Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, March 7, 2023

AI Summary. Firms that adopt robots are estimated to raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while lowering the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms. Non-adopting competitors in the same industry see hours worked fall by about 6.2% when rivals' robot adoption rises by one standard deviation.

Daron Acemoglu, Hans Koster and Ceren Ozgen National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Firms that adopted robots in the Netherlands between 2009-2020 increased output by 14.9% relative to non-adopting firms. Workers who were directly affected saw income reductions of about 1.5%. @DrDaronAcemoglu @nberpubs

Do robots raise employment at adopting firms while reducing it at rivals?

Core argument: Dutch robot-adopting firms raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while reducing the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms, magnitudes very similar to estimates from France and Spain.

Robot-adopting firms increase output by about 14.9%, increase employment (hours worked) by 4.3%, and reduce the labor share by 4.6 percentage points, relative to comparable non-adopting firms. The quantitative magnitudes of these estimates are very similar to those from France and Spain. As in these countries, we find negative effects on non-adopting rivals in the same industry. For example, a non-adopting firm experiences a 6.2% decline in hours worked when competitor robot adoption - that is, the share of sales by robot adopters in the same four-digit industry - increases by one standard deviation. The negative effects of robot adoption on workers employed in routine production work and replaceable occupations are predominantly through lower wages.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Dutch robot-adopting firms raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while reducing the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms, magnitudes very similar to estimates from France and Spain.
  2. A non-adopting Dutch firm experiences a 6.2% decline in hours worked when competitor robot adoption, measured as the share of sales by robot adopters in the same four-digit industry, rises by one standard deviation.
  3. The negative effects of robot adoption on workers in routine production work and replaceable occupations operate predominantly through lower wages.

AI Summary. The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, yet absolute adoption remains low, with 25-40 manufacturing workers per robot in America, China, Europe and Japan and 10 to one in South Korea. Industrial robot spending of $25bn in 2020 was under 1% of global capital expenditure outside energy and mining.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

The global stock of industrial robots is relatively low. In South Korea, there are ten manufacturing workers for every industrial robot whereas there are 25-40 manufacturing workers per robot in the US, China, Europe and Japan. @TheEconomist

Is robot adoption still low despite rapid growth in installations?

Core argument: The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, driven by better technology and lower prices.

As a result of better technology and lower prices, the global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021. Though down from the frothy peaks of 2021, when bosses sought alternatives to human workforces incapacitated by covid-19, robot-makers’ share prices remain a fifth higher than before the pandemic.  For all that growth, however, absolute levels of adoption remain low, especially in the West. Even South Korean firms, by far the world’s keenest robot-adopters, employ ten manufacturing workers for every industrial robot. In America, China, Europe and Japan the figure is 25-40 to one. The $25bn that, according to consultants at Boston Consulting Group, the world spent on industrial robots in 2020 was less than 1% of global capital expenditure (excluding the energy and mining sectors). People spent more on sex toys.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, driven by better technology and lower prices.
  2. South Korean firms, the world's keenest robot-adopters, still employ ten manufacturing workers per industrial robot, while the ratio is 25-40 to one in America, China, Europe and Japan.
  3. Boston Consulting Group puts global spending on industrial robots at $25bn in 2020, less than 1% of global capital expenditure excluding energy and mining, and below spending on sex toys.

AI Summary. US coal production fell from about 775m short tons to 535m short tons and coal consumption fell over 33%, from roughly 717m to 477m short tons, despite expectations of support for the industry. No major federal legislation has curtailed US oil and gas output, both of which have reached all-time highs.

Gregor Macdonald The Gregor Letter
Date Posted:

.@GregorMacdonald argues policy has had little impact on US energy production, which is driven by price and technological change. Fossil fuels expanded under Biden despite his pivot towards green policy, and coal declined under Trump.

Does federal policy drive US coal decline and oil and gas records?

