Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, May 17, 2023

AI Summary. The US fiscal deficit averaged just under 3% of gross national product from 1950 to 2011 but 6.6% from 2012 to 2022, driven mainly by health and social security spending, a pattern that holds excluding pandemic years. Even assuming permanently elevated profit margins, US equity valuations imply low long-run returns.

James Montier GMO
Date Posted:

James Montier @GMOInsights notes that American firms’ profit margins have been supported by persistent fiscal deficits and argues that the current historically-high PE multiple “dooms investors to low returns in the long run.”

Do elevated profit margins from larger deficits justify US equity valuations?

Core argument: The U.S. fiscal deficit averaged 6.6% of GNP over 2012–2022, more than double the just-under-3% average of 1950–2011, a pattern the author finds holds even when Covid years are excluded.

Between 1950 and 2011, the fiscal deficit averaged just less than 3% of GNP each year. In the period from 2012 to 2022, the fiscal deficit was more than double the previous average, at 6.6%. This isn’t just the impact of the pandemic: the same basic pattern holds even when I exclude the Covid years! The main sources of the increased deficit have been health spending and social security expenditure (again true even with Covid data excluded). Is this era of what Minsky would have called “Big Government” here to stay? Even if I take a very bullish view, that this is indeed a new era of permanent deficits and thus profit margins will remain elevated relative to history, I still cannot find any valuation attraction in U.S. equities in aggregate. The Shiller P/E naturally embodies the decade of higher-than-normal profit margins and yet still stands at 30x. Even without any valuation or margin mean reversion, this dooms investors to low returns in the long run.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. fiscal deficit averaged 6.6% of GNP over 2012–2022, more than double the just-under-3% average of 1950–2011, a pattern the author finds holds even when Covid years are excluded.
  2. The author identifies health spending and social security expenditure as the main sources of the increased deficit, also true with Covid data excluded.
  3. The author finds no valuation attraction in aggregate U.S. equities even assuming permanently elevated profit margins, since the Shiller P/E already embodies a decade of above-normal margins and still stands at 30x, dooming investors to low long-run returns.

AI Summary. S&P Global Ratings projects that without reforms to ageing-related fiscal policies the typical government's deficit would reach 9.1% of GDP by 2060, up from 2.4%, with pension costs rising 4.5 percentage points of GDP to 9.5%. A one percentage point rise in borrowing costs would add roughly 40–60 percentage points to debt-to-GDP ratios in Japan, Italy, the UK and US.

Mary McDougall Financial Times
Date Posted:

Rating agencies are reporting that demographics are impacting governments credit ratings globally. S&P has forecast that, in the absence of policy reforms, half of the world’s largest economies will be downgraded to junk by 2060, up from 1/3 today. @FT

Are ageing populations already weighing on government credit ratings?

Core argument: S&P Global Ratings estimates that, absent reforms to ageing-related fiscal policies, the typical government would run a deficit of 9.1% of GDP by 2060, up from 2.4% in 2025.

Marko Mrsnik, lead sovereign analyst at S&P Global Ratings, added that, according to an S&P stress test, a single percentage point increase in borrowing costs would increase debt to gross domestic product ratios for Japan, Italy, the UK and the US by around 40-60 percentage points by 2060. It estimated that, in the absence of reforms to ageing-related fiscal policies, the typical government would run a deficit of 9.1% of GDP by 2060, a huge increase from 2.4% in 2025. S&P also forecast that pension costs would rise by an average of 4.5 percentage points of GDP by 2060, reaching 9.5%, albeit with a large variation among countries. The rating agency projected that, between 2022 and 2060, healthcare spending would rise by 2.7 percentage points of GDP for the median country.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. S&P Global Ratings estimates that, absent reforms to ageing-related fiscal policies, the typical government would run a deficit of 9.1% of GDP by 2060, up from 2.4% in 2025.
  2. An S&P stress test indicates that a one percentage point increase in borrowing costs would raise debt-to-GDP ratios for Japan, Italy, the UK and the US by around 40-60 percentage points by 2060.
  3. S&P forecasts pension costs rising by an average of 4.5 percentage points of GDP to 9.5% by 2060, with large variation across countries, and healthcare spending up 2.7 percentage points of GDP for the median country between 2022 and 2060.

