Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, March 6, 2023

AI Summary. The authors estimate that post-pandemic labor market tightness compressed the US wage distribution, reducing the college wage premium and offsetting roughly one-quarter of the four-decade rise in 90-10 wage inequality. They attribute this in part to greater labor supply elasticity facing firms in low-wage markets, which reduced employer market power as young non-college workers moved to higher-paying jobs.

David Autor, Arindrajit Dube and Annie McGrew National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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In the aftermath of the pandemic, real hourly wage gains for non-college workers have reversed a quarter of the rise in wage inequality since 1980. @davidautor @nberpubs

Does a tight labor market reduce wage inequality by weakening employer power?

Core argument: Rapid relative wage growth at the bottom of the US wage distribution after the height of the Covid-19 pandemic counteracted roughly one-quarter of the four-decade increase in aggregate 90-10 log wage inequality and reduced the college wage premium.

Labor market tightness following the height of the Covid-19 pandemic led to an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution that reflects, in part, an increase in labor market competition. Rapid relative wage growth at the bottom of the distribution reduced the college wage premium and counteracted approximately one-quarter of the four-decade increase in aggregate 90-10 log wage inequality. Wage compression was accompanied by rapid nominal wage growth and rising job-to-job separations—especially among young non-college (high school or less) workers. Seen through the lens of a canonical job ladder model, the pandemic increased the elasticity of labor supply to firms in the low-wage labor market, reducing employer market power and spurring rapid relative wage growth among young non-college workers who disproportionately moved from lower-paying to higher-paying and potentially more-productive jobs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rapid relative wage growth at the bottom of the US wage distribution after the height of the Covid-19 pandemic counteracted roughly one-quarter of the four-decade increase in aggregate 90-10 log wage inequality and reduced the college wage premium.
  2. Wage compression was accompanied by rapid nominal wage growth and rising job-to-job separations, especially among young workers with a high school education or less.
  3. Interpreted through a canonical job ladder model, the pandemic raised the elasticity of labor supply to firms in the low-wage labor market, reducing employer market power as young non-college workers disproportionately moved from lower-paying to higher-paying, potentially more-productive jobs.

AI Summary. Most measures indicate underlying inflation has come down, though it remains significantly above the Federal Reserve's 2% target, with the economy still running hot despite a series of interest rate increases. There is no evidence inflation is becoming entrenched, but the argument is that rate increases must continue until inflation is clearly under control.

Paul Krugman New York Times
Date Posted:

.@paulkrugman weighs the evidence of the direction of inflation in light of recent revisions (red line on chart) concluding underlying inflation “probably” has come down since early 2022 but “we don’t know how much it has come down.”

Should rate increases continue until inflation is clearly under control?

Core argument: Underlying inflation has probably declined since early 2022, with few measures suggesting otherwise, though the magnitude of that decline remains unknown and inflation is still running significantly above the Fed's 2 percent target.

Underlying inflation probably has come down since early 2022 — you really have to work hard to find measures that don’t say that. But we don’t know how much it has come down. Inflation is still, however, running significantly above the Fed’s 2 percent target. Elevated inflation isn’t a mystery: The economy still seems to be running hot, despite a series of interest rate hikes from the Fed. So far there is no evidence that inflation is becoming entrenched, such that we would have to go through an extended period of high unemployment to get it back down. I’m not saying that it can’t happen, but as far as I can tell, there is no evidence supporting fears of ’70s-style stagflation. Given this picture, I don’t see how the Fed can avoid continuing to raise interest rates until it’s more or less unmistakable that inflation is coming under control.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Underlying inflation has probably declined since early 2022, with few measures suggesting otherwise, though the magnitude of that decline remains unknown and inflation is still running significantly above the Fed's 2 percent target.
  2. Elevated inflation reflects an economy that still seems to be running hot despite a series of Fed interest rate hikes.

AI Summary. US commercial bank deposits fell for the first time since 1948, with net withdrawals of $278bn, as depositors shifted toward higher-yielding Treasury bills and money market funds amid Federal Reserve rate increases. The average one-year certificate of deposit rate is roughly 1.5%, up from 0.25% but below inflation.

Alex Harris, David Caleb Mutua and Paige Smith Bloomberg
Date Posted:

American commercial bank deposits fell in 2022 for the first time since 1948 as depositors seek yield. CD rates are starting to rise in response. @markets

Are banks raising deposit rates as savers shift to higher-yielding alternatives?

