Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, June 21, 2023

AI Summary. The authors recalculate the Cost of Thriving Index and estimate the cost of supporting a family on one male earner's wages rose by just over 10 weeks of work rather than 22 weeks. Accounting for federal taxes—including the child tax credit—and quality improvements in health care and cars, they estimate the cost is now lower than in 1985.

Scott Winship and Jeremy Horpedahl American Enterprise Institute
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.@swinshi @AEIecon finds faults with @oren_cass analysis and argues that it has become easier for a male earner to support a family than it was in 1985. @jmhorp @JonahDispatch

Has the cost of supporting a family on one earner's wages fallen?

Core argument: Correcting the dollar costs in Oren Cass's Cost of Thriving Index, the authors find the cost of thriving for male workers rose by just over 10 weeks of work since 1985, not the 22 weeks Cass reports.

We find that it has become easier for a male earner to support a family than it was in 1985. We correct the dollar costs of the Oren Cass' Cost of Thriving Index (COTI) and find that instead of rising by 22 weeks of work, the cost of thriving (for male workers) rose by just over 10 weeks. This improved estimate overstates the increase in COTI, however. Cass’s way of measuring “costs” fails to account for quality improvement in the items he tracks—particularly better health care and nicer cars.  Furthermore, COTI does not take into account taxes—a major flaw. It’s especially important in this case because the kind of family Cass is describing has seen a major reduction in its federal tax burden since 1985, going from a net taxpayer to receiving a subsidy, primarily due to the child tax credit (CTC). After including estimates of the federal tax burden or tax subsidy in both years, we find that the 2022 cost of thriving for a family with one male earner is lower than it was in 1985.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Correcting the dollar costs in Oren Cass's Cost of Thriving Index, the authors find the cost of thriving for male workers rose by just over 10 weeks of work since 1985, not the 22 weeks Cass reports.
  2. After including estimates of the federal tax burden or subsidy in both years, the authors find the 2022 cost of thriving for a family with one male earner is lower than in 1985.
  3. The authors argue the Cost of Thriving Index omits taxes and quality improvements in the items it tracks, such as health care and cars, while the family Cass describes shifted from net taxpayer to subsidy recipient, primarily via the child tax credit.

AI Summary. U.S. national assessment scores for 13-year-olds declined 4 points in reading and 9 points in mathematics from the prior assessment, and 7 and 14 points respectively compared with a decade earlier. Mathematics declines were larger for lower-performing students (12–14 points) than for middle- and higher-performing students (6–8 points).

NCES Staff National Center for Educational Statistics
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America’s 13-year-olds test scores declined significantly between 2019-2020 and last school year. The mean 13-year-old lost 4pp in reading and 9pp in math a loss of 2.7% over a decade in reading and 5% in math.

Are student reading and math scores falling, most for low performers?

Core argument: Average NAEP long-term trend scores for 13-year-olds fell 9 points in mathematics and 4 points in reading between the 2019–20 and 2022–23 administrations, and 14 and 7 points respectively compared with a decade earlier.

The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) administered the NAEP long-term trend (LTT) reading and mathematics assessments to 13-year-old students from October to December of the 2022–23 school year. The average scores for 13-year-olds declined 4 points in reading and 9 points in mathematics compared to the previous assessment administered during the 2019–20 school year. Compared to a decade ago, the average scores declined 7 points in reading and 14 points in mathematics. The 2023 mathematics scores for age 13 students at all five selected percentile levels declined compared to 2020. The declines ranged from 6 to 8 points for middle- and higher-performing students to 12 to 14 points for lower-performing students, with larger declines for lower performers in comparison to their higher-performing peers. The percentage of students who reported missing 5 or more days doubled from 5 percent in 2020 to 10 percent in 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average NAEP long-term trend scores for 13-year-olds fell 9 points in mathematics and 4 points in reading between the 2019–20 and 2022–23 administrations, and 14 and 7 points respectively compared with a decade earlier.
  2. Mathematics scores for 13-year-olds declined at all five selected percentile levels relative to 2020, with drops of 12 to 14 points among lower-performing students versus 6 to 8 points for middle- and higher-performing students.
  3. The share of 13-year-olds reporting they missed 5 or more school days doubled from 5 percent in 2020 to 10 percent in 2023, according to the National Center for Education Statistics.

AI Summary. Phoenix-area suburbs are paying sharply higher prices for water rights from a basin west of the city, with one suburb approving $80m for 6,000 acre-feet — more than double the per-acre-foot price another suburb paid earlier. Arizona's groundwater replenishment assessments rose from $154 to $768 per acre-foot.

