Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, September 19, 2023

AI Summary. U.S. high-propensity business applications — those more likely to become employers — ran 40% above their 2019 average, according to Census Bureau data, with the elevated pace persisting after the pandemic. Business deaths also rose, but the net effect still points to strong growth in business formation.

Anna Zhou and Taylor Bowley Bank of America
Date Posted:

New business applications by firms that are likely to hire workers remain elevated relative to pre-pandemic; in July 2023, they were 40% higher than the mean 2019 level. @BankofAmerica

Has new business formation remained elevated after the pandemic?

Core argument: High-propensity business applications, those more likely to become businesses with a payroll, ran 40% above their 2019 average in July, according to Census Bureau data, and the pandemic-era surge in new business formations has continued post-Covid.

The pandemic led to a surge in new business formations. What is striking to us is that this elevated level has continued post-Covid. According to data from the Census Bureau, in July, high-propensity business applications, which include all those that are more likely to become businesses with a payroll, were 40% higher than the average level in 2019. While not all of these businesses survive (the number of business deaths also rose in 2022 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics), the net impact still points to strong growth in business formation. Business applications each year seem to be driven by a different sector. At the start of the pandemic, retail trade saw the biggest surge, driven largely by the growing demand for e-commerce, according to commentaries from the Census Bureau.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High-propensity business applications, those more likely to become businesses with a payroll, ran 40% above their 2019 average in July, according to Census Bureau data, and the pandemic-era surge in new business formations has continued post-Covid.
  2. Business deaths also rose in 2022 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but the net impact still points to strong growth in business formation.
  3. Business applications each year appear driven by a different sector, with retail trade showing the biggest surge at the start of the pandemic, largely on growing e-commerce demand, according to Census Bureau commentaries.

Related Articles:

  • Surging Business Formation in the Pandemic: Causes and Consequences — US applications for new businesses dropped early in the COVID-19 pandemic and then rose to record levels, remaining historically elevated, including among applications with characteristics likely to result in hiring and growth. Business applications have historically tracked actual business formation closely.
  • The Startup Surge Continues: Business Applications on Track for Second-Largest Annual Total on Record — Americans filed nearly 2.7m business applications in the first half of the year, up 5% from the prior year and 52% above the same period in 2019. One-third were applications with a high likelihood of hiring employees, 36% above the comparable 2019 total.
  • and Creative Destruction After the Pandemic — US establishment closures spiked and then returned to normal levels, while new establishment openings reached record highs—peaking at 379,000 in a single quarter—and have since cooled but remain far above any pre-2020 level. Much of this may be new businesses replacing those that closed, and it is unclear whether the new entrants are more productive than the firms they replaced.

AI Summary. Restoring the pre-pandemic 12% vacancy rate would require 2.7m new housing units left entirely empty, or more than 18m additional units if 75% of new units are filled on net. Construction of 1.4m units in the first half of 2023 failed to keep up with demand, pushing unoccupied housing rates lower.

Joseph Politano Apricitas Economics
Date Posted:

Residential vacancy rates are at multi-decade lows. Raising unoccupied inventory rates back to pre-pandemic levels would require building 2.7mm units (vs. current pacing of 1.4 million units for 2023).@JosephPolitano

How many new housing units would restore pre-pandemic vacancy rates?

Core argument: Restoring the U.S. vacancy rate to its 12% pre-pandemic level would require 2.7 million new housing units left entirely empty—more than Maryland's entire housing stock, or over 1.5 years of construction at 2022 rates.

To get rates back up to the 12% pre-pandemic level would require adding 2.7 million new housing units—more than the entire housing stock of the state of Maryland or more than 1.5 years of construction at 2022 rates—and leaving them all empty. Assume half occupancy and America needs 6.2 million new units—more than currently exist in Pennsylvania. If you assume that 75% of units will get filled on net then America needs more than 18 million additional housing units—roughly as many as exist in California and Washington state combined. Actual construction stood at only 1.4 million in the first half of 2023, failing to keep up with demand and leading to further declines in unoccupied housing rates—in other words, the structural shortage of housing is keeping prices high and vacancies down.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Restoring the U.S. vacancy rate to its 12% pre-pandemic level would require 2.7 million new housing units left entirely empty—more than Maryland's entire housing stock, or over 1.5 years of construction at 2022 rates.
  2. Assuming half of new units get occupied, the U.S. needs 6.2 million additional homes, more than exist in Pennsylvania; at 75% net occupancy the requirement rises above 18 million units, roughly the combined stock of California and Washington state.
  3. U.S. construction reached only 1.4 million units in the first half of 2023, failing to keep up with demand and leading to further declines in unoccupied housing rates, with the structural shortage keeping prices high and vacancies low.