Core argument: Commercial bank deposits fell last year for the first time since 1948, with net withdrawals reaching $278 billion as depositors shifted toward higher-yielding options like Treasury bills and money market funds.

After years of earning next to nothing, depositors are discovering a trove of higher-yielding options like Treasury bills and money market funds as the Federal Reserve ratchets up benchmark interest rates. The shift has been so pronounced that commercial bank deposits fell last year for the first time since 1948 as net withdrawals hit $278 billion. The very biggest banks can afford to slow-walk their rate increases, simply because they still have relatively high deposit levels. Overall, the average rate on a one-year CD is roughly 1.5%. That’s up from 0.25% a week before the Fed began raising rates a year ago, but still well below inflation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Commercial bank deposits fell last year for the first time since 1948, with net withdrawals reaching $278 billion as depositors shifted toward higher-yielding options like Treasury bills and money market funds.
  2. The average rate on a one-year certificate of deposit is roughly 1.5%, up from 0.25% a week before the Federal Reserve began raising rates a year ago, but still well below inflation.
  3. The largest US banks can slow-walk their deposit rate increases because they still hold relatively high deposit levels.

AI Summary. Using data on 18 advanced economies since 1870, the authors estimate that a loose monetary policy stance causally raises the risk of financial crises over the medium term, against an unconditional 10.5% probability of a crisis in a 3-year window. Lower rates raise asset valuations, opening the door to collateral-driven credit booms.

Maximilian Grimm, Oscar Jorda, et al Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
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Persistently loose monetary policies are associated with financial crises. A 1pp lower mean in a five-year window increases the probability of a financial crisis in the next 5 to 7 years by 5.5pp and by 15.5 in the following 7-9 years. @MSchularick @sffed

Does loose monetary policy raise the risk of financial crises?

Core argument: The authors report the first causal evidence that a loose monetary policy stance has strong implications for medium-term financial instability, calling the effects big against an unconditional 10.5% probability of a crisis in a 3-year window.

We are the first to show that, as a causal matter, a loose stance has strong implications for medium-term financial instability. The sample consists of 18 advanced economies over the period from 1870 until 2020. Since the unconditional probability of experiencing a crisis in a 3-year window is 10.5%, these effects are big. Moreover, these results are robust to alternative measures of stance and alternative definitions of financial stability. Lower interest rates in general and loose monetary policy in particular imply, ceteris paribus, higher asset valuations. This opens the door for collateral-driven credit booms. Such credit and asset price booms, in turn, have been identified by the literature as harbingers of financial turmoil.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors report the first causal evidence that a loose monetary policy stance has strong implications for medium-term financial instability, calling the effects big against an unconditional 10.5% probability of a crisis in a 3-year window.
  2. The study draws on 18 advanced economies from 1870 to 2020, and the authors find the results robust to alternative measures of monetary stance and alternative definitions of financial stability.
  3. The authors argue that lower interest rates and loose monetary policy imply, ceteris paribus, higher asset valuations, opening the door to collateral-driven credit booms that the literature identifies as harbingers of financial turmoil.

AI Summary. Russia lost an estimated 1.9m–2.8m people beyond its normal demographic decline over a roughly three-year span, combining pandemic deaths, war casualties and emigration. Life expectancy for Russian males aged 15 fell by nearly five years, and women now outnumber men by at least 10m.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
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.@TheEconomist estimates that between the pandemic, war and emigration Russia has lost more than 2m people relative to the pre-2020 baseline with the life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 falling by almost five years to the same level as Haiti.

How much population has Russia lost beyond its normal decline?

Core argument: Russia lost between 1.9m and 2.8m people in 2020–23 on top of its normal demographic deterioration, counting pandemic mortality, war casualties and flight from mobilization.

