Edward Conard

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Friday, January 20, 2023

Where'd All the Workers Go?

AI Summary. Group life insurance payments rose 20.7% above the five-year average and 15% above 2020 levels, and excluding Covid-19 and unnatural deaths such as homicide, suicide, and overdose reveals a spike in natural non-Covid deaths among working-age people. While the vulnerable died of Covid at high rates earlier, younger and healthy people subsequently died in aberrantly high numbers of something else.

Bret Swanson Infonomena
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023
Is Database:
Database

.@JBSay notes there have been at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among the US working-age population since 2020. Netting out Covid deaths and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.) he finds a spike starting in 2021.

Are working-age deaths rising from causes other than Covid?

Core argument: Group life insurance payments rose 20.7% above the five-year average in 2021 and 15% above 2020, the acute pandemic year.

In 2021 group life [insurance] payments exploded by 20.7% over the five-year average and by 15% over the acute pandemic year of 2020. If we remove both Covid-19 and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.), we see a dramatic spike of natural, non-Covid-19 deaths among working-age people beginning in the spring and summer of 2021. To overgeneralize: In 2020, the vulnerable died of Covid at unusually high rates. In 2021 and 2022, Covid continued its assault, but the young, middle-aged, and healthy also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Group life insurance payments rose 20.7% above the five-year average in 2021 and 15% above 2020, the acute pandemic year.
  2. Excluding Covid-19 and unnatural deaths such as homicide, suicide, and overdose, natural non-Covid deaths among working-age people spiked beginning in the spring and summer of 2021.
  3. The author characterizes the shift as the vulnerable dying of Covid at unusually high rates in 2020, while in 2021 and 2022 young, middle-aged, and healthy people also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else.

Breat Swanson notes there have been at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among the US working-age population since 2020. Netting out Covid deaths and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.) he finds a spike starting in 2021.

“…In 2021 group life [insurance] payments exploded by 20.7% over the five-year average and by 15% over the acute pandemic year of 2020. If we remove both Covid-19 and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.), we see a dramatic spike of natural, non-Covid-19 deaths among working-age people beginning in the spring and summer of 2021. To overgeneralize: In 2020, the vulnerable died of Covid at unusually high rates. In 2021 and 2022, Covid continued its assault, but the young, middle-aged, and healthy also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else….”

Bret Swanson, “Where Did All the Workers Go?,” Infonomena, January 19, 2023, https://infonomena.substack.com/p/whered-all-the-workers-go

Where Did All the Workers Go?

In a November 30, 2022, speech on “Inflation and the Labor Market,” Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell blamed most of the 3.5 million estimated shortfall in the U.S. labor force on premature retirements. He also blamed a large portion – between 280,000 and 680,000 – on “long Covid.” In a footnote, however, Powell acknowledged a far more somber factor: an estimated 400,000 unexpected deaths among working age people.

It’s easy to blame these deaths on Covid-19. The virus is of course one significant cause. But it’s not nearly the only cause, especially among young and middle-age workers. We need better government data transparency to make a full assessment. Until then, we can proceed with others who track mortality for a living – life insurance companies.

The Great Divide – 2020 vs. 2021

In 2020, Covid-19 took many lives, even among select groups of middle-age people, specifically those with comorbidities such as diabetes. In 2020, Covid did not take very many lives of healthy young and middle-age people – for example, the types of people who are employed at large and mid-size companies and who have group life insurance. As you can see in the chart below, group life insurance benefit payments in 2020 were barely higher than in 2018.

In 2021, however, group life payments exploded by 20.7% over the five year average and by 15% over the acute pandemic year of 2020. Why would healthy young and middle-age people suddenly begin dying in large numbers in 2021 when they’d navigated 2020 with relative success?

Especially when we consider that in 2021, the U.S. administered 520 million Covid-19 vaccine doses. Shouldn’t healthy people employed in good jobs with good benefits, now protected with vaccines, have fared better in 2021 than in 2020? Surely, overdoses and suicides have risen in recent years. But those causes of death are less prominent among the group life cohorts in general, and the latest data confirm these were not drivers of the group life surge. Curiously, two of the largest spikes in 2021 came from deadly automobile accidents and non-automobile accidents.

Millennial Mortality

Let’s look at a few of these young adult age groups in more detail. In the charts below, we’ve broken out total all-cause deaths into three groups – 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44. Eyeballing the age group charts alone shows that factors other than Covid-19 itself must have driven large portions of the mortality spike in young and middle-age workers. (We are using official statistics, which likely overstate Covid mortality and understate non-Covid mortality. It’s the best we’ve got for now.)

The most important overall point is that 2021 was far worse for young and middle-age people than 2020.

Another key point is that 2022 was also worse than 2020, though not as bad as 2021.

Mortality rates in 2022 were still dramatically higher than the pre-pandemic baseline.

Covid-19 hit hard in 2020, especially for the old, vulnerable, and comorbid. In other words, Covid-19 took many of the most unhealthy from us in 2020. In principle, therefore, a smaller number unhealthy people might have been susceptible to Covid-19 in 2021 and 2022. High mortality years are often followed by low mortality years. After two successive high mortality years, the third year is even more likely to be low-mortality. For 2022 to be as bad, or somewhat worse, than 2020, is thus a big surprise. Last year’s milder Omicron variants make 2022’s stubbornly high mortality rate even more baffling.

All-cause mortality is crucial to understand whether public health policies are working. All-cause numbers can also help expose faulty reasoning when overly narrow, overly complicated, or overly clever analyses miss or hide important signals. For example, an analysis which purported to show lockdowns reduced Covid deaths but which neglected to show other deaths rose even more, would not reflect the totality of the policy’s effects. Likewise, a chemotherapy which shrinks tumors but kills patients may be successful in its narrow task yet fail the larger mission. Most analysts and health authorities studiously ignored all-cause over the last three years. The all-cause figures above show our Covid policies were far from successful.