AI Summary. Non-financial firms in the S&P 500 and Europe's STOXX 600 spent more on capital investment and shareholder payouts than their operations generated, funding the gap with debt. At current debt levels, each percentage-point rise in interest rates is estimated to wipe out roughly 4% of these firms' combined earnings, pressuring dividends and buybacks.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

.@TheEconomist estimates that, at current debt levels, every percentage point increase in interest rates will wipe out 4% of combined S+P earnings, putting pressure on capital expenditure and buy-backs.

How much do rising interest rates cut debt-funded companies' earnings?

Core argument: At current debt levels, each one-percentage-point rise in interest rates would wipe out roughly 4% of the combined earnings of non-financial firms in the S&P 500 and Europe's STOXX 600, by The Economist's estimates.

In the years before the pandemic the non-financial firms in the S&P 500 and STOXX 600 index in Europe consistently splashed more cash on capital investments and shareholder payouts than they generated from their operations, with the gap plugged by debt. But if they wish to avoid a sustained drag on profitability from higher interest rates, they will soon need to start paying down those debts. At current debt levels, every percentage point increase in interest rates will wipe out roughly 4% of the combined earnings of these firms, according to our estimates. Many firms will have no choice but to cut back on dividends and share buy-backs, squeezing investor returns. Borrowing money in order to fork it over to shareholders makes less sense in a world of higher interest rates, argues Lotfi Karoui of Goldman Sachs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. At current debt levels, each one-percentage-point rise in interest rates would wipe out roughly 4% of the combined earnings of non-financial firms in the S&P 500 and Europe's STOXX 600, by The Economist's estimates.
  2. In the years before the pandemic, non-financial firms in the S&P 500 and STOXX 600 consistently spent more on capital investment and shareholder payouts than their operations generated, funding the gap with debt.
  3. Many of these firms will have no choice but to cut dividends and share buy-backs, squeezing investor returns, and Lotfi Karoui of Goldman Sachs argues that borrowing to hand cash to shareholders makes less sense at higher interest rates.

AI Summary. Prices at sit-down restaurants — which reflect domestic wages, rents, groceries, equipment costs, and consumers' willingness and ability to splurge — are rising far more slowly than during the 2021–2022 inflation spike, but annualized increases remain 2–3 percentage points faster than before the pandemic. Rather than continuing to accelerate, this measure appears to be settling into a 4–5% range.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Using his favored inflation barometer, restaurant prices, @M_C_Klein argues inflation has settled at a new baseline of 4-5%; he notes this was the pace coming out of the Volcker inflation victory.

Are restaurant prices signaling inflation is settling above its pre-pandemic pace?

Core argument: Prices for sit-down restaurant meals are rising 2–3 percentage points faster on an annualized basis than before the pandemic, though far more slowly than during the 2021–2022 inflation spike.

Perhaps the clearest way to synthesize this is to look at changes in the price of eating at sit-down restaurants. This incorporates domestic wages, rents, groceries, equipment, and consumers’ willingness (and ability) to splurge. The good news is that price of dining out—which had been a harbinger of the durability of the 2021-2022 inflation spike, which I confess I did not fully appreciate at the time—is rising far more slowly now than then. The bad news is that annualized price increases are still 2-3 percentage points faster than before the pandemic. It is not obvious to me that this is a serious problem for policymakers. Inflation is not continuing to accelerate, but instead seems to be settling into the 4-5% range.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prices for sit-down restaurant meals are rising 2–3 percentage points faster on an annualized basis than before the pandemic, though far more slowly than during the 2021–2022 inflation spike.
  2. Sit-down restaurant prices incorporate domestic wages, rents, groceries, equipment, and consumers' willingness and ability to splurge, and served as a harbinger of the durability of the 2021–2022 inflation spike.
  3. Inflation is not continuing to accelerate but appears to be settling into a 4–5% range, which is not obviously a serious problem for policymakers.