Leslie Kaufman, Jeremy Lin, and Linda Poon Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The price of water in Arizona is rising. Some cities are finding the price per acre-foot has doubled since 2021. @markets

Are desert suburbs paying sharply rising prices for water rights?

Core argument: Buckeye, a Phoenix suburb, approved paying $80 million for 6,000 acre-feet of Harquahala basin water, more than double the per-acre-foot price Queen Creek paid in its 2021 purchase of 5,000 acre-feet for $30 million.

In 2021 Queen Creek, [a high-end suburb of Phoenix] paid $30 million for 5,000 acre-feet of water [from] Harquahala, a basin west of Phoenix. It’s negotiating for another 8,000 acre-feet there, though the cost will likely be much higher this time around: Buckeye, [another Phoenix suburb,] approved paying $80 million for 6,000 acre feet from the same area in January.  That’s more than double what Queen Creek paid in 2021. In 1993 the state created the Central Arizona Groundwater Management Replenishment District (CAGRD). Communities would pay to pump water and in return the agency would replenish what they took out with water from the Colorado or other rivers. Households in the district pay bills for water and separate assessments for groundwater replenishment. Those rates have already gone from $154 per acre-foot in 2002 to $768 per acre-foot in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Buckeye, a Phoenix suburb, approved paying $80 million for 6,000 acre-feet of Harquahala basin water, more than double the per-acre-foot price Queen Creek paid in its 2021 purchase of 5,000 acre-feet for $30 million.
  2. Queen Creek is negotiating for another 8,000 acre-feet from the Harquahala basin west of Phoenix, where the cost will likely be much higher than in its 2021 deal.
  3. Groundwater replenishment assessments charged by Arizona's Central Arizona Groundwater Management Replenishment District, created in 1993 to replenish pumped groundwater with water from the Colorado or other rivers, rose from $154 per acre-foot in 2002 to $768 in 2021.

AI Summary. Europe's slowdown in GDP per capita growth reflects weaker productivity growth and aging, partly offset by rising labor force participation and hours worked. Gross changes in these growth components between 1979–1999 and 1999–2019 were large but largely offsetting, leaving a net decline of roughly 1 percentage point for most of Europe.

Dietrich Vollrath Economic Growth Blog
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.@DietzVollrath notes that a rise in labor force participation prevented what would have been a dramatic decline in European growth from 1999-2019, given Europe’s population aging and productivity slowdown.

Why has Europe's GDP per capita growth slowed?

Core argument: Europe's net slowdown in GDP per capita growth between 1979–1999 and 1999–2019 was on the order of one percentage point for most countries, despite massive gross changes in the underlying growth components.

The story of the slowdown in Europe is about productivity growth and aging, but with substantial offsets coming from LFP and hours. Changes in labor market activity, in general, prevented the slowdown in Europe from being even more devastating. The gross changes in the components of growth (productivity, labor force participation, etc..) were massive in Europe between 1979-1999 and 1999-2019. They turned out to offset each other in many cases so that the net change in the growth rate of GDP per capita was "only" on the order of minus 1 percentage point for most of Europe.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Europe's net slowdown in GDP per capita growth between 1979–1999 and 1999–2019 was on the order of one percentage point for most countries, despite massive gross changes in the underlying growth components.
  2. Productivity growth and aging account for Europe's slowdown, with substantial offsets from labor force participation and hours worked.
  3. Changes in labor market activity prevented Europe's slowdown from being even more devastating, as gross shifts in the components of growth offset each other in many cases.

Related Articles:

  • Fully Grown – European Vacation! — Europe's growth slowdown reflects a widespread drop in productivity growth rather than changes in physical capital accumulation, with human capital growth also mattering but varying by country. The productivity decline is larger than in the US: in countries such as the UK and France, productivity growth fell from about 2% to near zero or negative.

Thursday, June 22, 2023

AI Summary. The high-tech sector remains more dynamic than the rest of the economy, but the gap has faded as firm entry rates declined in both. The national firm entry rate peaked at 13.5% and the high-tech rate at 17.9%, and the gap between them narrowed from 5–6 percentage points to under one.

Connor O'Brian Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:

.@cojobrien argues that the sectors of the economy with a high share of STEM workers appear to have converged with the rest of the economy in terms of their startup rate.

Is the high-tech sector becoming less dynamic like the broader economy?

Core argument: The gap between U.S. High Tech and national firm entry rates fell below one percentage point in 2018, an all-time low, down from 5 to 6 percentage points in the 1990s.