Over the past three years Russia has lost around 2m more people than it would ordinarily have done, as a result of war, disease and exodus. The life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 fell by almost five years, to the same level as in Haiti. The number of Russians born in April 2022 was no higher than it had been in the months of Hitler’s occupation. And because so many men of fighting age are dead or in exile, women outnumber men by at least 10m. According to Western estimates, 175,000-200,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded over the past year. Somewhere between 500,000 and 1m mostly young, educated people have evaded the meat grinder by fleeing abroad. If you add pandemic mortality to the casualties of war and the flight from mobilization, Russia lost between 1.9m and 2.8m people in 2020-23 on top of its normal demographic deterioration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Russia lost between 1.9m and 2.8m people in 2020–23 on top of its normal demographic deterioration, counting pandemic mortality, war casualties and flight from mobilization.
  2. The life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 fell by almost five years, to the same level as in Haiti, and births in April 2022 were no higher than during Hitler's occupation.
  3. Western estimates put Russian soldiers killed or wounded in a year at 175,000-200,000, and 500,000 to 1m mostly young, educated people have fled abroad; with so many men of fighting age dead or in exile, women outnumber men by at least 10m.

The Economist estimates that between the pandemic, war and emigration Russia has lost more than 2m people relative to the pre-2020 baseline with the life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 falling by almost five years to the same level as Haiti. “..Over the past three years Russia has lost around 2m more people than it would ordinarily have done, as a result of war, disease and exodus. The life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 fell by almost five years, to the same level as in Haiti. The number of Russians born in April 2022 was no higher than it had been in the months of Hitler’s occupation. And because so many men of fighting age are dead or in exile, women outnumber men by at least 10m. According to Western estimates, 175,000-200,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded over the past year. Somewhere between 500,000 and 1m mostly young, educated people have evaded the meat grinder by fleeing abroad. If you add pandemic mortality to the casualties of war and the flight from mobilization, Russia lost between 1.9m and 2.8m people in 2020-23 on top of its normal demographic deterioration….”

Description automatically generated Economist Staff, “Russia’s population nightmare is going to get even worse,” The Economist, March 4, 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/04/russias-population-nightmare-is-going-to-get-even-worse

Russia’s population nightmare is going to get even worse

A demographic tragedy is unfolding in Russia. Over the past three years the country has lost around 2m more people than it would ordinarily have done, as a result of war, disease and exodus. The life expectancy of Russian males aged 15 fell by almost five years, to the same level as in Haiti. The number of Russians born in April 2022 was no higher than it had been in the months of Hitler’s occupation. And because so many men of fighting age are dead or in exile, women outnumber men by at least 10m.

War is not the sole—or even the main—cause of these troubles but it has made them all worse. According to Western estimates, 175,000-200,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded over the past year (Russia’s own figures are lower). Somewhere between 500,000 and 1m mostly young, educated people have evaded the meat grinder by fleeing abroad. Even if Russia had no other demographic problems, losing so many in such a short time would be painful. As it is, the losses of war are placing more burdens on a shrinking, ailing population. Russia may be entering a doom loop of demographic decline.

The roots of Russia’s crisis go back 30 years. The country reached peak population in 1994, with 149m people. The total has zig-zagged downwards since. It was 145m in 2021 (that figure, from the un, excludes the 2.4m people of Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014 and incorporated into its national accounts). According to un projections, the total could be just 120m in 50 years if current patterns persist. That would make Russia the 15th-largest country in the world, down from sixth in 1995. According to Alexei Raksha, an independent demographer who used to work for the state statistics service, if you look just at peacetime years, the number of births registered in April 2022 was the lowest since the 18th century. April was a particularly cruel month but it was a revealing glimpse of a chronic problem.

Population decline is not unique to Russia: most post-communist states have seen downturns, though not like this. Their declines have been slow, manageable diminutions. Russia’s population in recent decades has seen a precipitous slump, then a partial recovery (thanks to a period of high immigration and more generous child allowances after 2007), followed by a renewed slump.

According to the state statistics agency, in 2020 and 2021 combined the country’s population declined by 1.3m and deaths outstripped births by 1.7m. (The un also shows a fall but it is shallower). The decline was largest among ethnic Russians whose number, the census of 2021 said, fell by 5.4m in 2010-21. Their share of the population fell from 78% to 72%. So much for Mr Putin’s boast to be expanding the Russki mir (Russian world).

All this began before the war and reflects Russia’s appalling covid pandemic. The official death toll from the disease was 388,091, which would be relatively low; but The Economist estimates total excess deaths in 2020-23 at between 1.2m and 1.6m. That would be comparable to the number in China and the United States, which have much larger populations. Russia may have had the largest covid death toll in the world after India and the highest mortality rate of all, with 850-1,100 deaths per 100,000 people.