AI Summary. China dominates electric-vehicle battery supply chains, controlling 41% of global cobalt mining and the most lithium mining, and is projected to produce more than twice as many batteries as all other countries combined by 2030. It can build battery factories at nearly half the cost of North America or Europe.

Agnes Chang and Keith Bradsher New York Times
Date Posted:

Benchmark Minerals forecasts that by 2030 China will build twice as many batteries as the rest of the world combined, leveraging advantages in raw materials, components, and domestic EV demand. @NYT

Can the world build electric car batteries without China?

Core argument: China will make more than twice as many batteries as every other country combined in 2030, according to estimates from Benchmark Minerals, despite billions in Western investment.

Despite billions in Western investment, China is so far ahead — mining rare minerals, training engineers and building huge factories — that the rest of the world may take decades to catch up. Even by 2030, China will make more than twice as many batteries as every other country combined, according to estimates from Benchmark Minerals, a consulting group. China controls 41 percent of the world’s cobalt mining, and the most mining for lithium, which carries a battery’s electric charge. China became the largest battery producer partly by figuring out how to make battery components efficiently and at lower cost. China can build battery factories at nearly half the cost of countries in North America or Europe, according to Heiner Heimes, a professor at RWTH Aachen University in Germany. China has the most electric cars on the road and nearly all of them use Chinese-made batteries. Companies anywhere in the world will look to form partnerships with Chinese manufacturers to enter or expand in the industry.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China will make more than twice as many batteries as every other country combined in 2030, according to estimates from Benchmark Minerals, despite billions in Western investment.
  2. China controls 41 percent of the world's cobalt mining and the most lithium mining, and became the largest battery producer partly by figuring out how to make battery components efficiently and at lower cost.
  3. China can build battery factories at nearly half the cost of countries in North America or Europe, according to Heiner Heimes of RWTH Aachen University, and companies worldwide will look to partner with Chinese manufacturers to enter or expand in the industry.

AI Summary. An analysis of federal death statistics found the mortality rate for Americans ages 1 to 19 rose 10.7% in one year and a further 8.3% the next, with ages 10 to 19 accounting for most of the increase. Boys, whose death rates are roughly 2x those of girls, worsened slightly more.

Janet Adamy Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The mortality rate for young Americans (aged 1-19) is at the highest level in 15 years, with boys’ mortality 2x of girls.

Are death rates among American children and teenagers rising?

Core argument: The mortality rate for Americans ages 1–19 rose 10.7% between 2019 and 2020 and a further 8.3% the following year, according to an analysis of federal death statistics led by Steven Woolf of Virginia Commonwealth University.

Between 2019 and 2020, the overall mortality rate for ages 1 to 19 rose by 10.7%, and increased by an additional 8.3% the following year, according to an analysis of federal death statistics led by Steven Woolf, director emeritus of the Center on Society and Health at Virginia Commonwealth University. Older children and teenagers, ages 10 to 19, accounted for most of the increase in death rates for young people. Boys, whose mortality rates are roughly twice those of girls, saw their death rates worsen to a slightly greater degree during the pandemic, Woolf found. The overall findings held true when researchers excluded those ages 18 and 19, who were included in the broader research because such government data is grouped in five-year age bands.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The mortality rate for Americans ages 1–19 rose 10.7% between 2019 and 2020 and a further 8.3% the following year, according to an analysis of federal death statistics led by Steven Woolf of Virginia Commonwealth University.
  2. Children and teenagers ages 10–19 accounted for most of the increase in death rates among young Americans, Woolf's analysis of federal death statistics found.
  3. Boys, whose mortality rates run roughly twice those of girls, saw their death rates worsen to a slightly greater degree during the pandemic, and the overall findings held when researchers excluded 18- and 19-year-olds.

