Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, November 28, 2023

AI Summary. Between 1992 and 2008, global exports grew near 10% a year in nominal terms versus 6% GDP growth, lifting exports from under 20% to over 30% of national economies before flattening. Afterward, China's trade-to-GDP ratio fell from 71% to about 35% even as its share of global exports kept rising.

Arvind Subramanian, Martin Kessler, and Emanuele Properzi Peterson Institute for International Economics
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The decline in trade as a percent of global GDP in the aftermath of the global financial crisis has largely been driven by China, as China’s imports from the world have lagged both China’s GDP growth and the growth in global trade. @arvindsubraman

Has trade growth stopped outpacing global economic growth?

Core argument: During 1992–2008, global exports grew close to 10% a year in nominal terms versus 6% GDP growth, lifting exports' share of national economies from under 20% to over 30% in little more than 15 years.

Hyperglobalization refers to the exceptional period between 1992 and 2008 during which global exports grew at close to 10% a year in nominal terms while GDP increased by only 6% a year. As a result, the share of exports in national economies grew from less than 20% to more than 30% in a little bit more than 15 years. The hyper in hyperglobalization does not come from the level of trade relative to GDP, which remains high, or from levels compared with the theoretical potential of trade, which are low. Rather it comes from the change in the level of trade, which was positive before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and stagnant or slightly negative thereafter. After the GFC, a puzzling wedge emerged. China’s trade-to-GDP ratio plummeted by more than 30pp, from 71% to a trough of about 35%. But its global export market share continued to rise at the same heady pace, reaching nearly 15% of total exports and 22% of manufactured exports by 2022.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. During 1992–2008, global exports grew close to 10% a year in nominal terms versus 6% GDP growth, lifting exports' share of national economies from under 20% to over 30% in little more than 15 years.
  2. The "hyper" in hyperglobalization comes from the change in trade levels, positive before the Global Financial Crisis and stagnant or slightly negative afterward, rather than from trade's level relative to GDP or its theoretical potential.
  3. China's trade-to-GDP ratio fell more than 30pp after the Global Financial Crisis, from 71% to a trough near 35%, while its global export share kept rising to nearly 15% of total exports and 22% of manufactured exports by 2022.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Current Account Surplus Is Likely Much Bigger Than Reported — China's officially reported current account surplus understates the true figure, with both the balance-of-payments goods surplus falling well short of customs data and investment income remaining in deficit despite higher U.S. interest rates. Adjusting for these discrepancies, the author estimates the surplus would be roughly $300bn larger, around $800bn or over 4% of China's GDP.
  • Managing Economic and Financial Entanglements With China — China's surplus in manufactured goods net of commodity imports has kept growing relative to trade partners' output and relative to China's own economic output, alongside weak consumer spending and falling homebuilding. U.S. federal spending financed largely by borrowing has supported private balance sheets and demand, muting attention to that surplus.
  • Pettis On China’s Export Strategy — China is shifting investment from its weakened property sector toward manufacturing, which already accounts for 27% of Chinese GDP versus 14% elsewhere and is constrained by weak demand rather than scarce capital. Since China holds about 18% of global GDP but 30% of global manufacturing, added output must be absorbed abroad absent higher consumption.

AI Summary. Less than 1% of the planet's water is usable; water demand has risen about 40% over 40 years and is estimated to increase another 25% by 2050, while supply has more than halved since 1970. Some 57% of global freshwater aquifers are beyond their tipping point, and one-third of piped fresh water is lost to leakage.

Vanessa Cook Bank of America
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Globally, demand for water is up 40% over the past forty years and will increase another 25% by 2050. Since 1970 water supply has halved. @BankofAmerica

Is global usable water supply shrinking as demand rises?

Core argument: Global water demand has risen roughly 40% over the past 40 years and is estimated to increase another 25% by 2050, while supply has more than halved since 1970.