For other purposes, however, it’s helpful and even necessary to drill down on specific causes. Important signals can also be lost in large groupings – Simpson’s paradox, for example, is a common statistical illusion. (Few have dug deeper, with as much specificity, as John Beaudoin, an engineer from Massachusetts who gained access to his state’s digital death records for the last eight years. He shows that specific causes of death spike and fall at important moments and periods. CDC data is not organized with such granularity. More on Beaudoin’s analysis in coming weeks…)

We know that recent years saw an upswing in drug overdoses and suicides, which accelerated with the pandemic lockdowns. Although these troubling trends cannot explain the enormous and unprecedented all-cause mortality seen above, we should attempt to account for them. Likewise, although Covid-19 did not cause all these record deaths, it was a significant factor.

Employment Aberration

So we dig deeper. If we remove both Covid-19 and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.), we see a dramatic spike of natural, non-Covid-19 deaths among working age people beginning in the spring and summer of 2021. The CDC then stopped publishing the detailed data breaking out these particular categories.

But we know this trend continued. In fact, it got much worse. The life insurance companies told us so. On a December 30, 2021, videoconference with the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, OneAmerica CEO Scott Davison reported with shock:

“And what we saw just in third quarter, we’re seeing it continue into fourth quarter, is that death rates are up 40% over what they were pre-pandemic.”

“40% is just unheard of.”

“It may not all be COVID on their death certificate, but deaths are up just huge, huge numbers.”

Several months later, Lincoln National reported its 2021 payouts were $1.4 billion, versus $548 million in 2020, a 164% rise.

As you will remember seeing in our three all-cause charts, August, September, and October of 2021 showed a gigantic upward bubble – the worst ever period of concentrated young and middle-age deaths, at least in modern times.

Heart attacks, strokes, pulmonary embolisms, accidents, and many seemingly-inexplicable sudden deaths, which continued into 2022, and now in 2023. Here is the Society of Actuaries November 2022 update, which goes through June 2022.

It’s true that the late summer and fall period of 2021 coincided with the Delta wave in the U.S., which was more infectious and appeared to be more pathogenic than previous variants. (We’ve suggested the mass vaccination programs may have, by exerting extreme evolutionary pressure, driven convergence onto more infectious, vaccine-evading variants. Brand new research just published in the New England Journal of Medicine continues to bolster our escape variant thesis: Substantial Neutralization Escape by SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variants BQ.1.1 and XBB.1.)

Federal officials and the medical establishment, you will recall, argued in 2021 that it was a “pandemic of the unvaccinated.” Even the Society of Actuaries attempts to explain away its alarming findings by implying the deaths are due to lack of vaccination. It does so with crude regressions of excess mortality and bulk state-wide vaccination totals as of June 30, 2021.

But remember those 520 million vaccine doses. How can you generate far more deaths in 2021 – ascribing them to unvaccination – with a dramatically smaller number of unvaccinated people? In 2021, perhaps 20-40% of these group life insureds were unvaccinated. In 2020, 100% of them were unvaccinated, yet mortality barely rose. The math doesn’t come close to working.

The 40-44 age group, for example, suffered 21.5% more total deaths in 2021 than 2020. This terrible outcome occurred with less than half the so-called susceptible population due to their unvaccinated status. It’s difficult to assert robust vaccine effectiveness when both doses-delivered and deaths are skyrocketing.

On the other hand, the group life insurance data show vaccinated groups may have suffered the worse outcomes. By August, most large and mid-size companies and organizations across the country had vaccine mandates, and most employees complied. Yet these workers suffered extraordinary – indeed, totally unprecedented death rates – in 2021, especially the second half of 2021.

Ed Dowd, a former BlackRock portfolio manager, points to a crucial peculiarity in his book Cause Unknown. Employed people with group life insurance policies are far healthier than their overall population cohort. They typically die at a significantly lower rate, just 30-40% of the overall population. This is an iron actuarial law. In 2021, however, as you can see in the chart directly above, these employed Americans died at excess rates far higher than their larger pool of less healthy peers.

We could also point to fast-rising disability as a key factor in the worker shortage. Fed chair Powell blames it on long Covid. Once again, however, the timing doesn’t fit that story very well.

To overgeneralize:

In 2020, the vulnerable died of Covid at unusually high rates. In 2021 and 2022, Covid continued its assault, but the young, middle-aged, and healthy also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else.

These patterns are repeating across the high-income developed world – Germany, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Australia. We’ll examine these stories and survey the great work of other analysts in upcoming articles.

  • Demographics

How Job Risk and Human Capital Shape Male Lifetime Earnings Disparities

AI Summary. Men in the bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution are employed about 25% less than those at the median, giving them fewer chances to gain on-the-job experience or move to better-paying firms. Each additional year of work experience is associated with wage gains of about 2–3% for men below the 65th percentile, versus 8% at the top.

Serdar Ozkan and Cassandra Marks Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

.@stlouisfed finds that for workers in the bottom 65% of lifetime earnings, an additional year of work experience increases wages by 2-3% versus 8% for workers in the top 35%.

Does less stable employment widen lifetime earnings gaps among men?

Core argument: An additional year of work experience raises male wages by roughly 2–3% for workers below the 65th percentile of the income distribution, versus 8% for those at the top.

Bottom earners are employed about 25% less than those at the median, underscoring a less stable job ladder for them with fewer opportunities to learn on the job and to switch to better-paying firms.  The average returns to each additional year of work experience across the lifetime earnings (LE) distribution; the returns are relatively flatter in the bottom half of LE distribution and increase steeply toward the top. An additional year of work experience increases male workers’ wages by around 2% to 3% for workers below the 65th percentile of the income distribution, versus 8% for those at the top.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An additional year of work experience raises male wages by roughly 2–3% for workers below the 65th percentile of the income distribution, versus 8% for those at the top.
  2. Male workers at the bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution are employed about 25% less than those at the median, with fewer opportunities to learn on the job and to switch to better-paying firms.
  3. Returns to each additional year of work experience are relatively flatter in the bottom half of the male lifetime earnings distribution and increase steeply toward the top.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime

What Drives Innovation?

