Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, June 12, 2023

AI Summary. Public attention to inflation recedes as grocery price increases ease, and 3% inflation is likely low enough for the public to lose interest even if 4% is not. That raises the question of whether policymakers should pay a high price to push inflation from 3% down to 2%.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:

.@paulkrugman argues the cost associated with getting inflation from 3% to 2% outweighs the benefits citing the public’s declining interest in inflation among consumers, noting declining searches for “inflation.”

Is 3% inflation low enough for the public to stop caring?

Core argument: Public attention to inflation has declined and will likely recede further toward normal as grocery prices decrease, according to the author.

So people are thinking about inflation a lot less, and their interest will probably recede even further toward normal as grocery prices decrease. The question is, how low does the inflation target have to be for the public to lose interest? I now worry that 4 percent may be a bit too high. But 3 percent almost surely isn’t. In which case, should we be willing to pay a high price to get inflation down from 3 to 2? This isn’t a hypothetical question about a remote possibility. It may very well be exactly the question policymakers face a few months from now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Public attention to inflation has declined and will likely recede further toward normal as grocery prices decrease, according to the author.
  2. The author worries 4 percent inflation may be a bit too high for the public to lose interest, while 3 percent almost surely is not.
  3. The author frames whether to pay a high price to cut inflation from 3 percent to 2 percent as a question policymakers may face a few months from now, not a remote possibility.

AI Summary. The increase in nominal pretax U.S. business income since late 2019 equals about 17% of the increase in consumer spending excluding imputed rent over the same period, below the roughly 21% share of such spending that quarterly pretax business income has historically represented. On this measure, profit growth has been slightly low relative to a naive expectation.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

.@M_C_Klein notes the increase in nominal pretax business income is just 17% of the increase in consumer spending, suggesting that “excess” profits were not a primary driver of inflation post-pandemic.

Have profits grown faster than consumer spending since the pandemic?

Core argument: The increase in U.S. nominal pretax business income since 2019 Q4 equals just 17% of the increase in consumer spending excluding imputed rent over the same period.

Put another way, the increase in nominal pretax business income since 2019 Q4 is equivalent to just 17% of the increase in consumer spending excluding imputed rent since the eve of the pandemic. For perspective, the total amount of nominal pretax business income generated in the U.S. in any given quarter has historically been worth about 21% of PCE ex-imputed rents, which means that the growth in profits has been a little low relative to what one might have naively expected.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The increase in U.S. nominal pretax business income since 2019 Q4 equals just 17% of the increase in consumer spending excluding imputed rent over the same period.
  2. Nominal pretax business income in the U.S. has historically been worth about 21% of personal consumption expenditures excluding imputed rents in any given quarter, above the 17% share recorded since the eve of the pandemic.
  3. Profit growth since 2019 Q4 has been a little low relative to what the historical 21% ratio of business income to consumer spending excluding imputed rents would naively imply.

AI Summary. A study led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found nearly 2,000GW of solar, wind and storage projects waiting in queues to connect to US long-distance transmission grids, more than the installed capacity of the entire US power plant fleet. The authors find only about a fifth of such requested projects are typically built.

Attracta Mooney Financial Times
Date Posted:

According to research by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 2,000GW of solar, wind and storage projects are in the planning stage, and 20% are likely to be built based on historical completion rates, vs. 1,300 GW installed capacity in 2022.

Are transmission grid connection queues holding back renewable energy buildout?

Core argument: US grid connection requests grew 40% in 2022, according to a study led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, with nearly 2,000GW of solar, wind and storage projects queued to connect to transmission grids.

In the US, grid connection requests grew by 40 per cent in 2022, a study led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found. The researchers discovered that nearly 2,000GW of solar, wind and storage projects were in queues to connect to transmission grids — the long-distance, high-voltage electricity network — far more than the installed capacity of the entire US power plant fleet. Many of these projects will never be built. Developers often submit speculative applications, says lead author Joseph Rand. His research looking at connection requests submitted between 2000 and 2017 found that typically only a fifth of projects were built.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US grid connection requests grew 40% in 2022, according to a study led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, with nearly 2,000GW of solar, wind and storage projects queued to connect to transmission grids.
  2. The nearly 2,000GW of US projects awaiting transmission interconnection far exceeds the installed capacity of the entire US power plant fleet, and many of these projects will never be built.
  3. Lead author Joseph Rand, examining US connection requests submitted between 2000 and 2017, found that typically only a fifth of projects were built, and says developers often submit speculative applications.