Core argument: US coal consumption fell over 33% under Trump, from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons, while coal production dropped from 774,609 to 535,434 thousand short tons by 2020.

The big surprise however was that Trump was not able to do anything for the coal industry, a major reversal of expectations. US coal production continued to fall, from 774,609 thousand short tons in 2017 to 535,434 thousand short tons in 2020. The continued collapse of coal consumption was even more dramatic under Trump, falling over 33% from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons. Joe Biden came to office as the most vocal, aggressive US executive on the need to take action on climate change. And yet, there has been no meaningful federal legislation that curtails the output of US oil and gas—both of which just reached (again) all-time highs. That’s why the [flipping] in the US energy balance sheet, moving ever more deeply into the black in 2021 and 2022, will surely steamroll onward. And US petroleum production, which suffered a hit from the pandemic demand collapse globally, has taken a very standard 12-24 months to not just recover, but reach a new high. A classic example of the free market, not policy, in full control.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US coal consumption fell over 33% under Trump, from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons, while coal production dropped from 774,609 to 535,434 thousand short tons by 2020.
  2. Under Biden, no meaningful federal legislation has curtailed US oil and gas output, both of which reached all-time highs, despite his vocal insistence on action on climate change.
  3. US petroleum production took 12–24 months to recover from the pandemic demand collapse and reach a new high, which the author calls a classic example of the free market, not policy, in control.

AI Summary. Voters in Asian neighborhoods across New York City shifted 23 percentage points toward Republicans in a governor's election compared with the prior one, though these areas remained Democratic overall. A New York Times precinct-level analysis finds this was the largest electoral shift in the city's Asian neighborhoods between 2006 and 2022.

Jason Kao New York Times
Date Posted:

Voters in Asian neighborhoods shifted their support towards Republicans by 23pp between 2018 and 2022. @NYTimes

Have Asian neighborhoods in New York City shifted toward Republicans?

Core argument: New York City's Asian neighborhoods shifted 23 percentage points to the right in last year's governor's election compared with 2018, though these areas remained Democratic overall.

In last year’s governor’s election, voters in Asian neighborhoods across New York City sharply increased their support for Republicans. Though these areas remained blue overall, they shifted to the right by 23 percentage points, compared with 2018, after more than a decade of reliably backing Democrats. It was the largest electoral shift in Asian neighborhoods in the period from 2006 to 2022, the longest available span of election results by precinct, according to a New York Times analysis.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City's Asian neighborhoods shifted 23 percentage points to the right in last year's governor's election compared with 2018, though these areas remained Democratic overall.
  2. A New York Times analysis of precinct-level results found the shift was the largest electoral move in New York City's Asian neighborhoods from 2006 to 2022, the longest available span of such results.
  3. Asian neighborhoods across New York City had backed Democrats reliably for more than a decade before sharply increasing their support for Republicans in the governor's race.

AI Summary. Murders in 93 US cities fell 5% year over year after the increase that began in 2020, though homicides remained 4,764 (28.7%) above pre-pandemic levels, according to data compiled by AH Datalytics. US murder rates remain far higher than in other wealthy nations.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
Is Database:
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The wave of murders associated with the pandemic has seemingly crested. Homicide rates are still well above the pre-pandemic level, but 2022 homicides were down 5% from 2021. @foxjust

Are US murders declining after their pandemic-era surge?

Core argument: US murders in 2022 still exceeded pre-pandemic 2019 levels by 4,764, or 28.7%, on AH Datalytics estimates, and US murder rates remain much higher than those of other wealthy nations.

