Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, October 23, 2023

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the 2017 US corporate tax cut raised domestic investment at firms with the average tax change by about 20% relative to firms with no tax change, with long-run domestic and total capital up roughly 6% and 9%. They find dynamic revenue feedback under 2% of baseline corporate revenue.

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Firms that benefited from the corporate tax cuts in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act responded with increased investment relative to firms that were not impacted, according to @gchodorowreich @omzidar Eric Zwick and Matthew Smith.

How much did corporate tax cuts raise investment and revenue?

Core argument: The authors estimate that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act raised domestic investment by roughly 20% for firms experiencing the mean tax change, relative to firms with no tax change.

This paper combines administrative tax data and a model of global investment behavior to evaluate the investment and firm valuation effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. We have five main findings. First, the TCJA caused domestic investment of firms with the mean tax change to increase by roughly 20% relative to firms experiencing no tax change. Second, the TCJA created large incentives for some U.S. multinationals to increase foreign capital, which rose substantially following the law change. Third, domestic investment also increases in response to foreign incentives, indicating complementarity between domestic and foreign capital in production. Fourth, the general equilibrium long-run effects of the TCJA on the domestic and total capital of U.S. firms are around 6% and 9%, respectively. Finally, in our model, the dynamic labor and corporate tax revenue feedback in the first 10 years is less than 2% of baseline corporate revenue, as investment growth causes both higher labor tax revenues from wage growth and offsetting corporate revenue declines from more depreciation deductions. Consequently, the fall in total corporate tax revenue from the tax cut is close to the static effect.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act raised domestic investment by roughly 20% for firms experiencing the mean tax change, relative to firms with no tax change.
  2. The TCJA created incentives for some U.S. multinationals to expand foreign capital, which rose substantially after the law, and domestic investment also increased in response to foreign incentives, indicating complementarity between domestic and foreign capital.
  3. In the authors' model, long-run general equilibrium effects of the TCJA on domestic and total capital of U.S. firms are around 6% and 9%, while dynamic labor and corporate tax revenue feedback over the first 10 years is under 2% of baseline corporate revenue.

Related Articles:

  • Who Gains from Corporate Tax Cuts? — The authors estimate that corporate tax cuts boost overall investment and employment, with goods-producing firms such as manufacturers raising capital expenditure and wage bills without changing dividends, and a 1% cut in the marginal tax rate lifting their capital spending by as much as 8%. Service-sector firms instead direct most of the windfall to dividends.
  • End of an Era: The Coming Long-Run Slowdown in Corporate Profit Growth and Stock Returns — The authors estimate that declining interest and corporate tax rates accounted for over 40% of real corporate profit growth from 1989 to 2019, while falling risk-free rates explain the entire expansion in price-to-earnings multiples. Real earnings before interest and taxes grew slightly more slowly than in 1962–1989, at 2.2% versus 2.4% per year.
  • Is the Tax Cut Paying For Itself? By a Mile — My Wall Street Journal Op-Ed: Is the Tax Cut Paying For Itself? By a Mile.

AI Summary. A larger share of Treasury financing done through short-term bills rather than longer-dated coupon securities would likely ease upward pressure on long-term yields, though the effect may be modest. With the deficit estimated near $1.5t, shifting toward bills would let the Treasury hold coupon sizes steady or trim them, reducing near-term supply.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:

According to @FedGuy12 Treasury will likely raise the share of bill issuance to support the market. However, this will only have a short-term impact on the supply/demand mismatch driving yields.

Does more short-term bill issuance ease pressure on long-term yields?

Core argument: With the 2024 deficit estimated at roughly $1.5t, Treasury has guided toward raising coupon auction sizes over the next few quarters to meet its financing needs.

A potential surge in net bill issuance will likely ease upward pressure on longer dated yields, but the impact may not be significant. The 2024 deficit is estimated to be around $1.5t and Treasury has guided towards raising coupon sizes over the next few quarters to meet its financing needs. A willingness to raise the share of bill issuance means Treasury could at the minimum maintain coupon sizes, and instead issue more bills. Treasury could even be more aggressive and slightly reduce coupon issuance. In effect, this would lower the expected issuance of coupon securities for a period of time. Some prospective investors will look past this as a temporary measure, but at the end of the day there will be less immediate supply for the market to digest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. With the 2024 deficit estimated at roughly $1.5t, Treasury has guided toward raising coupon auction sizes over the next few quarters to meet its financing needs.
  2. A greater willingness to lean on bill issuance would let Treasury hold coupon sizes flat, or even trim them slightly, lowering expected coupon supply for a period of time.
  3. A surge in net bill issuance would likely ease upward pressure on longer dated yields by leaving less immediate supply for the market to digest, though the impact may not be significant.

Related Articles:

  • Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market — The authors argue that large, persistent US federal deficits and limited dealer balance-sheet flexibility will cause outstanding Treasury debt to grow rapidly relative to the market's capacity to intermediate trades, absent significant changes in market structure. They contend broad central clearing, all-to-all trading, real-time post-trade reporting, capital-regulation changes, and transparent official purchase programs could strengthen market capacity and resilience.
  • When Does Federal Debt Reach Unsustainable Levels? — The authors estimate that U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed roughly 200% of GDP even under favorable market conditions, and that under current policy the ratio reaches 175–200% within about 20 years. After that point, they argue, no tax increases or spending cuts could avert default or inflationary debt monetization.
  • The NY Fed Trading Desk’s Time to Shine? — Short-term interest rates are set at the discretion of the Federal Reserve's policy committee rather than by markets, and the Fed also tries to influence longer-term rates, sometimes by buying or selling bonds outright. The author argues central banks could conduct such trades directly instead of paying intermediaries, as the Bank of Japan does.

