Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, May 18, 2023

AI Summary. The average number of jobs created per new business establishment has declined over recent decades, from 6.4 employees per establishment birth in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021, even as the number of new establishments has risen.

Haley Klundt and Kevin Cooksey U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Date Posted:

A new @BLS_gov analysis finds the number of employees of new firms was 2.7 in 2021, down from 6.4 in 1996. Firms that make it to 1, 3, and 5 year survival marks also employ fewer workers than their 1990s counterparts.

Are new businesses creating fewer jobs than they used to?

Core argument: Average "birth weight" — gross job gains from establishment births divided by the number of establishment births — fell from 6.4 employees per new establishment in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021.

The increasing number of establishment births in combination with the decreasing number of jobs generated by those births suggests that the average size of new businesses has been shrinking in recent decades. This theory can be examined through a measure informally nicknamed “birth weight,” that is calculated as the level of gross job gains from establishment births divided by the level of establishment births. While the number of new business establishments tends to rise and fall with the business cycle of the overall economy, the decline in jobs created by establishment births raises questions regarding the changing nature of startups. The average “birth weight” has been steadily declining over the last 20 years from a high of 6.4 employees per establishment birth in 1996 to a low of 2.7 employees per establishment birth in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average "birth weight" — gross job gains from establishment births divided by the number of establishment births — fell from 6.4 employees per new establishment in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021.
  2. Rising establishment births alongside falling job gains from those births suggests the average size of new businesses has been shrinking in recent decades.
  3. The number of new establishments rises and falls with the overall business cycle, but the decline in jobs created by establishment births raises questions about the changing nature of startups.

Related Articles:

  • Surging Business Formation in the Pandemic: Causes and Consequences — US applications for new businesses dropped early in the COVID-19 pandemic and then rose to record levels, remaining historically elevated, including among applications with characteristics likely to result in hiring and growth. Business applications have historically tracked actual business formation closely.

AI Summary. Two government-backed enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, underwrite credit risk for more than half of US mortgages, and their guarantees enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages American borrowers expect. That structure helps explain why the US financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe's, where floating-rate mortgages are common.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

.@TheEconomist argues that the financial system is slipping into greater state control. Americans can park cash in money-market funds, which in turn park it directly at the Fed, circumventing the banking system altogether.

.@TheEconomist argues that the financial system is slipping into greater state control. Americans can park cash in...

Do government mortgage guarantees make the financial system bear more interest-rate risk?

Core argument: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-backed enterprises, together underwrite credit risk for more than half of American mortgages.

The real risk comes when policy preferences interfere with lending rules. In America this already happens in the mortgage market, which is dominated by two government-backed enterprises: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Together the two institutions now underwrite credit risk for more than half of mortgages. Their guarantees enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages Americans have come to expect. They also help explain why America’s financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe’s, where floating-rate mortgages are common.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-backed enterprises, together underwrite credit risk for more than half of American mortgages.
  2. The guarantees provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages Americans have come to expect.
  3. America's financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe's, where floating-rate mortgages are common, a difference the guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac help explain.

AI Summary. Global chipmakers including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Samsung Electronics, Intel and Micron have outlined expansion plans in Japan that could support the country's re-emergence as a semiconductor powerhouse. Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant using extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.

Leo Lewis and Kana Inagaki Financial Times
Date Posted:

Seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers including TSMC, Samsung and Intel announced plans for significant investment in Japan that would make Japan a “semiconductor powerhouse.”

Seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers including TSMC, Samsung and Intel announced plans for significant...

Are global chipmakers expanding semiconductor investment in Japan?

Core argument: Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant producing cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.

At an unprecedented meeting in Tokyo with Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida, the heads of chipmakers including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and Intel and Micron of the US described plans that could transform Japan’s prospects of re-emerging as a semiconductor powerhouse. Micron said it expected to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, to build a plant to produce cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology in Hiroshima. Samsung is also discussing setting up a ¥30bn research and development centre in Yokohama with pilot lines for semiconductor devices. Japanese government officials said the move followed a thaw in relations between Tokyo and Seoul.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant producing cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.
  2. Samsung is discussing a ¥30bn research and development centre in Yokohama with pilot lines for semiconductor devices, a move Japanese government officials said followed a thaw in Tokyo–Seoul relations.
  3. Heads of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Samsung Electronics, Intel and Micron met Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo and described plans that could transform Japan's prospects of re-emerging as a semiconductor powerhouse.