AI Summary. Government procurement has repeatedly helped overcome market risk by pulling innovative suppliers down the learning curve until they can offer low-cost, reliable products to commercial markets. In these cases, the fit between product and market emerges from a state-initiated process aligning an immature product with a nascent market.

William Janeway Project Syndicate
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

.@billjaneway argues that the procurement power of government can play an important role in reducing innovators’ and investors’ market risk. @ProSyn

.@billjaneway argues that the procurement power of government can play an important role in reducing innovators’ and...

Does government procurement drive innovation into commercial markets?

Core argument: Government procurement power recurs throughout the history of innovation, with the state helping overcome market risk by pulling innovative suppliers down the learning curve until they can offer low-cost, reliable products to commercial markets.

One recurring feature of that history has been the procurement power of governments. Freed from the necessity of abiding by a neat cost-benefit calculation, the state has repeatedly helped overcome market risk by pulling innovative suppliers down the learning curve to the point where they can offer low-cost and reliable products to commercial markets. In these cases, “product-market fit” results from a state-initiated dynamic process that succeeds in aligning an immature “product” with a nascent “market.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Government procurement power recurs throughout the history of innovation, with the state helping overcome market risk by pulling innovative suppliers down the learning curve until they can offer low-cost, reliable products to commercial markets.
  2. Freed from the necessity of abiding by a neat cost-benefit calculation, the state can support suppliers whose products remain immature.
  3. In such cases, "product-market fit" results from a state-initiated dynamic process that aligns an immature product with a nascent market.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking

Russia Sanctions Update: CIS-picious Trading Patterns

AI Summary. Exports of manufactured goods to Russia have been rising, and exports to Russia's friendly neighbors far exceed pre-invasion levels, indicating weakening sanctions pressure. Exports of dual-use goods, including from Europe and China, are rising, which could let Russia restock lost military equipment and prolong the war.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

According to @M_C_Klein, Russian imports have recovered as exports of goods delivered to Russia’s friendly neighbors have increased beyond pre-war levels suggesting export restrictions are being evaded.

Are trade flows through neighboring countries weakening sanctions pressure on Russia?

Core argument: Exports of manufactured goods to Russia have been rising rapidly, while exports of goods delivered to Russia's friendly neighbors are soaring far beyond pre-invasion norms, and the pressure on Russia from sanctions is fading.

The pressure on Russia from sanctions is fading. Exports of manufactured goods to Russia have been rising rapidly in recent months, while exports of goods delivered to Russia’s friendly neighbors are soaring far beyond pre-invasion norms. If export restrictions and sanctions enforcement cannot be tightened further, the Russians may be able to restock some of their lost military equipment—and prolong the war. The overall trend is that exports of dual-use goods are rising, including from Europe. Moreover, the Chinese data show that exports of dual-use goods continued to jump in December, even if Korean exports of dual-use goods has retreated somewhat from the surge in October. The detailed data from Turkey are not yet available, but it is possible that their exports of dual-use goods also jumped in December.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Exports of manufactured goods to Russia have been rising rapidly, while exports of goods delivered to Russia's friendly neighbors are soaring far beyond pre-invasion norms, and the pressure on Russia from sanctions is fading.
  2. Exports of dual-use goods to Russia are rising overall, including from Europe, with Chinese exports of such goods continuing to jump in December while Korean exports retreated somewhat from their October surge.
  3. Unless export restrictions and sanctions enforcement are tightened further, Russia may be able to restock some of its lost military equipment and prolong the war.
  • Security
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Great Power Conflict Puts the Dollar’s Exorbitant Privilege Under Threat

AI Summary. Current account surpluses in China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are being channeled less into traditional reserve assets such as US Treasuries, which offer negative real returns, and more into gold, commodities, geopolitical investments, and liquid bank deposits. Less dollar-invoiced trade and reduced recycling of surpluses into Treasuries could erode the dollar's reserve-currency privilege.

Zoltan Pozsar Financial Times
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

Zoltan Pozsar of @CreditSuisse argues that the American dollar’s global role is under threat as the rise in Chinese, Russian and Saudi Arabian current account surpluses are not flowing into Treasuries as they have historically.

Zoltan Pozsar of @CreditSuisse argues that the American dollar’s global role is under threat as the rise in Chinese, Russian...

Is surplus nations' shift away from Treasuries threatening the dollar's privilege?

Core argument: The current account surpluses of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia stand at a record, yet those surpluses are largely not being recycled into traditional reserve assets such as Treasuries, which offer negative real returns at current inflation rates.

The current account surpluses of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are at a record. Yet these surpluses are largely not being recycled into traditional reserve assets like Treasuries, which offer negative real returns at current inflation rates. Instead, we have seen more demand for gold, commodities, and geopolitical investments such as funding the [Belt and Road Initiative.] Leftover surpluses are held increasingly in bank deposits in liquid form to retain much-needed options in a changing world.  If less trade is invoiced in US dollars and there is a dwindling recycling of dollar surpluses into traditional reserve assets such as Treasuries, the “exorbitant privilege” that the dollar holds as the international reserve currency could be under assault.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The current account surpluses of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia stand at a record, yet those surpluses are largely not being recycled into traditional reserve assets such as Treasuries, which offer negative real returns at current inflation rates.
  2. Demand has instead grown for gold, commodities, and geopolitical investments such as funding the Belt and Road Initiative, with leftover surpluses held increasingly in liquid bank deposits to retain options.
  3. Less trade invoiced in US dollars, combined with dwindling recycling of dollar surpluses into traditional reserve assets such as Treasuries, could put the dollar's "exorbitant privilege" as the international reserve currency under assault.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Pettis On Pozsar

AI Summary. China's record trade surplus makes it more, not less, dependent on the world's willingness to hold dollars, since currency dominance requires allowing transparent foreign ownership of domestic assets and giving up control of capital and trade accounts. Because China's reserve accumulation runs indirectly through state-bank dollar purchases, whether its dollar holdings have fallen is unclear.

Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

.@michaelxpettis argues that Zoltan Pozsar is wrong about the dollar’s global role. Chronic surplus countries’ dependence on American deficits, and in turn the dollar’s global role, is growing.