Although the High Tech sector still remains more dynamic than the non-High Tech sector of the economy, the gap between the two has gradually faded. Beginning with firm entry rate, we see a long-running decline in both the High Tech sector and the broader economy. The national firm entry rate, hitting a series high of 13.5 percent in 1984, fell below 10% during the Great Recession and has yet to recover. The High Tech sector saw much higher startup rates during the 1980s, peaking at 17.9%, also in 1984. High Tech industries saw another huge surge in new startups in the 1990s, coinciding with the dot-com boom, but their startup rates have yet to recover. In 2018, the gap between the national and High Tech startup rates fell below one percentage point to an all-time low, down from 5 to 6percentage points in the 1990s. The rate of new firm creation in the High Tech sector, once far ahead of other sectors, now looks similar to that of the increasingly sclerotic national economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The gap between U.S. High Tech and national firm entry rates fell below one percentage point in 2018, an all-time low, down from 5 to 6 percentage points in the 1990s.
  2. The national firm entry rate peaked at a series high of 13.5 percent in 1984, fell below 10 percent during the Great Recession, and has yet to recover.
  3. High Tech startup rates peaked at 17.9 percent in 1984 and surged again in the 1990s alongside the dot-com boom, but have yet to recover.

AI Summary. College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.

David Deming National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

.@ProfDavidDeming finds that the college wage premium is driven by occupational sorting: workers with college degrees enter jobs with higher returns to tenure, suggesting the importance of on-the-job training.

Why do wages grow faster for college graduates over their careers?

Core argument: The college wage premium rises from 22% at age 26 to 49% at age 40 and 56% at age 60, and occupational sorting is estimated to explain at least half of this life cycle growth.

Shortly after graduating, workers with college degrees obtain jobs in professional, non-routine occupations with much greater scope for on-the-job learning and wage growth. Less educated workers hold jobs in similar occupations before and after completing schooling. Occupational sorting causes relative wages to grow especially rapidly for college graduates in the initial phase of their careers. However, after a few years, educated workers are less likely to switch jobs, and nearly 90% of life cycle wage growth occurs within rather than between jobs. Wages increase with job tenure much more in professional, nonroutine occupations, which are disproportionately held by college graduates. I estimate that occupational sorting explains at least half of the life cycle growth in the college wage premium. The college wage premium increases from 22% at age 26 to 49% at age 40 and 56% at age 60.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The college wage premium rises from 22% at age 26 to 49% at age 40 and 56% at age 60, and occupational sorting is estimated to explain at least half of this life cycle growth.
  2. College graduates move shortly after graduating into professional, non-routine occupations with much greater scope for on-the-job learning and wage growth, while less educated workers hold jobs in similar occupations before and after completing schooling.
  3. Nearly 90% of life cycle wage growth occurs within rather than between jobs, and wages increase with job tenure much more in professional, non-routine occupations disproportionately held by college graduates.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster For Educated Workers? — Most of the return to education reflects workers learning more over time rather than the initial quality their credentials signal, since signaling may secure a better first offer but longer-run wages reflect what has been learned. Signaling models of education fit awkwardly in dynamic rather than static settings.

AI Summary. Most of the return to education reflects workers learning more over time rather than the initial quality their credentials signal, since signaling may secure a better first offer but longer-run wages reflect what has been learned. Signaling models of education fit awkwardly in dynamic rather than static settings.

Tyler Cowen Marginal Revolution
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.@tylercowen thinks @ProfDavidDeming new paper implies that wages are driven by training not quality, suggesting the signaling theory of education is overstated.

.@tylercowen thinks @ProfDavidDeming new paper implies that wages are driven by training not quality, suggesting the...

Do wages grow faster for educated workers because they learn more?

Core argument: Cowen argues that most of the return to education comes from learning more over time rather than from signaling an initial level of quality, since long-run wages reflect what workers have learned.

You will note how this relates to the signaling vs. human capital debates over education. Signaling your quality may put you in a position to learn more over time, as your initial offer likely will be better if you come out of Harvard. But over the longer haul, the wages you earn are the result of what you have learned, not just your initial level of quality. So, most of the return to education is that you learn more over time, and thus most of the return is learning-related rather than initial quality-related. Overall, signaling models behave rather awkwardly in dynamic rather than purely static settings.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cowen argues that most of the return to education comes from learning more over time rather than from signaling an initial level of quality, since long-run wages reflect what workers have learned.
  2. Signaling quality, such as by graduating from Harvard, likely yields a better initial offer that can place a worker in a position to learn more over time, according to Cowen.
  3. Cowen contends that signaling models of education behave awkwardly in dynamic settings rather than purely static ones.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster For Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.