Some 75% of our planet is covered with water, but less than 1% is usable, and even this is depleting quickly. Why? Water demand is up approximately 40% over the past 40 years and is estimated to increase another 25% by 2050, yet supply has more than halved since 1970. Water supply is declining in both quality and quantity. Some 80% of global sewage is dumped into the sea without adequate treatment and microplastics have been found in 83% of tap water. Well over half (57%) of global freshwater aquifers are beyond the tipping point, and even poor infrastructure limits supply as one-third of all fresh water running through pipes globally is lost to leakage. For every +1°C increase in global temperatures, there is a 20% drop in renewable water sources. To put this in context, the average global temperature has increased by at least 1.1°C since 1880, and July 2023 was the hottest month on record.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global water demand has risen roughly 40% over the past 40 years and is estimated to increase another 25% by 2050, while supply has more than halved since 1970.
  2. Less than 1% of the water covering 75% of the planet is usable, with 57% of global freshwater aquifers beyond the tipping point and one-third of piped fresh water lost to leakage.
  3. Each 1°C increase in global temperatures corresponds to a 20% drop in renewable water sources, and average global temperature has risen at least 1.1°C since 1880.

Related Articles:

  • Texas Farmers Are Worried One of the State’s Most Precious Water Resources is Running Dry. You Should Be, Too — A report from a Texas water conservation district shows water levels in the Ogallala Aquifer, spanning eight U.S. High Plains states, have dropped consistently over the past five years. The aquifer supplies water for about 30% of U.S. irrigation, farms producing a quarter of national agricultural output, and drinking water for 82% of residents within its boundaries.
  • Arizona Is Running Out of Cheap Water. Investors Saw It Coming — Phoenix-area suburbs are paying sharply higher prices for water rights from a basin west of the city, with one suburb approving $80m for 6,000 acre-feet — more than double the per-acre-foot price another suburb paid earlier. Arizona's groundwater replenishment assessments rose from $154 to $768 per acre-foot.
  • America Is Using Up Its Groundwater Like There’s No Tomorrow — An analysis of 84,544 groundwater monitoring wells across the United States found that nearly half declined significantly over the past 40 years as more water was pumped out than nature replenished. Four of every 10 sites hit all-time lows in the past decade.

AI Summary. Lenders have incentives to offer more favorable terms to firms close to default in order to recover past investment, and U.S. loan-level data indicate that such "evergreening" lets less productive, more indebted firms borrow at relatively better terms. A dynamic model of the U.S. economy estimates that evergreening lowers borrowing rates, raises debt levels, and depresses overall productivity.

Miguel Faria-e-Castro, Pascal Paul, and Juan Sánchez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
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Banks lend to firms to help them recover sunk costs. Between 2014-19, bank lending to zombie firms reduced economy-wide productivity by 0.25%. @mfariacastro @vediense @pascalpaul

Do banks lending to distressed firms depress overall productivity?

Core argument: The authors find that evergreening lets firms with worse fundamentals—less productive and more indebted—borrow at relatively better terms, as lenders offer favorable terms to keep firms close to default alive and recover past investment.

Our study builds on an intuitive idea: to recover its past investment, a lender has incentives to offer more favorable lending terms to a firm close to default to keep the firm alive. In contrast to standard intuition, we find that evergreening allows a firm with worse fundamentals—less productive and with more debt—to borrow at relatively better terms. Based on detailed U.S. loan-level data for the years 2014-19, we provide empirical support for our theory at a time when the banks were relatively well capitalized and the economy was growing steadily. Using a dynamic model of the U.S. economy, we find that evergreening has material effects on the performance of the overall economy, resulting in lower borrowing rates, higher levels of debt, and depressed overall productivity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors find that evergreening lets firms with worse fundamentals—less productive and more indebted—borrow at relatively better terms, as lenders offer favorable terms to keep firms close to default alive and recover past investment.
  2. Using U.S. loan-level data for 2014–19, a period of relatively well-capitalized banks and steady growth, the authors provide empirical support for their theory of lending to distressed firms.
  3. In a dynamic model of the U.S. economy, the authors find evergreening materially affects aggregate performance, producing lower borrowing rates, higher debt levels, and depressed overall productivity.