.@michaelxpettis argues that Zoltan Pozsar is wrong about the dollar’s global role. Chronic surplus countries’...

Does a record trade surplus make China more dependent on the dollar?

Core argument: Pettis argues that China's larger-than-ever trade surplus makes China more dependent, not less, on the willingness of China and the rest of the world to hold dollars, contrary to Pozsar's reading.

The irony is that while Pozsar correctly notes that China's trade surplus is bigger than ever, he doesn't realize that this makes China even more dependent, and not less dependent, on the willingness of China and the rest of the world to hold dollars. The key to global currency "domination" is not how excited the political elite say they are about having their currency dominate. It is how willing they are to allow clear and transparent foreign ownership of domestic assets and, even more importantly, how willing and able they are to give up control of their capital and trade accounts. Can we at least agree that China is reducing the dollar component of its reserves? Even that is questionable. China's reserve accumulation since 2017 has occurred indirectly, through state-bank purchases of dollars. We have no idea whether or not the amount of dollars China is holding has increased or decreased, but simple B-o-P arithmetic tells us that China's rising accumulation of foreign assets was mostly matched by rising foreign accumulation of US assets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pettis argues that China's larger-than-ever trade surplus makes China more dependent, not less, on the willingness of China and the rest of the world to hold dollars, contrary to Pozsar's reading.
  2. Pettis contends currency dominance depends on allowing clear and transparent foreign ownership of domestic assets and on willingness and ability to give up control of capital and trade accounts, not on political elites' stated enthusiasm.
  3. Pettis notes China's reserve accumulation since 2017 has occurred indirectly through state-bank purchases of dollars, leaving the direction of China's dollar holdings unknown, while balance-of-payments arithmetic indicates its foreign asset accumulation was mostly matched by foreign accumulation of US assets.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP

Supply Chain Disruptions, Trade Costs, and Labor Markets

AI Summary. A model of elevated trade costs projects that U.S. labor supply falls by a cumulative 0.7% at its low point and remains 0.2% below its pre-shock level five years later. The decline occurs because higher trade costs make home production temporarily more attractive than working in industries hit by the trade disruption.

Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Mauricio Ulate, and Jose Vasquez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023

Researchers at @sffed argue that higher transportation costs related to supply chain issues have had a negative impact on American labor force participation with the impact peaking this year.

How do higher trade costs reduce U.S. labor supply?

Core argument: The authors' model projects U.S. labor supply falls a cumulative 0.7% by 2022 during years of elevated trade costs, with a slow recovery leaving it 0.2% below its pre-shock level by 2027.

Our model suggests that overall U.S. labor supply declines during the years when trade costs are elevated and then begins to recover. The biggest cumulative drop of 0.7% occurs in 2022 and the recovery is slow. By 2027, labor supply is projected to still be 0.2% lower than its pre-shock level. The fall in labor supply occurs because, while trade costs are higher, focusing on home production activities that are not reliant on the labor market temporarily becomes more attractive for some people than working in industries that are affected by the trade disruption. The blue line in Figure 2 for the cumulative change in employment since 2019 combines the separate effects from labor force participation and unemployment (green and red lines). Even though the low point for labor supply occurs in 2022, our model does not project that the low point for employment will happen until 2023, due to the additional unemployment that is generated when the trade-cost shock dissipates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors' model projects U.S. labor supply falls a cumulative 0.7% by 2022 during years of elevated trade costs, with a slow recovery leaving it 0.2% below its pre-shock level by 2027.
  2. The model attributes the decline in labor supply to some people finding home production activities not reliant on the labor market temporarily more attractive than working in industries affected by the trade disruption.
  3. The model projects employment reaches its low point in 2023, a year after the 2022 low point for labor supply, because of additional unemployment generated when the trade-cost shock dissipates.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

Where Did All the Workers Go?

AI Summary. The U.S. has recorded at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among working-age people since the pandemic began, excluding Covid-19 and unnatural causes such as homicides, suicides, and overdoses, with group life insurance payments up 20.7% over the five-year average. The Federal Reserve attributes part of a 3.5m labor force shortfall to these deaths.

Bret Swanson Infonomena
Date Posted:
January 20, 2023
Is Database:
Database

@BretSwanson notes at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among working-age US population since pandemic start, excluding Covid-19 & unnatural causes. Mortality rates for young & middle-aged workers surged, contributing to 3.5m labor force gap.

How much do excess working-age deaths explain the labor shortfall?

Core argument: The U.S. has recorded at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among working-age people since the pandemic's onset, excluding Covid-19 and unnatural causes such as homicides, suicides, and overdoses.

Since the pandemic's onset, the U.S. has experienced at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among its working-age population, excluding Covid-19 and unnatural causes like homicides, suicides, and overdoses. This spike began in 2021, with group life insurance payments rising by 20.7% over the five-year average and 15% over 2020. Despite 520m Covid-19 vaccine doses administered in 2021, mortality rates for young and middle-aged workers surged, with deaths from natural causes such as heart attacks and strokes increasing significantly. This unexpected rise in mortality has contributed to a labor force shortfall, with Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell attributing part of the 3.5m labor force gap to these deaths. The data suggests that while Covid-19 was a factor, other unexplained causes have driven this mortality increase, highlighting the need for improved data transparency to fully understand these trends and their economic implications.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. has recorded at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among working-age people since the pandemic's onset, excluding Covid-19 and unnatural causes such as homicides, suicides, and overdoses.
  2. Group life insurance payments rose 20.7% above the five-year average and 15% above 2020, with the spike in working-age mortality beginning in 2021 and deaths from natural causes such as heart attacks and strokes rising.
  3. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell attributes part of the 3.5m labor force gap to these deaths, which the data suggest stem partly from causes other than Covid-19 that remain unexplained.

Breat Swanson notes there have been at least 400,000 unexpected deaths among the US working-age population since 2020. Netting out Covid deaths and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.) he finds a spike starting in 2021.