AI Summary. Bloomberg Economics estimates that the inflation-adjusted natural rate of interest on 10-year US government notes fell from 5% in 1980 to under 2%, and projects it will rise about a percentage point from a trough of 1.7% to 2.7% in the 2030s, implying nominal 10-year yields of 4.5%–5%.

Jamie Rush, Martin Ademmer, Maeva Cousin, Tom Orlik, and Rich Miller Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Bloomberg Economics estimates that higher government debt levels, higher rates of investment driven by decarbonization demands, and faster growth will likely lift the natural rate to 4%, which implies a nominal 10-year yield of ~ 6%.

Will the natural rate of interest rise over the coming decade?

Core argument: Bloomberg Economics estimates the inflation-adjusted natural rate of interest on 10-year US Treasury notes fell from 5% in 1980 to a little under 2% over the past decade.

Bloomberg’s team of economists estimates that, adjusted for inflation, the natural rate of interest for 10-year US government notes fell from 5% in 1980 to a little less than 2% over the past decade. How much higher will the natural rate go? Bloomberg Economics’ model shows a rise of about a percentage point, from a trough of 1.7% in the mid-2010s to 2.7% in the 2030s. In nominal terms, that means 10-year Treasury yields could settle somewhere between 4.5% and 5%. And the risks are skewed toward even higher borrowing costs than that baseline suggests. According to Bloomberg Economics estimates, the combined impact of persistently high levels of government borrowing, more spending to fight climate change and faster growth would lift the natural rate to 4%, translating to a nominal 10-year bond yield in the region of 6%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bloomberg Economics estimates the inflation-adjusted natural rate of interest on 10-year US Treasury notes fell from 5% in 1980 to a little under 2% over the past decade.
  2. Bloomberg Economics' model shows the natural rate rising about a percentage point, from a trough of 1.7% in the mid-2010s to 2.7% in the 2030s, implying nominal 10-year Treasury yields of 4.5% to 5%.
  3. Bloomberg Economics estimates that persistently high government borrowing, more spending to fight climate change, and faster growth combined would lift the natural rate to 4%, translating into a nominal 10-year bond yield in the region of 6%.

Related Articles:

  • What Have We Learned About the Neutral Rate? — Analysts estimate that if inflation is brought down without a recession, the Federal Reserve's policy rate will stabilize nearer 3–3.25% than the 2.5% longer-run median projection of Federal Reserve officials. Projected shifts in government debt and demographics imply a roughly 0.5 percentage point net increase in the neutral rate over the next decade.
  • Global Natural Rates in the Long Run: Postwar Macro Trends and the Market-Implied r* in 10 Advanced Economies — Estimates for 10 advanced economies show natural interest rates have declined over the long run, though not steadily: as recently as the 1990s they ranged from 100 to 600 basis points, while by the end of the sample 4 of 10 countries had a negative natural rate and most others fell between 0 and 50 basis points.
  • In Search of Safe Havens: The Trust Deficit and Risk-free Investments! — Plotting US Treasury bond rates against a crude fundamental risk-free rate—actual inflation plus real GDP growth—undercuts the argument that central banks set interest rates. Central banks can nudge rates at the margin but cannot override the fundamentals of inflation and real growth.

AI Summary. The responsiveness of US oil supply to prices has declined and is estimated to be much smaller for publicly traded producers than private ones, with a 10% price increase raising US liquids output by roughly 1%, or 200,000 barrels a day. That implies US supply would offset only about 20-25% of a geopolitical supply shock.

Daan Struyven Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

The United States is the world’s marginal oil producer and has driven all of the growth in global oil supply over the past decade. @GoldmanSachs

How much does US shale output still respond to higher oil prices?

Core argument: Analysts estimate that a 10% oil price increase raises US liquids supply by about 1%, or 200kb/d, with the elasticity having fallen over time and being much smaller for public producers than for private ones.

We find that the elasticity of US supply has fallen over time, and is much smaller for public producers than for privates. We estimate that a 10% oil price increase boosts US liquids supply by around 1% or 200kb/d. Consolidation is likely to further depress the supply elasticity as inelastic public producers gain market share, and efficiency gains push the US lower on the cost curve. We see two takeaways. First, the trends in the Permian and ongoing capital discipline support our forecasts that US liquids supply growth slows in 2024 to 0.6mb/d (vs.1.4mb/d in 2023), and that Brent reaches $100/bbl in June. Second, our estimates imply that the US supply response to higher prices—caused by any geopolitical supply shock—would offset only about 20-25% of the initial shock, which underscores OPEC’s key role in balancing the market. While core OPEC countries currently have nearly 4mb/d of spare capacity, physical or political barriers to deploying spare capacity are the key upside risk to oil prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts estimate that a 10% oil price increase raises US liquids supply by about 1%, or 200kb/d, with the elasticity having fallen over time and being much smaller for public producers than for private ones.
  2. Permian trends and ongoing capital discipline support forecasts that US liquids supply growth slows to 0.6mb/d in 2024 from 1.4mb/d in 2023, and that Brent reaches $100/bbl in June.
  3. The estimated US supply response to higher prices would offset only about 20-25% of an initial geopolitical supply shock, underscoring OPEC's role in balancing the market, with core OPEC countries holding nearly 4mb/d of spare capacity.

Related Articles:

  • The Changing Nexus Between Commodity Prices and the Dollar: Causes and Implications — The shale boom turned the United States into a net exporter of natural gas and of oil, altering how commodity prices relate to US trade. Where higher oil prices were historically associated with a deterioration in US terms of trade, they now correspond to an improvement.
  • Monday Chart — US energy exports of $420bn accounted for 13.5% of total US exports of $3,108bn. Energy's $143bn increase comprised more than 25% of the $541bn rise in total US exports.
  • Portfolio Nuclear — The US is in its fifth year of net energy independence, with domestic oil and gas production at all-time highs across four consecutive administrations. Wind and solar now supply 15% of the grid, allowing more coal and liquefied natural gas to be exported.

