Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Public Entrepreneurial Finance around the Globe

AI Summary. Government entrepreneurial finance programs worldwide have averaged $156bn in annual budgets, comparable to $153bn in annual venture capital disbursements. Analysis of 755 programs across 66 countries finds no evidence that public funding crowds out venture capital; instead public and private funding are positively correlated, and program launches are associated with increased patent filings.

Jessica Bai National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 4, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Research by @JessicaBai shows no evidence globally that government entrepreneurial finance crowds out venture capital. In fact, state funding complements VC investment, enhancing innovation without displacing private capital.

Research by @JessicaBai shows no evidence globally that government entrepreneurial finance crowds out venture capital. In...

Does government startup funding crowd out private venture capital?

Core argument: Government entrepreneurial finance programs averaged $156bn in annual budgets over the past decade, roughly matching the $153bn disbursed by the venture capital industry.

Over the past decade, government entrepreneurial finance programs globally have matched the venture capital (VC) industry in scale, with an average annual budget of $156bn compared to $153bn in VC disbursements. Analysis of 755 programs across 66 countries from 1995 to 2019 shows no evidence of crowding out; instead, state funding complements VC investment. These programs are more frequent in regions with active private venture activity and are particularly effective when targeting early-stage companies. The initiation of government programs correlates with increased patent filings, indicating a beneficial synergy between public and private sectors. The positive correlation between private and public funding is more pronounced when governments are effective, suggesting that public entrepreneurial finance can enhance innovation without displacing private capital.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Government entrepreneurial finance programs averaged $156bn in annual budgets over the past decade, roughly matching the $153bn disbursed by the venture capital industry.
  2. Analysis of 755 programs across 66 countries from 1995 to 2019 finds no evidence of crowding out, with state funding instead complementing venture capital investment, and programs proving particularly effective when targeting early-stage companies.
  3. The initiation of government entrepreneurial finance programs correlates with increased patent filings, and the positive correlation between private and public funding is stronger where governments are effective.

New (from Ben's co-author Lerner) finds that globally over the past decade governments have invested ~ as much as the VC industry in startups, nothing earthshattering, few good factoids. Bu they don’t estimates the returns/hit rate for the different forms of financings, “…The aggregate budget of government funding programs is comparable to the global venture capital market. It is also interesting to compare these programs to the global venture capital market. As illustrated in Figure 5, over the last decade, the average cumulative annual budget of such government funding programs around the world was $156 billion. In contrast, global annual disbursements of traditional venture funds around the world were on average $153 billion, as tabulated by CrunchBase’s Global VC Reports..”

Core of paper, they don’t see evidence of crowding out and suggests state funding is complementary VC investment, “…We examined 755 programs in 66 countries active between 1995 and 2019. These programs were more frequent in nations and periods with more private venture activity. The positive correlation between private and public activities was more pronounced when governments were more effective. When we looked at the interactions between government programs and private capital markets, we found that these mechanisms were more frequent when the government programs targeted earlier-stage companies—where information asymmetries were likely greater—and the effectiveness of government was higher. The initiation of these programs was associated with an increase in patent filings from that nation, particularly for programs that focused on early-stage ventures or required matching from the private sector. Together, the results suggested a socially beneficial complementarity between the private and public sectors in this arena. The analysis suggested a wide variety of questions for future research. Foremost among these was the need for better understanding of the mechanisms employed in these programs and their implications. These programs had a wide variety of provisions that lent themselves to theoretical and empirical economic analysis. Examples included the differing sharing rules in the equity programs (e.g., the capping of the return to the public sector, as was the case in the Israeli Yozma initiative and a number of subsequent programs) and the extent that governments attempted to use these programs to achieve multiple goals. For instance, the SBIR program simultaneously attempted to promote technological innovation, to use small businesses to meet Federal R&D needs, and to encourage diversity. In short, despite the proliferation and size of public programs to promote entrepreneurial finance, many questions remain about their design and implementation. It is our hope that this analysis will encourage work on the open questions identified above, as well as related questions….”