If you add pandemic mortality to the casualties of war and the flight from mobilisation, Russia lost between 1.9m and 2.8m people in 2020-23 on top of its normal demographic deterioration. That would be even worse than during the disastrous early 2000s when the population was falling by roughly half a million a year.

https://www.staging4.edwardconard.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/image003-21.png

What might that mean for Russia’s future? It is worth remembering that demography is not always destiny and that Russia did begin to reverse its decline in the mid-2010s. The impact of population change is often complex, as Russia’s military mobilisation shows. The decline in the number of ethnic Russians of call-up age (which is being raised from 18-27 to 21-30) will make it harder for the military to carry out the regular spring draft, which begins in April. It will put an even greater burden on young men in non-Russian regions such as Dagestan, where protests have already broken out. It is also likely to hamper plans to increase the size of the armed forces by 350,000 over the next three years. On the other hand, there is little sign that Russia is running out of young men to sacrifice in the bloodlands. In October the government claimed it had reached its target of drafting 300,000 extra troops to bolster the occupation.

Such complications notwithstanding, the overall effect of demographic decline will be to change Russia profoundly and for the worse. Most countries which have suffered population falls have managed to avoid big social upheavals. Russia may be different. Its population is falling unusually fast and may drop to 130m people by mid-century. The decline is associated with increased misery: the life expectancy at birth of Russian males plummeted from 68.8 in 2019 to 64.2 in 2021, partly because of covid, partly from alcohol-related disease. Russian men now die six years earlier than men in Bangladesh and 18 years earlier than men in Japan.

And Russia may not achieve what enables other countries to be rich and ageing: high and rising levels of education. Nicholas Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, dc, argues that the country presents a peculiar combination of third-word mortality and first-world education. It has some of the highest rates of educational attainment among over-25s in the world. But the exodus of well-educated young families is eroding this advantage. According to the communications ministry, 10% of it workers left the country in 2022. Many were young men. Their flight is further skewing Russia’s unbalanced sex ratio which in 2021 meant there were 121 females older than 18 for every 100 males.

The demographic doom loop has not diminished Mr Putin’s craving for conquest. But it is making Russia a smaller, worse-educated and poorer country, from which young people flee and where men die in their 60s. The invasion has been a human catastrophe and not only for Ukrainians.

AI Summary. India's average applied "most favored nation" tariff, among the highest of major economies, reached 18.3% in 2021, up from 2014 as the government pushed companies to manufacture domestically. Indian officials say the tariffs target low-priced, substandard imports from China while seeking more open trade with developed economies.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

.@greg_ip argues that Indian policy is pivoting towards the United States and is seeking to reduce trade friction with Europe, America, Canada, Japan, and Korea.

Is India raising tariffs against China while opening trade with developed economies?

Core argument: India's average most-favored-nation applied tariff stood at 18.3% in 2021, one of the highest among major economies, and higher than in 2014 following Prime Minister Narendra Modi's push to get domestic and foreign companies to manufacture more in India.

India’s trade barriers have long been among the highest of major economies. Its average “most favored nation” [MFN] applied tariff in 2021 stood at 18.3%, one of the highest among major economies. That’s actually up from 2014, a result of Mr. Modi’s efforts to encourage domestic and foreign companies to manufacture more in India. The high MFN tariff is aimed at “nontransparent economies who are dumping really low-quality, substandard goods at really low prices, which is hurting the Indian economy and Indian manufacturing,” Piyush Goyal, India’s minister of commerce and industry, said in an interview, in a reference to China. “The tariffs are not meant to be a detriment, ideally, to…Europe or America or Canada or Japan or Korea. We are looking at having more trading relationships, bilaterally or collectively, with the developed world with whom we want more and more open borders.” India wants more protection from China, and freer trade with everyone else.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. India's average most-favored-nation applied tariff stood at 18.3% in 2021, one of the highest among major economies, and higher than in 2014 following Prime Minister Narendra Modi's push to get domestic and foreign companies to manufacture more in India.
  2. India's minister of commerce and industry, Piyush Goyal, said the high most-favored-nation tariff targets "nontransparent economies" dumping low-quality, low-priced goods that hurt the Indian economy and Indian manufacturing, in a reference to China.
  3. Piyush Goyal said the tariffs are not ideally meant to hinder Europe, America, Canada, Japan or Korea, and that India seeks more bilateral or collective trading relationships with the developed world and "more and more open borders.".