Where Did All the Workers Go?: Extended Excerpt Image 1

“…In 2021 group life payments exploded by 20.7% over the five-year average and by 15% over the acute pandemic year of 2020. If we remove both Covid-19 and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.), we see a dramatic spike of natural, non-Covid-19 deaths among working-age people beginning in the spring and summer of 2021. To overgeneralize: In 2020, the vulnerable died of Covid at unusually high rates. In 2021 and 2022, Covid continued its assault, but the young, middle-aged, and healthy also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else….”

Bret Swanson, "Where Did All the Workers Go?,"Infonomena, January 19, 2023, https://infonomena.substack.com/p/whered-all-the-workers-go

Where Did All the Workers Go?

In a November 30, 2022, speech on “Inflation and the Labor Market,” Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell blamed most of the 3.5 million estimated shortfall in the U.S. labor force on premature retirements. He also blamed a large portion - between 280,000 and 680,000 - on “long Covid.” In a footnote, however, Powell acknowledged a far more somber factor: an estimated 400,000 unexpected deaths among working age people.

It’s easy to blame these deaths on Covid-19. The virus is of course one significant cause. But it’s not nearly the only cause, especially among young and middle-age workers. We need better government data transparency to make a full assessment. Until then, we can proceed with others who track mortality for a living - life insurance companies.

The Great Divide - 2020 vs. 2021

In 2020, Covid-19 took many lives, even among select groups of middle-age people, specifically those with comorbidities such as diabetes. In 2020, Covid did not take very many lives of healthy young and middle-age people - for example, the types of people who are employed at large and mid-size companies and who have group life insurance. As you can see in the chart below, group life insurance benefit payments in 2020 were barely higher than in 2018.

Where Did All the Workers Go?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


In 2021, however, group life payments exploded by 20.7% over the five year average and by 15% over the acute pandemic year of 2020. Why would healthy young and middle-age people suddenly begin dying in large numbers in 2021 when they’d navigated 2020 with relative success?

Especially when we consider that in 2021, the U.S. administered 520 million Covid-19 vaccine doses. Shouldn’t healthy people employed in good jobs with good benefits, now protected with vaccines, have fared better in 2021 than in 2020? Surely, overdoses and suicides have risen in recent years. But those causes of death are less prominent among the group life cohorts in general, and the latest data confirm these were not drivers of the group life surge. Curiously, two of the largest spikes in 2021 came from deadly automobile accidents and non-automobile accidents.

Millennial Mortality

Let’s look at a few of these young adult age groups in more detail. In the charts below, we’ve broken out total all-cause deaths into three groups - 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44. Eyeballing the age group charts alone shows that factors other than Covid-19 itself must have driven large portions of the mortality spike in young and middle-age workers. (We are using official statistics, which likely overstate Covid mortality and understate non-Covid mortality. It’s the best we’ve got for now.)

The most important overall point is that 2021 was far worse for young and middle-age people than 2020.

Another key point is that 2022 was also worse than 2020, though not as bad as 2021.

Mortality rates in 2022 were still dramatically higher than the pre-pandemic baseline.

Covid-19 hit hard in 2020, especially for the old, vulnerable, and comorbid. In other words, Covid-19 took many of the most unhealthy from us in 2020. In principle, therefore, a smaller number unhealthy people might have been susceptible to Covid-19 in 2021 and 2022. High mortality years are often followed by low mortality years. After two successive high mortality years, the third year is even more likely to be low-mortality. For 2022 to be as bad, or somewhat worse, than 2020, is thus a big surprise. Last year’s milder Omicron variants make 2022’s stubbornly high mortality rate even more baffling.

All-cause mortality is crucial to understand whether public health policies are working. All-cause numbers can also help expose faulty reasoning when overly narrow, overly complicated, or overly clever analyses miss or hide important signals. For example, an analysis which purported to show lockdowns reduced Covid deaths but which neglected to show other deaths rose even more, would not reflect the totality of the policy’s effects. Likewise, a chemotherapy which shrinks tumors but kills patients may be successful in its narrow task yet fail the larger mission. Most analysts and health authorities studiously ignored all-cause over the last three years. The all-cause figures above show our Covid policies were far from successful.

For other purposes, however, it’s helpful and even necessary to drill down on specific causes. Important signals can also be lost in large groupings - Simpson’s paradox, for example, is a common statistical illusion. (Few have dug deeper, with as much specificity, as John Beaudoin, an engineer from Massachusetts who gained access to his state’s digital death records for the last eight years. He shows that specific causes of death spike and fall at important moments and periods. CDC data is not organized with such granularity. More on Beaudoin’s analysis in coming weeks…)

We know that recent years saw an upswing in drug overdoses and suicides, which accelerated with the pandemic lockdowns. Although these troubling trends cannot explain the enormous and unprecedented all-cause mortality seen above, we should attempt to account for them. Likewise, although Covid-19 did not cause all these record deaths, it was a significant factor.

Employment Aberration

So we dig deeper. If we remove both Covid-19 and unnatural deaths (homicide, suicide, overdose, etc.), we see a dramatic spike of natural, non-Covid-19 deaths among working age people beginning in the spring and summer of 2021. The CDC then stopped publishing the detailed data breaking out these particular categories.

Where Did All the Workers Go?: Extended Excerpt Image 3


But we know this trend continued. In fact, it got much worse. The life insurance companies told us so. On a December 30, 2021, videoconference with the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, OneAmerica CEO Scott Davison reported with shock:

“And what we saw just in third quarter, we’re seeing it continue into fourth quarter, is that death rates are up 40% over what they were pre-pandemic.”

“40% is just unheard of.”

“It may not all be COVID on their death certificate, but deaths are up just huge, huge numbers.”

Several months later, Lincoln National reported its 2021 payouts were $1.4 billion, versus $548 million in 2020, a 164% rise.

As you will remember seeing in our three all-cause charts, August, September, and October of 2021 showed a gigantic upward bubble - the worst ever period of concentrated young and middle-age deaths, at least in modern times.

Heart attacks, strokes, pulmonary embolisms, accidents, and many seemingly-inexplicable sudden deaths, which continued into 2022, and now in 2023. Here is the Society of Actuaries November 2022 update, which goes through June 2022.