Related Articles:

  • Repeat After Me: Building Any New Homes Reduces Housing Costs For All — Studies from the US, Sweden, and Finland find that new market-rate housing triggers chains of moves that free up homes for lower-income residents, with 100 new US units associated with up to 70 people leaving below-median-income neighborhoods, regardless of the new units' price point.
  • On the Move: Which Cities Have The Biggest Housing Shortage? — An analysis finds San Antonio, Dallas, and Orlando have the most constrained housing supply as strong labor markets attract residents, while St. Louis, Detroit, and Miami have the highest housing stock relative to population. Cities with lower housing supply are already seeing higher construction trends.
  • Have Rising Mortgage Rates Frozen the Housing Market? — 42% of American homeowners own their homes outright with no mortgage, and among those with mortgages the median housing debt is 52% of the home's value. Homeowners with large equity cushions should be less affected by "lock-in" from low pandemic-era mortgage rates.

AI Summary. Areas with the highest shares of people working from home are mostly central cities of metropolitan areas or places hosting large corporate headquarters, including Cupertino, California and Redmond, Washington, home to Apple and Microsoft. Working from home appears most popular in places close to concentrations of offices and other workplaces.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:

.@foxjust notes that two-thirds of America’s top 20 “work from home” neighborhoods in 2022 are within commuting distance to major cities’ central business districts.

Is working from home most common near dense job centers?

Core argument: Most of the top-50 U.S. places by work-from-home share are central cities of metropolitan areas, designated as such based on population and the number of people commuting to jobs there.

All these areas clearly do have much higher WFH shares than the nation as a whole. What else do they have in common? One striking characteristic, which I highlighted in the top-50 table, is that most are located in central cities of metropolitan areas, which are designated as such based on population and how many people commute to jobs there. What’s more, two non-central cities on the list — Cupertino, California, and Redmond, Washington — happen to be home to the headquarters of the two most valuable companies in the world, Apple and Microsoft, and several others are also home to large corporate headquarters. Working at home seems to be most popular in places close to lots of offices and other places of employment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Most of the top-50 U.S. places by work-from-home share are central cities of metropolitan areas, designated as such based on population and the number of people commuting to jobs there.
  2. Two non-central cities on the top-50 work-from-home list, Cupertino, California, and Redmond, Washington, host the headquarters of Apple and Microsoft, the two most valuable companies in the world, and several other places host large corporate headquarters.
  3. Working from home appears most popular in places close to large concentrations of offices and other places of employment, and the listed areas all have work-from-home shares much higher than the nation as a whole.

Related Articles:

  • Remote Work, Three Years Later — Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
  • Work From Home and the Office Real Estate Apocalypse — The authors estimate New York City office values fell 45% in 2020 and 39% in the longer run, a $453bn value destruction, with lower-quality buildings hit hardest as tenants shifted to higher-quality space. They argue this has implications for local public finances and financial sector stability.
  • Real-Estate Doom Loop Threatens America’s Banks — A Wall Street Journal analysis estimates banks' total commercial real-estate exposure at $3.6tn—about 20% of their deposits—including indirect lending, foreclosed properties, commercial mortgage-backed securities, and loans to nonbank mortgage lenders. Losses on these loans risk triggering a doom loop in which banks cut lending, pushing property prices down further and generating additional losses.

AI Summary. Bloomberg Economics finds that the global share of new-project foreign direct investment going to countries that declined to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine averaged 15%, down from 30% in the decade to 2019, with China and Hong Kong's share falling below 2% from nearly 11%.

Shawn Donnan and Enda Curran Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Citing a @IMFNews analysis, @sdonnan notes the global share of greenfield FDI has declined for countries that failed to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine as world trade balkanizes on geopolitical lines.

Is foreign investment shifting toward politically aligned countries?

Core argument: Bloomberg Economics found the global share of greenfield foreign direct investment going to countries that did not condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine averaged 15% over the past two years, down from 30% in the decade to 2019.