AI Summary. The author argues that China's economic growth will slow further, settling closer to US rates rather than returning to mid-single-digit levels, with successes in some technologies unable to offset broad deceleration. Fear of abrupt state interventions is dampening enthusiasm among businesspeople and young people, producing more foot-dragging and less initiative in response to centralized campaigns.

Dan Wang DanWang.co
Date Posted:

In his annual letter @danwwang notes a change in animal spirits in China in the aftermath of 2022’s Covid policy and regulatory attacks on business “I perceive a fading sense of enthusiasm among businesspeople and youths.”

In his annual letter @danwwang notes a change in animal spirits in China in the aftermath of 2022’s Covid policy and...

Will China's growth slow toward US rates despite technological successes?

Core argument: The author expects China's growth to slow further, not returning to 2019's mid-single-digit pace but converging toward US levels of growth.

What I did not sufficiently appreciate is that a state that would so casually decapitate a sector like online tutoring would also have the will to visit catastrophe upon whole cities. And fear of those moves is wearing on people. I perceive a fading sense of enthusiasm among businesspeople and youths. The residue of resentment won’t wear on their faces; and I expect that the state will keep a lid on wide-scale protests. But there will be more foot-dragging and less self-initiative in response to Beijing’s centralized campaigns of inspiration. The picture I see for the next few years however is that growth will slow further. The economy won’t return to the 2019 mid-single digit levels of growth, but something closer to US levels. I believe that China is likely to succeed on many technological endeavors, but these bright spots can’t compensate for broad deceleration. The major source of risk is that the political system is more likely to squash growth in the longer run.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author expects China's growth to slow further, not returning to 2019's mid-single-digit pace but converging toward US levels of growth.
  2. The author argues that a state willing to casually decapitate the online tutoring sector also had the will to visit catastrophe upon whole cities, and that fear of such moves is wearing on businesspeople and youths.
  3. The author expects fewer wide-scale protests under state control but more foot-dragging and less self-initiative in response to Beijing's centralized campaigns, with the political system the major source of risk to longer-run growth.

AI Summary. China's planned defense spending increase of 7.2% outpaces the 5.7% rise in general public expenditure and exceeds the government's 5% economic growth target, reflecting Beijing's reweighting toward security over development.

Kathrin Hille Financial Times
Date Posted:

China is increasing military spending by 7.2% in 2023, 2.2 percentage points above the government’s 5% growth target. @FT

China is increasing military spending by 7.2% in 2023, 2.2 percentage points above the government’s 5% growth target....

Is China prioritizing military spending over economic development?

Core argument: China's defense expenditure will rise 7.2 per cent in 2023, its fastest pace in four years, according to a draft budget presented to the National People's Congress.

China’s military spending will grow at its fastest pace in four years in 2023 and outpace other categories of expenditure, underscoring Beijing’s reweighting towards security over development. Defense expenditure will increase by 7.2 per cent in 2023, well ahead of the 5.7 per cent increase in general public expenditure, according to a draft budget presented to the National People’s Congress, the country’s rubber-stamp legislature. China’s proposed rise in 2023 defense expenditure is 2.2 percentage points above the government’s 5 per cent economic growth target.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's defense expenditure will rise 7.2 per cent in 2023, its fastest pace in four years, according to a draft budget presented to the National People's Congress.
  2. China's proposed 2023 defense increase of 7.2 per cent exceeds the 5.7 per cent rise in general public expenditure and sits 2.2 percentage points above the government's 5 per cent economic growth target.
  3. China's military spending will outpace other categories of expenditure in 2023, underscoring Beijing's reweighting towards security over development.

Tuesday, March 7, 2023

AI Summary. Firms that adopt robots are estimated to raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while lowering the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms. Non-adopting competitors in the same industry see hours worked fall by about 6.2% when rivals' robot adoption rises by one standard deviation.

Daron Acemoglu, Hans Koster and Ceren Ozgen National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Firms that adopted robots in the Netherlands between 2009-2020 increased output by 14.9% relative to non-adopting firms. Workers who were directly affected saw income reductions of about 1.5%. @DrDaronAcemoglu @nberpubs

Do robots raise employment at adopting firms while reducing it at rivals?