Where Did All the Workers Go?: Extended Excerpt Image 4


It’s true that the late summer and fall period of 2021 coincided with the Delta wave in the U.S., which was more infectious and appeared to be more pathogenic than previous variants. (We’ve suggested the mass vaccination programs may have, by exerting extreme evolutionary pressure, driven convergence onto more infectious, vaccine-evading variants. Brand Research just published in the New England Journal of Medicine continues to bolster our escape variant thesis: Substantial Neutralization Escape by SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variants BQ.1.1 and XBB.1.)

Federal officials and the medical establishment, you will recall, argued in 2021 that it was a “pandemic of the unvaccinated.” Even the Society of Actuaries attempts to explain away its alarming findings by implying the deaths are due to lack of vaccination. It does so with crude regressions of excess mortality and bulk state-wide vaccination totals as of June 30, 2021.

But remember those 520 million vaccine doses. How can you generate far more deaths in 2021 - ascribing them to unvaccination - with a dramatically smaller number of unvaccinated people? In 2021, perhaps 20-40% of these group life insureds were unvaccinated. In 2020, 100% of them were unvaccinated, yet mortality barely rose. The math doesn’t come close to working.

The 40-44 age group, for example, suffered 21.5% more total deaths in 2021 than 2020. This terrible outcome occurred with less than half the so-called susceptible population due to their unvaccinated status. It’s difficult to assert robust vaccine effectiveness when both doses-delivered and deaths are skyrocketing.

On the other hand, the group life insurance data show vaccinated groups may have suffered the worse outcomes. By August, most large and mid-size companies and organizations across the country had vaccine mandates, and most employees complied. Yet these workers suffered extraordinary - indeed, totally unprecedented death rates - in 2021, especially the second half of 2021.

Where Did All the Workers Go?: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Ed Dowd, a former BlackRock portfolio manager, points to a crucial peculiarity in his book Cause Unknown. Employed people with group life insurance policies are far healthier than their overall population cohort. They typically die at a significantly lower rate, just 30-40% of the overall population. This is an iron actuarial law. In 2021, however, as you can see in the chart directly above, these employed Americans died at excess rates far higher than their larger pool of less healthy peers.

We could also point to fast-rising disability as a key factor in the worker shortage. Fed chair Powell blames it on long Covid. Once again, however, the timing doesn’t fit that story very well.

To overgeneralize:

In 2020, the vulnerable died of Covid at unusually high rates. In 2021 and 2022, Covid continued its assault, but the young, middle-aged, and healthy also died in aberrantly high numbers of something else.

These patterns are repeating across the high-income developed world - Germany, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Australia. We’ll examine these stories and survey the great work of other analysts in upcoming articles.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Healthcare/Seniors
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Monday, January 23, 2023

Brad Setser On Deglobalization

AI Summary. Talk of "reglobalization" is premature because no real deglobalization has occurred: Chinese exports of manufactures remain at a record level relative to global output, and China continues to draw a record amount of net demand from the rest of the world to sustain its unbalanced economy.

Brad Setser @Brad_Setser
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023

.@Brad_Setser shows that Chinese exports are still at a record level relative to global output and concludes, “Graph is clear; China never deglobalized.”

Has deglobalization actually occurred?

Core argument: Brad Setser argues that talk of "reglobalization" is misplaced because no real deglobalization has occurred, with Chinese exports of manufactures still at a record level relative to global output.

It is hard to “reglobalize” when there hasn’t yet been any real deglobalization. The world will start deglobalizing when Chinese exports of global manufactures are no longer at a record level relative to global output and when China no longer needs to draw a record amount of net demand from the world to sustain its unbalanced economy. The graph is clear; China never deglobalized.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Brad Setser argues that talk of "reglobalization" is misplaced because no real deglobalization has occurred, with Chinese exports of manufactures still at a record level relative to global output.
  2. Setser contends deglobalization will begin only when China no longer needs to draw a record amount of net demand from the world to sustain its unbalanced economy.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • China
  • GDP

US Daily: The Immigration Rebound

AI Summary. Tighter immigration policies followed by pandemic disruptions depressed the US foreign-born working-age population, pushing the foreign-born labor force as much as 2.8m below its long-term trend and leaving it 1.2m below trend two years later. The foreign-born labor force has since grown 110k per month, up from 42k per month in the earlier period.

Tim Krupa Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Tim Krupa from @GoldmanSachs reports that the foreign-born labor force is rebounding from 2.8M below trend in September 2020 to 1.2M below trend in March 2022.

Is the foreign-born labor force recovering from its shortfall?

Core argument: The US foreign-born labor force fell 2.8 million below its long-term trend level in April 2020 and remained 1.2 million below trend in March 2022, following tighter immigration policies beginning in 2019 and pandemic disruptions.

Starting in 2019, tighter immigration policies under the Trump Administration followed by pandemic disruptions depressed the US foreign-born working-age population. The foreign-born labor force fell 2.8 million below its long-term trend level in April 2020 and remained 1.2 million below trend in March 2022. The foreign-born population has grown 137k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 68k per month from Jan. 2010 to Jan. 2019. The chart above shows the foreign-born labor force has grown 110k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 42k per month during the prior period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US foreign-born labor force fell 2.8 million below its long-term trend level in April 2020 and remained 1.2 million below trend in March 2022, following tighter immigration policies beginning in 2019 and pandemic disruptions.

“….Starting in 2019, tighter immigration policies under the Trump Administration followed by pandemic disruptions depressed the US foreign-born working-age population. The foreign-born labor force fell 2.8 million below its long-term trend level in April 2020 and remained 1.2 million below trend in March 2022. In Exhibit 1, the left panel shows the foreign-born population has grown 137k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 68k per month from Jan. 2010 to Jan. 2019. The right panel shows the foreign-born labor force has grown 110k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 42k per month during the prior period…..”