AI Summary. The share of women in their late 20s working in the four highest-paying broad occupation groups rose from about 30% to 55%, while the share in professional occupations rose from about 19% to 26%. Women early in their careers shifted away from predominantly administrative work toward better-paying occupations.

Oksana Leukhina and Amy Smaldone Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

The gender pay gap has narrowed as women have become more attached to the labor force and moved into higher earning occupations. Between 1970 and 2015 the share of women in the four highest paying occupations increased from 30% to 55%. @stlouisfed

Has a shift into higher-paying occupations narrowed the gender pay gap?

Core argument: The share of women in their late 20s working in the top four highest-paying occupations rose from about 30% in 1970 to about 55% in 2015, with occupations ranked by average male wages in 2015.

The figure shows how the distribution of working women across 10 broadly defined occupations evolved over time. We are looking at women in the beginning of their careers (in their late 20s). The occupations (top to bottom) are ranked according to the average male wages in 2015, with technicians, managers and professionals having the highest average wages that year, and machine operators and those in farming and services ranking near the bottom of the pay distribution. In 1970, women entered into lower-paying occupations, working predominantly in administrative jobs. Over time, women clearly shifted toward better-paying occupations. For example, we see that the percentage of women working in the professional occupations went up from about 19% in 1970 to about 26% in 2015. The fraction of women working in the top four high-paying occupations increased from around 30% to 55%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of women in their late 20s working in the top four highest-paying occupations rose from about 30% in 1970 to about 55% in 2015, with occupations ranked by average male wages in 2015.
  2. The share of women in their late 20s working in professional occupations rose from about 19% in 1970 to about 26% in 2015.
  3. Women beginning their careers in 1970 worked predominantly in lower-paying administrative jobs and shifted over time toward better-paying occupations, with technicians, managers and professionals having the highest average male wages in 2015.

Thursday, May 18, 2023

AI Summary. The average number of jobs created per new business establishment has declined over recent decades, from 6.4 employees per establishment birth in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021, even as the number of new establishments has risen.

Haley Klundt and Kevin Cooksey U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Date Posted:

A new @BLS_gov analysis finds the number of employees of new firms was 2.7 in 2021, down from 6.4 in 1996. Firms that make it to 1, 3, and 5 year survival marks also employ fewer workers than their 1990s counterparts.

Are new businesses creating fewer jobs than they used to?

Core argument: Average "birth weight" — gross job gains from establishment births divided by the number of establishment births — fell from 6.4 employees per new establishment in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021.

The increasing number of establishment births in combination with the decreasing number of jobs generated by those births suggests that the average size of new businesses has been shrinking in recent decades. This theory can be examined through a measure informally nicknamed “birth weight,” that is calculated as the level of gross job gains from establishment births divided by the level of establishment births. While the number of new business establishments tends to rise and fall with the business cycle of the overall economy, the decline in jobs created by establishment births raises questions regarding the changing nature of startups. The average “birth weight” has been steadily declining over the last 20 years from a high of 6.4 employees per establishment birth in 1996 to a low of 2.7 employees per establishment birth in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average "birth weight" — gross job gains from establishment births divided by the number of establishment births — fell from 6.4 employees per new establishment in 1996 to 2.7 in 2021.
  2. Rising establishment births alongside falling job gains from those births suggests the average size of new businesses has been shrinking in recent decades.
  3. The number of new establishments rises and falls with the overall business cycle, but the decline in jobs created by establishment births raises questions about the changing nature of startups.

Related Articles:

  • Surging Business Formation in the Pandemic: Causes and Consequences — US applications for new businesses dropped early in the COVID-19 pandemic and then rose to record levels, remaining historically elevated, including among applications with characteristics likely to result in hiring and growth. Business applications have historically tracked actual business formation closely.

