Edward Conard

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Friday, January 7, 2022

Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a U.S. corporate tax deduction for domestic production raised average earnings by 1.1% for each 1% cut in marginal tax rates, with the largest gains at the top of the earnings distribution. Small firms showed larger top-percentile wage responses and employment gains, while large firms increased capital investment and reduced employment.

Christine Dobridge, Paul Landefeld, and Jacob Mortenson Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:
January 7, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The 2005 U.S. corporate tax cut, particularly the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), significantly impacted wage distribution. A 1% cut in marginal tax rates increased average earnings by 1.1%, with small firms seeing higher gains at the top of the earnings distribution.

How do corporate tax cuts affect earnings across the wage distribution?

Core argument: A 1% reduction in marginal tax rates under the 2005 Domestic Production Activities Deduction raised average earnings by 1.1%, with the largest gains at the top of the within-firm earnings distribution.

The 2005 U.S. corporate tax cut, specifically the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), significantly impacted wage distribution within firms, with notable effects on smaller firms. A 1% reduction in marginal tax rates led to a 1.1% increase in average earnings, with the most substantial gains at the top of the earnings distribution. For small firms, semi-elasticities at the 95th and 99th percentiles were 4.4 and 5.7, respectively, compared to 2.2 for large firms at the 99th percentile. This suggests that smaller firms experienced larger wage gains, likely due to less monopsony power and greater employee bargaining power. While overall employment remained unchanged, small firms saw an increase in employee numbers, contrasting with declines in large firms. The DPAD also spurred capital investment in large firms, indicating a shift towards capital-labor substitution. These findings highlight the tax cut's role in widening income disparities and its varied impact across firm sizes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1% reduction in marginal tax rates under the 2005 Domestic Production Activities Deduction raised average earnings by 1.1%, with the largest gains at the top of the within-firm earnings distribution.
  2. Semi-elasticities for small firms reached 4.4 at the 95th percentile and 5.7 at the 99th, versus 2.2 for large firms at the 99th percentile, a gap attributed to less monopsony power and greater employee bargaining power at small firms.
  3. Overall employment was unchanged under the Domestic Production Activities Deduction, with small firms adding employees while large firms saw declines and increased capital investment, suggesting a shift toward capital-labor substitution.

"...This paper investigates how corporate tax changes affect workers’ earnings. We use a dataset of U.S. worker-level W-2 filings matched with corporate tax returns and study the implementation of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD). We find the DPAD tax rate reduction has a substantial effect on the distribution of annual wage earnings within a firm. Earnings of workers at the top of their firm’s earnings distribution rise relative to those at the bottom of the distribution. We estimate a semi-elasticity of average earnings of 1.1 with respect to the DPAD marginal tax rate reduction, while the semi-elasticity of median earnings is notably smaller—0.5. Furthermore, we estimate a semi-elasticity of 1.3 at the 95th percentile of workers’ earnings and 2.7 at the 99th percentile. This trend of larger semi-elasticities at the top of the earnings distribution is especially pronounced for small firms. Looking at overall employment effects, we see no change overall, but the number of employees rises at small firms and declines at large firms. In contrast, we find that capital investment rises for large firms, suggesting that the DPAD also resulted in domestic capital labor substitution for large corporations. Our paper has significant implications for assessing the progressivity of the U.S. tax code and for analyzing the effect of corporate tax policy changes on the U.S. income distribution....We find the DPAD tax reduction resulted in a substantial increase in mean earnings at the firm level and that earnings gains were particularly concentrated at the top of the earnings distribution within firms. Our results suggest that a one percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates due to the DPAD led to a 1.1 percent increase in average earnings at the firm level. We find a much smaller impact, however, on median earnings within a firm, with an estimated semi-elasticity that is less than half the size of the average effect. Looking more broadly across the within-firm earnings distribution, we find semi-elasticities of earnings that are statistically indistinguishable from 0 at the very bottom of the earnings distribution—the 1st percentile through the 10th percentile. At the 25th percentile, we observe a statistically significant semi-elasticity of 0.4, which rises slightly at the median and the 75th percentiles, to 0.5 and 0.6, respectively. Earnings at the top of the distribution are notably more responsive: we find a semi-elasticity of 0.9 at the 90th percentile and of 1.3 at the 95th percentile. Earnings are the most responsive at the very top of the distribution; at the 99th percentile, we observe a semi-elasticity of 2.7—more than double that of mean earnings. As a result of rising earnings at the top of the distribution, we find the tax reduction leads to a widening of the within-firm earnings distribution overall. A one percentage point tax rate reduction due to the DPAD leads to a 1.1 percent increase in the ratio of earnings paid to the 95th percentile of workers compared to the 5th percentile. The change is even more pronounced at the higher end. A one percentage point rate reduction leads to a 2.8 percent increase in the 99th-to-1st percentile earnings ratio....We also examine the DPAD’s effect on overall firm employment and investment. We find no effect of the DPAD tax reduction on firm employment but find that the number of employees rises at small firms and declines at large firms. Our estimates of investment responses are consistent with capital-labor substitution for large firms, with investment increasing substantially in the highest two quintiles of firm size. But we find no investment effect of the tax cut for small firms...."