Jessica Bai, Shai Bernstein, Abhishek Dev, Josh Lerner, "Public Entrepreneurial Finance around the Globe," National Bureau Of Economic Research, April 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28744

Takeaways, “…we first established several stylized facts about public entrepreneurial finance efforts. We found that government funding programs have become prevalent around the globe. Between 2010 and 2019, national governments’ entrepreneurial finance programs around the world had on average a cumulative annual budget of $156 billion, as opposed to an average of $153 billion of global disbursements of traditional venture funds. These efforts were geographically dispersed, and not just confined to developed countries. Moreover, such government efforts relied on a host of different financial instruments, from grants and equity funding, to credit guarantees, loans, innovation vouchers, and tax credits. Many public funding programs targeted specific industries and company stages. Turning to our main analyses, we found that more private venture activity was associated with subsequent government entrepreneurial finance: the two sources of capital were positively correlated.Using panel data, we saw not just a positive correlation but that public policies followed private capital investments. Moreover, increases in venture capital activity in a given industry country pair were followed by subsequent government funding programs that targeted those industries as well…”

  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Productivity
    • Investment

The Effects of Parental and Sibling Incarceration: Evidence from Ohio

AI Summary. A quasi-experimental study using 30 years of Ohio data estimates that parental incarceration reduces a child's likelihood of being charged, convicted, or incarcerated before age 25 by 6.6, 5.5, and 4.9 percentage points, with effects concentrated among Black children. The authors find sibling incarceration similarly reduces children's criminal activity.

Samuel Norris American Economic Review
Date Posted:
May 4, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Having a criminal parent jailed reduces children’s likelihood of incarceration by 4.9pp.

Does incarcerating a parent or sibling reduce a child's criminal activity?

Core argument: Using 30 years of Ohio data, quasi-experimental estimates indicate that parental incarceration reduces a child's likelihood of incarceration by 4.9pp, with effects concentrated among black children.

Utilizing 30 years of data from Ohio, this study provides quasi-experimental estimates showing that parental incarceration reduces children's likelihood of incarceration by 4.9pp [percentage points]. It also decreases the likelihood of a child being charged, convicted, or incarcerated before age 25 by 6.6, 5.5, and 4.9pp, respectively. These effects are notably concentrated among black children. The study highlights that sibling incarceration similarly reduces criminal activity, emphasizing the role of peer effects in youth criminal tendencies. Despite the high costs of incarceration, these findings suggest potential economic benefits and underscore the importance of considering family spillovers in sentencing policy. However, the study advocates for exploring alternative interventions to aid children with incarcerated family members, given the costliness of incarceration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using 30 years of Ohio data, quasi-experimental estimates indicate that parental incarceration reduces a child's likelihood of incarceration by 4.9pp, with effects concentrated among black children.
  2. Parental incarceration lowers the likelihood a child is charged, convicted, or incarcerated before age 25 by 6.6, 5.5, and 4.9pp respectively, according to the Ohio estimates.
  3. Sibling incarceration similarly reduces children's criminal activity, which the study links to peer effects and cites as reason to weigh family spillovers in sentencing policy while exploring alternative interventions, given incarceration's costliness.

This finding is intuitive to me, “…Every year, millions of Americans experience the incarceration of a family member. Using 30 years of administrative data from Ohio and exploiting differing incarceration propensities of randomly assigned judges, this paper provides the first quasi-experimental estimates of the effects of parental and sibling incarceration in the US. Parental incarceration has beneficial effects on some important outcomes for children, reducing their likelihood of incarceration by 4.9 percentage points and improving their adult neighborhood quality….parental incarceration decreases the likelihood that a child is charged with a crime, convicted, or incarcerated before the age of 25 by 6.6, 5.5, and 4.9 percentage points respectively.2,3 These effects are concentrated among black children…While estimates on academic performance and teen parenthood are imprecise, we reject large positive or negative effects. Sibling incarceration leads to similar reductions in criminal activity….”

