consecutive annual decline, with scores down across English, math, reading and science. The testing organization says the results indicate fewer high-school seniors are ready for college.

AI Summary. Chinese authorities are tightening limits on capital outflows by restricting retail access to funds that invest in offshore securities, a channel that bypasses strict capital controls. About a third of such funds have announced suspensions or caps on sales to retail investors, citing stable operations and investor protection.

Cheng Leng, Sun Yu and Thomas Hale Financial Times
Date Posted:

China is tightening limits on capital outflows by further constraining domestic investors’ ability to buy foreign equities “as the country battles a brutal market rout.”

Is China restricting retail investors' access to offshore investment funds?

Core argument: About a third of Chinese funds investing in foreign securities under a scheme that bypasses strict capital controls have announced in stock exchange notices that they suspended or capped sales to retail investors.

Chinese authorities are tightening limits on capital outflows by restricting access to funds that invest in offshore securities as the country battles a brutal market rout. About a third of Chinese funds that invest in foreign securities under a scheme that bypasses strict capital controls have announced in stock exchange notices they have suspended or capped sales to retail investors “to maintain stable operations and protect investors’ interests.” The Beijing-based manager of one fund that focuses on US stocks said they had received informal instructions from the Shanghai Stock Exchange to reduce sales of such products targeting overseas markets after demand went “through the roof.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About a third of Chinese funds investing in foreign securities under a scheme that bypasses strict capital controls have announced in stock exchange notices that they suspended or capped sales to retail investors.
  2. Chinese authorities are restricting access to funds that invest in offshore securities, tightening limits on capital outflows as the country battles a market rout.
  3. The Beijing-based manager of a fund focused on US stocks said it received informal instructions from the Shanghai Stock Exchange to reduce sales of such products targeting overseas markets after demand went "through the roof.".

Related Articles:

  • Foreign Investors Unwind $33bn Bet On China Growth Rebound — Net foreign investment in China-listed shares has fallen 87% from its peak of Rmb235bn ($33bn) to Rmb30.7bn, according to Financial Times calculations using Hong Kong Stock Connect data. The exit has been absorbed by corporate share buybacks and purchases from domestic funds and state-run financial institutions under government pressure to support valuations.
  • The Threat From China’s Capital Flight — Oddities in China's official balance of payments statistics suggest its actual current account surplus may be nearly 3x the reported figure, which would make it about as large relative to world output as it has ever been. The likeliest explanation for simultaneous downward pressure on the yuan is capital flight of roughly $500bn a year.
  • The Rise & Fall of Foreign Direct Investment in China — Net foreign direct investment into China has been negative for four consecutive quarters, as foreign investors shifted from reinvesting earnings from their Chinese operations to repatriating them. Whether this reflects cash management or signals a future slowdown in foreign direct investment is unclear, but the repatriation of profits is negative for China's currency.

AI Summary. Rising numbers of Chinese nationals are being apprehended at the US-Mexico border, with US officers encountering around 1,000 in one month early in the year and nearly 5,000 by November. Most Chinese emigrants leave through legal means, going primarily to Singapore, Japan, and Thailand.

Dan Wang The Secure Transport Of Light
Date Posted:

.@danwwang notes that for China 2023 was “a year of disappearing ministers, disappearing generals, disappearing entrepreneurs, disappearing economic data, and disappearing business for the firms that have counted on blistering economic growth.”

.@danwwang notes that for China 2023 was “a year of disappearing ministers, disappearing generals, disappearing...

Are more Chinese nationals leaving China for other countries?

Core argument: US officers encountered roughly 1,000 Chinese nationals at the southwest border in January, with numbers rising to nearly 5,000 by November.