Tim Krupa, “The Immigration Rebound,” Goldman Sachs, January 19, 2023, https://idfs.gs.com/as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=token&client_id=2a47af2c425a4313bae0a25fe5ec7322&IdpAdapterId=GirWorkflowComp&access_token_manager_id=RefGir&response_mode=form_post&redirect_uri=https://publishing.gs.com/login/access/idfs/redirect&state=L2NvbnRlbnQvdGhlbWVzL2hvbWVwYWdlLmh0bWw=&reset=true

  • Immigration
  • Workforce

How the U.S. Government Amassed $31 Trillion in Debt

AI Summary. The US added $25tn in debt over two decades, with the largest and often bipartisan drivers being federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic recession. Those responses included a nearly $800bn stimulus and tax-cut package, over $3tn in pandemic aid, and a later $1.9tn stimulus plan.

Jim Tankersley New York Times
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023

.@jimtankersley notes that “America’s debt is now six times what it was at the start of the 21st century” and outlines how America added $25 trillion in debt over the past two decades.

What drove the $25 trillion in debt added over two decades?

Core argument: The U.S. added $25 trillion in debt over two decades, reaching $31 trillion in total, with the largest and often bipartisan drivers being federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic recession.

In just two decades, America has added $25 trillion in debt. The biggest — and often bipartisan — drivers of debt have been the federal responses to two sharp economic downturns: the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic recession. Shortly after Mr. Obama took office in 2009, inheriting a recession, he pushed Congress to approve a nearly $800 billion package of tax cuts and stimulus spending. Safety-net spending continued at high levels for the next several years as the economy recovered sluggishly. Mr. Trump approved a much larger collection of aid packages, totaling more than $3 trillion after Covid-19 swept the world in 2020. Mr. Biden took office the next year and signed a $1.9 trillion stimulus plan soon after.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. added $25 trillion in debt over two decades, reaching $31 trillion in total, with the largest and often bipartisan drivers being federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic recession.
  2. President Obama pushed Congress in 2009 to approve a nearly $800 billion package of tax cuts and stimulus spending, and safety-net spending continued at high levels for several years as the economy recovered sluggishly.
  3. President Trump approved more than $3 trillion in aid packages after Covid-19 spread in 2020, and President Biden signed a $1.9 trillion stimulus plan soon after taking office the following year.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits

Why We Have Federal Deficits: An Updated Analysis

AI Summary. The analysis attributes over two-thirds of the US structural fiscal imbalance to the growth rates of federal health programs, especially Medicare and Medicaid, and argues federal finances will not stabilize until those growth rates moderate regardless of choices on taxes, income security, or annually appropriated spending. It finds more recent administrations have run far larger average deficits than earlier ones.

Charles Blahous Mercatus Center George Mason University
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Charles Blahous @mercatus notes that America’s long-term Federal fiscal imbalance was largely set between 1965-72. The cost of programs enacted during that period is growing faster than economic output and neither party has made an effort to address this.

What drives most of the federal structural fiscal imbalance?

Core argument: Over two-thirds of the U.S. structural fiscal imbalance derives from the growth rates of federal health programs, most especially Medicare and Medicaid, which the analysis describes as unsustainable.

Over two-thirds of the structural fiscal imbalance derives from the unsustainable growth rates of federal health programs, most especially Medicare and Medicaid. Irrespective of future policy decisions in other areas such as tax policy, income security, and annually appropriated domestic and defense spending, federal finances will not be stabilized until Medicare and Medicaid’s growth rates are moderated. A survey of fiscal stewardship records produces the unsurprising result that more recent officeholders have tended to run far higher federal deficits than those countenanced by previously elected officials. The largest average federal deficits were operated during the Trump administration, followed, in turn, by the Obama, Ronald W. Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Over two-thirds of the U.S. structural fiscal imbalance derives from the growth rates of federal health programs, most especially Medicare and Medicaid, which the analysis describes as unsustainable.
  2. Federal finances will not be stabilized until Medicare and Medicaid growth rates are moderated, irrespective of policy decisions on taxes, income security, and annually appropriated domestic and defense spending.
  3. A survey of fiscal stewardship records finds the largest average federal deficits were run during the Trump administration, followed by the Obama, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Politics

How Republicans Can Get Serious on Spending

AI Summary. Stabilizing federal debt at 95% of GDP would require holding deficits near 3% of GDP, against baseline deficits rising past 6% over the next decade and 11% in three decades. Proposed steps include freezing annual discretionary appropriations, a roughly $400bn package of mandatory savings, and bipartisan groundwork on Social Security and Medicare, which drive nearly all long-term deficits.

Brian Riedl The Dispatch
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023
Is Database:
Database

.@Brian_Riedl offers practical suggestions on how Republicans could permanently stabilize the American debt at 95% of GDP, a goal that would start with running deficits at 3% of GDP relative to the current baseline of 6% over the next decade.

.@Brian_Riedl offers practical suggestions on how Republicans could permanently stabilize the American debt at 95% of GDP, a...

What would it take to stabilize federal debt at 95% of GDP?

Core argument: Stabilizing federal debt permanently at 95 percent of GDP would require holding deficits near 3 percent of GDP, against baseline deficits rising past 6 percent of GDP over the next decade and 11 percent of GDP in three decades.

Fiscal conservatives should aim to permanently stabilize the debt at 95 percent of GDP. This goal would mean keeping deficits near 3 percent of GDP, compared to the baseline deficits rising past 6 percent of GDP over the next decade and 11 percent of GDP in three decades.  In the short run, this means: Freezing annual discretionary appropriations. Building momentum for mandatory spending reforms with a modest package of savings (perhaps $400 billion over the decade) that address lower-hanging fruit such as leftover pandemic spending, program overpayments, and federal spending benefits for upper-income families. Begin working toward Social Security and Medicare reform—which drive nearly 100 percent of long-term deficits—by building bipartisan working groups behind the scenes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Stabilizing federal debt permanently at 95 percent of GDP would require holding deficits near 3 percent of GDP, against baseline deficits rising past 6 percent of GDP over the next decade and 11 percent of GDP in three decades.
  2. The proposed short-run agenda for fiscal conservatives includes freezing annual discretionary appropriations and a modest savings package of perhaps $400 billion over the decade targeting leftover pandemic spending, program overpayments, and federal spending benefits for upper-income families.
  3. Social Security and Medicare drive nearly 100 percent of long-term deficits, and reform should begin with bipartisan working groups built behind the scenes.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Politics

Trump’s Fiscal Legacy: A Comprehensive Overview of Spending, Taxes, and Deficits

AI Summary. An analysis argues that the Trump administration's fiscal record does not compare favorably with its immediate predecessors, though it inherited a $10tn 10-year baseline deficit, versus $4tn for Obama and a projected $6tn surplus for Bush. Economic and technical factors outside political control, mainly falling federal debt interest rates, produced $3.9tn in 10-year deficit reduction.