AI Summary. World trade as a share of gross domestic product rose from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008, while the U.S. ratio rose from about 11% to a peak of about 31% in 2011. Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating U.S.-China relationship.

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Maximiliano Dvorkin, Fernando Leibovici and Ana Maria Santacreu Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

The U.S. trade to GDP ratio peaked in 2011 at 31% of GDP. Since then it has declined as trade has slowed relative to the economy. @AmSantacreu @LeiboviciF @stlouisfed

Has global trade openness stopped rising after decades of expansion?

Core argument: The world trade-to-GDP ratio, a standard measure of openness to trade, climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008.

The figure shows the marked expansion in both U.S. and global trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), which is a standard measure of openness to trade. The world trade-to-GDP ratio climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008. Similarly, the U.S. trade-to-GDP ratio rose from about 11% in 1970 to a peak of about 31% in 2011.  [Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating US-China relationship.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The world trade-to-GDP ratio, a standard measure of openness to trade, climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008.
  2. The U.S. trade-to-GDP ratio rose from about 11% in 1970 to a peak of about 31% in 2011.
  3. Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating U.S.-China relationship.

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low of 4.7%, dropping below 5% for the first time in US Labor Department records dating to 1972, though it remained above the national average. Black Americans' share of professional and business services employment rose to 11.4% from 9.6% before the pandemic, suggesting some gains could persist.

Sarah Chaney Cambon and Gwynn Guilford Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The tight labor market has led to record black employments rates, with black unemployment under 5% for the first time since 1972.

Are job prospects for Black workers improving in lasting ways?

Core argument: The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April, below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records that began in 1972, though still above the national average.

The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April. That was still above the national average, but below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records of employment for Black Americans, which began in 1972. About 1.1 million more Black Americans held jobs last month than in February 2020, just before the pandemic took hold. That increase accounts for nearly half the total gain in employment during that time. There are signs, though, that some of the improvements could last, in part because many Black workers moved into higher-paying industries and occupations during the pandemic. Black Americans accounted for 11.4% of professional and business services workers in the first quarter of this year, up from 9.6% in the same period in 2019, according to the Labor Department.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April, below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records that began in 1972, though still above the national average.
  2. About 1.1 million more Black Americans held jobs in April than in February 2020, accounting for nearly half the total U.S. employment gain over that period.
  3. Black Americans made up 11.4% of professional and business services workers in the first quarter of this year, up from 9.6% in the same period of 2019, according to the Labor Department.

AI Summary. A survey of existing research finds that migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated native women and on the gender pay gap in high-powered occupations. Low-skilled immigration to the US raised the probability that top-quartile-earning native women worked over 50 hours weekly by 1.8 percentage points.

Patricia Cortés National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

A review of relevant research suggests increased availability of immigrant household workers has had large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated female workers and on the gender wage gap. @cortespatico

Does low-skilled immigration raise highly educated native women's labor supply?

Core argument: Estimates suggest low-skilled immigration to the United States between 1980 and 2000 raised the probability that affected native women in the top wage quartile work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.

Overall, the existing research suggests that migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated women’s labor supply and on the gender pay gap for high-powered occupations. These migrants have contributed to the narrowing of persistent gender inequalities in the labor market, particularly for the highly-skilled native women in many countries around the world. The mechanism studied in this paper should be considered when analyzing the benefits and costs of immigration policies. Overall, the magnitude of the effects suggests that the low-skilled immigration flow to the United States between 1980 and 2000 increased the probability that affected native women at the top quartile of the wage distribution work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Compared to the standard 40-hour work week, these higher hours at the higher end of the earning distribution, suggest that these women had jobs requiring long hours, which is typical of some high-powered occupations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Estimates suggest low-skilled immigration to the United States between 1980 and 2000 raised the probability that affected native women in the top wage quartile work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.
  2. Existing research suggests migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated women and on the gender pay gap in high-powered occupations.
  3. Migrant domestic workers have contributed to narrowing persistent labor market gender inequalities for highly skilled native women in many countries, a mechanism that should be considered when weighing the benefits and costs of immigration policies.