The shocking rise in murders that began in the summer of 2020 looks as if it may have played out. In the nearly complete tally of 2022 homicide statistics from 93 US cities compiled by AH Datalytics, murder and non-negligent manslaughter was down 5% from the year before. There were still many more people murdered in the US in 2022 than before the pandemic in 2019 — going by the AH Datalytics estimates it was 4,764, or 28.7%, more. Murder rates are also much, much higher in the US than in other wealthy nations. But with weekly crime statistics from the three biggest US cities showing a continuing and possibly accelerating murder decline so far in 2023, it does look as if a return to the awful conditions of the 1970s through early 1990s probably isn’t in the cards.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US murders in 2022 still exceeded pre-pandemic 2019 levels by 4,764, or 28.7%, on AH Datalytics estimates, and US murder rates remain much higher than those of other wealthy nations.
  2. Weekly crime statistics from the three biggest US cities show a continuing and possibly accelerating murder decline in 2023, suggesting a return to the conditions of the 1970s through early 1990s probably isn't in the cards.

AI Summary. China's leadership has accused the United States of leading Western countries in all-round containment and suppression of China's development, calling it a severe challenge. China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2% to 328bn yuan ($47bn) and overhauling how government research funds are allocated, giving scientists greater say over technological road maps.

Teddy Ng South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

Xi Jinping is accusing the United States of attempting to suppressing China’s development. @SCMPNews

Xi Jinping is accusing the United States of attempting to suppressing China’s development. @SCMPNews

How is China responding to accusations of US-led containment?

Core argument: China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion), part of a legislative session agenda to cut reliance on the United States.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has directly accused the United States of leading other Western nations to suppress China’s development. “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to the country’s development.” A key agenda for the ongoing legislative sessions in China is to provide a strategy to cut reliance on the US. As part of that plan, the central government proposed on Sunday to raise science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion).To that end, China will overhaul its mechanisms for allocating and using government research funds and will “grant scientists a greater say when it comes to determining technological road maps and spending research funds”, according to a budget report released by the Ministry of Finance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion), part of a legislative session agenda to cut reliance on the United States.
  2. Xi Jinping said "Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China," which he described as bringing unprecedented severe challenges to the country's development.
  3. A Ministry of Finance budget report said China will overhaul its mechanisms for allocating and using government research funds and grant scientists a greater say over technological road maps and research spending.

AI Summary. Proposed US legislation would give the government power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when deemed necessary, without naming TikTok or its owner ByteDance. Lawmakers say such measures are intended to counter security threats from apps that they say can gather user data or serve as propaganda tools.

Daniel Flatley and Jenny Leonard Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Legislation is moving in Congress to give the government authorities that would enable it to restrict access to the TikTok app. @markets

Legislation is moving in Congress to give the government authorities that would enable it to restrict access to the TikTok...

Should the government have broad power to ban foreign technologies?

Core argument: Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner is set to unveil a bill that would give the US power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, without naming ByteDance Ltd.'s TikTok.

The US is moving closer to restricting access to the popular video-sharing app TikTok, with Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner set to unveil a bill Tuesday that the Biden administration is poised to support, according to people familiar with the issue. The measure, one of many being proposed in Congress to restrict Bytedance Ltd.’s TikTok but isn’t expected to pinpoint the company by name, would give the US the power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, said one of the people, who asked not to be identified discussing private deliberations. Lawmakers say the measures are intended to counter security threats from apps like TikTok, which they say can be used to gather user data or as tools for propaganda. Last week, legislation authorizing the US to ban TikTok in the US advanced through the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner is set to unveil a bill that would give the US power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, without naming ByteDance Ltd.'s TikTok.
  2. The Biden administration is poised to support Warner's measure, according to people familiar with the issue.
  3. Lawmakers say the restrictions are intended to counter security threats from apps like TikTok, which they say can be used to gather user data or as tools for propaganda.

AI Summary. The UK and Australia are pressing the US to ease secrecy rules that officials say are slowing cooperation on undersea capabilities and electronic warfare within their trilateral security pact. The obstacles include technology-transfer and arms-export licensing requirements and a classification barring information sharing with non-US nationals.

Demetri Sevastopulo Financial Times
Date Posted:

.@Dimi reports that Washington is starting to reform security rules that would undercut the Aukus security pact. The US and Australia are expected to shortly announce the plan for production of Australian nuclear submarines.