Many Chinese are now talking about rùn. Chinese youths have in recent years appropriated this word in its English meaning to express a desire to flee. Over the three years of zero-Covid, after the state enforced protracted lockdowns, rùn evolved to mean emigrating from China altogether. One of the most incredible trends I’ve been watching this year is that rising numbers of Chinese nationals are being apprehended at the US-Mexico border. In January, US officers encountered around 1,000 Chinese at the southwest border; the numbers kept rising, and by November they encountered nearly 5,000. The Chinese who rùn to the American border are still a tiny set of the people who leave. Most emigrés are departing through legal means. People who can find a way to go to Europe or an Anglophone country would do so, but most are going, as best as I can tell, to three Asian countries. Those who have ambition and entrepreneurial energy are going to Singapore. Those who have money and means are going to Japan. And those who have none of these things — the slackers, the free spirits, kids who want to chill — are hanging out in Thailand.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US officers encountered roughly 1,000 Chinese nationals at the southwest border in January, with numbers rising to nearly 5,000 by November.
  2. Chinese youths have appropriated the word rùn in its English meaning to express a desire to flee, and over three years of zero-Covid lockdowns it came to mean emigrating from China altogether.
  3. Most Chinese emigrés depart through legal means, and by the author's estimate most go to three Asian countries: the entrepreneurial to Singapore, those with money and means to Japan, and free spirits to Thailand.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Southern Border Has Become A Global Crossroads — Migrants from countries other than Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras made up more than half of all people apprehended at the US southern border for the first time, with Venezuelans the largest share. Crossings included 43,000 Russians, 42,000 Indians, and 24,000 Chinese, up from 4,100, 2,600, and 450 two years earlier.
  • China’s Age Of Malaise — More than 300,000 Chinese people emigrated in a single year, more than double the pace of a decade earlier, with some traveling overland through a half-dozen countries to reach the US. US authorities at the southern border recorded 17,894 encounters with Chinese migrants over ten months, a thirteenfold increase from the prior year.
  • The Rise & Fall of Foreign Direct Investment in China — Net foreign direct investment into China has been negative for four consecutive quarters, as foreign investors shifted from reinvesting earnings from their Chinese operations to repatriating them. Whether this reflects cash management or signals a future slowdown in foreign direct investment is unclear, but the repatriation of profits is negative for China's currency.

Thursday, January 25, 2024

AI Summary. A recommended Federal Reserve path calls for interest-rate cuts at every other meeting, four cuts over the year, with more aggressive cuts if serious recession fears emerge (25% chance) and increases of up to 0.5 percentage points if core inflation is on track to exceed 3% (15% chance).

Jason Furman American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

In comments at @AEI @jasonfurman argues “Much to my surprise and delight, we have landed softly” and suggests a reduction in the FFR by ~ 140bps this year.

How should the Fed set interest rates this year?

Core argument: The author's modal case calls for Federal Reserve rate cuts at every other meeting beginning in March, totaling four cuts for the year.

My recommendation. Modal case for the economic outlook: Cut rates every other meeting starting in March—so four rate cuts for the year. Serious recession fears emerge (25% chance): Cut rates more aggressively. Core PCE inflation on track to rise above a 3% pace (15% chance): Raise rates by up to 50 basis points. Mean reduction in FFR:~140 basis points (more than December SEP but less than market expectation).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author's modal case calls for Federal Reserve rate cuts at every other meeting beginning in March, totaling four cuts for the year.
  2. The author assigns a 25% chance to serious recession fears emerging, which would warrant more aggressive rate cuts, and a 15% chance that core PCE inflation tracks above a 3% pace, which would warrant raising rates by up to 50 basis points.
  3. The author's mean expected reduction in the federal funds rate is roughly 140 basis points, more than the December Summary of Economic Projections but less than market expectations.

Related Articles:

  • Macro Outlook 2024: The Hard Part Is Over — Goldman Sachs projects limited recession risk, holding a 15% US recession probability, and expects tailwinds to global growth including strong real household income growth, a smaller drag from monetary and fiscal tightening, recovering manufacturing, and central banks more willing to cut rates if growth slows. It projects core inflation falling to 2–2½%.
  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • The Grind Ahead — Higher short-term and long-term interest rates are flowing through to credit and interest costs, which the authors expect to produce "the grind" — a gradual decline in growth and in the health of corporate and household balance sheets — as a dominant driver of economies and markets over the next 12–18 months.

AI Summary. Central bank influence on interest rates is strongest at the shortest maturities and decays at longer ones, so long-term rates are better understood through the Fisher decomposition of a nominal rate into expected inflation plus an expected real rate. Assuming the expected real rate converges on real economic growth yields an "intrinsic risk-free rate" estimated as inflation plus real growth.

Aswath Damodaran Musings on Markets
Date Posted:

.@AswathDamodaran estimates the Intrinsic Risk-Free Rate, which he defines as inflation plus real growth, in the post-pandemic period (2021-2023) is at 8.86%, up from 3.13% during the post-crisis period (2009-2020).

Do inflation and real growth explain long-term interest rates?

Core argument: Damodaran argues that even if the Federal Reserve strongly influences interest rates, that influence is strongest at the shortest maturities and decays as maturities lengthen.