AI Summary. Two government-backed enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, underwrite credit risk for more than half of US mortgages, and their guarantees enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages American borrowers expect. That structure helps explain why the US financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe's, where floating-rate mortgages are common.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

.@TheEconomist argues that the financial system is slipping into greater state control. Americans can park cash in money-market funds, which in turn park it directly at the Fed, circumventing the banking system altogether.

.@TheEconomist argues that the financial system is slipping into greater state control. Americans can park cash in...

Do government mortgage guarantees make the financial system bear more interest-rate risk?

Core argument: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-backed enterprises, together underwrite credit risk for more than half of American mortgages.

The real risk comes when policy preferences interfere with lending rules. In America this already happens in the mortgage market, which is dominated by two government-backed enterprises: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Together the two institutions now underwrite credit risk for more than half of mortgages. Their guarantees enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages Americans have come to expect. They also help explain why America’s financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe’s, where floating-rate mortgages are common.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-backed enterprises, together underwrite credit risk for more than half of American mortgages.
  2. The guarantees provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enable the 30-year fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages Americans have come to expect.
  3. America's financial system bears more interest-rate risk than Europe's, where floating-rate mortgages are common, a difference the guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac help explain.

AI Summary. Global chipmakers including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Samsung Electronics, Intel and Micron have outlined expansion plans in Japan that could support the country's re-emergence as a semiconductor powerhouse. Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant using extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.

Leo Lewis and Kana Inagaki Financial Times
Date Posted:

Seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers including TSMC, Samsung and Intel announced plans for significant investment in Japan that would make Japan a “semiconductor powerhouse.”

Seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers including TSMC, Samsung and Intel announced plans for significant...

Are global chipmakers expanding semiconductor investment in Japan?

Core argument: Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant producing cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.

At an unprecedented meeting in Tokyo with Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida, the heads of chipmakers including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and Intel and Micron of the US described plans that could transform Japan’s prospects of re-emerging as a semiconductor powerhouse. Micron said it expected to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, to build a plant to produce cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology in Hiroshima. Samsung is also discussing setting up a ¥30bn research and development centre in Yokohama with pilot lines for semiconductor devices. Japanese government officials said the move followed a thaw in relations between Tokyo and Seoul.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Micron said it expects to invest up to ¥500bn ($3.7bn), including Japanese state subsidies, in a Hiroshima plant producing cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography technology.
  2. Samsung is discussing a ¥30bn research and development centre in Yokohama with pilot lines for semiconductor devices, a move Japanese government officials said followed a thaw in Tokyo–Seoul relations.
  3. Heads of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Samsung Electronics, Intel and Micron met Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo and described plans that could transform Japan's prospects of re-emerging as a semiconductor powerhouse.

AI Summary. World trade as a share of gross domestic product rose from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008, while the U.S. ratio rose from about 11% to a peak of about 31% in 2011. Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating U.S.-China relationship.

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Maximiliano Dvorkin, Fernando Leibovici and Ana Maria Santacreu Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

The U.S. trade to GDP ratio peaked in 2011 at 31% of GDP. Since then it has declined as trade has slowed relative to the economy. @AmSantacreu @LeiboviciF @stlouisfed

Has global trade openness stopped rising after decades of expansion?

Core argument: The world trade-to-GDP ratio, a standard measure of openness to trade, climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008.

The figure shows the marked expansion in both U.S. and global trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), which is a standard measure of openness to trade. The world trade-to-GDP ratio climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008. Similarly, the U.S. trade-to-GDP ratio rose from about 11% in 1970 to a peak of about 31% in 2011.  [Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating US-China relationship.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The world trade-to-GDP ratio, a standard measure of openness to trade, climbed from about 25% in 1970 to a peak of about 61% in 2008.
  2. The U.S. trade-to-GDP ratio rose from about 11% in 1970 to a peak of about 31% in 2011.
  3. Headwinds to trade include trading blocs, geopolitical tensions, and a deteriorating U.S.-China relationship.