Back to this paper what they try to do, “….We make three main contributions relative to these papers. First, although we study only one state, we emphasize the policy relevance of the US context: there are currently over 2 million prisoners in the US, making up one- fifth of all prisoners in the world, as opposed to approximately 5,400 in Sweden, 3,700 in Norway, 3,100 in Finland, and 121,000 in Colombia… Second, motivated by the prevalence of sibling incarceration 34% of US inmates have a brother who has been incarcerated, as opposed to 19% with an ever-incarcerated father….we provide some of the first estimates of the spillovers of sibling incarceration. Third, the breadth and depth of our data permit us to investigate differences in effects among different interesting subsamples (e.g. socioeconomic status, racial groups) and provide novel tests of the mechanisms at work…. The net result is that incarceration reduces the total criminal exposure for family members over the following 30 quarters by approximately 0.6 crimes, relative to a sample mean of 3.94.2
Core results, “….Tens of millions of Americans have been incarcerated, and a substantial literature has at tempted to understand both the direct and spillover effects of incarceration. In this paper, we provide the first causal estimates of the effects of parental and sibling incarceration in the United States. In contrast to existing correlational evidence,we find that parental incarceration decreases children’s future criminal involvement and improves child long-term socioeconomic status. There are multiple mechanisms that may mediate this effect, including:(1) lower rates of criminal activity by the defendant and the non-incarcerated parent; (2) among male defendants, a greater dedication to existing family; (3) deterrence; and (4) removal of an unstable influence or shifting the child to a more stable care-giving environment.Even if there are notable anecdotes of when parental incarceration has harmed children, there appear to be other, potentially less salient cases in which the effects are positive. These positive cases counterbalance the negative ones to produce economic benefits. We find that sibling incarceration also results in reductions in criminal activity, consistent with the importance of peer effects in the formation of youth criminal tendencies. The timing of the sibling effects indicates sibling incarceration has a direct, short-term influence on criminality, rather than affecting long-term behavior. The relatively positive family spillovers from incarceration have a number of implications for policy. The costs and benefits from the spillovers of incarceration matter for determining optimal sentencing and incarceration policy… and our findings demonstrate a previously unknown benefit of incarceration. We conduct a partial cost benefit analysis and conclude that while the marginal child benefits from parental incarceration, the high costs of incarceration still outweigh the benefits. More broadly, the positive effects of family incarceration we find highlight the challenging environment faced by children with family members on the margin of incarceration, and demonstrate the scope for policy to affect their long-run economic outcomes. However, given the costliness of incarceration, future work should study other interventions that may aid this population..”
Samuel Norris, Matthew Pecenco, Jeffrey Weaver, “The Effects of Parental and Sibling Incarceration: Evidence from Ohio,”American Economic Review, May 2021, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles

Note this finding mirrors a 2018 study we looked at (attached) that found that in terms of crime there are significant spillover (in terms of propensity to be arrested) effects from older to younger siblings (effect is gendered, impacting males)

  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Wednesday, May 5, 2021

Concentration in Product Markets

AI Summary. Product-level market concentration has declined, with the share of industries classified as highly concentrated falling from 44.4% to 36.6%, a pattern found across goods and services both nationally and across 29 state groups. Concentration levels remain high — the median Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 2,180 — but the authors find no evidence of worsening market power over time.

C. Lanier Benkard National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 5, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Product market concentration has been decreasing since 1994, with highly concentrated industries dropping from 44.4% in 1994 to 36.6% in 2019.

Is product market concentration rising or falling?

Core argument: The share of industries classified as "highly concentrated" at the product level fell from 44.4% in 1994 to 36.6% in 2019, a decline observed across goods and services both nationally and locally across 29 state groups.

Since 1994, product market concentration has been decreasing, with the number of industries classified as "highly concentrated" dropping from 44.4% in 1994 to 36.6% in 2019. This trend is observed across a broad range of goods and services, both nationally and locally in 29 state groups. The decrease in product-level concentration contrasts with rising concentration at broader sector levels, suggesting firms are expanding into adjacent product markets within the same sector. Despite high concentration levels, there is no evidence of worsening market power over time. The median Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for product markets is 2180, with 42.2% of industries having an HHI above 2500, indicating potential market power higher than previously thought. However, this finding contradicts popular perceptions driven by large firms and high-profile mergers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of industries classified as "highly concentrated" at the product level fell from 44.4% in 1994 to 36.6% in 2019, a decline observed across goods and services both nationally and locally across 29 state groups.
  2. Falling product-level concentration contrasts with rising concentration at broader sector levels, suggesting firms are expanding into adjacent product markets within the same sector, with no evidence of worsening market power over time.
  3. The median product-market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 2180, with 42.2% of industries above 2500, indicating potential market power higher than previously thought.