AI Summary. Travel speeds in the U.S. have largely stopped improving over the past half-century: scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has lengthened by about 30 minutes, and the fastest Washington–New York train trip takes roughly 20 minutes longer than earlier nonstop service. Academic research finds commuting makes people more unhappy than almost any other daily activity.

David Leonhardt New York Times
Date Posted:

Citing increasing travel times for air and rail travel, @DLeonhardt makes the case the American private and public sector is underinvesting.

Citing increasing travel times for air and rail travel, @DLeonhardt makes the case the American private and public sector is...

Has travel speed in the U.S. stopped improving?

Core argument: Scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has lengthened by about 30 minutes since 1959, one of several U.S. travel areas where progress has largely stopped over the past half-century.

The speed at which people can get from one place to another is one of the most basic measures of a society’s sophistication. It affects economic productivity and human happiness; academic research has found that commuting makes people more unhappy than almost any other daily activity. Yet in one area of U.S. travel after another, progress has largely stopped over the past half-century. The scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has become about 30 minutes longer [since 1959.] In 1969, Metroliner trains made two-and-a-half-hour nonstop trips between Washington and New York. Today, there are no nonstop trains on that route, and the fastest trip, on Acela trains, takes about 20 minutes longer than the Metroliner once did.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has lengthened by about 30 minutes since 1959, one of several U.S. travel areas where progress has largely stopped over the past half-century.
  2. Metroliner trains ran nonstop between Washington and New York in two-and-a-half hours in 1969, while today no nonstop trains serve that route and the fastest Acela trip takes about 20 minutes longer.
  3. Travel speed affects economic productivity and human happiness, and academic research has found that commuting makes people more unhappy than almost any other daily activity.

Related Articles:

  • Leonhardt On Investment — US chip and green-energy subsidies replicate what the country already does at far greater cost rather than making anything cheaper, faster, or better. The core problem with US public investment is waste rather than insufficient funding, as seen in $4bn-per-mile subways and a California high-speed rail project exceeding $100bn with no track laid.
  • US Capital is Depreciating Faster — US gross investment has run about 20-25% of GDP over time, but net investment has fallen from roughly 10% of GDP in the 1950s-1980s to about 5% recently. About three-quarters of gross investment now replaces capital that has worn out, rather than adding to the capital stock.
  • Capital Allocation — Capital spending minus depreciation as a share of sales peaked at 6.9% and bottomed at 0.5%, averaging 1.8% over the past decade. Depreciation is an imperfect proxy for maintenance capital spending because rising prices make replacement costs exceed historical-cost depreciation, and technological obsolescence means depreciation can overstate an asset's useful life.

AI Summary. US chip and green-energy subsidies replicate what the country already does at far greater cost rather than making anything cheaper, faster, or better. The core problem with US public investment is waste rather than insufficient funding, as seen in $4bn-per-mile subways and a California high-speed rail project exceeding $100bn with no track laid.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:

.@JohnHCochrane writes that @DLeonhardt is confusing public underinvestment for declining productivity, which is largely driven in his view by government regulation and rent-seeking unions.

.@JohnHCochrane writes that @DLeonhardt is confusing public underinvestment for declining productivity, which is largely...

Is the problem with US public investment waste rather than funding?

Core argument: California's high-speed rail has consumed 15 years and more than $100 billion without a mile of track laid, which Cochrane calls the poster child for what is wrong with US public investment.

US chips and green energy subsidies don't make anything cheaper, faster, or better. They just do what we already do in the US, at vastly greater cost, and in a different way. Even if electric cars did save carbon, they would not get you to the airport any faster. The problem with US public investment is not just lack of money. It is that the money we do spend goes down ratholes, so not spending is wise. Public teacher unions that deliver generations of children, mostly already disadvantaged, who cannot read or count. $4 billion per mile subways. Leonhardt mentions other countries' success with high-speed trains, without mentioning the poster child for all that is wrong with US public investment: the California railroad. 15 years and counting, $100+ billion dollars, not a mile of track laid yet. If it were not so perfectly obvious to voters that money will be wasted, they might support a lot more investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. California's high-speed rail has consumed 15 years and more than $100 billion without a mile of track laid, which Cochrane calls the poster child for what is wrong with US public investment.
  2. US chips and green energy subsidies do not make anything cheaper, faster, or better, in Cochrane's view, but replicate what the US already does at vastly greater cost.
  3. Cochrane argues the core problem with US public investment is not lack of money but that spending goes down ratholes, citing public teacher unions delivering children who cannot read or count and $4 billion-per-mile subways.

Related Articles:

  • Longer Commutes, Shorter Lives: The Costs of Not Investing in America — Travel speeds in the U.S. have largely stopped improving over the past half-century: scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has lengthened by about 30 minutes, and the fastest Washington–New York train trip takes roughly 20 minutes longer than earlier nonstop service. Academic research finds commuting makes people more unhappy than almost any other daily activity.
  • US Capital is Depreciating Faster — US gross investment has run about 20-25% of GDP over time, but net investment has fallen from roughly 10% of GDP in the 1950s-1980s to about 5% recently. About three-quarters of gross investment now replaces capital that has worn out, rather than adding to the capital stock.
  • Capital Allocation — Capital spending minus depreciation as a share of sales peaked at 6.9% and bottomed at 0.5%, averaging 1.8% over the past decade. Depreciation is an imperfect proxy for maintenance capital spending because rising prices make replacement costs exceed historical-cost depreciation, and technological obsolescence means depreciation can overstate an asset's useful life.