Using UN votes to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a filter, Bloomberg Economics found that the global share of greenfield foreign direct investment going to countries that didn't condemn the invasion averaged only 15% in the last two years, down from 30% in the decade to 2019. China's share, including Hong Kong, fell to less than 2% in 2022 from nearly 11% on average over 2010-19. The data point to US and other Western companies investing more in like-minded countries. Between the second quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of this year, US companies’ greenfield investments in China plunged 57.9% and those by European firms dropped 36.7% versus the five years leading up to the pandemic, an updated IMF analysis shared with Bloomberg found. Investments from the rest of Asia into China were down by more than two-thirds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bloomberg Economics found the global share of greenfield foreign direct investment going to countries that did not condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine averaged 15% over the past two years, down from 30% in the decade to 2019.
  2. China's share of global greenfield foreign direct investment, including Hong Kong, fell to less than 2% in 2022 from nearly 11% on average over 2010–19, according to Bloomberg Economics.

Related Articles:

  • Setser On Rumors Of Decoupling — Chinese data show US imports from China as a share of GDP slightly higher than before the trade war, and G-7 imports from China have boomed, indicating little shift of global supply chains out of China. Decoupling is a forecast rather than a current reality.
  • How America Is Failing To Break Up With China — Research finds that countries with the strongest existing trade ties to China in a given industry have gained the most as direct Chinese exports to the US are redirected, suggesting Chinese supply chains remain central to American imports even in advanced-manufacturing goods officials most want to shield from China.
  • Global Firms Are Eyeing Asian Alternatives to Chinese Manufacturing — Chinese manufacturing wages doubled between 2013 and 2022 to an average of $8.27 an hour, while hourly manufacturing wages in India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam remain below $3. This alternative Asian supply chain has a combined working-age population of 1.4bn versus China's 980m, and 154m tertiary-educated people aged 25–54 versus China's 145m.

AI Summary. An analysis finds China's working-age population (16–65) grew from 600m to 1bn between 1982 and 2015 while labour-force participation fell from 85% to just over 70%, challenging the "demographic dividend" explanation of China's growth. The decline was concentrated among urban household-registration holders facing mandatory retirement at 55 for women and 65 for men, alongside expanded schooling and university enrolment.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

Between 1982 to 2015 China’s working-age population grew from 600mm to 1bn; however, LFP dropped from 85% to 70% during the same period. This suggests that a “demographic dividend” didn’t drive Chinese growth.

Did a growing working-age population actually drive China's economic growth?

Core argument: Xin Meng of the Australian National University finds that China's working-age population (ages 16–65) grew from 600m in 1982 to 1bn in 2015, while labour-force participation fell from 85% to just over 70%.

Xin Meng of the Australian National University appears to refute the “demographic dividend” as an explanation for China’s economic success. Her analysis showed that between 1982 and 2015 China’s working-age population, defined as those aged between 16 and 65, grew from 600m to 1bn. During this same period, however, labour-force participation dropped from 85% to just over 70%. Much of the decline came from those with an urban hukou. Unlike holders of rural hukou, urbanites were subjected to mandatory retirement at the age of 55 for women and 65 for men. Compulsory education and greater university enrolment kept under-25s out of the workforce.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Xin Meng of the Australian National University finds that China's working-age population (ages 16–65) grew from 600m in 1982 to 1bn in 2015, while labour-force participation fell from 85% to just over 70%.
  2. Much of China's participation decline came from urban hukou holders, who faced mandatory retirement at 55 for women and 65 for men, unlike rural hukou holders.
  3. Compulsory education and greater university enrolment kept Chinese under-25s out of the workforce, part of the participation decline Meng cites in challenging the "demographic dividend" explanation of China's economic success.

Related Articles:

  • Population Aging and Economic Growth: From Demographic Dividend to Demographic Drag? — The authors estimate that a 1% increase in the working-age share of the population raises income per capita by about 1%, with an added 0.1–0.4% boost to growth in later periods. They project population aging will slow annual income per capita growth in advanced economies by 0.4–0.8 percentage points through 2050, while spurring growth in less developed countries.
  • The Chinese Century Is Already Over — The author projects that China's demographic decline will cap its rise: its prime-age labor force began shrinking in 2012 as growth slowed from about 10% annually to 3%, and by 2031-35 its growth rate will fall below America's with per capita income near 30% of the US level.
  • The Neoclassical Growth of China — China's per capita GDP growth path closely tracks those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from similar starting income levels, indicating nothing unusual about its growth rate. The authors' model projects China's per capita GDP will level off at about 41% of the US level, reflecting a slowdown in productivity catch-up.