AI Summary. A decomposition of the change in growth rates between 1979–1999 and 1999–2019 finds that Germany's annual GDP per capita growth fell by 0.67 percentage points, with slower productivity growth subtracting 1.32 points and education 0.43 points. Rising hours worked and labor force participation added 0.5 and 1.38 points, offsetting much of the decline.

Dietrich Vollrath Economic Growth Blog
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.@DietzVollrath notes that the European productivity slowdown could be in part explained by higher labor force participation which drew “relatively less skilled (or possibly less experienced?) workforce that lowered measured productivity growth.”

What drives Europe's slowdown in GDP per capita growth?

Core argument: Germany's annual growth rate of GDP per capita fell by 0.67 percentage points from 1979–1999 to 1999–2019, the slowdown the decomposition seeks to explain.

The entries in the table are the change in the growth rate of each element from 1979-1999 to 1999-2019. In Germany (DEU), for example, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita fell by -0.67 percentage points from the earlier period to the later period. That is the slowdown we're trying to understand. The remaining columns are the breakdown of that drop in the growth rate of GDP per capita into different parts. For example, in Germany the fall in the growth rate of productivity subtracted 1.32 percentage points from the growth rate of GDP per capita, and changes in education subtracted 0.43 percentage points. In contrast, changes in hours worked added 0.5 percentage points to the growth rate and increases in labor force participation added 1.38 percentage points. Those latter things helped offset all the other negatives, making the slowdown not as bad as it could have been.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany's annual growth rate of GDP per capita fell by 0.67 percentage points from 1979–1999 to 1999–2019, the slowdown the decomposition seeks to explain.
  2. The fall in productivity growth subtracted 1.32 percentage points from Germany's GDP per capita growth rate, and changes in education subtracted 0.43 percentage points.
  3. Increases in labor force participation added 1.38 percentage points and changes in hours worked added 0.5 percentage points to Germany's GDP per capita growth rate, partly offsetting the other negatives.

Related Articles:

  • Fully Grown – European Vacation! and — Europe's growth slowdown reflects a widespread drop in productivity growth rather than changes in physical capital accumulation, with human capital growth also mattering but varying by country. The productivity decline is larger than in the US: in countries such as the UK and France, productivity growth fell from about 2% to near zero or negative.
  • The Slowdown in Europe via Human Capital — Europe's slowdown in GDP per capita growth reflects weaker productivity growth and aging, partly offset by rising labor force participation and hours worked. Gross changes in these growth components between 1979–1999 and 1999–2019 were large but largely offsetting, leaving a net decline of roughly 1 percentage point for most of Europe.

AI Summary. China's Ministry of Finance reported governments across the country held 37tn yuan ($5.1tn) in on-book debt, with no official tally of hidden debt or who owes it. The International Monetary Fund estimated local government financing vehicles held 66tn yuan ($9.2tn) of hidden debt at end-2022, up from 40tn yuan in 2019.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
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The Chinese Ministry of Finance is launching an effort to track gross government debt in China. In February the IMF estimated there was 66T yuan ($9.2T) of local government hidden debt at the end of 2022, up from 40T yuan in 2019. @markets

How much hidden local government debt does China have?

Core argument: The IMF estimated in February that China's local government financing vehicles held 66 trillion yuan ($9.2T) of hidden debt at the end of 2022, up from 40 trillion yuan in 2019, as local governments ramped up off-book borrowing during the pandemic.

Ministry of Finance data showed governments across China had 37 trillion yuan ($5.1T) in on-book debt outstanding at the end of April, but there is no official total for how much hidden debt there is and who owes it. The International Monetary Fund estimated in February that nationwide there was 66T yuan [$9.2T] of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) hidden debt at the end of 2022, up from 40Tyuan in 2019, with that quick increase underscoring how local governments ramped up off-book borrowing and spending during the pandemic to support their local economies. Local officials will be pressed to come clean about their so-called hidden debt as national leaders attempt to get a fuller picture of liabilities across all levels of government, the people said, asking not to be named discussing private information. The campaign is being led by the Ministry of Finance, one of the people said.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IMF estimated in February that China's local government financing vehicles held 66 trillion yuan ($9.2T) of hidden debt at the end of 2022, up from 40 trillion yuan in 2019, as local governments ramped up off-book borrowing during the pandemic.
  2. Ministry of Finance data showed governments across China had 37 trillion yuan ($5.1T) in on-book debt outstanding at the end of April, with no official total for how much hidden debt exists or who owes it.
  3. China's Ministry of Finance is leading a nationwide campaign pressing local officials to disclose hidden debt as national leaders seek a fuller picture of liabilities across all levels of government.