Related Articles:

  • The Grind Ahead — Higher short-term and long-term interest rates are flowing through to credit and interest costs, which the authors expect to produce "the grind" — a gradual decline in growth and in the health of corporate and household balance sheets — as a dominant driver of economies and markets over the next 12–18 months.
  • 40% of Companies in Russell 2000 Have Negative Earnings — 40% of companies in the Russell 2000 index of small-cap US firms have negative earnings, a share that typically rises during recessions. If the economy enters a recession, many middle-market companies would be vulnerable to the combination of high interest rates and slowing growth.
  • Rates Are Up. We’re Just Starting to Feel the Heat — U.S. companies have $600bn in corporate debt maturing this year, a total Goldman Sachs data show rising to more than $1tn a year from 2025 through 2028. Those debt loads, combined with higher financing costs, may cut into corporate profits, investor returns, innovation spending, and hiring, with some analysts expecting credit-rating downgrades.

AI Summary. It now takes $119.27 to buy what $100 purchased before the pandemic, with prices rising about as much since early 2020 as in the preceding decade. Groceries and electricity are each up 25% since January 2020, used cars 35%, auto insurance 33%, and rents roughly 20%.

Reade Pickert and Jennah Haque Bloomberg
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While Americans are now seeing real wage gains vs. the start of 2020, the price level is up 19.3%, about as much as the cumulative rise in prices between 2010-20.

How much have household prices risen since before the pandemic?

Core argument: Buying the same goods and services a US family could afford with $100 before the pandemic now requires $119.27, with prices since early 2020 rising about as much as in the full preceding decade.

It now requires $119.27 to buy the same goods and services a family could afford with $100 before the pandemic. Since early 2020, prices have risen about as much as they had in the full 10 years preceding the health emergency. It’s hard to find an area of a household budget that’s been spared: Groceries are up 25% since January 2020. Same with electricity. Used-car prices have climbed 35%, auto insurance 33%, and rents roughly 20%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Buying the same goods and services a US family could afford with $100 before the pandemic now requires $119.27, with prices since early 2020 rising about as much as in the full preceding decade.
  2. Used-car prices have climbed 35% since January 2020 and auto insurance 33%, while groceries and electricity are each up 25% and rents roughly 20%.

Related Articles:

  • The US Consumer: Still Strong in 2024 — Real disposable income is forecast to grow 3% over the year, with labor income accounting for over half the increase, interest income adding over 1 percentage point, and a pullback in Medicaid coverage subtracting almost half a point. That pace is below the prior year's 4% but above the roughly 2.5% average in the two decades before the pandemic.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Fiscal Arithmetic and the Global Inflation Outlook — Across advanced economies, core inflation is significantly positively associated with growth in government debt since the start of the pandemic, and the authors expect this decade's fiscal expansions to shift price levels permanently higher. They argue this differs from permanently higher inflation, projecting inflation to diminish as temporary deficits normalize, with medium-term inflation expectations still anchored near central bank targets.

AI Summary. India's rupee has lost less than 1% against the dollar this year, compared with more than 3% for the Chinese yuan, about 9% for the South African rand, and 11% for the Japanese yen. The Reserve Bank of India built foreign-exchange reserves above $600bn, and the economy is on track to grow more than 6%.

Matthew Thomas Wall Street Journal
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The rupee has lost less than 1% of its value against the dollar as the Indian central bank’s efforts are supported by 6% growth and foreign investment inflows.

Is currency stability the clearest sign of India's strong economy?

Core argument: The Indian rupee has lost less than 1% against the dollar this year, at roughly 83 per dollar, versus declines of more than 3% for the Chinese yuan, about 9% for the South African rand, and 11% for the Japanese yen.