AI Summary. China's government has long encouraged university enrollment, raising higher-education student numbers from 22m to 383m and expanding graduate-school capacity, with master's candidates up 25% in one year. The author argues that boosting graduate numbers while restricting the services sector and subsidizing construction is bad economics and worse social policy.

Benn Steil and Elisabeth Harding Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:

.@BennSteil argues the disconnect between the number of Chinese college graduates and service jobs will “fuel discontent among an age cohort on which China will depend for its future national vitality.”

Does expanding graduate education while restricting services raise youth unemployment?

Core argument: China's higher-education enrollment rose from 22 million students in 1990 to 383 million in 2021, following decades of government encouragement of university attendance.

For decades now, the Chinese government has encouraged university enrollment, pushing the number of students in higher education from 22 million in 1990 to 383 million in 2021. During the pandemic, it pressed even harder, expanding graduate-school capacity. Master’s-degree candidates rose by 25 percent in 2021. China’s Ministry of Education estimated that 10.76 million college students would graduate in 2022, 1.67 million more than in 2021—and it expects a further large rise in 2023. The message for China’s policymakers is clear: boosting graduate numbers while throttling services and subsidizing buildings is bad economics and worse social policy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's higher-education enrollment rose from 22 million students in 1990 to 383 million in 2021, following decades of government encouragement of university attendance.
  2. China's Ministry of Education estimated that 10.76 million college students would graduate in 2022, 1.67 million more than in 2021, and expects a further large rise in 2023.
  3. China expanded graduate-school capacity during the pandemic, with master's-degree candidates rising 25 percent in 2021; boosting graduate numbers while throttling services and subsidizing buildings is, the article argues, bad economics and worse social policy.

Related Articles:

  • Why Has Youth Unemployment Risen So Much in China? — Young workers aged 15-24 are particularly vulnerable when economic growth slows, and China's youth unemployment rate does not appear to be an outlier relative to its income level among global peers. Mismatches between the skills graduates acquire in higher education and those employers demand may add to labor market frictions.
  • China Cannot Allow Jobless Young To ‘Lie Flat’ — China's job mix has shifted toward low-pay, low-skill, informal work at the expense of higher-paid, high-skill manufacturing and construction jobs, with the informal-to-formal ratio flipping from 40:60 to 60:40 over 15 years, according to a Stanford University estimate. Younger workers are over-represented in low-pay sectors and gig work.
  • China’s Defeated Youth — Urban Chinese unemployment among those aged 16 to 24 has run above 20%, about double the pre-pandemic level for that age group, with over 70% of unemployed youth in one year calculated to be graduates. Sentiment analysis of social media indicates the mood of young Chinese is growing darker.

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

AI Summary. U.S. manufacturing output per hour has grown about 0.2% a year since 2009, below the overall economy and peer economies in Europe and Asia except Japan, with motor vehicle manufacturing productivity falling 32% from 2012 through last year. Unlike warehouses and hospitals, manufacturers face foreign competition and cannot pass higher labor costs to customers.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

As the UAW strike gets underway, @greg_ip notes that American manufacturing productivity is lagging peer economies. Since 2009, manufacturing output per hour has grown at only 0.2% per year in the US.

Is weak manufacturing productivity the core problem facing American labor?

Core argument: U.S. manufacturing output per hour has grown just 0.2% a year since 2009, below the overall economy and peer economies in Europe and Asia, with the exception of Japan.

Since 2009, manufacturing output per hour in the U.S. has grown just 0.2% a year, well below the economy as a whole and peer economies in Europe and Asia, except Japan. In motor vehicle manufacturing, the picture is especially bad: From 2012 through last year, productivity plummeted 32%, though some of this was no doubt due to pandemic disruptions. Warehouses and hospitals can pass the cost of higher wages and reduced hours to customers without being undercut by foreign competitors. Manufacturers don’t have that luxury. That’s why Detroit is recoiling at the UAW’s demands. While their output per employee is among the highest of 11 global manufacturers ranked by consultants AlixPartners, so are their costs per vehicle. The lowest cost: China’s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. manufacturing output per hour has grown just 0.2% a year since 2009, below the overall economy and peer economies in Europe and Asia, with the exception of Japan.
  2. Productivity in U.S. motor vehicle manufacturing fell 32% from 2012 through last year, though part of that decline reflected pandemic disruptions.
  3. Detroit automakers rank among the highest in output per employee of 11 global manufacturers ranked by AlixPartners, but also among the highest in cost per vehicle, with China's costs the lowest.