Important Research helps support Rossi-Hansberg findings (that we cited in chapter) that found that the consolidation uptick in fragmented sectors (retail, restaurants, and wholesale distribution) lead to an increase in competition in those sectors.

This Research' core finding, "...Efficient firms in single product markets enter each others’ “home” product markets, thereby increasing aggregate concentration while reducing product level concentration. The model suggests that this process is welfare improving for consumers. While it is possible, or even likely, that multiple forces are at work, this simple model can also explain observed trends in corporate profits..."
This concentration doesn't seem be driving an increase in market power, "However, while we find high concentration levels,we reiterate that we find no evidence that market power has been getting worse over time in any broad-based way. On the contrary, concentration in the most concentrated industries has fallen as fast as the median industry.In our data the number of industries in the “highly concentrated” range fell from 44.4% in 1994 to 36.6% in 2019.This finding is particularly interesting because it contradicts the prevailing popular opinion (Shapiro, 2018). We speculate that popular perception may be driven by a few prominent large firms, such as Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Google, which have grown enormously in recent years, as well as high profile mergers in industries such as hospitals (Gaynor, 2018) and airlines..."
Core of paper, "...uses new data to reexamine trends in concentration in U.S. markets from 1994 to 2019. The paper’s main contribution is to construct concentration measures that reflect narrowly defined consumption-based product markets, as would be defined in an antitrust setting, while accounting for cross-brand ownership, and to do so over a broad range of consumer goods and services. Our findings differ substantially from well established results using production data. We find that 42.2% of the industries in our sample are “highly concentrated” as defined by the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which is much higher than previous results. Also in contrast with the previous literature,we find that product market concentration has been decreasing since 1994. This finding holds at the national level and also when product markets are defined locally in 29 state groups. We find increasing concentration once markets are aggregated to a broader sector level. We argue that these two diverging trends are best explained by a simple theoretical model based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), in which the costs of a firm supplying adjacent geographic or product markets falls over time, and efficient firms enter each others’ home product markets...."
Some individual findings, "... Figure 1 presents the median HHI concentration measure over time for four market definitions that differ in their level of geographic and product aggregation. Our central finding is that we document a decrease in median product market concentration across a broad range of goods and services since 1994. This result lies in distinct contrast to the findings from production data in the Census. The level of concentration is higher when accounting for the geographic location of consumers in 29 state-groups, but decreases at a similar rate to national concentration. The latter result confirms the main finding in Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2020), who show that local market concentration has decreased in the establishment data from NETS. However, Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2020) find increased national concentration in the NETS data even for the most narrow industry classifications, in contrast to our findings. When product markets are aggregated into broader sectors, our findings reverse: we find increases in concentration over time. After accounting for geographic location at the state level, the rise in concentration at the sector level is small. We find little evidence of firms entering adjacent geographies, as can be seen by the fact that the trends in local and national HHIs are nearly identical. Instead, the joint finding of rising sector concentration and decreasing product market concentration implies that firms are expanding into adjacent product markets within the same sector. Our sector level measurements are more consistent with the results in existing work using establishment-level data, likely because the sector level of market aggregation matches the establishment data more closely. While we find broad-based decreases in concentration over time, using our market definitions, concentration levels are much higher than in the establishment-level data. In our data the median HHI over all periods is 2180, with 42.2% of industries having an HHI above 2500, the level that is considered “highly concentrated” in the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Thus, using this (admittedly too simple) antitrust screen, our data suggests that market power is potentially much higher than previously thought in a large fraction of U.S. product markets. Applying the same simple antitrust screen to the Census data would lead to the opposite conclusion that market power is generally low in U.S. product markets. Autor et al. (2020) report average HHIs from the Census ranging from a low of about 85 in the Services sector in 1987 to a high of 950 in manufacturing in 2007. Even the stricter pre-2010 merger guidelines labeled all of these as “unconcentrated”...."

Concentration in Product Markets: Extended Excerpt Image 1


C. Lanier Benkard, Ali Yurukoglu and Anthony Lee Zhang, "Concentration in Product Markets," National Bureau Of Economic Research, April 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28745

  • Cronyism
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Institutional Capabilities
    • Intangibles
    • Investment

The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!

AI Summary. The number of tax filers earning under $50,000 fell by 6.1m while filers in higher brackets increased, including 7.6m more in the $100,000–$200,000 range. Average tax rates declined across these groups, with the largest drop of 2.6ppt among filers earning $200,000–$500,000, from 19.2% to 16.6%.