The core evidence"... We find the DPAD tax reduction resulted in a substantial increase in mean earnings at the firm level and that earnings gains were particularly concentrated at the top of the earnings distribution within firms. Our results suggest that a one percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates due to the DPAD led to a 1.1 percent increase in average earnings at the firm level. We find a much smaller impact, however, on median earnings within a firm, with an estimated semi-elasticity that is less than half the size of the average effect. Looking more broadly across the within-firm earnings distribution, we find semi-elasticities of earnings that are statistically indistinguishable from 0 at the very bottom of the earnings distribution—the 1st percentile through the 10th percentile. At the 25th percentile, we observe a statistically significant semi-elasticity of 0.4, which rises slightly at the median and the 75th percentiles, to 0.5 and 0.6, respectively. Earnings at the top of the distribution are notably more responsive: we find a semi-elasticity of 0.9 at the 90th percentile and of 1.3 at the 95thpercentile. Earnings are the most responsive at the very top of the distribution; at the 99thpercentile, we observe a semi-elasticity of 2.7—more than double that of mean earnings. As a result of rising earnings at the top of the distribution, we find the tax reduction leads to a widening of the within-firm earnings distribution overall. A one percentage point tax rate reduction due to the DPAD leads to a 1.1 percent increase in the ratio of earnings paid to the 95th percentile of workers compared to the 5th percentile. The change is even more pronounced at the higher end. A one percentage point rate reduction leads to a 2.8 percent increase in the 99th-to-1st percentile earnings ratio….”

Christine Dobridge, Paul Landefeld, and Jacob Mortenson, "Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction," Federal Reserve Board, December 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/corporate-taxes-and-the-earnings-distribution-effects-of-the-domestic-production-activities-deduction.htm