AI Summary. An estimated 900m people face hunger or severe food insecurity daily, and more than 1.4bn others lack vital micronutrients needed for health and life expectancy. The prevalence of moderate to severe food insecurity globally was estimated at 29.6%, up from 22.7% six years earlier, with increases in both Africa and Asia.

Vanessa Cook and Taylor Bowley Bank of America
Date Posted:

According to @BankofAmerica 900mm people, largely in Sub-Saharan Africa, face daily hunger in 2022, up from the pre-pandemic period.

Is global food insecurity rising?

Core argument: Global prevalence of moderate to severe food insecurity was estimated at 29.6% in 2022, up from 22.7% in 2016, with an estimated 900 million people facing hunger or severe food insecurity daily.

An estimated 900 million people around the globe face hunger or severe food insecurity daily. More than 1.4 billion additional people lack vital micronutrients, affecting their health and life expectancy. Globally, the prevalence of moderate to severe food insecurity was estimated at 29.6% in 2022, up from 22.7% in 2016. In Africa, the number of severely and moderately food insecure people rose almost 25% from 695 million in 2019 to 868 million in 2022. In Asia, the same group went from 982 million in 2019 to over 1.1 billion in 2022. The Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that the pandemic increased incidence of hunger and lack of access to adequate food by over 300 million people from 2019 to 2020 alone.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global prevalence of moderate to severe food insecurity was estimated at 29.6% in 2022, up from 22.7% in 2016, with an estimated 900 million people facing hunger or severe food insecurity daily.
  2. Africa's moderately and severely food insecure population rose almost 25%, from 695 million in 2019 to 868 million in 2022, while Asia's rose from 982 million to over 1.1 billion over the same period.
  3. The Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates the pandemic increased the incidence of hunger and lack of access to adequate food by over 300 million people from 2019 to 2020 alone.

Related Articles:

  • Feeding the Future: How Climate and Agriculture Intersect — Domestic demand for major US crops and livestock is projected to grow 2–10% over the next decade, with rising meat consumption—requiring over 4x the acreage of a vegetarian diet—adding pressure on feed crops. With global population projected to rise by about 2bn by 2050, agriculture must produce more food in 30–40 years than in the past 8,000.
  • China Ups Food Security Drive, Plans To Grow 90 Percent Of Its Grain By 2032, Warning For US And Thai Farmers — China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs plans to raise domestic self-sufficiency in grain — mainly rice, wheat, corn and soybeans — to 88.4% within a decade from 82%. The plan would cut grain imports to 122m metric tonnes from 146.9m.
  • Saudi Forces Accused of Killing Hundreds of Ethiopian Migrants — Human Rights Watch alleges in a 73-page report that Saudi border forces killed hundreds of Ethiopian migrants attempting to cross into the kingdom from Yemen, firing explosive weapons at them and in some cases asking migrants which limb they would prefer to be shot. Saudi Arabia hosts hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian workers.

AI Summary. A reprinted Chinese book about the last Ming dynasty emperor — who purged senior officials, mismanaged his realm and hanged himself as rebels closed in — has been pulled from shelves in China, with online searches for it censored. Publishers say removal of an already state-vetted reprint is uncommon.

Joe Leahy Financial Times
Date Posted:

A reprint of a history of “an emperor who ran his realm into the ground before committing suicide nearly 400 years ago” has disappeared from bookstores in China and is being censored on social media like Weibo.

A reprint of a history of “an emperor who ran his realm into the ground before committing suicide nearly 400 years ago” has...

Why would censors pull a state-approved book about a failed emperor?

Core argument: "Chongzhen: the Diligent Emperor of a Failed Dynasty," republished in China, has disappeared from bookshelves and online searches for it have been censored; it recounts how the last Ming emperor purged senior officials and mismanaged his realm.

A Chinese reprint of a book about an emperor who ran his realm into the ground before committing suicide nearly 400 years ago has abruptly disappeared from book shelves in China and searches for it have been censored online. The Book Chongzhen: the Diligent Emperor of a Failed Dynasty, republished last month, recounts how the last emperor of the 1368-1644 Ming dynasty purged senior officials and mismanaged his kingdom before finally hanging himself on a tree outside the Forbidden City as rebels closed in on Beijing. The blurb on the book’s cover declares that the harder Chongzhen worked, the faster he brought about the collapse of the empire. “A series of foolish measures [and] every step a mistake, the more diligent [he was] the faster the downfall,” it says. The disappearance of a reprint of a previously published book, which would have been vetted by state propagandists before publication, is not common, publishers say.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. "Chongzhen: the Diligent Emperor of a Failed Dynasty," republished in China, has disappeared from bookshelves and online searches for it have been censored; it recounts how the last Ming emperor purged senior officials and mismanaged his realm.
  2. The book's cover blurb says of Chongzhen, who hanged himself on a tree outside the Forbidden City as rebels closed in on Beijing, "a series of foolish measures [and] every step a mistake, the more diligent [he was] the faster the downfall.".
  3. Publishers say the disappearance of a reprint is not common, since a previously published book would have been vetted by state propagandists before publication.

Related Articles:

  • As China Ramps Up Scrutiny of Culture, the Show Does Not Go On — More than a dozen performances across China, including stand-up comedy, jazz and a touring Japanese choral group, were abruptly cancelled with virtually no explanation, after authorities fined a Chinese comedy studio around $2m over a joke deemed insulting to the military. Performers must submit scripts or set lists for vetting.
  • China’s Defeated Youth — Urban Chinese unemployment among those aged 16 to 24 has run above 20%, about double the pre-pandemic level for that age group, with over 70% of unemployed youth in one year calculated to be graduates. Sentiment analysis of social media indicates the mood of young Chinese is growing darker.
  • The Root of China’s Growing Youth Unemployment Crisis — China's government has long encouraged university enrollment, raising higher-education student numbers from 22m to 383m and expanding graduate-school capacity, with master's candidates up 25% in one year. The author argues that boosting graduate numbers while restricting the services sector and subsidizing construction is bad economics and worse social policy.