Core argument: Dutch robot-adopting firms raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while reducing the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms, magnitudes very similar to estimates from France and Spain.

Robot-adopting firms increase output by about 14.9%, increase employment (hours worked) by 4.3%, and reduce the labor share by 4.6 percentage points, relative to comparable non-adopting firms. The quantitative magnitudes of these estimates are very similar to those from France and Spain. As in these countries, we find negative effects on non-adopting rivals in the same industry. For example, a non-adopting firm experiences a 6.2% decline in hours worked when competitor robot adoption - that is, the share of sales by robot adopters in the same four-digit industry - increases by one standard deviation. The negative effects of robot adoption on workers employed in routine production work and replaceable occupations are predominantly through lower wages.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Dutch robot-adopting firms raise output by about 14.9% and hours worked by 4.3% while reducing the labor share by 4.6 percentage points relative to comparable non-adopting firms, magnitudes very similar to estimates from France and Spain.
  2. A non-adopting Dutch firm experiences a 6.2% decline in hours worked when competitor robot adoption, measured as the share of sales by robot adopters in the same four-digit industry, rises by one standard deviation.
  3. The negative effects of robot adoption on workers in routine production work and replaceable occupations operate predominantly through lower wages.

AI Summary. The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, yet absolute adoption remains low, with 25-40 manufacturing workers per robot in America, China, Europe and Japan and 10 to one in South Korea. Industrial robot spending of $25bn in 2020 was under 1% of global capital expenditure outside energy and mining.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

The global stock of industrial robots is relatively low. In South Korea, there are ten manufacturing workers for every industrial robot whereas there are 25-40 manufacturing workers per robot in the US, China, Europe and Japan. @TheEconomist

Is robot adoption still low despite rapid growth in installations?

Core argument: The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, driven by better technology and lower prices.

As a result of better technology and lower prices, the global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021. Though down from the frothy peaks of 2021, when bosses sought alternatives to human workforces incapacitated by covid-19, robot-makers’ share prices remain a fifth higher than before the pandemic.  For all that growth, however, absolute levels of adoption remain low, especially in the West. Even South Korean firms, by far the world’s keenest robot-adopters, employ ten manufacturing workers for every industrial robot. In America, China, Europe and Japan the figure is 25-40 to one. The $25bn that, according to consultants at Boston Consulting Group, the world spent on industrial robots in 2020 was less than 1% of global capital expenditure (excluding the energy and mining sectors). People spent more on sex toys.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The global stock of industrial robots grew from 1m in 2011 to nearly 3.5m in 2021, driven by better technology and lower prices.
  2. South Korean firms, the world's keenest robot-adopters, still employ ten manufacturing workers per industrial robot, while the ratio is 25-40 to one in America, China, Europe and Japan.
  3. Boston Consulting Group puts global spending on industrial robots at $25bn in 2020, less than 1% of global capital expenditure excluding energy and mining, and below spending on sex toys.

AI Summary. US coal production fell from about 775m short tons to 535m short tons and coal consumption fell over 33%, from roughly 717m to 477m short tons, despite expectations of support for the industry. No major federal legislation has curtailed US oil and gas output, both of which have reached all-time highs.

Gregor Macdonald The Gregor Letter
Date Posted:

.@GregorMacdonald argues policy has had little impact on US energy production, which is driven by price and technological change. Fossil fuels expanded under Biden despite his pivot towards green policy, and coal declined under Trump.

Does federal policy drive US coal decline and oil and gas records?

Core argument: US coal consumption fell over 33% under Trump, from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons, while coal production dropped from 774,609 to 535,434 thousand short tons by 2020.