.@Dimi reports that Washington is starting to reform security rules that would undercut the Aukus security pact. The US and...

Are US secrecy rules slowing allied defense technology cooperation?

Core argument: President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak are expected to disclose how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13.

President Joe Biden, Australia’s prime minister Anthony Albanese and UK PM Rishi Sunak are expected to reveal how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13. Officials are optimistic the US has found ways to share closely guarded nuclear-propulsion secrets with Australia. But there is concern that the second pillar, which includes undersea capabilities and electronic warfare, faces obstacles that have slowed its momentum. These hurdles relate to technology transfer, licensing requirements under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and a classification called “NoForn” that bars information sharing with non-US nationals.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak are expected to disclose how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13.
  2. Officials are optimistic that the US has found ways to share closely guarded nuclear-propulsion secrets with Australia.
  3. The pact's second pillar, covering undersea capabilities and electronic warfare, faces obstacles tied to technology transfer, International Traffic in Arms Regulations licensing requirements, and a "NoForn" classification that bars sharing information with non-US nationals.

Wednesday, March 8, 2023

AI Summary. With expected inflation near 2.5%, a real interest rate of 1.5% to 2%, and some risk and term premium, short-term interest rates would average around 4%, one argument in a debate on the future of interest rates holds. If traditional spreads reassert themselves, longer-term rates would run about 1 percentage point higher, near 5%.

Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:

Larry Summers argues over the next decade “short rates will run in the four range on average and longer-term rates if traditional spreads reassert themselves running 100 basis points above that. So, four and five.” @LHSummers @ojblanchard1

Larry Summers argues over the next decade “short rates will run in the four range on average and longer-term rates if...

Will short- and long-term interest rates settle near 4% and 5%?

Core argument: Larry Summers puts his expected value of inflation at 2.5% or a bit higher, citing tail risk of 4% or 5%, and assigns a very low likelihood to inflation running well below 2%.

Larry Summers, "I think today my expected value of inflation would be 2.5 or a bit larger given the tail risk of 4 or 5. And given that, I'd assign a very low likelihood to it being well below two. So, if you take a 1.5% to 2% real rate, a 2.5% inflation rate and some risk and term premium, you're sort of looking at short rates running in the four range on average and longer-term rates if traditional spreads reassert themselves running 100 basis points above that. So, four and five."

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Larry Summers puts his expected value of inflation at 2.5% or a bit higher, citing tail risk of 4% or 5%, and assigns a very low likelihood to inflation running well below 2%.
  2. Combining a 1.5–2% real rate, a 2.5% inflation rate, and some risk and term premium, Summers sees short rates averaging around 4%.
  3. Summers expects longer-term rates to run 100 basis points above short rates if traditional spreads reassert themselves, putting them near 5%.

AI Summary. Women have gained more jobs than men for four straight months and hold more than 49.8% of all nonfarm jobs, with the labor-force recovery most pronounced among mothers of school-age children, whose participation has surpassed pre-pandemic levels. Participation among fathers of school-age children and among women without young children remains below pre-pandemic levels.

Sarah Chaney Cambon and Lauren Weber Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The share of mothers with school aged children who are in the labor force is above January 2020 levels, whereas their male counterparts are under the 2020 level. @WSJ

Are women driving the labor force recovery?

Core argument: Women hold more than 49.8% of all U.S. nonfarm jobs after gaining more jobs than men for four straight months, including during January's hiring surge.

Women have gained more jobs than men for four straight months, including in January’s hiring surge, pushing them to hold more than 49.8% of all nonfarm jobs. The recent labor-force recovery has been particularly pronounced among mothers. The share of mothers with school-age children employed or seeking work surpassed January 2020 levels in November. The participation rate among fathers of school-age children retreated at the end of last year and is down from January 2020. Participation among women who don’t have children or who have children age 18 or above also remains depressed, in part reflecting early retirements during the pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Women hold more than 49.8% of all U.S. nonfarm jobs after gaining more jobs than men for four straight months, including during January's hiring surge.
  2. The share of mothers with school-age children employed or seeking work surpassed its January 2020 level in November, while participation among fathers of school-age children retreated late last year and remains below January 2020.
  3. Labor-force participation among women without children or with children age 18 or above remains depressed, in part reflecting early retirements during the pandemic.