AI Summary. An analysis of North Atlantic tropical cyclones finds mean maximum intensification rates up to 28.7% greater in 2001–2020 than in 1971–1990. The number of storms strengthening from a Category 1 hurricane or weaker into a major hurricane within 36 hours has more than doubled between those periods.

Andra Garner Nature Scientific Reports
Date Posted:

According to new @Nature research, the rate at which tropical cyclones have grown into hurricanes within 36 hours has doubled in the modern era (2001-2020) relative to the 1971–1990 period.

Are Atlantic hurricanes intensifying faster than they did decades ago?

Core argument: Mean maximum intensification rates for North Atlantic tropical cyclones were up to 28.7% greater in 2001–2020 than in 1971–1990, based on observed maximum changes in wind speed from 1971 to 2020.

An analysis of observed maximum changes in wind speed for Atlantic Tropical Cyclones (TCs) from 1971 to 2020 indicates that TC intensification rates have already changed as anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have warmed the planet and oceans. Mean maximum TC intensification rates are up to 28.7% greater in the modern era (2001–2020) compared to the historical era (1971–1990). In the modern era, it is about as likely for TCs to intensify by at least 50 kts in 24 h, and more likely for TCs to intensify by at least 20 kts within 24 h than it was for TCs to intensify by these amounts in 36 h in the historical era. Finally, the number of TCs that intensify from a Category 1 hurricane (or weaker) into a major hurricane within 36 h has more than doubled in the modern era relative to the historical era.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Mean maximum intensification rates for North Atlantic tropical cyclones were up to 28.7% greater in 2001–2020 than in 1971–1990, based on observed maximum changes in wind speed from 1971 to 2020.
  2. The number of Atlantic tropical cyclones intensifying from Category 1 or weaker into a major hurricane within 36 hours has more than doubled in 2001–2020 relative to 1971–1990.
  3. In 2001–2020, Atlantic tropical cyclones are about as likely to intensify by at least 50 kts in 24 hours, and more likely to intensify by at least 20 kts in 24 hours, as they were in 36 hours during 1971–1990.

Related Articles:

  • Analyzing State Resilience to Weather and Climate Disasters — The real annual cost of U.S. weather and climate disasters has risen from about $20bn per year in the 1980s to nearly $95bn per year in 2010–19, reaching roughly $153bn in one year. Property insurers absorbed 48% of these costs, uninsured or underinsured homeowners, businesses and farms 37%, the federal government 11%, and state and local governments 4%.
  • Gulf Coast Temperatures Surge to Highest Levels Ever Observed — Sea surface temperatures in the Gulf of Mexico have warmed more than 3 degrees above the norm for the date, with temperatures near 88°F common down to depths of 165 feet. Though the Gulf as a whole has cooled slightly from record levels, it remains near all-time highs.
  • Why California and Florida Have Become Almost Uninsurable — Wildfires in California and hurricanes in Florida have generated large volumes of insurance claims, while higher housing prices and construction and repair costs have made each claim more expensive. Insurers have also faced costlier reinsurance, with worldwide average reinsurance rates up about a quarter in one year and another third the next, according to reinsurance broker Howden Tiger.

Tuesday, October 24, 2023

AI Summary. Sustained higher mortgage rates are expected to weigh most on housing turnover, since nearly all borrowers hold rates below market levels, discouraging moves; the authors project existing home sales of 3.8mn, the fewest annual sales since the early 1990s. Housing starts are projected to fall 4% to 1.34mn.

Ronnie Walker Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

According to @GoldmanSachs, 90% of mortgage borrowers have a rate 2pp below current market rates, and 60% have a rate 4pp below. However limited supply means housing starts have yet to be impacted; housing starts last month were 5% above 2019 levels.

How do sustained higher mortgage rates affect home sales and construction?

Core argument: Existing home sales are forecast at 3.8mn in 2024, the fewest annual sales since the early 1990s, as nearly all mortgage borrowers hold rates below current market rates, disincentivizing moving.

Sustained higher mortgage rates will have their most pronounced impact in 2024 on housing turnover. Nearly all mortgage borrowers have interest rates below current market rates, strongly disincentivizing them from moving. As a result, we expect the fewest annual existing home sales since the early 1990s at 3.8mn. Limited available housing supply has kept homebuilding resilient to higher interest rates: despite 3½pp higher mortgage rates today, housing starts were 5% above 2019 levels in September. While vacancy rates remain at historic lows, we expect housing starts to decline by 4% to 1.34mn in 2024, reflecting sharply fewer multifamily starts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Existing home sales are forecast at 3.8mn in 2024, the fewest annual sales since the early 1990s, as nearly all mortgage borrowers hold rates below current market rates, disincentivizing moving.
  2. Despite mortgage rates 3½pp higher, housing starts in September stood 5% above 2019 levels, with limited available housing supply keeping homebuilding resilient to higher interest rates.
  3. Housing starts are projected to decline 4% to 1.34mn in 2024, reflecting sharply fewer multifamily starts, even as vacancy rates remain at historic lows.