AI Summary. Marijuana positivity in U.S. workplace drug tests rose to 4.3% of more than 6m general workforce tests, up from 3.9%, the highest rate since 1997, while positivity for some opioids and barbiturates declined. Positive tests following on-the-job accidents reached 7.3%, tripling over a decade as more than two-thirds of U.S. states legalized recreational or medicinal use.

Anne Marie Chaker Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

According to data from Quest Diagnostics, 4.3% of workforce drug tests came back positive for marijuana in 2022, up from 3.9% in 2021. In the accommodation and food services sector, 8.1% of tests in the were positive, up from 4% in 2018.

Are more American workers testing positive for marijuana as legalization spreads?

Core argument: Of the more than six million general workforce tests Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% were positive, up from 3.9% the prior year and the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997.

Of the more than six million general workforce tests that Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% came back positive, up from 3.9% the prior year. That is the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997. Positivity rates last year for certain classes of opioids and barbiturates declined. More than two-thirds of U.S. states have legalized recreational or medicinal use of marijuana. The percentage of employees that tested positive for marijuana following an on-the-job accident rose to 7.3% in 2022, an increase of 9% compared with the prior year. From 2012 to 2022, post-accident marijuana positive test rates tripled, tracking with widening legalization.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the more than six million general workforce tests Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% were positive, up from 3.9% the prior year and the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997.
  2. Marijuana positivity among employees tested after an on-the-job accident rose to 7.3% in 2022, a 9% increase over the prior year, and post-accident positive rates tripled from 2012 to 2022, tracking with widening legalization.
  3. Positivity rates for certain classes of opioids and barbiturates declined in 2022, while more than two-thirds of U.S. states have legalized recreational or medicinal marijuana use.

AI Summary. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention counted a provisional 109,680 US overdose deaths in a year, essentially flat against 109,179 the prior year. The plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in one year and a 30% surge the year before.

Jon Kamp Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The CDC’s provisional count of overdose deaths suggests drug deaths are leveling off with 109,680 in 2022, compared to 109,179 in 2021. Synthetic opioids (mostly fentanyl) accounted for 75,217 deaths. effectively unchanged since 2021.

Have US overdose deaths leveled off after two years of surges?

Core argument: The CDC's provisional count put U.S. drug overdose deaths at 109,680 in 2022, essentially flat against a comparable 2021 projection of 109,179, indicating the fentanyl crisis leveling off.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on Wednesday released a provisional count of overdose deaths last year that indicated the toll of the fentanyl crisis leveling off after two years of surges during the Covid-19 pandemic. The CDC counted 109,680 overdose deaths in 2022 compared with 109,179 deaths from a similar 2021 projection. “It’s hard to know for sure where it will end up, but it will be essentially flat,” said Dr. Robert Anderson, chief of the mortality statistics branch at the CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. The plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in 2021 and a 30% surge in 2020. The U.S. has only recorded two years in which drug fatalities declined in the past several decades, 1990 and 2018.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The CDC's provisional count put U.S. drug overdose deaths at 109,680 in 2022, essentially flat against a comparable 2021 projection of 109,179, indicating the fentanyl crisis leveling off.
  2. The 2022 plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in 2021 and a 30% surge in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

AI Summary. The World Meteorological Organization estimates a 66% chance that the annual mean global surface temperature will temporarily exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year within the next five years, up from roughly 48% a year earlier and close to zero a decade ago.

Camilla Hodgson Financial Times
Date Posted:

The World Meteorological Organization has assessed that global temperatures are likely to exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels within the next five years.

Are global temperatures likely to temporarily exceed 1.5C within five years?

Core argument: The World Meteorological Organization puts a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise temporarily surpasses 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year by 2027, which would be the first such breach in human history.

Global temperatures are likely to exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels for the first time in human history within the next five years, the World Meteorological Organization has said in its latest annual assessment. In a stark conclusion, scientists said for the first time there was a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise would temporarily surpass 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in “at least” one year by 2027. The chances of this outcome were also “increasing with time”, the report said. The assessment of a two-thirds chance of a temporary breach of the 1.5C threshold compares with estimates of around 48 per cent a year ago, and “close to zero” in 2015.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The World Meteorological Organization puts a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise temporarily surpasses 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year by 2027, which would be the first such breach in human history.
  2. The two-thirds probability of a temporary 1.5C breach compares with roughly 48 per cent estimated a year earlier and "close to zero" in 2015, according to the World Meteorological Organization's annual assessment.
  3. The World Meteorological Organization report says the chances of a temporary 1.5C breach are "increasing with time".