Even if you are a believer that the Fed has a strong influence on rates, that effect is strongest on the shortest term rates and decays as you get to longer maturities. To understand what causes long term interest rates to move, I went back to my interest rate basics, and in particular, the Fisher equation breakdown of a nominal interest rate (like the US ten-year treasury rate) into expected inflation and an expected real interest rate: Nominal Interest Rate = Expected Inflation + Expected real interest rate. If you are willing to assume that the expected real interest rate should converge on the growth rate in the real economy in the long term, you can estimate what I call an intrinsic risk free rate: Intrinsic Risk Free Rate = Expected Inflation + Expected real growth rate in economy. I take first shot at estimating this intrinsic risk free rate, by adding the actual inflation rate each year to the real GDP growth rate in that year, for the US.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Damodaran argues that even if the Federal Reserve strongly influences interest rates, that influence is strongest at the shortest maturities and decays as maturities lengthen.
  2. Using the Fisher equation, Damodaran decomposes nominal rates such as the US ten-year Treasury rate into expected inflation plus an expected real interest rate.
  3. Assuming the expected real rate converges on real economic growth in the long term, Damodaran estimates an intrinsic risk-free rate for the US by adding each year's actual inflation rate to that year's real GDP growth rate.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Picture: Back to the Future — The secular backdrop has shifted from disinflationary to more inflationary, with interest rates no longer near zero and real rates no longer negative. Household balance sheets are as healthy as they have been in 20 years, leaving room to borrow, while the public sector is as indebted as it has ever been.
  • In Search of Safe Havens: The Trust Deficit and Risk-free Investments! — Plotting US Treasury bond rates against a crude fundamental risk-free rate—actual inflation plus real GDP growth—undercuts the argument that central banks set interest rates. Central banks can nudge rates at the margin but cannot override the fundamentals of inflation and real growth.
  • What Have We Learned About the Neutral Rate? — Analysts estimate that if inflation is brought down without a recession, the Federal Reserve's policy rate will stabilize nearer 3–3.25% than the 2.5% longer-run median projection of Federal Reserve officials. Projected shifts in government debt and demographics imply a roughly 0.5 percentage point net increase in the neutral rate over the next decade.

AI Summary. Bank of America consumer auto loan data show the electric vehicle share of new auto loan originations levelling off, with the plateau concentrated among older generations. Citing affordability, limited model choice, and range anxiety as likely reasons for sluggish mass-market adoption, the bank has revised down its US electric vehicle volume and market-share forecasts through 2030.

David Tinsley and Taylor Bowley Bank of America
Date Posted:

Based on auto loan origination data showing slower EV sales, @BankofAmerica has revised its forecast of the EV penetration rate to just over 30% by 2030.

Is electric vehicle adoption levelling off among older buyers?

Core argument: Bank of America consumer auto loan origination data indicate the EV share of new auto loans levelling off, with the plateau concentrated among Gen X, Boomers, and Traditionalists rather than younger generations.

Bank of America consumer auto loan origination data appears to confirm the picture of a levelling off in the share of new loans for EVs. When we split the data by generations, we find that it is mainly the older generations (Gen X, Boomers, and Traditionalists) where the share of EVs in new auto originations appears to have stopped rising, for now at least. Softer EV demand has led BofA Global Research to revise down its volume forecasts for EVs and their overall share of the overall US market out to 2030. A lack of affordability, limited choice, and 'range anxiety' are likely key reasons for the relatively sluggish mass market EV adoption. But we remain optimistic: hybrid vehicles are bridging some of the gap to full EV transition, while the choice and affordability of EVs should improve from here.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank of America consumer auto loan origination data indicate the EV share of new auto loans levelling off, with the plateau concentrated among Gen X, Boomers, and Traditionalists rather than younger generations.
  2. BofA Global Research revised down its EV volume forecasts and projected EV share of the overall US market out to 2030 on softer EV demand.
  3. BofA cites a lack of affordability, limited choice, and range anxiety as likely reasons for sluggish mass market EV adoption, while expecting hybrids to bridge part of the gap and EV choice and affordability to improve.

Related Articles:

  • Toyota Nears Mass Production of Solid-State Batteries — Toyota says it is close to producing next-generation solid-state batteries at the same rate as existing electric-vehicle batteries, which would allow mass production by 2027 or 2028. The carmaker expects solid-state-powered cars to travel 1,200km on a charge, more than twice its current electric vehicles, and charge in 10 minutes or less.
  • EU To Launch Anti-Subsidy Probe into Chinese Electric Vehicles — The European Union is opening an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicles it says are distorting the EU market, one of its largest trade cases. Manufacturers found in breach of trade rules could face punitive tariffs, as the EU seeks to avoid a repeat of the insolvencies in its solar panel industry caused by cheap Chinese imports.
  • G.M. and Other Automakers Will Build 30,000 Electric Vehicle Chargers — Seven automakers—BMW, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mercedes-Benz and Stellantis—will invest at least $1bn in a joint venture to build 30,000 fast electric-vehicle chargers in the US and Canada, nearly doubling the roughly 32,000 fast chargers in the US. The chargers will accommodate both Tesla's connector standard and the one used by most other carmakers.