Related Articles:

  • Autoworkers Have Good Reason to Demand a Big Raise — Inflation-adjusted average hourly pay for US production and nonsupervisory workers has risen 13% over 20 years, about 0.6% a year, while the average hourly wage for auto production-line workers has fallen 30%. General Motors, Ford and Stellantis earned a combined $42bn in net income over 12 months.
  • Auto Union Boss Wants 46% Raise, 32-Hour Work Week in ‘War’ Against Detroit Carmakers — The United Auto Workers union has demanded a 46% raise, a return to traditional pensions, and a 32-hour work week from the three Detroit automakers. The companies say meeting those demands would raise labor costs by $80bn and lift total pay and benefit expenses to more than $150 an hour from about $64.
  • EV Boom Remakes Rural Towns in the American South — Automakers have announced more than $110bn in electric-vehicle investments in the US, with about half directed to Southern states and most of the remainder to Great Lakes states including Michigan, Ohio and Indiana. Great Lakes auto employment, though still nearly double the South's, has fallen 34% over two decades to 382,000 workers.

AI Summary. Large language models can assist at each stage of economic experiments: designing them (wording of questions, coding, documentation), implementing them (creating consistent participant experiences, improving comprehension of instructions, monitoring engagement in real time), and analyzing the resulting data, including pre-processing and cleaning. The authors argue each use improves the probability of reporting accurate findings.

Gary Charness, Brian Jabarian and John List National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Large Language Models (LLM) will likely accelerate knowledge creation by making science research and data more transparent and rigorous. @Econ_4_Everyone @brian_jabarian

Large Language Models (LLM) will likely accelerate knowledge creation by making science research and data more transparent...

Can language models improve the design and analysis of economic experiments?

Core argument: Large language models can improve experimental design by refining elicitation wording, coding experiments, and producing documentation.

We discuss how Large Language Models (LLM) can improve experimental design, including improving the elicitation wording, coding experiments, and producing documentation. Second, we discuss the implementation of experiments using LLM, focusing on enhancing causal inference by creating consistent experiences, improving comprehension of instructions, and monitoring participant engagement in real time. Third, we highlight how LLMs can help analyze experimental data, including pre-processing, data cleaning, and other analytical tasks while helping reviewers and replicators investigate studies. Each of these tasks improves the probability of reporting accurate findings

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Large language models can improve experimental design by refining elicitation wording, coding experiments, and producing documentation.
  2. In implementing experiments, large language models can enhance causal inference by creating consistent participant experiences, improving comprehension of instructions, and monitoring participant engagement in real time.
  3. Large language models can assist in analyzing experimental data through pre-processing, data cleaning, and other analytical tasks, while aiding reviewers and replicators in investigating studies, with each task improving the probability of reporting accurate findings.

Related Articles:

  • Centaurs and Cyborgs on the Jagged Frontier — In a pre-registered experiment at Boston Consulting Group covering 18 realistic consulting tasks, consultants using ChatGPT-4 completed 12.2% more tasks, worked 25.1% faster, and produced 40% higher quality results than those without it. The tool acted as a skill leveler: the lowest-scoring consultants improved 43%, while top performers gained less.
  • Society’s Technical Debt and Software’s Gutenberg Moment — Every wave of technological innovation has been unleashed by something costly becoming cheap enough to waste, and large language models are collapsing the cost and complexity of producing software. The authors argue that decades of underproduced software have left society with immense technical debt that is poised to contract, releasing a wave of innovation.
  • Generative AI at Work — A study of 5,179 customer support agents finds that access to a generative AI conversational assistant raised issues resolved per hour by 14% on average, with the largest gains for novice and low-skilled workers and minimal effect on experienced, highly skilled ones. The authors also find AI assistance improved customer sentiment, reduced requests for managerial intervention, and improved employee retention.

AI Summary. The author estimates an 80–85% chance the incumbent Democratic president wins his party's nomination and a 75% chance Donald Trump wins the Republican nomination. Trump's 25% risk is attributed to a 10% chance of a conventional primary defeat, a 5% chance of a health-related exit, and a 10% chance legal jeopardy ends his bid.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:

.@NateSilver538 argues that the prediction markets are underpricing both Trump and Biden’s odds of being their party’s nominee.

How likely is a presidential rematch between the two nominees?