The rupee has lost less than 1% of its value against the dollar this year, compared with a decline of more than 3% for the Chinese yuan, a roughly 9% fall in the South African rand, and an 11% slide in the Japanese yen. One dollar currently buys around 83 rupees. Solid management by the Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank, deserves much of the credit. The central bank spent decades building up the country’s foreign-exchange reserves to more than $600 billion by the first half of 2022, one the largest pools of central-bank reserves in the world. India’s central bank has had a lot of help. The economy is on track to grow more than 6% this year, bringing its gross domestic product close to $4 trillion—within reach of Germany’s, the world’s fourth-largest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Indian rupee has lost less than 1% against the dollar this year, at roughly 83 per dollar, versus declines of more than 3% for the Chinese yuan, about 9% for the South African rand, and 11% for the Japanese yen.
  2. The Reserve Bank of India deserves much of the credit for the rupee's stability, having spent decades building foreign-exchange reserves to more than $600 billion by the first half of 2022, one of the world's largest central-bank reserve pools.
  3. India's economy is on track to grow more than 6% this year, bringing gross domestic product close to $4 trillion, within reach of Germany's, the world's fourth-largest.

Related Articles:

  • Indian Stock Market Surges as Foreign Funds Buy Into National Growth Story — Indian equities rose $440bn to more than $3.5tn in value, making India the world's fifth-largest stock market after the US, China, Japan, and Hong Kong, ahead of France and the UK. Foreign portfolio investors added a net $9.4bn to Indian shares in the quarter, with analysts attributing the bulk of this year's inflows to passive index buying.
  • India Equity: An Unsung Long-Term Performance Story — Cumulative total returns for Indian equities have been comparable to or better than US equities over roughly three decades, while Chinese equities have lagged both, according to index data for the MSCI India, S&P 500, and MSCI China indexes.
  • India At The Centre — India has averaged real GDP growth above 6% a year for three decades, and unlike China's growth, it has translated into equity returns, with the Sensex matching or beating the S&P 500 over 30-, 20-, 10-, and five-year spans. Analysis attributes the growth to rising total factor productivity, with contributions from services exports and improved basic infrastructure.

Wednesday, November 29, 2023

AI Summary. The authors estimate that an absolute full-income poverty measure, which counts a fuller set of income sources and adjusts thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% to 1.6%, versus an official decline to 10.5%. They also find relative poverty reductions modest and government dependence more than doubled among working-age adults.

Richard Burkhauser, Kevin Corinth, James Elwell, and Jeff Larrimore Journal of Political Economy
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The US won the War on Poverty on LBJ’s terms, cutting the absolute full-income poverty rate from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019. During these years the share of working-age adults who earned < half of their income from market sources more than doubled.

Has absolute poverty nearly disappeared while government dependence has risen?

Core argument: The authors' absolute full-income poverty measure, which uses a fuller income measure and updates thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019, versus an official poverty rate decline from 19.5% to 10.5%.

We evaluate progress in the War on Poverty as President Lyndon B. Johnson defined it, which established a 20% baseline poverty rate and adopted an absolute standard. While the official poverty rate fell from 19.5% in 1963 to 10.5% in 2019, our absolute full-income poverty measure—which uses a fuller income measure and updates thresholds only for inflation—fell from 19.5% to 1.6%. However, we also show that relative poverty reductions have been modest. Additionally, government dependence increased over this time, with the share of working-age adults receiving under half their income from market sources more than doubling.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors' absolute full-income poverty measure, which uses a fuller income measure and updates thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019, versus an official poverty rate decline from 19.5% to 10.5%.
  2. Reductions in relative poverty were modest, in contrast to the decline measured against the absolute standard President Lyndon B. Johnson adopted alongside a 20% baseline poverty rate.
  3. Government dependence increased, with the share of working-age adults receiving under half their income from market sources more than doubling.