AI Summary. Using county-level data on opioid deaths, shipments, friendship links and distance, the authors estimate large spillovers in opioid use and deaths across areas, with a shock raising deaths by 1 in one county causing 0.38 to 0.76 additional deaths elsewhere. They estimate such spillovers account for 84–92% of opioid deaths and are the main reason the epidemic has persisted.

David Cutler and Travis Donahoe National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The spread of information about drugs from person to person, and the ease and safety of acquiring drugs account for 84-92% of the rise in opioid deaths between 1990-2018, and drive the persistence of the epidemic. @Cutler_econ @travis_donahoe

How much do spillovers across areas explain opioid deaths?

Core argument: The authors estimate that cross-county spillovers explain 84–92% of opioid deaths from 1990 to 2018 and are the main reason deaths kept rising for so long.

We focus the bulk of our explanation on a theory: that demand increases endogenously due to spillovers in demand for opioids across people. [Here] spillovers are dynamics such as the spread of information about the substances, and ease and safety in ability to acquire the substances. We test for spillovers using county-level data on opioid deaths from 1991–2018 and opioid shipments from 2006–2009, combined with data on friendships and distance between counties. Estimating a model with addiction and spatial spillovers, we find large spillovers in opioid use and deaths across areas. A shock that increases opioid death rates by 1 in an index county causes 0.38 to 0.76 more deaths in other counties because of spillovers. Because opioids are addictive, this leads to even more deaths and spillovers in future years. In some specifications, these effects are large enough to generate a continuously increasing epidemic without any ongoing changes in demand or supply. We estimate spillovers explain 84 to 92% of opioid deaths from 1990 to 2018 and are the main reason deaths have increased for so long. In our preferred models, spillovers explain most opioid deaths since 1990 and are the main reason the epidemic has not burned out.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that cross-county spillovers explain 84–92% of opioid deaths from 1990 to 2018 and are the main reason deaths kept rising for so long.
  2. A shock raising opioid death rates by 1 in an index county causes 0.38 to 0.76 additional deaths in other counties through spillovers, with addiction compounding deaths and spillovers in later years.
  3. Testing with county-level opioid deaths from 1991–2018, opioid shipments from 2006–2009, and data on friendships and distance between counties, the authors find some specifications generate a continuously increasing epidemic without ongoing changes in demand or supply.

Related Articles:

  • The Rise in American Pain: The Importance of the Great Recession — The authors find that the rise in reported pain among Americans was almost entirely concentrated in the 2007–2010 recession period rather than following a smooth upward trend, with the disproportionate increase among the less educated also occurring primarily then. The authors state they find this jump difficult to explain.
  • Importing the Opioid Crisis? International Trade and Fentanyl Overdoses — A study using U.S. mortality and import data finds a positive state-level association between imports per resident and drug overdose death rates, driven by fentanyl and accounting for an estimated 15,000–20,000 deaths per year. The authors estimate that 10% higher imports per resident is associated with an 8.1% higher fentanyl death rate.
  • Democracy and the Opioid Epidemic — Using US commuting zone data and the concentration of early prescription opioid marketing in cancer pain markets, the authors estimate that exposure to the opioid epidemic substantially increased the Republican vote share in congressional and presidential elections, with a one standard deviation rise in initial cancer mortality corresponding to 13.8 percentage points.

AI Summary. Pew survey data indicate about 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, identifying as atheist, agnostic, or "nothing in particular." Most of these adults believe in God or a higher power, rarely attend religious services, say religion does some harm while many also see some good, and reject the idea that science can explain everything.

Gregory Smith, Patricia Tevington, Justin Nortey, Michael Rotolo, Asta Kallo and Becka Alper Pew Research Center
Date Posted:

28% of American adults are religiously unaffiliated, describing themselves as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular” up from 16% in 2007. @pewresearch

Do religiously unaffiliated Americans still believe in a higher power?

Core argument: About 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, describing themselves as atheists, agnostics, or "nothing in particular," according to Pew survey data.

About 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, describing themselves as atheists, agnostics, or “nothing in particular” when asked about their religion. Pew's survey data shows: Most “nones” believe in God or another higher power. But very few go to religious services regularly. Most say religion does some harm, but many also think it does some good. They are not uniformly anti-religious. Most “nones” reject the idea that science can explain everything. But they express more positive views of science than religiously affiliated Americans do.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, describing themselves as atheists, agnostics, or "nothing in particular," according to Pew survey data.
  2. Most religious "nones" believe in God or another higher power, yet very few attend religious services regularly, Pew's data shows.
  3. Most "nones" say religion does some harm while many also say it does some good, and most reject the idea that science can explain everything even as they view science more positively than religiously affiliated Americans do.