Friday, May 19, 2023

AI Summary. Updated estimates of the natural rate of interest—the inflation-adjusted rate consistent with a balanced economy—for Canada, the Euro Area, and the United States show no sign of a significant reversal of the decline seen in prior decades, with each economy's estimate within two-tenths of a percentage point of its pre-pandemic level.

John Williams Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:

John Williams announces @NewYorkFed research that finds “there is no evidence that the era of very low natural rates of interest has ended.”

Has the long-run decline in the natural rate of interest reversed?

Core argument: The r-star estimates for Canada, the Euro Area, and the United States in 2022 are within two-tenths of a percentage point of their corresponding 2019 estimates, showing no signs of a significant reversal of the decline evident in prior decades.

Based on the new r-star estimates for Canada, the Euro Area, and the United States, we see no signs of a significant reversal of the decline in r-star estimates evident in prior decades. In fact, in all three economies, the r-star estimates in 2022 are within two-tenths of a percentage point of the corresponding estimate in 2019. The current Holston-Laubach-Williams model estimates of r-star in the United States are shown in Figure 3. For comparison, the figure also shows estimates using a version of the model that is not adjusted to take into account COVID or outliers and holds the parameter values fixed at estimates using data through the end of 2019. The two sets of estimates are very similar through 2019. They differ sharply during the acute period of the pandemic, however, when the estimates from the unmodified model exhibit large swings due to the presence of sizeable outliers. Interestingly, the two estimates are very close to each other at the end of the sample.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The r-star estimates for Canada, the Euro Area, and the United States in 2022 are within two-tenths of a percentage point of their corresponding 2019 estimates, showing no signs of a significant reversal of the decline evident in prior decades.
  2. The Holston-Laubach-Williams model's U.S. r-star estimates are very similar through 2019 to those from a version unadjusted for COVID or outliers, and the two sets of estimates are very close again at the end of the sample.
  3. The unmodified model, with parameter values held fixed at estimates using data through the end of 2019, exhibits large swings in U.S. r-star during the acute period of the pandemic due to sizeable outliers.

AI Summary. Nominal wage growth of 4–5% in the euro area and 3–4% in the United States is compatible with inflation coming within reach of 2%, provided import price growth slows and profit margins stabilise or shrink slightly. The disinflation path of domestic prices and nominal wages falls within the range of past disinflations in both economies.

Benoît Mojon, Gabriela Nodari and Stefano Siviero Bank for International Settlements
Date Posted:

Analysts at @BIS_org argue that the current pace of deflation is consistent with reaching the Fed’s target within the next 18 months. @HyunSongShin

Is current nominal wage growth compatible with reaching 2% inflation?

Core argument: Nominal wage growth of 4–5% in the euro area and 3–4% in the United States this year and next is compatible with bringing inflation within reach of 2% by end-2024, provided import price growth slows and profit margins stabilise or slightly shrink.

Nominal wage increases of 4–5% in the euro area and 3–4% in the United States this year and next year are compatible with bringing inflation within reach of 2% by end-2024, provided that import price growth slows and profit margins stabilise or slightly shrink. From a historical perspective, the 2023–24 disinflation path of domestic prices and nominal wages are within the range of past disinflations in both economies (Graph 1, left-hand and centre panels). However, two observations are in order. First, while US real wages always tend to decline around the time when US inflation peaks, the 2022 decline in euro area real wages was unprecedented (upper right-hand panel).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nominal wage growth of 4–5% in the euro area and 3–4% in the United States this year and next is compatible with bringing inflation within reach of 2% by end-2024, provided import price growth slows and profit margins stabilise or slightly shrink.
  2. The 2023–24 disinflation path of domestic prices and nominal wages in both the euro area and the United States falls within the range of past disinflation episodes.
  3. US real wages tend to decline around the time US inflation peaks, while the 2022 decline in euro area real wages was unprecedented.

AI Summary. The authors argue that roughly 15 years of money printing produced little gain in economic growth but inflated asset prices, so the main correction will come in asset prices rather than the broader economy. With inflation at 5%, above the Federal Reserve's 2% target, they expect capital costs to stay elevated.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

Torsten Sløk @apolloglobal argues the recession associated with this hiking cycle will impact asset prices more than the “real” economy.