Size of firms, "... Generally, these results suggest that the DPAD had larger effects on the widening of the earnings distribution for the smallest firms by employment size than for the largest firms. Small firms exhibit positive and significant semi-elasticity estimates, and the estimates are strongest at the upper end of the earnings distribution. The semi-elasticities for small firms are statistically discernible from zero at the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles, with magnitudes that increase substantially at the very top of the distribution. The semi-elasticities in the upper portion of the distribution are also notably larger for small firms than for larger firms. The point estimate for the median percentile of small firms is a semi-elasticity of 1.8, for example, which rises to 4.4 and 5.7 percent, respectively, for the 95th and 99th percentiles. In contrast, for the largest firms, semi-elasticity estimates are considerably smaller overall. The point estimate for the semielasticity of the earnings for the median worker is 0.03, for example, and not statistically different from zero. Estimates increase the most at the very top of the earnings distribution for the largest firms, with a 2.2 semi-elasticity of earnings estimate for workers in the 99th percentile (though still less than half the magnitude of the 5.7 estimate at the 99th percentile for the smallest firms). Interestingly, for the largest firms, we observe statistically significant earnings increases at the very bottom of the earnings distribution—the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentiles—in addition to the top of the distribution, and the magnitude of the effect is similar to that for workers in higher earnings percentiles of these large firms. For workers in the 5th and 10th percentiles of the largest firms, for example, the semi-elasticity point estimates are 0.9, similar to the point estimates of 0.7 and 0.9 for the 90th and 95th percentile. The largest firms are the only firms for which we observe earnings increases due to the DPAD at the very bottom of the distribution. For firms in the middle of the employment distribution (the 2nd through 4th quintiles), we observe a statistically significant increase in earnings only at the 99th percentile for the third and fourth employment quintiles, and also at the 75th percentile for the third employment quintile.20 Finding larger effects for small firms is consistent with employees having more bargaining power at those firms but is also consistent with small firms having less monopsony power than large firms to set earnings. We further investigate the bargaining power and monopsony theories by studying effects of the DPAD on earnings for publicly traded firms and multinational firms in our sample. Large, public firms and multinational firms operating in global markets may also be expected to have greater local wage-setting power and workers in these firms may have less bargaining power as well. Semi-elasticities specific to publicly held firms for select earnings percentiles are presented in Table VI, column (3) and shown in Figure IV.B. Multinational firm results are in Table VI, column (4). Semi-elasticities for the full earnings distribution for public and multinational firms are given in Appendix Table A3. For publicly held firms, we find little effect of the DPAD on workers’ earnings. The largestpoint estimate is for the 99th percentile of the within-firm earnings distribution and implies a semielasticity of about 2.2. This result lends some support for Ohrn’s (2021) finding that top executives of publicly traded firms capture a substantial fraction of the DPAD and bonus depreciation tax reductions, but that there are no effects elsewhere in the earnings distribution for public firms. Widening of the within-firm earnings distribution, therefore, only occurs when comparing the very top of the distribution to the very bottom; the ratio of the 99th percentile earnings to the 1st percentile earnings rises by 2.2 percent as a result of the DPAD (Table VI)...."

Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Who gains, "...To investigate whether earnings increases are flowing to firm owners, we examine a sample of firms (half of whom are in our main sample) who reveal their owners in Schedule G of their corporate tax return.23 These data are available starting in 2011. We match these firm owners to W-2s issued by the company and determine where in the firm earnings distribution these owners lie for firms with employee counts in the first quintile of our main sample (about 50 employees or less). The location of owners in the within-firm earnings distribution is shown in Figure V. This figure demonstrates that owners comprise more than 50 percent of the workers above the 99th percentile at these firms and around 25 percent of the workers between the 95th and 99th percentiles (i.e., more than 75 percent of workers in this sample of firms are in the top 5 percent of their withinfirm distributions). This result provides suggestive evidence that earnings gains among these small firms are accruing to firm owners and that some of the corporate tax cut benefits are accruing to capital and not labor...."

Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Employment, Net Investment, and Total Earnings Effects

"...We report results for employment in column (1) of Table VII, Panel A, and we find an aggregate firm employment effect that is indistinguishable from zero. Column (2) presents the results for net investment as a share of installed capital and finds a point estimate of 0.008, implying that a one
percentage point reduction in the tax rate leads to 0.8 percentage point increase in net investment as a share of installed capital.26 Because the calculation of net investment requires an extra year of data and therefore the sample of firms is smaller, column (3) reproduces the estimates from column (1) with the smaller, common sample as well. We see that the employment effect remains statistically insignificant if a somewhat larger magnitude in the common sample...."
"...Figure VI.B shows the response of net investment as a share of installed capital to the DPAD rate cut. We find that the investment response is generally concentrated among the largest firms, with an increase in net investment as a share of capital of about 0.8 and 1.4 for every 1 percentage point decline in the tax rate due to the DPAD, for firms in the 4th and 5th quintiles by employment size, respectively.28 Of note, the combination of results in Figures VI.A and VI.B are consistent with evidence from Lester (2018), who uses a sample of large, publicly traded firms and finds that total employment declined among firms using the DPAD while investment increased. Lester suggests that this is consistent with capital-labor substitution among these firms...."

Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction: Extended Excerpt Image 3


"..Similarly to the largest firms in our sample, we also observe some decline in terms of total employment for publicly traded firms and for firms that payout to shareholders (our proxy for firms less likely to be financially constrained)—declines of 1.6 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively (Table VII). In contrast, we do not observe a statistically significant responses in terms of total employment among multinationals or firms that do not payout to shareholders. But we find that all of these subsets of companies have statistically significant and sizeable investment responses (1.6 percent, 1.1 percent, 0.7 percent, 1.0 percent for publicly traded, multinational, no payout and payout firms, respectively). Of note, the results for payout and non-payout firms taken together do not provide consistent evidence of financial constraints driving firm investment or employment responses to the tax cut; if looser financial constraints due to the DPAD were the primary mechanism driving our results, we would expect to see an investment increase in the “no payout” firms only...."

Ed Comment: "Not clear what time frame they used. My guess is a short one. Very profitable firms have sustainable competitive advantages. That’s why they are more profitable. If we lower the tax rate, they and their leaders will capture some of the value in the short run. But the prospect of excess returns is the very thing the incents innovation. Without excess returns, competitors are highly incented to wait until their competitors take the risks and suffer the failures needed to create innovation. So the correct time frame for tax analysis has to be very long, much longer than anyone’s Ceteris paribus data. And the link between tax rates and R&D, which we saw recently, and here capex and tax rates, both harbingers of the future, are not encouraging that we can enjoy a free lunch in the long run. The notion of a progressive corporate tax rate that looks at returns above the cost of capital is intriguing in theory but hard to imagine how it would work in practice. This harkens back to my debate with Jan Eeckout. We can’t look at the one lucky success and tax their excess returns, if we want innovation to pay. If we want a logical tax system, we have to look at the returns of the one lucky firm divided by the cost of the entire pool of failure, or said differently, we have to discount a successful firm’s profits by its ex-ante probability of success. Good luck with that! Otherwise we are taxing the very thing we would like to avoid taxing—excess returns to innovations that are large enough to make a difference to our growth. Moreover, those are the very firms that expose our most productive workers to the technological frontier, which is critical increase the probability of producing successful innovation. And we have to treat international competitors differently, if they can’t pass their higher tax rates on to customers when competitors have lower rates in other countries."

Steve Comment: Time Frame Is 2005-2017 (Repealed By TCJA)

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Monday, January 10, 2022

An Intensive, School-Based Learning Camp Targeting Academic and Non-Cognitive Skills Evaluated in a Randomized Trial

AI Summary. A randomized trial of an intensive school-based learning camp for underperforming Danish students, covering 15,559 pupils across 264 schools, found small positive short-run effects in math and weak evidence of gains in Danish, but no lasting effects on academic or non-cognitive skills. Variants devoting 30% of time to non-cognitive skills and those focused solely on academics produced similar results.

Charlotte Hvidman Institute of Labor Economics
Date Posted:
January 10, 2022
Is Database:
Database

A randomized trial of an intensive learning camp for underperforming Danish students found no lasting effects on academic or non-cognitive skills.

A randomized trial of an intensive learning camp for underperforming Danish students found no lasting effects on academic or...

Do intensive learning camps produce lasting gains for underperforming students?

Core argument: A stratified cluster randomized trial of 15,559 pupils across 264 Danish schools found an intensive learning camp for underperforming students produced small positive short-run math effects and weak evidence of Danish gains, neither of which persisted.

The evaluation of an intensive learning camp for underperforming Danish students revealed no evidence of lasting effects on academic or non-cognitive skills. Conducted as a stratified cluster randomized trial with 15,559 pupils across 264 schools, the camp showed small positive short-run effects in math and weak evidence for Danish improvements. However, these gains did not persist, and no significant long-term effects were observed. The camp's main variant, which allocated 30% of time to non-cognitive skills like self-regulation and growth mindsets, failed to enhance academic outcomes or non-cognitive skills. The alternative variant, focusing solely on academic skills, showed similar results, indicating that short-term interventions may not effectively manipulate non-cognitive skills in older pupils. These findings suggest that such interventions in high-resource school systems may not yield the desired long-term educational benefits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A stratified cluster randomized trial of 15,559 pupils across 264 Danish schools found an intensive learning camp for underperforming students produced small positive short-run math effects and weak evidence of Danish gains, neither of which persisted.
  2. The camp's main variant, which devoted 30% of time to non-cognitive skills such as self-regulation and growth mindsets, failed to improve either academic outcomes or non-cognitive skills.
  3. The academic-only variant of the camp showed results similar to the main variant, suggesting that short-term interventions may not effectively manipulate non-cognitive skills in older pupils.