AI Summary. Oil output from the top 10% of wells in the Delaware portion of the Permian basin averaged 15% lower than the best wells drilled several years earlier, and the average well produced 6% less than the prior year, patterns that resemble the production plateaus seen in more mature U.S. shale fields.

Collin Eaton and Benoît Morenne Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The rate of increase of shale production is slowing. Domestic oil output last year grew at one-third of the annual average pace seen in shale’s heyday from 2017-2019. @WSJ

The rate of increase of shale production is slowing. Domestic oil output last year grew at one-third of the annual average...

Is declining well productivity signaling a plateau in U.S. shale output?

Core argument: Oil production from the best 10% of wells drilled in the Delaware portion of the Permian averaged 15% lower last year than top 2017 wells, according to data from FLOW Partners LLC.

Recent results out of the Permian, are mimicking the onset of a production plateau that has taken place at other, more mature U.S. shale plays. Oil production from the best 10% of wells drilled in the Delaware portion of the Permian was 15% lower last year, on average, than top 2017 wells, according to data from analytics firm FLOW Partners LLC. Meanwhile, the average well put out 6% less oil than the prior year, according to an analysis of data from analytics firm Novi Labs. Oil production in the U.S. rose from about 7.2 million barrels a day a decade ago to a high of about 13 million barrels a day before the pandemic. But domestic output last year grew at one-third of the annual average pace seen in shale’s heyday from 2017 to 2019, and hasn’t yet caught up with prepandemic levels. The slowdown was mostly because of investor pressure on companies to curtail spending and limit growth in favor of generating higher returns. At the same time, weaker well results in the Delaware basin contributed to flattening output.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Oil production from the best 10% of wells drilled in the Delaware portion of the Permian averaged 15% lower last year than top 2017 wells, according to data from FLOW Partners LLC.
  2. The average Delaware basin well produced 6% less oil than the prior year, according to an analysis of data from Novi Labs, with weaker well results contributing to flattening output.
  3. U.S. oil output rose from about 7.2 million barrels a day a decade ago to a high of about 13 million before the pandemic, but grew last year at one-third the 2017-2019 pace, mostly because of investor pressure to curtail spending.

AI Summary. Private indebtedness fell by roughly 70 percentage points of nominal GDP between 1940 and 1945, driven mainly by a 122% increase in incomes rather than debt reduction. More recently private indebtedness has been flat, as the nominal income surge was large enough to be inflationary but too small to reset private borrowing capacity.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

.@M_C_Klein speculates that one reason we didn’t see a post pandemic boom was that the current reflation isn’t associated with private sector deleveraging.

Did the recent nominal income surge reduce private indebtedness like wartime reflation?

Core argument: Private indebtedness fell by roughly 70 percentage points of nominal GDP between 1940 and 1945, driven less by debt paydown than by a 122% increase in incomes, which the author argues gave the private sector a clean slate to lever back up for six decades until the global financial crisis.