Will the coming correction hit asset prices rather than the economy?

Core argument: The author argues that nearly 15 years of money printing never had any major positive effect on GDP growth and instead created a significant bubble in asset prices.

What makes the coming recession so unusual is that it is happening after almost 15 years of money printing, which never really had any major positive effect on GDP growth. Instead, the 15 years of money printing created a significant bubble in asset prices. As a result, the big correction during this recession will not be in the economy but in asset prices as the Fed continues to deflate the buy-everything bubble created due to global easy money. A mild economic recession with a big recession in asset prices is what we call a non-recession recession. With inflation currently at 5%, well above the Fed’s 2% inflation target, the ongoing correction in asset prices will continue as the costs of capital will stay elevated well into 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues that nearly 15 years of money printing never had any major positive effect on GDP growth and instead created a significant bubble in asset prices.
  2. With inflation at 5%, well above the Federal Reserve's 2% target, the author expects the cost of capital to stay elevated well into 2024 and the correction in asset prices to continue.
  3. The author characterizes the coming downturn as a "non-recession recession," in which the economic recession is mild but the correction in asset prices is large as the Fed deflates the buy-everything bubble.

AI Summary. Analyzing 51,937 neighborhoods across 222 US metropolitan areas, the authors find that residential segregation among 25- to 29-year-olds rose over the 2010s, reversing an earlier decline: the average neighborhood segregation index for that age group fell from 19 to 16 over the 2000s, then climbed to 22.

Josh Zumbrun Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Despite being more diverse, younger millennials live in significantly more segregated neighborhoods than older cohorts of Americans did at the same age.

Is residential segregation among young adults rising again?

Core argument: The average segregation index for neighborhoods inhabited by 25- to 29-year-olds fell from 19 in 2000 to 16 in 2010, then rose to 22 by 2019, according to findings from Noli Brazil and Jennifer Candipan.

Residential segregation among young people increased, rather than decreased, from 2010 to 2019, according to the new findings from Noli Brazil at the University of California, Davis, and Jennifer Candipan at Brown University. Brazil and Candipan parse the data for 51,937 neighborhoods (or census tracts) in 222 metropolitan areas. In 2000, the average segregation index of the neighborhoods inhabited by 25- to 29-year-olds was 19. By 2010, the average index of people of that age (older millennials) had dropped to 16. By 2019, the average index of people of that age (young millennials) had risen to 22.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average segregation index for neighborhoods inhabited by 25- to 29-year-olds fell from 19 in 2000 to 16 in 2010, then rose to 22 by 2019, according to findings from Noli Brazil and Jennifer Candipan.
  2. Residential segregation among young people increased rather than decreased from 2010 to 2019, according to Noli Brazil of the University of California, Davis, and Jennifer Candipan of Brown University.
  3. Brazil and Candipan parse data covering 51,937 neighborhoods, or census tracts, across 222 metropolitan areas.

AI Summary. China's government reported that 20.4% of job-seekers ages 16 to 24 were unemployed, the highest level since it began publishing the statistic in 2018. The youth jobless rate has stayed high even as the overall unemployment rate declined for two consecutive months.

Claire Fu New York Times
Date Posted:

11.6M new Chinese graduates are entering the labor market in June. Currently 20% of Chinese between the ages of 16-24 are out of work.

11.6M new Chinese graduates are entering the labor market in June. Currently 20% of Chinese between the ages of 16-24 are...

Is youth unemployment in China rising even as overall joblessness falls?

Core argument: China's jobless rate for 16–24 year-olds reached 20.4% in April, the highest level since the government began publishing the statistic in 2018.

The government reported this week that 20.4 percent of people ages 16 to 24 looking for a job were out of work in April. That is the highest level since China started announcing the statistic in 2018. The government, facing rare public discontent as young professionals in major cities across China protested the “zero Covid” rules, abruptly announced in December that it would start easing the policies. But the youth jobless rate has remained high, even as the overall rate has ticked down two months in a row.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's jobless rate for 16–24 year-olds reached 20.4% in April, the highest level since the government began publishing the statistic in 2018.
  2. China's youth unemployment rate has stayed elevated even as the overall jobless rate declined for two consecutive months, with millions more students set to graduate.
  3. China abruptly announced in December that it would begin easing its "zero Covid" rules, after young professionals in major cities protested the policy.