Brian Riedl Manhattan Institute
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Last year @Brian_Riedl compared Trump, Obama, and George W. Bush’s fiscal records and found that Trump’s policies in one term cost $7.8T over a decade, relative to $5T for Obama and $6.9T for Bush.

How does this president's fiscal record compare with his predecessors'?

Core argument: President Trump inherited a $10 trillion 10-year baseline deficit, dwarfing the $4 trillion projected baseline deficit inherited by President Obama and the $6 trillion projected baseline surplus inherited by President Bush.

President Trump’s record on fiscal responsibility does not compare favorably to his immediate predecessors. Surely, it would not be fair to judge President Trump simply by the total budget deficits under his watch, however, as the $10 trillion 10-year baseline deficit that he inherited dwarfed the $4 trillion projected baseline deficit inherited by President Obama and the $6 trillion projected baseline surplus inherited by President Bush. That is far from a level playing field.  On the other hand, President Trump also received the largest automatic deficit reductions from his inherited baseline. During his presidency, economic and technical factors that fall mostly outside of political control produced $3.9 trillion in 10-year deficit reduction, mainly through falling interest rates on the federal debt.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Trump inherited a $10 trillion 10-year baseline deficit, dwarfing the $4 trillion projected baseline deficit inherited by President Obama and the $6 trillion projected baseline surplus inherited by President Bush.
  2. Economic and technical factors largely outside political control produced $3.9 trillion in 10-year deficit reduction during President Trump's presidency, mainly through falling interest rates on the federal debt.
  3. President Trump's record on fiscal responsibility does not compare favorably to his immediate predecessors, though judging him solely by the total budget deficits under his watch would not be a level playing field.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Politics

Data Update 2 for 2023: A Rocky Year for Equities

AI Summary. The implied equity risk premium on the S&P 500 rose from 4.24% to 5.94% over the course of 2022, placing it near the top of its range since 1960, while the expected return on stocks of 9.82% is its highest since 1995. Whether the market is fairly valued turns on whether that risk premium is too high or too low.

Aswath Damodaran Musings on Markets
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023

.@AswathDamodaran writes that, if analyst earnings forecasts are correct, the equity risk premium has increased from 4.2% at the start of 2022 to 5.9% today, and equity markets are now priced to earn the highest expected return since 1996.

Are stocks fairly valued after the equity risk premium rose?

Core argument: Damodaran's implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500 rose from 4.24% at the start of 2022 to 5.94% at the start of 2023, closer to the top of the range of historical premiums since 1960.

I note the increase in equity risk premiums during 2022 from 4.24% at the start of 2022 to 5.94% at the start of 2023. I posited that any debate about whether the market, as it stands now, is fair, under or overvalued is really one about whether the equity risk premium at the start of 2023 is too high (in which case, the market is undervalued) or too low (in which case, it is overvalued). To answer that question, and address the question of where the expected return of 9.82% stands in historical context, I report the expected returns and equity risk premiums for the S&P 500 from 1960 to 2022: At 5.94%, the implied equity risk premium is closer to top of the range of historical risk premiums, but the most striking feature of 2022 is that the expected return on stocks, at 9.82%, is now at its highest level since 1995.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Damodaran's implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500 rose from 4.24% at the start of 2022 to 5.94% at the start of 2023, closer to the top of the range of historical premiums since 1960.
  2. The expected return on S&P 500 stocks stands at 9.82% at the start of 2023, its highest level since 1995, based on Damodaran's estimates spanning 1960 to 2022.
  3. Damodaran argues the debate over whether equities are fairly valued, undervalued or overvalued reduces to whether the 5.94% equity risk premium at the start of 2023 is too high or too low.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

U.S. Weapons Industry Unprepared for a China Conflict, Report Says

AI Summary. A Center for Strategic and International Studies report argues the U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for the current security environment and operates in a manner better suited to peacetime. The study recommends reassessing total munitions requirements and stockpile replenishment needs, creating a strategic munitions reserve, and setting a sustainable procurement plan.

Gordon Lubold Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
January 23, 2023

A new @CSIS study warns that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has stressed the American defense industrial base and argues that the surge capacity needed for a potential Taiwan conflict is lacking. @SethGJones

A new @CSIS study warns that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has stressed the American defense industrial base and argues that...

Is the US defense industrial base prepared for today's security environment?

Core argument: Seth Jones, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, judges that the U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for the existing security environment and is operating in a manner better suited to peacetime.

“The bottom line is the defense industrial base, in my judgment, is not prepared for the security environment that now exists,” said Seth Jones, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Industry now is operating in a manner “better suited to a peacetime environment.” Mr. Jones recommends that the U.S. reassess its total munition requirements, urging Congress to hold hearings on the matter. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark Milley said in November that such an effort is already underway. The study also suggests reassessing American requirements for replenishing its stockpiles, creating a strategic munitions reserve, and determining a sustainable munitions procurement plan to meet current and future requirements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Seth Jones, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, judges that the U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for the existing security environment and is operating in a manner better suited to peacetime.
  2. The CSIS study recommends that the U.S. reassess its total munition requirements and stockpile replenishment needs, create a strategic munitions reserve, and determine a sustainable munitions procurement plan for current and future requirements.
  3. Jones urges Congress to hold hearings on U.S. munition requirements, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark Milley said in November that such an effort is already underway.
  • Security
  • China


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