Related Articles:

  • Have Rising Mortgage Rates Frozen the Housing Market? — 42% of American homeowners own their homes outright with no mortgage, and among those with mortgages the median housing debt is 52% of the home's value. Homeowners with large equity cushions should be less affected by "lock-in" from low pandemic-era mortgage rates.
  • The “New Normal” Mortgage Rate Range — Goldman Sachs economists expect the federal funds rate to eventually stabilize at 3–3.25%, above what the Federal Reserve currently projects for the neutral rate. With a funds rate near 3.25% and a 10-year Treasury yield of 4.45%, 30-year fixed mortgage rates would sit in the low-to-mid 6% range.
  • US Housing Market Crash Turns Not-So-Sweet 16 — The median existing-home sale price exceeds what a buyer spending 25% of gross household income with a 15% down payment and a 30-year fixed mortgage could afford, leaving affordability more strained than in 2004-07. With for-sale supply very low and most existing mortgages carrying below-market rates, the authors expect home prices to rise slowly.

AI Summary. Measures of typical and aggregate pay adjusted by personal consumption inflation have grown since 2019 and kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends, while results are more mixed when deflated by the consumer price index, with average hourly earnings and total compensation below trend.

Chloe East, Wendy Edelberg, and Noadia Steinmetz-Silber Brookings Institution
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Lower-income workers have seen real wage gains since the pre-pandemic period; however, higher-wage workers have seen low or zero real growth depending on the measure. @ChloeNEast @WendyEdelberg

Has worker pay kept pace with inflation since 2019?

Core argument: Measures of typical and aggregate pay deflated by PCE inflation have grown since 2019 and kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends.

Generally speaking, we find measures of typical and aggregate pay, adjusted by PCE inflation, have grown since 2019 and have kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends. Results are more mixed when those measures are deflated by CPI; we still see gains since 2019, but Average Hourly Earnings and Total Compensation are below longer-term trend levels. In other words, nominal pay by these measures has done relatively well in keeping up with overall costs of living, measured by the PCE. In contrast, nominal pay has done less well in keeping up with increases in the costs of goods and services that are much more salient to consumers, measured by the CPI. For higher-wage workers, the ECI suggests that nominal pay has grown about in line with or more slowly than prices, while Average Hourly Earnings and Weekly Earnings show roughly no change or some small positive changes for higher-wage workers. Again, we see that deflating by CPI points to weaker pay growth across all groups.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Measures of typical and aggregate pay deflated by PCE inflation have grown since 2019 and kept pace with or exceeded longer-term trends.
  2. Deflated by CPI instead, pay results are more mixed: gains remain since 2019, but Average Hourly Earnings and Total Compensation sit below longer-term trend levels.
  3. For higher-wage workers, the Employment Cost Index suggests nominal pay has grown about in line with or more slowly than prices, while Average Hourly Earnings and Weekly Earnings show roughly no change or small positive changes.

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Incomes Fall for Third Straight Year — The Census Bureau reported that US inflation-adjusted median household income fell 2.3% to $74,580, a 4.7% decline from its peak. Wage growth for the typical worker subsequently outstripped inflation, with inflation-adjusted wages rising about 3%, according to Atlanta Federal Reserve and Labor Department data.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Economy — Wage inequality is falling for the first time in four decades as pay rises at the bottom, with real wages increasing among young high school graduates and workers in the lowest quartile. The authors argue this reflects intensified employer competition for workers rather than simply a tight labor market, implying wages better reflect productivity and higher aggregate productivity.
  • Jason Furman On Employment Cost Index — The Employment Cost Index shows private wages and compensation rising at annual rates of roughly 4.7%–5.1%, higher than any point in the previous cycle, supporting the argument that wage growth is not slowing and that the measured slowdown in average hourly earnings reflected shifts in workforce composition. Real wages and salaries remain 5% below their pre-pandemic trend.

AI Summary. The International Monetary Fund projects combined eurozone government deficits will fall to 3.4% of GDP from 3.6%, and to 2.7% the following year. Greece and Portugal are forecast to post deficits below 2% of GDP and Ireland a surplus, while Italy and France remain near 5%.

Paul Hannon Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

According to IMF estimates, eurozone cumulative deficits will fall to 3.4% of GDP in 2023, relative to 6.3% in the US. Aside from Italy, the crisis-era PIGS are running even lower deficits, ranging from 1.6% in Greece to 0.2% in Portugal.

Are eurozone budget deficits shrinking?

Core argument: The IMF expects combined eurozone government deficits to fall to 3.4% of GDP this year from 3.6% in 2022, and further to 2.7% in 2024.

The IMF expects combined deficits of eurozone governments will fall to 3.4% of GDP this year from 3.6% in 2022, and further to 2.7% in 2024. Those countries that were in crisis a decade ago are expected to have much smaller budget gaps. In Greece, the deficit is forecast to fall to 1.6% of GDP from 2.3% last year, while Portugal’s is expected to fall to 0.2% of GDP from 0.4%. Ireland is forecast to have a budget surplus for the second straight year. Italy and France, among others, continue to have deficits of roughly 5% of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IMF expects combined eurozone government deficits to fall to 3.4% of GDP this year from 3.6% in 2022, and further to 2.7% in 2024.
  2. Countries at the center of the eurozone crisis a decade ago are forecast to post much smaller budget gaps, with Greece's deficit falling to 1.6% of GDP from 2.3% and Portugal's to 0.2% from 0.4%.
  3. Ireland is forecast to run a budget surplus for a second straight year, while Italy and France continue to have deficits of roughly 5% of GDP.