AI Summary. Of 243,700 US manufacturing firms, only 1,700 have majority-owned foreign establishments, and 1,200 of those operate both US and foreign plants, making them the most prevalent type of US multinational manufacturer. Firms manufacturing exclusively abroad employ under 1m workers worldwide, 2.5% of US manufacturing firms' global employment.

Teresa Fort National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Detailed analysis by @Tfpiasecki shows that American manufacturing firms have not fully substituted foreign for domestic production, but rather supplement their domestic efforts with foreign production.

How many US manufacturers actually produce only in foreign plants?

Core argument: Of the 243,700 US manufacturing firms in 2007, only 1,700 had majority-owned foreign establishments, and 1,200 of those owned both US and foreign manufacturing plants, the most prevalent type of US multinational manufacturing enterprise.

The first row of Table 1 presents the number of US firms that manufacture in-house in 2007 across these four categories. Of the 243,700 US manufacturing firms, only 1,700 have majority-owned foreign establishments (columns 2 to 4). Among these multinationals, 1,200 firms own US and foreign manufacturing plants, versus 350 firms with just domestic plants, and only 150 firms with exclusively foreign in-house manufacturing. Firms with both domestic and foreign manufacturing plants are thus the most prevalent type of US multinational manufacturing enterprise. Panel A of Table 1 presents total sales for these firms. Panel B shows that transnational manufacturers - those that perform in-house physical transformation activities in the United States and abroad - employ more workers than all other firm types, with just over half of these workers employed at their US plants. Firms that manufacture exclusively in foreign plants employ less than one million workers worldwide and account for just 2.5 percent of all US manufacturing firms ' global employment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the 243,700 US manufacturing firms in 2007, only 1,700 had majority-owned foreign establishments, and 1,200 of those owned both US and foreign manufacturing plants, the most prevalent type of US multinational manufacturing enterprise.
  2. Transnational manufacturers, which perform in-house physical transformation in both the United States and abroad, employ more workers than all other firm types, with just over half of those workers at their US plants.
  3. The 150 US firms that manufacture exclusively in foreign plants employ fewer than one million workers worldwide and account for 2.5 percent of all US manufacturing firms' global employment.

AI Summary. A joint Princeton, Harvard and MIT study found more than 1,400 US-based ethnic Chinese scientists switched their academic affiliation from American to Chinese institutions in a single year, a 22% increase over the prior year. OECD data show the US lost 896 scientific authors that year while China gained 3,108, reversing an earlier pattern.

Echo Xie South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

According to the OECD, the US lost 896 scientific authors in 2021, while China picked up 3,108. In 2015, the US gained 2,920 scientists while China lost 366. @SCMPNews

According to the OECD, the US lost 896 scientific authors in 2021, while China picked up 3,108. In 2015, the US gained 2,920...

Are Chinese scientists leaving US institutions for China in growing numbers?

Core argument: A joint Princeton, Harvard and MIT study found more than 1,400 US-based ethnic Chinese scientists changed their academic affiliation from American to Chinese institutions in 2021, a 22 per cent increase on the previous year.

A joint study last year by Princeton, Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found more than 1,400 US-based ethnic Chinese scientists changed their academic affiliation from American to Chinese institutions in 2021 – a 22 per cent increase on the previous year. According to data published in April by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the US lost 896 scientific authors in 2021, while China picked up 3,108. The findings are in stark contrast to 2015, when traffic was reversed, with a gain of 2,920 scientists for the US and a loss of 336 to China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A joint Princeton, Harvard and MIT study found more than 1,400 US-based ethnic Chinese scientists changed their academic affiliation from American to Chinese institutions in 2021, a 22 per cent increase on the previous year.
  2. OECD data published in April show the US lost 896 scientific authors in 2021 while China gained 3,108, contrasting with 2015, when the US gained 2,920 scientists and China lost 336.
  3. Xie Xiaoliang is the latest Chinese scientist to give up US citizenship.

Related Articles:

  • Creating and Connecting US and China Science: Chinese Diaspora and Returnee Researchers — The authors estimate that China-born researchers working in the US contributed to 27% of US-addressed scientific papers, while China-born researchers with US experience who returned home contributed to 38% of China-addressed papers. Papers with these authors averaged more citations and appeared more often in high-impact journals than other papers.

AI Summary. About 6.8m couples registered marriages in China, an 11% decline and the lowest level since 1985, when available government data begins, with unions peaking in 2013 and falling since. United Nations data show more than 10m more men than women aged 20-34, a gender imbalance that could make marriage harder.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:

There were 6.8M marriages in China in 2022, the lowest level since 1985, driven by a decline in the population aged between 20-34, and a gender imbalance of 10M more men than women in that cohort.