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low of 4.7%, dropping below 5% for the first time in US Labor Department records dating to 1972, though it remained above the national average. Black Americans' share of professional and business services employment rose to 11.4% from 9.6% before the pandemic, suggesting some gains could persist.

Sarah Chaney Cambon and Gwynn Guilford Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The tight labor market has led to record black employments rates, with black unemployment under 5% for the first time since 1972.

Are job prospects for Black workers improving in lasting ways?

Core argument: The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April, below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records that began in 1972, though still above the national average.

The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April. That was still above the national average, but below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records of employment for Black Americans, which began in 1972. About 1.1 million more Black Americans held jobs last month than in February 2020, just before the pandemic took hold. That increase accounts for nearly half the total gain in employment during that time. There are signs, though, that some of the improvements could last, in part because many Black workers moved into higher-paying industries and occupations during the pandemic. Black Americans accounted for 11.4% of professional and business services workers in the first quarter of this year, up from 9.6% in the same period in 2019, according to the Labor Department.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The unemployment rate for Black workers fell to a record low 4.7% in April, below 5% for the first time in Labor Department records that began in 1972, though still above the national average.
  2. About 1.1 million more Black Americans held jobs in April than in February 2020, accounting for nearly half the total U.S. employment gain over that period.
  3. Black Americans made up 11.4% of professional and business services workers in the first quarter of this year, up from 9.6% in the same period of 2019, according to the Labor Department.

AI Summary. A survey of existing research finds that migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated native women and on the gender pay gap in high-powered occupations. Low-skilled immigration to the US raised the probability that top-quartile-earning native women worked over 50 hours weekly by 1.8 percentage points.

Patricia Cortés National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

A review of relevant research suggests increased availability of immigrant household workers has had large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated female workers and on the gender wage gap. @cortespatico

Does low-skilled immigration raise highly educated native women's labor supply?

Core argument: Estimates suggest low-skilled immigration to the United States between 1980 and 2000 raised the probability that affected native women in the top wage quartile work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.

Overall, the existing research suggests that migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated women’s labor supply and on the gender pay gap for high-powered occupations. These migrants have contributed to the narrowing of persistent gender inequalities in the labor market, particularly for the highly-skilled native women in many countries around the world. The mechanism studied in this paper should be considered when analyzing the benefits and costs of immigration policies. Overall, the magnitude of the effects suggests that the low-skilled immigration flow to the United States between 1980 and 2000 increased the probability that affected native women at the top quartile of the wage distribution work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Compared to the standard 40-hour work week, these higher hours at the higher end of the earning distribution, suggest that these women had jobs requiring long hours, which is typical of some high-powered occupations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Estimates suggest low-skilled immigration to the United States between 1980 and 2000 raised the probability that affected native women in the top wage quartile work more than 50 or 60 hours a week by 1.8 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.
  2. Existing research suggests migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated women and on the gender pay gap in high-powered occupations.
  3. Migrant domestic workers have contributed to narrowing persistent labor market gender inequalities for highly skilled native women in many countries, a mechanism that should be considered when weighing the benefits and costs of immigration policies.

AI Summary. Marijuana positivity in U.S. workplace drug tests rose to 4.3% of more than 6m general workforce tests, up from 3.9%, the highest rate since 1997, while positivity for some opioids and barbiturates declined. Positive tests following on-the-job accidents reached 7.3%, tripling over a decade as more than two-thirds of U.S. states legalized recreational or medicinal use.

Anne Marie Chaker Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

According to data from Quest Diagnostics, 4.3% of workforce drug tests came back positive for marijuana in 2022, up from 3.9% in 2021. In the accommodation and food services sector, 8.1% of tests in the were positive, up from 4% in 2018.

Are more American workers testing positive for marijuana as legalization spreads?

Core argument: Of the more than six million general workforce tests Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% were positive, up from 3.9% the prior year and the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997.