The big surprise however was that Trump was not able to do anything for the coal industry, a major reversal of expectations. US coal production continued to fall, from 774,609 thousand short tons in 2017 to 535,434 thousand short tons in 2020. The continued collapse of coal consumption was even more dramatic under Trump, falling over 33% from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons. Joe Biden came to office as the most vocal, aggressive US executive on the need to take action on climate change. And yet, there has been no meaningful federal legislation that curtails the output of US oil and gas—both of which just reached (again) all-time highs. That’s why the [flipping] in the US energy balance sheet, moving ever more deeply into the black in 2021 and 2022, will surely steamroll onward. And US petroleum production, which suffered a hit from the pandemic demand collapse globally, has taken a very standard 12-24 months to not just recover, but reach a new high. A classic example of the free market, not policy, in full control.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US coal consumption fell over 33% under Trump, from 716,856 thousand short tons in 2017 to 476,693 thousand short tons, while coal production dropped from 774,609 to 535,434 thousand short tons by 2020.
  2. Under Biden, no meaningful federal legislation has curtailed US oil and gas output, both of which reached all-time highs, despite his vocal insistence on action on climate change.
  3. US petroleum production took 12–24 months to recover from the pandemic demand collapse and reach a new high, which the author calls a classic example of the free market, not policy, in control.

AI Summary. Voters in Asian neighborhoods across New York City shifted 23 percentage points toward Republicans in a governor's election compared with the prior one, though these areas remained Democratic overall. A New York Times precinct-level analysis finds this was the largest electoral shift in the city's Asian neighborhoods between 2006 and 2022.

Jason Kao New York Times
Date Posted:

Voters in Asian neighborhoods shifted their support towards Republicans by 23pp between 2018 and 2022. @NYTimes

Have Asian neighborhoods in New York City shifted toward Republicans?

Core argument: New York City's Asian neighborhoods shifted 23 percentage points to the right in last year's governor's election compared with 2018, though these areas remained Democratic overall.

In last year’s governor’s election, voters in Asian neighborhoods across New York City sharply increased their support for Republicans. Though these areas remained blue overall, they shifted to the right by 23 percentage points, compared with 2018, after more than a decade of reliably backing Democrats. It was the largest electoral shift in Asian neighborhoods in the period from 2006 to 2022, the longest available span of election results by precinct, according to a New York Times analysis.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City's Asian neighborhoods shifted 23 percentage points to the right in last year's governor's election compared with 2018, though these areas remained Democratic overall.
  2. A New York Times analysis of precinct-level results found the shift was the largest electoral move in New York City's Asian neighborhoods from 2006 to 2022, the longest available span of such results.
  3. Asian neighborhoods across New York City had backed Democrats reliably for more than a decade before sharply increasing their support for Republicans in the governor's race.

AI Summary. Murders in 93 US cities fell 5% year over year after the increase that began in 2020, though homicides remained 4,764 (28.7%) above pre-pandemic levels, according to data compiled by AH Datalytics. US murder rates remain far higher than in other wealthy nations.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
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Is Database:
Database

The wave of murders associated with the pandemic has seemingly crested. Homicide rates are still well above the pre-pandemic level, but 2022 homicides were down 5% from 2021. @foxjust

Are US murders declining after their pandemic-era surge?

Core argument: US murders in 2022 still exceeded pre-pandemic 2019 levels by 4,764, or 28.7%, on AH Datalytics estimates, and US murder rates remain much higher than those of other wealthy nations.

The shocking rise in murders that began in the summer of 2020 looks as if it may have played out. In the nearly complete tally of 2022 homicide statistics from 93 US cities compiled by AH Datalytics, murder and non-negligent manslaughter was down 5% from the year before. There were still many more people murdered in the US in 2022 than before the pandemic in 2019 — going by the AH Datalytics estimates it was 4,764, or 28.7%, more. Murder rates are also much, much higher in the US than in other wealthy nations. But with weekly crime statistics from the three biggest US cities showing a continuing and possibly accelerating murder decline so far in 2023, it does look as if a return to the awful conditions of the 1970s through early 1990s probably isn’t in the cards.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US murders in 2022 still exceeded pre-pandemic 2019 levels by 4,764, or 28.7%, on AH Datalytics estimates, and US murder rates remain much higher than those of other wealthy nations.
  2. Weekly crime statistics from the three biggest US cities show a continuing and possibly accelerating murder decline in 2023, suggesting a return to the conditions of the 1970s through early 1990s probably isn't in the cards.

AI Summary. China's leadership has accused the United States of leading Western countries in all-round containment and suppression of China's development, calling it a severe challenge. China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2% to 328bn yuan ($47bn) and overhauling how government research funds are allocated, giving scientists greater say over technological road maps.