Edward Yardeni Yardeni Research
Date Posted:
May 5, 2021
Is Database:
Database

The number of low-income tax filers decreased by 6.1mm btw 2011-2018, while higher income brackets saw increases in tax returns.

Are tax filers shifting into higher income brackets as tax rates fall?

Core argument: Between 2011 and 2018, tax filers earning under $50,000 fell by 6.1m, while returns rose by 5m in the $50,000–$100,000 bracket, 7.6m in $100,000–$200,000, and 3.7m in $200,000–$500,000.

Between 2011 and 2018, the number of low-income tax filers, those earning less than $50,000, decreased by 6.1m, highlighting a significant shift in income distribution. During the same period, tax returns for higher income brackets increased: $50,000-$100,000 by 5m, $100,000-$200,000 by 7.6m, and $200,000-$500,000 by 3.7m. The average tax rates for these groups also declined, with the $200,000-$500,000 group experiencing the largest drop of 2.6ppt from 19.2% to 16.6%. This group, representing 4.5% of all tax returns in 2018, benefited from tax breaks that potentially fueled business expansion and a robust labor market in 2018-2019. Meanwhile, the One Percent reported $2.5tn in AGI, paying $639bn in taxes, which was 25.3% of their AGI but accounted for 41.5% of total income taxes paid. This data underscores the complex dynamics of income distribution and tax policy impacts on economic growth and inequality.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Between 2011 and 2018, tax filers earning under $50,000 fell by 6.1m, while returns rose by 5m in the $50,000–$100,000 bracket, 7.6m in $100,000–$200,000, and 3.7m in $200,000–$500,000.
  2. The $200,000–$500,000 group recorded the largest average tax rate decline, 2.6 percentage points from 19.2% to 16.6%, and accounted for 4.5% of all tax returns in 2018.
  3. The One Percent reported $2.5tn in adjusted gross income and paid $639bn in taxes, equal to 25.3% of their AGI and 41.5% of total income taxes paid.

, “…What you won't hear from progressives is that the same can be said for all the other income groups other than taxpayers earnings less than $50,000,clearly showing that there are fewer low-income tax filers! Their headcount has dropped 6.1 million since they peaked at a record 95.0 million during 2011.Since 2009, the number of returns filed by taxpayers with AGI of $50,000-$100,000 rose 5.0 million, $100,000-$200,000 rose 7.6 million, and $200,000-$500,000 rose 3.7 million….”

The IRS data show the following declines in the average tax rates (based on AGI) for the following income groups:

$0-$50,000 (down 0.1ppt from 0.7% to 0.6%)

$50,000-$100,000 (down 1.4ppt from 8.9% to 7.5%)

$100,000-$200,000 (down 1.5ppt from 12.6% to 11.1%)

$200,000-$500,000 (down 2.6ppt from 19.2% to 16.6%)

$500,000 and over (down 1.4ppt from 26.7% to 25.3%)

(6) Three cheers for the Five Percent! These numbers suggest that the biggest winners were in the $200,000-$500,000 AGI group, accounting for 4.5% of all tax returns in 2018. They aren’t in the One Percent. They are in the “Five Percent,” the upper middle class with many of them owning their own businesses, which tend to employ lots of people. Arguably, their tax break provided them with more cash to expand their businesses, which certainly explains why the labor market was so strong in 2018 and 2019.

The Biden administration has pledged that the tax increases it intends to enact will only hit taxpayers earning more than $400,000 per year. The problem is that lots of these people tend to have their own businesses. The latest data available show there were just under 32 million pass-through businesses in 2013, almost 20 times the number of C corporations. There are surely many more such proprietorships today. An increase in their tax bills reduces the cash that they have to invest in growing their businesses. One way or another, a tax increase on them will hurt the wages and employment opportunities of lots of people earning much less than $400,000. Tax increases on the rich inevitably trickle down to the rest of us.

But at least there will surely be more income equality.

The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!: Extended Excerpt Image 1


What should be the fair share for the One Percent? Instead of about 40% of the federal government’s tax revenue, should they be kicking in 50%? Why not 75%? They would be less rich, but everyone else would be richer—unless paying more in taxes caused the One Percent to work less hard or leave the country, sapping their incentive to keep creating new businesses, jobs, and wealth here in America.