The wartime reflation worked better because it was so much larger. Recall that private indebtedness fell by roughly 70 percentage points of NGDP between 1940 and 1945. The private debt stock fell somewhat during the war, but the real magic was the 122% increase in incomes. That gave the private sector a clean slate to spend the next six decades levering back up—until the global financial crisis. This time around, private indebtedness has been flat. The nominal income surge that we actually experienced was large enough to be inflationary, but too small to reset private borrowing capacity. Would we have enjoyed more investment and more productivity gains if the private sector had shed its legacy debt constraints? Or would that simply have made inflation even worse by allowing nominal spending to rise even faster relative to real output?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Private indebtedness fell by roughly 70 percentage points of nominal GDP between 1940 and 1945, driven less by debt paydown than by a 122% increase in incomes, which the author argues gave the private sector a clean slate to lever back up for six decades until the global financial crisis.
  2. Private indebtedness has been flat this time around, and the author argues the nominal income surge was large enough to be inflationary but too small to reset private borrowing capacity.
  3. The author leaves open whether shedding legacy private debt constraints would have delivered more investment and productivity gains or instead worsened inflation by letting nominal spending rise faster relative to real output.

AI Summary. Follow-up probing in household surveys reveals that about one in 10 workers who initially report working for an employer is actually an independent contractor on at least one job, which nearly doubles the estimated independent contractor share of the main-job workforce to roughly 15%. Young, less educated, and lower-hours workers are more likely to be miscoded.

Katharine Abraham, Brad Hershbein, et ak National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

15% of American workers are independent contractors, according to a Gallup survey that was carefully constructed to avoid data problems that had previously plagued the space. @kgahome @BHershbein @bethtruesdale

Do household surveys undercount the independent contractor workforce?

Core argument: Roughly 1 in 10 workers who initially report working for an employer on one or more jobs is, upon probing, an independent contractor on at least one of those jobs.

We find that, upon probing, roughly one in 10 workers who initially reports working for an employer on one or more jobs (and thus is coded as an employee) is in fact an independent contractor on at least one of those jobs. Incorporating these miscoded workers into estimates of work arrangement on the main job nearly doubles the share who are independent contractors, to about 15 percent of all workers. Young workers, less educated workers, workers of color, multiple-job holders, and those with low hours are more likely to be miscoded. Taking these workers into account substantively changes the demographic profile of the independent contractor workforce. Our research indicates that probing in household surveys to clarify a worker’s employment arrangement and identify all low-hours work is critical for accurately measuring independent contractor work.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly 1 in 10 workers who initially report working for an employer on one or more jobs is, upon probing, an independent contractor on at least one of those jobs.
  2. Incorporating these miscoded workers nearly doubles the share classified as independent contractors on their main job, to about 15 percent of all workers.
  3. Young workers, less educated workers, workers of color, multiple-job holders, and those with low hours are more likely to be miscoded, and accounting for them substantively changes the demographic profile of the independent contractor workforce.

AI Summary. The open world markets that Germany in particular depended on are becoming less open in a more nationalist and fragmented world economy, which is bound to be costly. As the US moves toward interventionist and protectionist industrial policy, similar efforts in Europe would be more national than European, threatening the single market and favoring the best-resourced member states.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:

Over the past decade the EU’s economy has grown more inward facing: exports outside the EU as a share of all exports have declined from 43% in 2014 to 38% in 2022. @martinwolf_

Does a more fragmented world economy threaten Europe's single market?

Core argument: A more nationalist and fragmented world economy is closing the open markets on which Germany in particular depended, a shift that is bound to be costly.

Difficulties are only likely to grow in this more nationalist and more fragmented world economy. The open world markets on which Germany, in particular, depended are becoming less so. That is bound to be costly. Moreover, the US is moving towards an interventionist and protectionist industrial policy. For the EU, such a shift creates existential problems. Similar efforts there are bound to be more national than European. This would threaten the single market and give the whip hand to the member countries with the most resources. Germany will be the best positioned. At the same time, the higher costs of energy in Europe than in the US are a threat to its own heavy industry. (

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A more nationalist and fragmented world economy is closing the open markets on which Germany in particular depended, a shift that is bound to be costly.
  2. The US move toward interventionist, protectionist industrial policy creates existential problems for the EU, since European responses are bound to be more national than European, threatening the single market.
  3. National industrial policies would give the whip hand to the member states with the most resources, leaving Germany best positioned, while energy costs higher in Europe than in the US threaten European heavy industry.