Related Articles:

  • Work Requirements and the Lost Lessons of 1996 — New York City's cash welfare rolls fell from 1.1m to about 360,000 even as its population grew, after shifting from signing people up for benefits to helping them into work; labor-force participation among never-married single mothers rose from roughly 50% to 65-70%. Polling shows about two-thirds of Americans back work requirements.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth

AI Summary. Inflation-adjusted wages rose over the past four years, including when measured from just before the pandemic, at roughly the same pace as in the preceding years: about 3% cumulative growth adjusted by the consumer price index versus about 4% in 2015-2019, and about 5% growth adjusted by personal consumption prices.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
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“Are you better off than you were four years ago?” @jmhorp finds that PCE-adjusted average wages for nonsupervisory workers are up 5% since Jan. 2020. By Nov. 2024, he expects average real wages to be up 4% vs. the start the Biden administration.

Have inflation-adjusted wages grown as fast as before the pandemic?

Core argument: CPI-adjusted wages rose about 3% over the past four years, compared with roughly 4% over 2015–2019, while PCE-adjusted wages grew about 5% cumulatively over four years, on track with the pre-pandemic pace.

The data are quite clear: over the past 4 years, inflation-adjusted wages are up! This is also true if you start roughly right before the pandemic (December 2019 or January 2020 or thereabouts). And not only are inflation-adjusted wages up, they are up roughly the same amount as they were in the years before the pandemic. CPI-adjusted wages are a touch below: about 3% growth over 4 years, versus roughly 4% from 2015-2019. But PCE-adjusted wages are right on track, at around 5% cumulative 4-year growth. It’s true right now that if we start the data in January 2021, at the beginning of the Biden Presidency, CPI-adjusted wages are down slightly: about 1%. But PCE-adjusted wages are up slightly: also about 1%. But unless there is a major reversal of the trajectory of either wage or price growth, by next year these will both be positive (even if only slightly).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CPI-adjusted wages rose about 3% over the past four years, compared with roughly 4% over 2015–2019, while PCE-adjusted wages grew about 5% cumulatively over four years, on track with the pre-pandemic pace.
  2. Measured from January 2021, CPI-adjusted wages are down about 1% while PCE-adjusted wages are up about 1%.
  3. Absent a major reversal in wage or price growth, both CPI- and PCE-adjusted wage measures starting from January 2021 will turn positive by next year, if only slightly.

Related Articles:

  • Have Workers Gotten A Raise? — Measures of typical and aggregate pay adjusted by personal consumption inflation have grown since 2019 and kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends, while results are more mixed when deflated by the consumer price index, with average hourly earnings and total compensation below trend.
  • Are Real Wages Rising? — Cumulative growth in hourly compensation has outpaced inflation since the end of 2019, though it remains slightly below the strong trend of the latter half of the 2010s. The real wage distribution has compressed, with lower-wage workers gaining proportionally more, an effect tempered because low-income households faced greater inflation.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.

AI Summary. The Employment Cost Index, which adjusts for shifts in the mix of jobs and industries, shows inflation-adjusted wages have fallen 3.7% since the end of 2020, erasing the gains of the late 2010s. Real wages stand at 2015 levels, so American paychecks buy no more than they did eight years earlier.

Stephen Miran City Journal
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.@SteveMiran when examining the change in real wages, argues that taking into account the changing composition of the labor force is absolutely essential; when he does so, he finds that inflation-adjusted wages and salaries are down 3.7% since 2020.

Have real wages stagnated despite headline economic growth?

Core argument: The BLS National Compensation Survey's Employment Cost Index, which accounts for changes in the composition of the workforce across job types and industries, shows inflation-adjusted wages shrinking by 3.7% since the end of 2020.

To get a clearer picture of the economy, therefore, we need to adjust for the changing composition of the workforce and consider changes to wages in each type of job and industry. A BLS statistic, the National Compensation Survey’s Employment Cost Index, does just this. According to ECI, inflation-adjusted wages have shrunk by 3.7% since the end of 2020. While real wages rose in response to falling energy prices late last year, they have been roughly flat since. Worse, the drop in real wages erased all gains made in the late 2010s. Real wages today stand at 2015 levels, meaning Americans’ paychecks don’t go any further now than they did eight years ago.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The BLS National Compensation Survey's Employment Cost Index, which accounts for changes in the composition of the workforce across job types and industries, shows inflation-adjusted wages shrinking by 3.7% since the end of 2020.
  2. Real wages stand at 2015 levels, erasing the gains made in the late 2010s, leaving Americans' paychecks going no further than they did eight years ago.
  3. Real wages rose as energy prices fell but have since remained roughly flat.