Related Articles:

  • US Fiscal Alarm Bells Are Drowning Out a Deeper Problem — The Congressional Budget Office projects US federal debt held by the public at 98% of national income, within 7.6 percentage points of its 1946 wartime peak and on track to exceed it by 2028. International Monetary Fund forecasts show US debt surpassing Italy's by 2028 and Greece's by the end of the decade.
  • France Ready to Accelerate Spending Cuts as it Battles Persistent Deficits — France's proposed budget implies a deficit of 4.4% of national output, above the European Union's 3% target, with the government expecting to fall below that level only by 2027 — among the last EU countries to comply. The government estimates debt-servicing costs will reach about €75bn a year by then, exceeding spending on education or defense.
  • Europe’s Imbalances in Pandemic and War — Europe's trade surplus that emerged after the euro crisis has returned, with its distribution shifted as Germany's investment slump and flat consumption were offset by building booms in Spain, Greece, and central and eastern Europe. Since 1999, net fixed investment in Spain has exceeded Germany's despite Spain having half Germany's population.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that each $878,000 in federal assistance to state and local governments created or preserved one state or local job-year, with about a third of the effect driven by spillovers from other states. Their confidence intervals rule out a cost below $428,000 per job-year, implying weaker employment support than during the global financial crisis.

Stan Veuger, Beatrice Lee, Jeffrey Clemens, and John Kearns Spatial Economic Analysis
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Accounting for spillovers from other states, @stanveuger and @jeffreypclemens find that $900B federal pandemic aid translated to $878,000 of spending to create or preserve one state or local job for one year. @AEIecon

Accounting for spillovers from other states, @stanveuger and @jeffreypclemens find that $900B federal pandemic aid...

How much federal aid to states did each government job-year cost?

Core argument: The authors estimate that each $878,000 of pandemic-era federal aid to state and local governments created or preserved one state or local government job-year, a fairly small jobs multiplier.

Federal assistance generated fairly small (jobs) multipliers.  We found that each $878,000 in federal assistance created or preserved one state or local job-year. About a third of the effect size is driven by spillovers from other states. More important than the point estimate itself, however, are the values we can rule out on the basis of our estimates’ confidence intervals. We can rule out an estimate that federal fiscal assistance saved a state or local government job-year at a cost of less than $428,000, making fiscal assistance far less effective at supporting employment during the pandemic than during the global financial crisis.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that each $878,000 of pandemic-era federal aid to state and local governments created or preserved one state or local government job-year, a fairly small jobs multiplier.
  2. About one-third of the estimated employment effect of federal assistance is driven by spillovers from other states, according to the authors.
  3. The authors' confidence intervals rule out a cost below $428,000 per state or local government job-year, which they argue makes pandemic fiscal assistance far less effective at supporting employment than during the global financial crisis.

AI Summary. Roughly one-third of children from the very richest families scored 1300 or higher on the SAT, compared with under 5% of middle-class students, according to researchers who matched SAT and ACT scores with parents' federal income tax records. Among the poorest families, only about one in five students took the test at all.

Claire Cain Miller New York Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

.@OppInsights data shows that 31% of the children of the top 1% of income score 1300 or above on the SAT, as compared to 2.4% of children of the bottom 20%.

How closely do SAT scores track family income?

Core argument: One-third of children from the very richest families scored 1300 or higher on the SAT, compared with under 5 percent of middle-class students, according to Opportunity Insights economists at Harvard.

One-third of the children of the very richest families scored a 1300 or higher on the SAT, while less than 5 percent of middle-class students did, according to the data, from economists at Opportunity Insights, based at Harvard. Relatively few children in the poorest families scored that high; just one in five took the test at all. The researchers matched all students’ SAT and ACT scores for 2011, 2013 and 2015 with their parents’ federal income tax records for the prior six years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. One-third of children from the very richest families scored 1300 or higher on the SAT, compared with under 5 percent of middle-class students, according to Opportunity Insights economists at Harvard.
  2. Relatively few children in the poorest families scored 1300 or higher on the SAT, and just one in five of them took the test at all, according to the Opportunity Insights data.
  3. The Opportunity Insights researchers matched students' SAT and ACT scores for 2011, 2013 and 2015 with their parents' federal income tax records for the prior six years.

Related Articles:

  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.

AI Summary. General Social Survey data show that increases among young American adults appear in same-sex sexual behavior as well as in identification, with 20% reporting a same-sex partner versus 18.5% identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The increases are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds.

Jean Twenge Generation Tech
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Jean Twenge notes that the increase in young Americans identifying as gay or bisexual is matched by self-reported behavior from the General Social Survey, with 20% of young Americans 18-26 reporting having had sex with a same-sex partner.

Do rising gay identification rates among young adults match actual behavior?

Core argument: In the General Social Survey, 20% of American young adults report having had sex with a same-sex partner, slightly exceeding the 18.5% who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.

Some reports have suggested that increases appear primarily in LGB identification, but not much in behavior. In other words, more young adults identify as LGB, but they are not necessarily acting on it. At least in the data from the General Social Survey, that does not appear to be true: There has also been a significant increase in young adults having homosexual sex (men with men and women with women). In fact, slightly more American young adults have had sex with a same-sex partner — 20% (see Figure 4) than identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual — 18.5% (see Figure 2). The increases are even larger for 27- to 41-year-olds (the next older age group), perhaps because they have had more time to accumulate sexual partners since age 18.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the General Social Survey, 20% of American young adults report having had sex with a same-sex partner, slightly exceeding the 18.5% who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
  2. General Social Survey data counter reports that rising LGB identification is not matched by behavior, showing a significant increase in young adults having same-sex sex, among both men and women.
  3. Increases in same-sex sexual behavior are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds than among younger adults, perhaps because the older group has had more time to accumulate sexual partners since age 18.

Related Articles:

  • Young Adults in the U.S. Are Reaching Key Life Milestones Later Than in the Past — Pew Research Center analysis of Census Bureau data finds 21-year-olds in the US are less likely than their counterparts four decades earlier to have a full-time job, be financially independent, live on their own, be married, or have a child. Among 21-year-olds, 39% worked full time versus 64% four decades earlier, and a quarter were financially independent versus 42%.
  • Is the Surge to the Left Among Young Voters a Trump Blip or the Real Deal? — Data from the Cooperative Election Study show millennials and Gen Z have voted increasingly for Democratic House candidates over time, contrary to the adage that voters grow more conservative as they age. One political scientist notes such generational shifts translate slowly into vote share and can be offset by Republican gains elsewhere.