Core findings, "...We evaluate two variants of a school-based, intensive learning camp for pupils who are assessed `not ready’ for further education after compulsory school, using a stratified cluster randomized trial involving 15,559 pupils in 264 schools in Denmark. Next to training pupils in Danish and mathematics, the main variant targets non-cognitive skills, while the alternative variant instead uses this time for more training in Danish and math. In the short-run, in the academic areas that are targeted in the camp, we find small positive effects in math and weak evidence for positive effects in Danish. Yet, we find no evidence of lasting effects and we do not find short-run effects on non-targeted areas in math and Danish or on non-cognitive skills. Further, we find no evidence that training of noncognitive skills affects academic outcomes. These results provide a perspective on recent evidence regarding the effects of training non-cognitive skills in schools - by running such an intervention with older pupils and in a comparatively high-resource school system...."

The exercise, "...Accordingly, we ran two variants of a two-week camp, conducted at the school of a participating pupil during the regular teaching hours, targeting grade 8 pupils in Denmark, who are assessed as ‘not ready for further education’.3 After the camp, pupils participated in followup program where they met once a week for eight weeks. In addition to math and Danish, the main learning camp variant devoted roughly 30 percent of the time to strengthen the non-cognitive skills of pupils. For example, pupils (and teachers) learned about self-regulation strategies - such as goal setting (Locke and Latham, 1990) and mental contrasting with implementation intentions (Gollwitzer et al., 2011); and they were introduced to the concept of “growth mindsets” (Dweck, 2006), which reflects a view that ability is malleable and that success is driven by effort. In the alternative variant of the camp, the time spent on training non-cognitive skills in the main variant was instead used for extra training in math and Danish. The motivation for testing two variants of the camp stems from the uncertainty as to whether non-cognitive skills can be manipulated during an intervention as short as the one studied here and which is aimed at 8th graders rather than younger pupils. The two variants allow us to investigate if the time spent training non-cognitive skills makes a difference relative to using it for additional training of academic skills...."

Outcome, "... We observe small, positive short-run effects on the targeted area in mathematics (numbers and algebra). In Danish, the evidence for positive effects is weaker as only one out of the two targeted areas (namely, text comprehension) is positively affected by the camp. In terms of long-run effects, we do not find any effects that are statistically significant at conventional levels. There is some weak indication of the camp having a positive impact on math performance in the final exams in grade 9 and on being enrolled in post-compulsory education three years after the camp. We also examine the effects on non-cognitive skills. Next to self-administered pre- and post- surveys that included several psychological scales, we observe in the register data how school counselors evaluated a pupil's readiness for further education, and use here specifically the evaluation of the personal and social skills. We do not observe any positive effects on any of these outcome measures for the main learning camp that trained non-cognitive skills. The measurement of non-cognitive skills with surveys and the evaluation of the pupil's readiness for further education has some disadvantages. However, there is some evidence to support the lacking effects on non-cognitive skills as not merely a measurement problem. Firstly, we do not observe any spillover effects to non-targeted academic areas in the standardized national tests. If the intervention at the camps affected non-cognitive skills such as self-control, one could expect the improved non-cognitive skills to broadly enhance academic performance both in targeted and non-targeted areas. This, however, is not the case. Secondly, when comparing the two camps, we primarily find non-significant differences in outcomes between the two, once again underlining the lacking effect of non-cognitive skills. Overall, the results thus suggest that the main camp did not affect non-cognitive skills….”

Charlotte Hvidman Alexander Koch Julia Nafziger Søren Albeck Nielsen Michael Rosholm, "An Intensive, School-Based Learning Camp Targeting Academic and Non-Cognitive Skills Evaluated in a Randomized Trial," Institute For Labor Economics, October 2020, https://ftp.iza.org/dp13771.pdf

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