Are marriages in China falling to multi-decade lows?

Core argument: About 6.8 million Chinese couples registered marriages last year, down 11% from 2021 and the lowest total since 1985, when available government data begins, with unions peaking in 2013 before declining rapidly.

About 6.8 million couples registered marriages in China last year, down 11% from 2021 and the lowest number since 1985, when available government data begins. The data shows the number of unions peaked in 2013 and has since rapidly declined. In 2021, the number of people aged 20-34 fell below 300 million for the first time since the mid-1980s, and there were more than 10 million more men than women in that age cohort, according to data from the United Nations. That gender imbalance could make it even harder to get married, especially as same-sex marriage isn’t legal in China. The average age of a first marriage in 2020 was almost 29, up almost four years from 2010, local media Yicai reported over the weekend, citing national census data.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About 6.8 million Chinese couples registered marriages last year, down 11% from 2021 and the lowest total since 1985, when available government data begins, with unions peaking in 2013 before declining rapidly.
  2. China's population aged 20–34 fell below 300 million in 2021 for the first time since the mid-1980s, and that cohort had more than 10 million more men than women, according to United Nations data.
  3. The average age of first marriage in China was almost 29 in 2020, up almost four years from 2010, Yicai reported, citing national census data.

AI Summary. China's total credit to the nonfinancial sector reached $49.9tn, more than triple the level 10 years earlier, according to the Bank for International Settlements, with the debt concentrated in households, the private sector and local governments rather than the central government. Total debt reached 295% of GDP, above the US at 257%.

Stella Yifan Xie Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Fueled by Long Credit Binge, China’s Economy Faces Drag from Debt Purge

Is China's debt burden now larger relative to GDP than America's?

Core argument: China's total credit to the nonfinancial sector reached $49.9 trillion last September, more than triple the level of 10 years earlier, according to Bank for International Settlements data.

Total credit to the nonfinancial sector was $49.9 trillion last September, more than triple the level 10 years ago, according to the Bank for International Settlements, a consortium of global central banks. The figure has begun to drop in dollar terms from $51.4 trillion at the end of 2021, though in local currency, the debt continued to climb. The issue isn’t the central government, whose debts are relatively low as a percentage of gross domestic product, but households, the private sector and local governments. Total debt as a share of GDP hit 295% in China last September, surpassing 257% in the U.S. and an average of 258% in the eurozone, BIS data show.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's total credit to the nonfinancial sector reached $49.9 trillion last September, more than triple the level of 10 years earlier, according to Bank for International Settlements data.
  2. China's total debt hit 295% of GDP last September, exceeding 257% in the U.S. and an average of 258% in the eurozone, BIS data show.
  3. China's debt problem lies with households, the private sector and local governments rather than the central government, whose debts are relatively low as a share of GDP.

Related Articles:

  • Can China’s Long-Term Growth Rate Exceed 2-3 Percent? — China invests roughly 42–44% of its GDP, while more mature, capital-intensive economies typically invest about 15–20%. Modeling a ten-year path that lowers China's investment share to 30% of GDP, the author argues the resulting growth rate depends mainly on how fast consumption grows.

Tuesday, June 13, 2023

AI Summary. Core consumer inflation excluding food and energy has run at about a 5% annual rate for six straight months, but narrower measures that also exclude shelter and used cars are much lower, at 1.1% over one month and 4.2% over twelve. The author argues the standard core measure overstates underlying inflation.

Jason Furman @jasonfurman
Date Posted:

.@jasonfurman argues that, with core inflation running at a 5% annualized rate, the Fed shouldn’t pause. Even though today’s report does offer evidence inflation is falling, he has “no confidence it is falling to 3% let alone 2%.”

Does core inflation overstate underlying inflation?

Core argument: Core CPI rose at about a 5% annual rate for a sixth straight month, which Jason Furman argues almost certainly overstates current underlying inflation given the outsized importance of shelter and used cars.