Teddy Ng South China Morning Post
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Xi Jinping is accusing the United States of attempting to suppressing China’s development. @SCMPNews

Xi Jinping is accusing the United States of attempting to suppressing China’s development. @SCMPNews

How is China responding to accusations of US-led containment?

Core argument: China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion), part of a legislative session agenda to cut reliance on the United States.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has directly accused the United States of leading other Western nations to suppress China’s development. “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to the country’s development.” A key agenda for the ongoing legislative sessions in China is to provide a strategy to cut reliance on the US. As part of that plan, the central government proposed on Sunday to raise science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion).To that end, China will overhaul its mechanisms for allocating and using government research funds and will “grant scientists a greater say when it comes to determining technological road maps and spending research funds”, according to a budget report released by the Ministry of Finance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's central government proposed raising science and technology spending by 2 per cent in 2023 to 328 billion yuan (US$47 billion), part of a legislative session agenda to cut reliance on the United States.
  2. Xi Jinping said "Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China," which he described as bringing unprecedented severe challenges to the country's development.
  3. A Ministry of Finance budget report said China will overhaul its mechanisms for allocating and using government research funds and grant scientists a greater say over technological road maps and research spending.

AI Summary. Proposed US legislation would give the government power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when deemed necessary, without naming TikTok or its owner ByteDance. Lawmakers say such measures are intended to counter security threats from apps that they say can gather user data or serve as propaganda tools.

Daniel Flatley and Jenny Leonard Bloomberg
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Legislation is moving in Congress to give the government authorities that would enable it to restrict access to the TikTok app. @markets

Legislation is moving in Congress to give the government authorities that would enable it to restrict access to the TikTok...

Should the government have broad power to ban foreign technologies?

Core argument: Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner is set to unveil a bill that would give the US power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, without naming ByteDance Ltd.'s TikTok.

The US is moving closer to restricting access to the popular video-sharing app TikTok, with Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner set to unveil a bill Tuesday that the Biden administration is poised to support, according to people familiar with the issue. The measure, one of many being proposed in Congress to restrict Bytedance Ltd.’s TikTok but isn’t expected to pinpoint the company by name, would give the US the power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, said one of the people, who asked not to be identified discussing private deliberations. Lawmakers say the measures are intended to counter security threats from apps like TikTok, which they say can be used to gather user data or as tools for propaganda. Last week, legislation authorizing the US to ban TikTok in the US advanced through the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner is set to unveil a bill that would give the US power to ban or prohibit foreign technologies or companies when necessary, without naming ByteDance Ltd.'s TikTok.
  2. The Biden administration is poised to support Warner's measure, according to people familiar with the issue.
  3. Lawmakers say the restrictions are intended to counter security threats from apps like TikTok, which they say can be used to gather user data or as tools for propaganda.

AI Summary. The UK and Australia are pressing the US to ease secrecy rules that officials say are slowing cooperation on undersea capabilities and electronic warfare within their trilateral security pact. The obstacles include technology-transfer and arms-export licensing requirements and a classification barring information sharing with non-US nationals.

Demetri Sevastopulo Financial Times
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.@Dimi reports that Washington is starting to reform security rules that would undercut the Aukus security pact. The US and Australia are expected to shortly announce the plan for production of Australian nuclear submarines.

.@Dimi reports that Washington is starting to reform security rules that would undercut the Aukus security pact. The US and...

Are US secrecy rules slowing allied defense technology cooperation?

Core argument: President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak are expected to disclose how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13.

President Joe Biden, Australia’s prime minister Anthony Albanese and UK PM Rishi Sunak are expected to reveal how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13. Officials are optimistic the US has found ways to share closely guarded nuclear-propulsion secrets with Australia. But there is concern that the second pillar, which includes undersea capabilities and electronic warfare, faces obstacles that have slowed its momentum. These hurdles relate to technology transfer, licensing requirements under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and a classification called “NoForn” that bars information sharing with non-US nationals.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak are expected to disclose how and where the submarines will be built at a joint event in the US on March 13.
  2. Officials are optimistic that the US has found ways to share closely guarded nuclear-propulsion secrets with Australia.
  3. The pact's second pillar, covering undersea capabilities and electronic warfare, faces obstacles tied to technology transfer, International Traffic in Arms Regulations licensing requirements, and a "NoForn" classification that bars sharing information with non-US nationals.