(4) Taxing math. To repeat, during 2018 the One Percent reported $2.5 trillion in AGI, which accounted for 21.7% of total AGI. They paid $639 billion in income taxes, which was 25.3% of their AGI but accounted for 41.5% of total income taxes paid to the IRS.

I’m sure there are plenty of progressives who believe that the One Percent should pay at least 50% of their AGI in income taxes. That would have amounted to an extra $600 billion in their tax bill for a total of $1.25 trillion in 2018. Total tax revenues would have been $2.1 trillion, with the One Percent’s fairer share of that at 60%. There would have been plenty more tax revenues for the government to spend and redistribute.

So let’s tax the rich much more! But if their fair share is raised again and again by the progressives, what will we do when the rich are all gone?

(5) Trumped. By the way, we can slice and dice the IRS data to see how President Trump’s tax reform affected individual income tax receipts during 2018 compared to 2017, i.e., before and after tax reform. The law retained the old structure of seven individual income tax brackets, but in most cases, it lowered the rates. The top rate fell from 39.6% to 37.0%, while the 33% bracket dropped to 32%, the 28% bracket to 24%, the 25% bracket to 22%, and the 15% bracket to 12%. The lowest bracket remained at 10%, and the 35% bracket was also unchanged.

The number of tax returns increased 0.6% from 152.9 million to 153.8 million, while AGI rose 5.7% to $11.64 trillion (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8). Total individual income taxes paid fell 4.3% to $1.54 trillion as the average tax rate fell from 14.6% during 2017 to 13.2% during 2018, which was the lowest since 13.1% during 2012 (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10).
The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!: Extended Excerpt Image 2

The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!: Extended Excerpt Image 3


That’s outrageous: The One Percent earned over 20% of all national AGI during 2018! Off with their heads!

Not so fast, Robespierre.

(3) Taxes. Collectively, during 2018, the One Percent paid $639 billion in income taxes, or 25.3% of their AGI (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). That amount represented a record 41.5% of the $1.54 trillion in federal income taxes paid by all taxpayers (Fig. 6). That’s up from 29.8% in 2009. Meanwhile, the rest of us working stiffs, the “Ninety-Nine Percent,” picked up only 58.5% of the total tax bill during 2018.

Edward Yardeni, "The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!,"Yardeni Research, May 4, 2021, http://blog.yardeni.com/2021/05/the-one-percent-off-with-their-heads.html The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!

Socialists promote policies that they claim will lead to greater income equality. History shows that most countries that have embraced socialism have achieved income equality: Almost everyone is poorer than before socialism was imposed on them for their own good. Purchasing power is depressed for most people, and the quality of the goods and services they can purchase is poorer too.

Socialists often declare that the rich don't pay their “fair share” of taxes and must pay more so that the proceeds can be redistributed to boost the incomes of the poor. The problem is that the fair share that the rich must pay never seems to be enough. Higher and higher taxes on the rich result in fewer and fewer of them. Eventually, the only fat cats left are the socialist elites, who always get richer as most of the rich in the private sector get poorer. Needless to say, the poor also get poorer as a result.

In the US today, progressive politicians claim that the “One Percent” of taxpayers are compensated too much and don't pay their fair share of taxes. It's hard to deny that a few CEOs, especially the ones heading up technology and financial companies, get paid too much relative to the pay of their workers. Many professional athletes and Hollywood celebrities earn even more than top-paid CEOs. So the progressives could be right, but let’s see what the latest available data through 2018 show:

(1) Number of tax returns. The total number of all the tycoons on Wall Street, in Silicon Valley, in Hollywood, and on the playing fields—including everyone with adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeding $500,000 a year—was 1.65 million taxpayers in 2018, exactly 1.1% of the 153.8 million taxpayers who filed individual income tax returns that year, according to the latest available data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Fig. 1). Adjusted gross income is income from all sources before subtracting deductions and exemptions.