Core inflation (which excludes food and energy) rose at about a 5% annual rate for a sixth straight month. But other measures of underlying inflation were much lower reflecting the outsized importance of shelter and used cars (again) this month. Some relief should be coming. Look at the BLS's most narrow measure, sometimes called "supercore," which also excludes shelter (which is lagging) and used cars (which are volatile and posted a big increase in May). At an annual rate: 1 month: 1.1% 3 months: 2.3% 6 months: 3.3% 12 months: 4.2%. What does all of this mean? The most standard measure of core inflation is running at a 5% rate. That almost certainly overstates current underlying inflation. But by how much? How much will it fall? I expect some but have no confidence it is falling to 3% let alone 2%. The Fed has strongly telegraphed a pause/skip & nothing about this will change that. But is mildly unfortunate. Over the last 3 months core CPI is 5.0% annual rate. The employment mandate is fine with 283K jobs per month. Both much hotter than expected. Ought to raise now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Core CPI rose at about a 5% annual rate for a sixth straight month, which Jason Furman argues almost certainly overstates current underlying inflation given the outsized importance of shelter and used cars.
  2. The BLS's narrowest measure, sometimes called "supercore," which also excludes shelter and used cars, ran at annual rates of 1.1% over one month, 2.3% over three months, 3.3% over six months, and 4.2% over twelve months.
  3. Furman expects some decline in inflation but has no confidence it falls to 3% let alone 2%, and calls the Fed's telegraphed pause mildly unfortunate with core CPI at a 5.0% three-month rate and 283K jobs per month.

AI Summary. More than a dozen US states are triggering the Sahm rule, which ties the onset of recession to a three-month average unemployment rate at least half a percentage point above its 12-month low, a pattern that suggests labour market conditions have softened. The rule traditionally applies to national rather than state data, and the weakness is not yet broad-based.

Colby Smith Financial Times
Date Posted:

Unemployment rates have risen at least 0.5% above the prior 12 month low in DC and 18 states. Based on the “Sahm Rule,” which has been remarkably accurate at the national level, this would suggest these states have entered a recession.

Do state-level recession signals show the labor market has softened?

Core argument: Well over a dozen US states have triggered the Sahm rule, which ties recession onset to a three-month moving average unemployment rate rising at least 0.5 percentage points above its 12-month low.

Across the country, well over a dozen states are flashing warning signals, triggering the so-called Sahm rule, which links the start of a recession to when the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises at least half a percentage point above its low over the past 12 months. The Sahm rule traditionally applies to national unemployment — not state-level data, which can be distorted by small sample sizes — but the trend across the country suggests labour market conditions have softened. Still, the weakness is not yet broad-based and would need to intensify for the worst prognoses to be realised.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Well over a dozen US states have triggered the Sahm rule, which ties recession onset to a three-month moving average unemployment rate rising at least 0.5 percentage points above its 12-month low.
  2. The Sahm rule traditionally applies to national unemployment rather than state-level data, which can be distorted by small sample sizes, though the cross-state trend suggests labour market conditions have softened.
  3. US labour market weakness is not yet broad-based and would need to intensify for the worst prognoses to be realised.

AI Summary. A vector autoregressive model of economic growth, loan growth, and bank lending standards estimates that a one standard deviation tightening in bank lending standards takes six quarters to reach its maximum negative effect on economic growth. The authors argue the drag from tighter lending standards accumulates over that period because banks need time to repair their balance sheets.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

According to a model by Torsten Sløk @apolloglobal, it takes a year and half for tighter credit to have its maximum impact on GDP, suggesting changes in banks behavior in the aftermath of SVB won’t peak until the second half of next year.

How long do tighter bank lending standards take to slow growth?

Core argument: A small vector autoregressive model of GDP growth, loan growth, and bank lending standards indicates that a one standard deviation shock to lending standards takes six quarters to reach its maximum negative impact on GDP.

We built a small vector autoregressive model with GDP growth, loan growth, and bank lending standards, and giving a one standard deviation shock to bank lending standards using a standard Cholesky decomposition shows that it takes six quarters before tighter credit conditions have a maximum negative impact on GDP, see chart below. In other words, the negative impact of the SVB collapse on tighter lending standards will continue to accumulate until the second half of 2024 because it takes time for banks to repair their balance sheets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A small vector autoregressive model of GDP growth, loan growth, and bank lending standards indicates that a one standard deviation shock to lending standards takes six quarters to reach its maximum negative impact on GDP.
  2. Because banks need time to repair their balance sheets, the negative impact of the SVB collapse on tighter lending standards is expected to accumulate until the second half of 2024.
  3. The shock to bank lending standards in the model is identified using a standard Cholesky decomposition.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in a firm's perceived cost of capital raises its discount rate by only 0.3 percentage points, with 40% of firms leaving discount rates unchanged even over a decade. Larger gaps between discount rates and the perceived cost of capital are associated with lower investment rates.

Niels Joachim Gormsen and Kilian Huber National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

.@NielsGormsen shows that the average firm reduces its discount rate by only .3% in response to a 1% decline in perceived cost of capital. The implication is a lower level of capital spending relative to what the decline in cost of capital would imply.

How closely do corporate discount rates track the cost of capital?