Related Articles:

  • Have Workers Gotten A Raise? — Measures of typical and aggregate pay adjusted by personal consumption inflation have grown since 2019 and kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends, while results are more mixed when deflated by the consumer price index, with average hourly earnings and total compensation below trend.
  • Are Real Wages Rising? — Cumulative growth in hourly compensation has outpaced inflation since the end of 2019, though it remains slightly below the strong trend of the latter half of the 2010s. The real wage distribution has compressed, with lower-wage workers gaining proportionally more, an effect tempered because low-income households faced greater inflation.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.

AI Summary. The National Center for Health Statistics reported nearly 50,000 U.S. suicide deaths in a provisional tally, a rate of 14.3 per 100,000 people that is the highest since 1941, with the agency saying the final count would likely be higher. Suicide rates fell 18% among children aged 10-14 and 9% among people aged 15-24, returning those groups to pre-pandemic levels.

Julie Wernau Wall Street Journal
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Almost 50,000 people killed themselves in the United States in 2022. At 14.3 deaths per 100,000, that’s the highest rate since 1941. Suicide rates for young people declined to their pre-pandemic level.

Have U.S. suicide rates reached their highest level since 1941?

Core argument: Nearly 50,000 people in the U.S. died by suicide in 2022, according to a provisional tally from the National Center for Health Statistics, which said the final count would likely be higher.

Nearly 50,000 people in the U.S. lost their lives to suicide in 2022, according to a provisional tally from the National Center for Health Statistics. The agency said the final count would likely be higher. The suicide rate of 14.3 deaths per 100,000 people reached its highest level since 1941. Suicide rates for children 10-14 and people 15-24 declined by 18% and 9%, respectively, last year from 2021, bringing suicide rates in those groups back to prepandemic levels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly 50,000 people in the U.S. died by suicide in 2022, according to a provisional tally from the National Center for Health Statistics, which said the final count would likely be higher.
  2. The U.S. suicide rate of 14.3 deaths per 100,000 people in 2022 was the highest since 1941.
  3. Suicide rates fell 18% among children aged 10–14 and 9% among people aged 15–24 in 2022 from 2021, returning both groups to prepandemic levels.

Related Articles:

  • Suicide Rates Are up for Gen Z Across the Anglosphere, Especially for Girls — Rates of self-harm episodes among adolescents in the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have increased since 2010, especially for girls, reaching record-high levels in all five countries. The author links this to a five-year period in which adolescents shifted from basic phones to smartphones with continuous internet and social media access.
  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • How Disadvantage Became Deadly in America — The author calculates that the average age of death among the shortest-lived 10% of Americans is 36, versus 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden, after falling by about eight years over the past decade. Wealthy Americans live equally long regardless of local opioid use and gun violence, while poor Americans in those areas live far shorter lives.

AI Summary. European-made batteries and cars do not straightforwardly qualify for U.S. consumer electric-vehicle subsidies, and U.S. national security tariffs apply even to close security allies, while the European Union prefers responding to Chinese trade distortions only through measures clearly permitted by the World Trade Organization. These competing approaches have fractured transatlantic markets for clean energy goods and steel.

Brad Setser Council on Foreign Relations
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.@Brad_Setser argues the US and EU should harmonize trade and industrial policy specifically in terms of EV and steel to create domestic manufacturing capacity and offset Chinese mercantilism.

Can the US and EU harmonize trade approaches on EVs and steel?

Core argument: European batteries and cars do not qualify straightforwardly for U.S. consumer EV subsidies, though the "leased vehicle" exception leaves ample ground for transatlantic trade.