Of the more than six million general workforce tests that Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% came back positive, up from 3.9% the prior year. That is the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997. Positivity rates last year for certain classes of opioids and barbiturates declined. More than two-thirds of U.S. states have legalized recreational or medicinal use of marijuana. The percentage of employees that tested positive for marijuana following an on-the-job accident rose to 7.3% in 2022, an increase of 9% compared with the prior year. From 2012 to 2022, post-accident marijuana positive test rates tripled, tracking with widening legalization.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the more than six million general workforce tests Quest screened for marijuana in 2022, 4.3% were positive, up from 3.9% the prior year and the largest marijuana positivity rate since 1997.
  2. Marijuana positivity among employees tested after an on-the-job accident rose to 7.3% in 2022, a 9% increase over the prior year, and post-accident positive rates tripled from 2012 to 2022, tracking with widening legalization.
  3. Positivity rates for certain classes of opioids and barbiturates declined in 2022, while more than two-thirds of U.S. states have legalized recreational or medicinal marijuana use.

AI Summary. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention counted a provisional 109,680 US overdose deaths in a year, essentially flat against 109,179 the prior year. The plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in one year and a 30% surge the year before.

Jon Kamp Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The CDC’s provisional count of overdose deaths suggests drug deaths are leveling off with 109,680 in 2022, compared to 109,179 in 2021. Synthetic opioids (mostly fentanyl) accounted for 75,217 deaths. effectively unchanged since 2021.

Have US overdose deaths leveled off after two years of surges?

Core argument: The CDC's provisional count put U.S. drug overdose deaths at 109,680 in 2022, essentially flat against a comparable 2021 projection of 109,179, indicating the fentanyl crisis leveling off.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on Wednesday released a provisional count of overdose deaths last year that indicated the toll of the fentanyl crisis leveling off after two years of surges during the Covid-19 pandemic. The CDC counted 109,680 overdose deaths in 2022 compared with 109,179 deaths from a similar 2021 projection. “It’s hard to know for sure where it will end up, but it will be essentially flat,” said Dr. Robert Anderson, chief of the mortality statistics branch at the CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. The plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in 2021 and a 30% surge in 2020. The U.S. has only recorded two years in which drug fatalities declined in the past several decades, 1990 and 2018.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The CDC's provisional count put U.S. drug overdose deaths at 109,680 in 2022, essentially flat against a comparable 2021 projection of 109,179, indicating the fentanyl crisis leveling off.
  2. The 2022 plateau follows a 16% increase in overdose deaths in 2021 and a 30% surge in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

AI Summary. The World Meteorological Organization estimates a 66% chance that the annual mean global surface temperature will temporarily exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year within the next five years, up from roughly 48% a year earlier and close to zero a decade ago.

Camilla Hodgson Financial Times
Date Posted:

The World Meteorological Organization has assessed that global temperatures are likely to exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels within the next five years.

Are global temperatures likely to temporarily exceed 1.5C within five years?

Core argument: The World Meteorological Organization puts a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise temporarily surpasses 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year by 2027, which would be the first such breach in human history.

Global temperatures are likely to exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels for the first time in human history within the next five years, the World Meteorological Organization has said in its latest annual assessment. In a stark conclusion, scientists said for the first time there was a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise would temporarily surpass 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in “at least” one year by 2027. The chances of this outcome were also “increasing with time”, the report said. The assessment of a two-thirds chance of a temporary breach of the 1.5C threshold compares with estimates of around 48 per cent a year ago, and “close to zero” in 2015.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The World Meteorological Organization puts a 66 per cent chance that the annual mean global surface temperature rise temporarily surpasses 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in at least one year by 2027, which would be the first such breach in human history.
  2. The two-thirds probability of a temporary 1.5C breach compares with roughly 48 per cent estimated a year earlier and "close to zero" in 2015, according to the World Meteorological Organization's annual assessment.
  3. The World Meteorological Organization report says the chances of a temporary 1.5C breach are "increasing with time".