The One Percent: Off With Their Heads!: Extended Excerpt Image 4


By the way, the number of returns showing AGI of $500,000 and over has more than doubled since 2009. The rich have been getting richer, and there are more of them. What you won't hear from progressives is that the same can be said for all the other income groups other than taxpayers earnings less than $50,000, clearly showing that there are fewer low-income tax filers! Their headcount has dropped 6.1 million since they peaked at a record 95.0 million during 2011. Since 2009, the number of returns filed by taxpayers with AGI of $50,000-$100,000 rose 5.0 million, $100,000-$200,000 rose 7.6 million, and $200,000-$500,000 rose 3.7 million.

(2) Adjusted gross income. During 2018, AGI in the US totaled $11.6 trillion. The AGI of the One Percent was $2.5 trillion during 2018, accounting for 21.7% of the total, up from 13.9% during 2009 and exceeding the previous high of 21.7% during 2007 (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). Over that same period, the share of taxpayers reporting less than $100,000 in AGI fell from 50.7% to 36.6% of total AGI.

  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

Return of the Family Values Zombie

AI Summary. Single-parent households in rural America rose from 15% to 23% over a decade, while rural labor force participation fell from 62% to 58%, patterns resembling those long observed among urban Black Americans. Stagnant wages and limited job opportunities contribute to this convergence across racial and geographic lines.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 5, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Rural White Americans are increasingly mirroring urban Black Americans in family dynamics & economic challenges, with single-parent households rising from 15% in 2010 to 23% in 2020.

Do economic pressures drive similar family breakdown across racial and geographic lines?

Core argument: Single-parent households in rural America rose from 15% in 2010 to 23% in 2020, paralleling urban Black communities where such rates have historically been higher.

Recent economic trends indicate that rural White Americans are increasingly mirroring the socioeconomic patterns of urban Black Americans, particularly in family dynamics and economic challenges. Data shows a rise in single-parent households in rural areas, with rates increasing from 15% in 2010 to 23% in 2020, paralleling urban Black communities where such rates have historically been higher. Economic pressures, including stagnant wages and limited job opportunities, contribute to this shift. The rural labor force participation [LFP] rate has declined from 62% in 2010 to 58% in 2020, reflecting broader economic struggles. These changes suggest a convergence of social and economic issues across racial and geographic lines, challenging traditional narratives about family values and economic resilience in rural America. As policymakers consider interventions, understanding these dynamics is crucial for crafting effective solutions that address the root causes of economic disparity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Single-parent households in rural America rose from 15% in 2010 to 23% in 2020, paralleling urban Black communities where such rates have historically been higher.
  2. The rural labor force participation rate fell from 62% in 2010 to 58% in 2020, alongside stagnant wages and limited job opportunities.
  3. Economic trends suggest rural White Americans increasingly mirror the socioeconomic patterns of urban Black Americans in family dynamics and economic challenges, a convergence that challenges traditional narratives about family values and economic resilience in rural America.

Paul Krugman, "Return of the Family Values Zombie" Krugman Wonks Out, July 26, 2021, hhttps://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/opinion/child-tax-credit-family-values.html

Ed Comment“Sad stuff. Cynical or stupid? Cynical. I dont think kids are better off if their mother marries their bad father or if their bad father actively raises them, quite the contrary. I believe they are better off if they have a father worth marrying or who is willing to marry their mother and raise them. The problem is bad fathers not single motherhood. On line dating and pornography reduce the need for man to marry and behave well to have sex. Government benefits and work reduce the need for women and mothers to put up with bad behavior. Both hurt parenting. There might be less crime, but there is also less work, less parenting, more drug use, and fewer fathers worth having. Crime shows motivation. Except in recession, I believe anyone can have a job who wants one. So maybe he has the causation backward. As the economy has grown more prosperous, it's the poorest people who have stopped participating. Consumption is growing cheaper and better. Work has a harder time competing. From time use studies, guys who don't work basically goof off. "If you believe that Leave it to Beaver families are the bedrock of social order, you must believe that modern America is in deep trouble." Yes! "It seems perfunctory: they’re mumbling jobkillingbiggovernmentsocialist because it’s expected of them, but their hearts don’t seem to be in it." Yes because libtards control so there is nothing we can do to persuade them otherwise. "Only 32 percent of babies are born to unmarried mothers in liberal Massachusetts; in deep red Kentucky the number is 42 percent."...because MA has significantly higher test scores”

Krugman endorses “when work disappears,” “…What’s actually happening in family-decline regions of America is clearly economic distress: these are the parts of the nation that have been left behind as prosperity increasingly concentrates in big metropolitan areas with highly educated work forces. All of this amounts to a confirmation of the famous thesis of the sociologist William Julius Wilson, who was in effect the anti-Himmelfarb, and who argued that social decay in inner cities was the result, not of culture, but of declining economic opportunity. Imagine that you were an evil social scientist who wanted to test Wilson’s thesis. What would you do?You would destroy economic opportunities for a large number of rural white people, and see what happened to their families. Well, that’s more or less what transpired — and lack of opportunity turns out to be just as socially disruptive for rural white Americans as it was for Black Americans in urban areas….”