Europeans are frustrated that European batteries and cars don’t qualify for U.S. consumer EV subsidies in a straightforward way (though the “leased vehicle” exception provides ample ground for trade), as well as the persistence of national security tariffs that apply to close security allies. Americans are frustrated by the contortions created by the EU’s desire to respond to China's distortions by only using measures that fit within the narrow confines clearly allowed by the WTO (The U.S. also takes a more expansive view than the EU about what the WTO allows). These competing approaches to managing the Chinese threat have led to the fracturing of the transatlantic markets for not only clean energy goods, but also dirty goods like steel that need to become clean to lower global carbon emissions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. European batteries and cars do not qualify straightforwardly for U.S. consumer EV subsidies, though the "leased vehicle" exception leaves ample ground for transatlantic trade.
  2. Americans object to the EU's insistence on countering Chinese distortions only through measures clearly permitted by the WTO, while the U.S. takes a more expansive view of what WTO rules allow.
  3. Competing U.S. and EU approaches to managing the Chinese threat, alongside U.S. national security tariffs applied to close security allies, have fractured transatlantic markets for clean energy goods and for steel.

Related Articles:

  • Can China Reduce Its Internal Balances Without Renewed External Imbalances? — China's headline goods trade surplus is about 5% of its GDP, with the underlying surplus in manufactured goods close to 10% of GDP. The author argues that if China relies on interest rate cuts, exchange rate liberalization, and a weak yuan to offset its property downturn, its trade surplus could reach record levels relative to trading partners' output.
  • China’s Auto Export Wave Echoes Japan’s in the ’70s — The shift from petroleum-fueled internal combustion vehicles to electric vehicles moves resource leverage from Persian Gulf oil producers to critical minerals, with China holding more than half of global processing capacity for lithium, cobalt, and graphite and about a third for nickel. Chinese companies have spent $4.5bn acquiring stakes in nearly 20 lithium mines, mostly in Latin America and Africa.
  • Danish Weight Loss Drugs vs. Chinese Cars: Two Models of Export Booms — Denmark's weight-loss drug exports illustrate a positive-sum export boom in which new products create both supply and demand, while Chinese car exports reflect firms with persistent overcapacity fighting for market share. The US preempted Chinese electric vehicles through legislation that boosts demand while reserving a share for local producers; Europe remains more exposed.

AI Summary. The China-aligned bloc holds about half of the world's land mass and 46% of its population but generates 27% of world GDP and 38% of industrial output, against 67% and 55% for the US-aligned bloc. The author argues the fastest way to shift this balance would be a US decision to dismantle its alliances.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:

Martin Wolf notes that the US and its close allies remain relatively dominant with 67% of global GDP and absolutely dominant in finance and capital flows.

Does the US-aligned bloc still outweigh China's economically?

Core argument: The China bloc generates 27% of world GDP, nearly all of it in China itself, against 67% for the US bloc, despite holding half the world's non-Antarctic land mass and 46% of its people.

The China bloc accounts for half of the world’s (non-Antarctic) land mass, compared with 35% for the US bloc. It is also home to slightly more of the world’s people (46%, against 43%). But it still generates only 27% of the world’s GDP, nearly all of that in China itself, compared with 67% in the US bloc. Unsurprisingly, the China bloc is more important in industry than in GDP. Thus, its share of world industrial output was 38% in 2022, against 55% for the US bloc. Many countries wish to see the US and its allies, the dominant powers of the last two centuries, taken down more than just a peg or two. But they are more united and economically powerful than China’s group of malcontents. The event likely to change this balance quickly would be a US decision to tear its alliances to pieces.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The China bloc generates 27% of world GDP, nearly all of it in China itself, against 67% for the US bloc, despite holding half the world's non-Antarctic land mass and 46% of its people.
  2. The China bloc's share of world industrial output was 38% in 2022, compared with 55% for the US bloc, a larger share than its share of GDP.
  3. The US and its allies are more united and economically powerful than China's group of malcontents, and the event likely to change that balance quickly would be a US decision to tear its alliances to pieces.

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