Core argument: The author puts Joe Biden's chances of winning the Democratic nomination at 80–85% and Donald Trump's chances of winning the Republican nomination at 75%.

Joe Biden is likely to be the Democratic nominee. I would put his chances in the range of 80 to 85%. Donald Trump is likely to be the Republican nominee. I would put his chances in the range of 75%. The chance of an average non-Hispanic white man of Biden’s age (80) dying in the next year is about 5%. Biden’s odds are presumably lower than this, however. Even if he’s lost a step or two, I feel comfortable asserting that his physical and mental health are better than that of the typical 80-year-old. However, there are a lot of medical events other than Biden literally passing away that might end his bid for a second term. Overall, I figure there’s a 10% chance that Trump loses the nomination in “typical” fashion, such as being caught from behind in Iowa, a 5% chance that a health-related issue ends his campaign, and a 10% chance that legal jeopardy forces Trump to reconsider or compels Republicans to turn on him, even though they haven’t so far.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author puts Joe Biden's chances of winning the Democratic nomination at 80–85% and Donald Trump's chances of winning the Republican nomination at 75%.
  2. An average non-Hispanic white man of Biden's age, 80, faces roughly a 5% chance of dying within the next year, though the author judges Biden's physical and mental health to be better than that of a typical 80-year-old.
  3. The author assigns Trump a 10% chance of losing the nomination in typical fashion, such as being caught from behind in Iowa, a 5% chance that a health issue ends his campaign, and a 10% chance that legal jeopardy forces him to reconsider or turns Republicans against him.

Related Articles:

  • Five Reasons Why Biden Might Lose in 2024 — Working-class voters are projected to outnumber college-educated voters by roughly half again in the US presidential electorate, so slippage among them carries outsize weight. The author argues that if Republicans matched their 13-point national House margin among working-class voters, Democrats would need a college-educated advantage above 30 points to offset it.
  • For Some Key Voters, Trump Has Become Toxic — The number of white Americans without college degrees, a group that backed Donald Trump by 67% to 32%, has fallen by 2.1m, while the number of white college graduates, a constituency that narrowly favored Joe Biden, has grown by 13.3m. These demographic shifts work against Republican candidates.
  • How to Interpret Polling Showing Biden’s Loss of Nonwhite Support — Since 1980, the gap between white and Black voter turnout has been related to the share of Black registered voters backing Democrats in pre-election polls, meaning Black voters who don't support Democrats tend not to vote. Polls showing weaker Democratic support among Black voters may therefore signal a smaller Black share of the electorate.

AI Summary. Trust in government is consistently higher among members of the party holding the White House than among the opposition party. Republicans have often been more reactive to changes in political leadership, expressing much lower trust during Democratic presidencies, while Democrats' attitudes have been somewhat more consistent regardless of which party governs.

Pew Staff Pew Research Center
Date Posted:

In 2023, only 16% of Americans said they trust the government always/most of the time. Republican-leaning voters are lower trust at 8% relative to 25% of Democratic-leaning voters.

Does trust in government depend on which party holds the White House?

Core argument: Since the 1970s, trust in government has been consistently higher among members of the party that controls the White House than among the opposition party.

Since the 1970s, trust in government has been consistently higher among members of the party that controls the White House than among the opposition party. Republicans have often been more reactive than Democrats to changes in political leadership, with Republicans expressing much lower levels of trust during Democratic presidencies; Democrats’ attitudes have tended to be somewhat more consistent, regardless of which party controls the White House. However, the GOP and Democratic shifts in attitudes from the end of Donald Trump’s presidency to the start of Joe Biden’s were roughly the same magnitude.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since the 1970s, trust in government has been consistently higher among members of the party that controls the White House than among the opposition party.
  2. Republicans have often been more reactive than Democrats to changes in political leadership, expressing much lower levels of trust during Democratic presidencies, while Democrats' attitudes have tended to be somewhat more consistent regardless of which party controls the White House.
  3. The shifts in attitudes among Republicans and Democrats from the end of Donald Trump's presidency to the start of Joe Biden's were roughly the same magnitude.

Related Articles:

  • Collapsing Social Trust is Driving American Gun Violence — The statistical link between gun availability and gun deaths across countries and US states is driven largely by suicides, which account for the vast majority of gun deaths, while the link to gun homicides alone is much weaker. Adding interpersonal trust alongside gun ownership restores the relationship with homicides.