AI Summary. Government data show border agents made 2.05m arrests in a single federal fiscal year, the second consecutive year above 2m, after figures never previously exceeded 1.7m or stayed elevated for as long. A growing share of migrants are families with children, who are difficult to deport to their home countries, rather than single adults from Mexico seeking work.

Andrew Mollica, Alicia Caldwell, Michelle Hackman and Santiago Pérez Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

A composition shift in illegal immigration over the past two years, from single men to family units, is putting stress on the border control system as they are harder to deport.

Are border arrests at record levels with harder-to-deport migrants?

Core argument: Border agents made 2.05 million arrests in the federal fiscal year that ended in September, the second consecutive year above two million, according to new government data.

Border agents made 2.05 million arrests in the federal fiscal year that ended in September, new government data show, the second year in a row that figure has exceeded two million. In the past, the numbers have risen and fallen based on significant economic and policy changes like recessions and pandemic-era border restrictions. But they never exceeded 1.7 million and never stayed at an elevated level as long as they have the past few years. In the past, most migrants were single adults from Mexico looking for work. If caught by the Border Patrol, they could easily and quickly be deported. Now, a fast-growing share are families with children, who are difficult to deport to their home countries. The change started around 2014 and has exploded in the past two years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Border agents made 2.05 million arrests in the federal fiscal year that ended in September, the second consecutive year above two million, according to new government data.
  2. Border arrests had never exceeded 1.7 million before and never stayed elevated as long as they have in the past few years, having previously risen and fallen with recessions and pandemic-era border restrictions.
  3. Most migrants were once single adults from Mexico seeking work who could be deported quickly, while a fast-growing share are now families with children who are difficult to deport, a shift that began around 2014.

Related Articles:

  • Immigrants & Their Kids Were 70% of U.S. Labor Force Growth Since 1995 — U.S. labor force data show immigrants accounted for 49% of labor force growth over roughly the past three decades and their children another 21%, together about 70% of an increase of nearly 32.8m workers. Immigrants rose from about 10% to 18% of the labor force, and immigrants plus their children from 18% to 29%.
  • Rebound in Immigration Comes to Economy’s Aid — Goldman Sachs analysis found average monthly growth in the US foreign-born labor force is about 65,000 higher than in 2022, with that labor force nearing 32m people. Foreign-born workers' share of the labor force reached a record 18% in 2022 and has averaged 18.5% this year.
  • U.S. Will Build Stretch of Border Wall and Begin Deportations to Venezuela — The U.S. said it would build an additional stretch of wall on the Mexican border in the Rio Grande Valley, using funds Congress appropriated for wall construction, and begin deporting thousands of Venezuelans. Venezuelans are the second-largest nationality group crossing the southern border, after Mexicans.

AI Summary. Immigration has not been the dominant cause of wage stagnation since the 1970s, as the regions attracting the most immigrants are not those with the worst wage stagnation. The same evidence suggests immigration has played a meaningful but secondary role in holding wages down, since the availability of immigrant workers lets employers offer lower wages.

David Leonhardt The Atlantic
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Citing Christopher Jencks, @DLeonhardt notes the cost of America’s current immigration policy is disproportionately borne by low-skilled American workers.

Is immigration the main cause of wage stagnation?

Core argument: Immigration has not been the dominant cause of wage stagnation since the 1970s, as the regions attracting the largest numbers of immigrants are not those suffering the worst wage stagnation.

Immigration has not been the dominant cause of post-1970s wage stagnation, despite the suspicious timing. You do not need to be able to read peer-reviewed articles in an academic journal to grasp this conclusion, although those articles support it. You simply need to notice that the regions attracting the largest number of immigrants are not the ones suffering the worst wage stagnation. But the story does not end here. The same evidence suggests that immigration has played a meaningful, if secondary, role in holding down wages. People sometimes claim that immigrants work in jobs that native-born Americans do not want. But Christopher Jencks, a social-policy professor at Harvard University, has pointed out that this statement is incomplete: Immigrants typically work in jobs that native-born Americans do not want at the wages that employers are offering. One reason that employers can offer such wages, Jencks adds, is the availability of so many immigrant workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigration has not been the dominant cause of wage stagnation since the 1970s, as the regions attracting the largest numbers of immigrants are not those suffering the worst wage stagnation.
  2. The same regional evidence suggests immigration has played a meaningful, if secondary, role in holding down wages.
  3. Harvard social-policy professor Christopher Jencks argues that immigrants take jobs native-born Americans do not want at the wages employers offer, and that the availability of immigrant workers is one reason employers can offer such wages.

Related Articles:

  • Why Immigration Is an Urban Phenomenon — Because many immigrants send remittances home or plan to return, part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than where they work, so local prices apply to only part of their budget. The authors argue this makes immigrants less deterred by high local costs, concentrating them in expensive cities.
  • Monopsony, Efficiency, and the Regularization of Undocumented Immigrants — A study of France's amnesty program, which regularized undocumented workers making up 2.0% of workers in Paris and nearly 1% nationwide, finds positive effects on employment and wages, particularly for male, low-skill workers. The authors argue regularization reduces employers' wage-setting power in the undocumented labor market, and estimate a rise in total French GDP of around 1%.
  • Immigration and U.S. Labor Market Tightness: Is There a Link? — The U.S. was missing an average of about 1.39m foreign workers relative to the pre-pandemic trend, a shortfall that has since recovered. Across industries and states, the authors find no statistically significant relationship between the number of missing foreign workers as a share of employment and changes in job vacancy rates.