Core argument: Using within-firm variation, the authors find that a 1 percentage point increase in a firm's perceived cost of capital raises its discount rate by 0.3 percentage points on average, in contrast to the stylized view.

We document that changes in the perceived cost of capital only modestly affect discount rates, in contrast to the stylized view. Using within-firm variation, we show that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the perceived cost of capital leads to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the discount rate. We show that discount rate wedges are associated with investment fluctuations at the firm level. A 1 percentage point increase in the wedge lowers the investment rate by 0.9 points. Many firms rarely change discount rates, so the relation becomes stronger over longer horizons. However, even at the 10-year horizon, 40 percent of firms maintain unchanged discount rates and, even if they change, adjust less than one-to-one with the perceived cost of capital.  These results suggest that discount rates have “a life of their own,” beyond the perceived cost of capital.  The average US firm in our sample has increased its discount rate wedge by 2.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using within-firm variation, the authors find that a 1 percentage point increase in a firm's perceived cost of capital raises its discount rate by 0.3 percentage points on average, in contrast to the stylized view.
  2. Discount rate wedges are associated with firm-level investment fluctuations, with a 1 percentage point increase in the wedge lowering the investment rate by 0.9 points.
  3. Even at a 10-year horizon, 40 percent of firms leave discount rates unchanged and those that adjust move less than one-to-one with the perceived cost of capital, while the average US firm in the sample raised its discount rate wedge by 2.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2021.

AI Summary. US births declined steadily for years before the pandemic, with almost 600,000 fewer annual births in 2019 than in 2007, a 13% drop. The pandemic-related baby bust and subsequent rebound were short-term deviations from that longer trend, and 2022 birth counts remained below 2019 levels.

Melissa Kearney and Phillip Levine Brookings Institution
Date Posted:

During COVID, births fell dramatically, especially in states where case counts were high and unemployment spikes were relatively large. Births rebounded sharply in 2021 but are still below 2019 levels. @kearney_melissa @phil_wellesley

Are US births continuing their long-run decline after the pandemic swings?

Core argument: US annual births fell by almost 600,000 between 2007 and 2019, a 13% reduction, continuing a steady decline that preceded the pandemic.

Before the pandemic, births had been steadily declining for many years. There were almost 600,000 fewer annual births in 2019 relative to 2007—a 13% reduction. The size of the COVID-related baby bust, and subsequent rebound were meaningful in that context, but they also represent short-term deviations from an ongoing trend of considerably greater importance. Birth counts in 2022 are still below what they were in 2019.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US annual births fell by almost 600,000 between 2007 and 2019, a 13% reduction, continuing a steady decline that preceded the pandemic.
  2. The COVID-related baby bust and subsequent rebound were meaningful in size but represent short-term deviations from the longer-running downward trend in US births.
  3. US birth counts in 2022 remained below their 2019 level.

AI Summary. More than 500 active and planned submarine cables carry 99% of intercontinental data to roughly 1,400 coastal landing stations worldwide. US efforts have kept China from becoming a major supplier: Chinese firm HMN Tech accounts for 10% of existing and planned cables where the supplier is known, versus 41% for France's ASN and 21% for America's SubCom.

Anna Gross, Alexandra Heal, et al. Financial Times
Date Posted:

China is building its own parallel fiber optic network as the West increasingly locks Chinese firms out of the cable network that carries internet traffic.

Has the US kept China a minor supplier of undersea internet cables?

Core argument: Chinese supplier HMN Tech has supplied or is set to supply equipment for 10% of all existing and planned global submarine cables where the supplier is known, according to FT analysis of TeleGeography data.

There are more than 500 active and planned submarine cables, transporting 99% of intercontinental data, arriving at around 1,400 coastal landing stations around the world. The US has succeeded in preventing Beijing from becoming a major player in the global submarine cable market. Chinese supplier HMN Tech has provided or is set to provide the equipment to only 10% of all existing and planned global cables, where the supplier is known, FT analysis of data supplied by the consultancy TeleGeography shows. Meanwhile, French cable maker ASN has supplied 41 per cent and American company SubCom has supplied 21%. Neither ASN nor SubCom responded to requests for comment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese supplier HMN Tech has supplied or is set to supply equipment for 10% of all existing and planned global submarine cables where the supplier is known, according to FT analysis of TeleGeography data.
  2. French cable maker ASN has supplied 41% and American company SubCom 21% of existing and planned global submarine cables where the supplier is known, according to FT analysis of TeleGeography data.
  3. More than 500 active and planned submarine cables carry 99% of intercontinental data to around 1,400 coastal landing stations worldwide, and the US has succeeded in preventing Beijing from becoming a major player in that market.