AI Summary. Indian equities rose $440bn to more than $3.5tn in value, making India the world's fifth-largest stock market after the US, China, Japan, and Hong Kong, ahead of France and the UK. Foreign portfolio investors added a net $9.4bn to Indian shares in the quarter, with analysts attributing the bulk of this year's inflows to passive index buying.

Hudson Lockett and Chloe Cornish Financial Times
Date Posted:

India’s stock market has gained 14% in the past three months driven by institutional foreign investors. Indian equities account for 3.3% of global stock market total capitalization.

Are foreign inflows lifting Indian equities into the world's fifth-largest market?

Core argument: Indian equities rose $440bn in value to more than $3.5tn, lifting India above France and the UK to regain the status of the world's fifth-largest stock market after the US, China, Japan, and Hong Kong.

The $440bn increase in the value of Indian equities to more than $3.5tn means India has climbed well above both France and the UK to regain the status of the world’s fifth-largest stock market after the US, China, Japan, and Hong Kong. The Sensex index, which tracks India’s 30 biggest companies by market capitalisation and is weighted towards financial stocks, has been climbing steadily for the past three months and hit a record 63,588 points on Wednesday, spurred by buying from foreign pension and insurance funds. Indian shares have received $9.4bn of net inflows from foreign portfolio investment in the second quarter, according to Bloomberg data. The Kotak Institutional Equities analysts said “the bulk” of the net inflow this year had been passive, meaning fund managers were buying a whole index rather than choosing specific stocks.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Indian equities rose $440bn in value to more than $3.5tn, lifting India above France and the UK to regain the status of the world's fifth-largest stock market after the US, China, Japan, and Hong Kong.
  2. The Sensex, which tracks India's 30 biggest companies by market capitalisation and is weighted towards financial stocks, hit a record 63,588 points after climbing steadily for three months, spurred by buying from foreign pension and insurance funds.
  3. Indian shares drew $9.4bn of net foreign portfolio inflows in the second quarter, according to Bloomberg data, and Kotak Institutional Equities analysts said "the bulk" of this year's net inflow had been passive, with managers buying whole indices rather than specific stocks.

Related Articles:

  • India Equity: An Unsung Long-Term Performance Story — Cumulative total returns for Indian equities have been comparable to or better than US equities over roughly three decades, while Chinese equities have lagged both, according to index data for the MSCI India, S&P 500, and MSCI China indexes.
  • India Is Getting an Eye-Wateringly Big Transport Upgrade — India is spending 1.7% of GDP on transport infrastructure this year, roughly twice the level in the United States and most European countries. The stated aim is to cut domestic logistics costs from about 14% of GDP to 8% by 2030.

AI Summary. A researcher argues that "endocrine disrupting" chemicals — including pesticides, bisphenols that harden plastic, and phthalates that soften it — interfere with the body's natural hormones and may be lowering sperm counts and affecting the reproductive development of unborn children. Traces of these chemicals have been found in breast milk, placental tissue, urine, blood, and seminal fluid.

Sarah Neville Financial Times
Date Posted:

Shanna Swan argues that falling sperm counts around the world are likely driven the proliferation of “endocrine disrupting” chemicals which are used in pesticides and plastic manufacturing.

Shanna Swan argues that falling sperm counts around the world are likely driven the proliferation of “endocrine disrupting”...

Are hormone-disrupting chemicals in everyday products lowering sperm counts?

Core argument: A scientist who has spent more than two decades studying endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs) links falling global sperm counts to compounds that interfere with the body's natural hormones, including pesticides, bisphenols and phthalates.

For more than two decades she has devoted her life to studying the effects of “endocrine disrupting” chemicals (EDCs), which can interfere with the body’s natural hormones. These include pesticides, bisphenols, which harden plastic so it can be used in food storage containers and baby bottles, and phthalates, which soften plastic for use in packaging and products such as garden hoses. In recent years, traces of EDCs have been found in breast milk, placental tissue, urine, blood, and seminal fluid. The innocuous products in your kitchen cupboard, bathroom cabinet or garden shed may be lowering sperm counts. They could also affect the reproductive systems of your unborn children. The implications of EDCs for human health don’t stop there: they can disrupt thyroid function, trigger cancer and obesity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A scientist who has spent more than two decades studying endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs) links falling global sperm counts to compounds that interfere with the body's natural hormones, including pesticides, bisphenols and phthalates.
  2. Traces of EDCs have been found in breast milk, placental tissue, urine, blood and seminal fluid, and common kitchen, bathroom and garden products may be lowering sperm counts and affecting the reproductive systems of unborn children.
  3. Beyond reproduction, EDCs can disrupt thyroid function and trigger cancer and obesity; bisphenols harden plastic for food containers and baby bottles, while phthalates soften it for packaging and garden hoses.