Is information physically linked to energy and thermodynamics?
Core argument: Maxwell's demon, a thought experiment dating to 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information, with Shannon's information entropy and Landauer's erasure principle showing that information processing is linked to physical processes.
Maxwell's demon, a thought experiment from 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information. Advances in information theory and thermodynamics, notably Shannon's information entropy and Landauer's erasure principle, have shown that information processing is inherently linked to physical processes. This understanding has led to real-world applications, such as using information to create temperature imbalances in nanoelectronic devices, potentially enhancing thermal systems and computer chip efficiency. These developments underscore the economic potential of harnessing information as a physical resource, with implications for industries reliant on energy efficiency and data processing.











Ed Comment 1/2: This seems to parallels my view. Private sector gradually expands to the outer limits of the private sector’s willingness and capacity to bear risk. Shock destroys equity and causes a reassessment of the risk upward. Economy contracts to compensate. And then gradually searches for a new optimal reallocation of resources, which takes time.
Ben Comment 1/2:Seems like the paper nods in the direction of Ed’s thinking but doesn’t really go there. Ed’s thinking (as I understand it): people take more and more risks. As those risks pile up, it becomes more likely one of those risks comes up bad. When that risk comes up bad, people pull back on their whole risk budget. The analogy is the mouse in the field who keeps going farther afield to find food. Importantly, there is a link between the amount of risk being taken and the subsequent shock to the risk budget. This paper shocks the risk parameter directly but that shock is decoupled from whatever risks might have built up in the economy. So while the paper does work through shocking a risk taking parameter, the cause of the shock is exogenous (while Ed’s thinking, as laid out above) has endogenous risk taking shocks. What I mean is, there’s no sense in which the expansion leads to the decline in risk taking. The decline in risk taking is much closer to “animal spirits” than anything Ed’s said (at least to me). Additionally, the shocks in this paper work through the labor market and not through business start ups or additional risk underwriting. Essentially, long term labor contracts are risky, so in this model when risks aversion goes up, companies substitute long term employees with short term employees. These short termers are less productive, so output goes down, investment goes down and consumption goes down. They match the facts of the world in aggregate but the mechanisms they work through are significantly different. Maybe you could interpret these long term labor relationships as risk underwriting, but to me they seem to fall into a different category. From an empirical point of view, I don’t think these guys have very much. They’re hiding a principle component analysis in their VAR (eq 8) and then saying they’ve found something. But what they’ve found is a statistical artifact that is highly correlated (by construction!) with the data series they’re interested and given it a name. Fine, that’s a thing to do but I’m not sure how much insight it gives you, especially with economic and financial data. Structural VAR models are hard and mostly aren’t structural because they end up projecting things we see in the economy in more convenient ways. They get answers but I’m not sure they get insights.
Ed Comment 2/2:It seems to me all shocks are in part exogenous at least from our "inside the economy" perspective. That is, we don’t see them coming. So while I do think that increased risk-taking (and misallocations) increases the probability of undesirable risky outcomes manifesting themselves, the triggering is sort of exogenous. My view that private sector risk-taking gradually rises to the privates sector's willingness and capacity to bear risk is somewhat different than my view about rats overreacting and scurrying back to the den. The rat story is about the logic of over-reacting to intermittent data samples. Perhaps one could argue that the only reason we aren't optimally maximizing risk is because we have overreacted in fear. But that seems too simplistic to me. what if we are taking too much risk at the end of the cycle? Clearly we would be doing that for a different reason (that fear). So I think end of cycle risk-taking might be driven by different dynamics that rat-scurrying. On the other hand one might say the same rat-like think is the very thing cause us to take too much risk, namely that we just keep taking more until bad things happen. That's say we might be taking less and less (more) for secondary reasons. Risk-taking crosses a spectrum from saving but not investing (Keynesian paradox of thrift in recession when everyone is scared), to consuming more (equilibrium), to investing more (heading to an higher equilibrium), to investing more in risky investments (heading there faster), and, possibly to consuming more. I think that if the financial markets grow and I grow more confident and buy art/a jet/second home (I save and invest less) that somehow I'm taking more risk.
Ben Comment 2/2: Thanks for clarifying. It still reads to me like there’s a link between the overall quantity of risk and the pull back in risk taking - that link is missing from the paper. I also think a lot of people are going to look at this paper pretty askance. Directly shocking a deep parameter gives your model so much flexibility that it’s hard to interpret the results in a meaningful way. This is where things start looking more like behavioral economics. Not a bad thing but there are a lot of economists who don’t really go in for it. Just my take