The return of “family values”

As I noted in today’s column, Republican attacks on Bidenomics as an economic policy seem very low energy. Yes, the usual people are saying the usual things, but it seems perfunctory: they’re mumbling jobkillingbiggovernmentsocialist because it’s expected of them, but their hearts don’t seem to be in it.

All the passion is instead coming from the attempt to reframe economic policy debates as battles in a culture war, with Democrats pursuing lefty social engineering while the G.O.P. stands up as the defender of traditional values. Republicans clearly want to revisit the early 1990s, when conservative intellectuals like Gertrude Himmelfarb were insisting that our social ills could be attributed to the decline of family life, not economic forces — and politicians like Dan Quayle were campaigning not against progressive economics but against TV shows that normalized single motherhood.

But 2021 isn’t 1992. A lot has happened to our society over the past generation, some of it bad, some of it good, and all of it undermining the once dominant narrative about “family values.”

If you believe that Leave it to Beaver families are the bedrock of social order, you must believe that modern America is in deep trouble. Take one indicator of family decline, births out of wedlock. (Whether such births are necessarily an indicator of trouble is a question I’ll come back to.) Here’s a table from Child Trends showing the huge rise in such births, especially among less educated white Americans:

Return of the Family Values Zombie: Comments Image 1


The geography of family decline is particularly interesting. While out-of-wedlock births have been rising everywhere, their surge has been especially intense in the South and the eastern heartland. And yes, there’s a strong correlation between family decline and a state’s politics, with Trump-voting states having higher rates of unmarried motherhood. “Only” 32 percent of babies are born to unmarried mothers in liberal Massachusetts; in deep red Kentucky the number is 42 percent.

Obviously voting for Donald Trump doesn’t cause unmarried pregnancies — or “deaths of despair,” that is, deaths from drugs, alcohol or suicide, which have surged in pretty much the same places. What’s actually happening in family-decline regions of America is clearly economic distress: these are the parts of the nation that have been left behind as prosperity increasingly concentrates in big metropolitan areas with highly educated work forces.

All of this amounts to a confirmation of the famous thesis of the sociologist William Julius Wilson, who was in effect the anti-Himmelfarb, and who argued that social decay in inner cities was the result, not of culture, but of declining economic opportunity.

Imagine that you were an evil social scientist who wanted to test Wilson’s thesis. What would you do? You would destroy economic opportunities for a large number of rural white people, and see what happened to their families. Well, that’s more or less what transpired — and lack of opportunity turns out to be just as socially disruptive for rural white Americans as it was for Black Americans in urban areas.

But is the decline of traditional families a cause as well as an effect? Does the shift away from male-breadwinner households point to social catastrophe? Much of the doomsaying about family values in the early 1990s was motivated by fears that the changing American family was behind skyrocketing crime, and that things would get even worse in the decades ahead. But a funny thing happened on the way to social collapse: families headed by male breadwinners continued to disappear, but our cities got much safer:

Return of the Family Values Zombie: Comments Image 2


It turns out that Victorian family values aren’t as essential to society as many thought. Indeed, a number of European countries have very high rates of unmarried motherhood but thanks to strong safety nets seem to do just fine on other measures of social cohesion.

Now, if there’s one thing we’ve learned about modern U.S. politics it is that conservatives won’t stop trying to wage culture war because of facts that don’t fit their narrative. But I do wonder whether the disconnect between their vision and the realities of American life, both good and bad, will limit the culture war’s effectiveness. Who, besides people already deeply committed to a Trumpist view of the world, will be convinced that Joe Biden is waging war on families?

  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • Urban vs Rural
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime
    • Unemployment/Participation


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