Edward Conard

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  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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Tuesday, April 27, 2021

How Maxwells Demon Continues to Startle Scientists

AI Summary. The Maxwell's demon thought experiment has evolved into a framework showing that information processing is physically linked to thermodynamics, via concepts such as information entropy and the principle that erasing information dissipates energy. Researchers have applied this by using information to create temperature imbalances in nanoelectronic devices, with potential uses in thermal systems and computer chip efficiency.

Jonathan O'Callaghan Quanta Magazine
Date Posted:
April 27, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Maxwell’s demon, a thought experiment from 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information. Advances in information theory & thermodynamics have shown that information processing is inherently linked to physical processes.

Maxwell’s demon, a thought experiment from 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of...

Is information physically linked to energy and thermodynamics?

Core argument: Maxwell's demon, a thought experiment dating to 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information, with Shannon's information entropy and Landauer's erasure principle showing that information processing is linked to physical processes.

Maxwell's demon, a thought experiment from 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information. Advances in information theory and thermodynamics, notably Shannon's information entropy and Landauer's erasure principle, have shown that information processing is inherently linked to physical processes. This understanding has led to real-world applications, such as using information to create temperature imbalances in nanoelectronic devices, potentially enhancing thermal systems and computer chip efficiency. These developments underscore the economic potential of harnessing information as a physical resource, with implications for industries reliant on energy efficiency and data processing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Maxwell's demon, a thought experiment dating to 1867, has evolved into a concept illustrating the physical nature of information, with Shannon's information entropy and Landauer's erasure principle showing that information processing is linked to physical processes.
  2. Information has been used to create temperature imbalances in nanoelectronic devices, an application with potential to enhance thermal systems and computer chip efficiency.
  3. Harnessing information as a physical resource carries economic potential for industries that depend on energy efficiency and data processing.

new advances in understanding Maxwell’s demon"...The team, led by Manzano, wondered if there was a way toimplement something like Maxwell’s demon but without the information requirements. They imagined a two-compartment system with a door, as before. But in this case, the door would open and close on its own. Sometimes particles would randomly separate themselves into hotter and colder compartments. The demon could only watch this process and decide when to turn the system off. In theory this process could create a small temperature imbalance, and therefore a useful heat engine, if the demon was smart about when to end the experiment and lock any temperature imbalance in place, much as a smart gambler on a hot streak knows when to leave the table. “You can either play all night on the roulette table, or you can stop if you win $100,” said Édgar Roldán, a physicist at the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Italy who was a co-author on the study. “We’re saying we don’t need such a complicated device as Maxwell’s demon to extract work in the second law. We can be more relaxed.”The researchers then implemented such a gambling demon in a nanoelectronic device, to show it was possible..."

Jonathan O'Callaghan, "How Maxwell’s Demon Continues to Startle Scientists,"Quanta Magazine, April 22, 2021, https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-maxwells-demon-continues-to-startle-scientists-20210422/

How Maxwell’s Demon Continues to Startle Scientists

The universe bets on disorder. Imagine, for example, dropping a thimbleful of red dye into a swimming pool. All of those dye molecules are going to slowly spread throughout the water. Physicists quantify this tendency to spread by counting the number of possible ways the dye molecules can be arranged. There’s one possible state where the molecules are crowded into the thimble. There’s another where, say, the molecules settle in a tidy clump at the pool’s bottom. But there are uncountable billions of permutations where the molecules spread out in different ways throughout the water. If the universe chooses from all the possible states at random, you can bet that it’s going to end up with one of the vast set of disordered possibilities.

Seen in this way, the inexorable rise in entropy, or disorder, as quantified by the second law of thermodynamics, takes on an almost mathematical certainty. So of course physicists are constantly trying to break it.

One almost did. A thought experiment devised by the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell in 1867 stumped scientists for 115 years. And even after a solution was found, physicists have continued to use “Maxwell’s demon” to push the laws of the universe to their limits.

In the thought experiment, Maxwell imagined splitting a room full of gas into two compartments by erecting a wall with a small door. Like all gases, this one is made of individual particles. The average speed of the particles corresponds to the temperature of the gas — faster is hotter. But at any given time, some particles will be moving more slowly than others.

What if, suggested Maxwell, a tiny imaginary creature — a demon, as it was later called — sat at the door. Every time it saw a fast-moving particle approaching from the left-hand side, it opened the door and let it into the right-hand compartment. And every time a slow-moving particle approached from the right, the demon let it into the left-hand compartment.

After a while, the left-hand compartment would be full of slow, cold particles, and the right-hand compartment would grow hot. This isolated system would seem to grow more orderly, not less, because two distinguishable compartments have more order than two identical compartments. Maxwell had created a system that appeared to defy the rise of entropy, and thus the laws of the universe.

“He tried to prove a system where the entropy would decrease,” said Laia Delgado Callico, a physicist at King’s College London. “It’s a paradox.”

Two advances would be crucial to solving Maxwell’s demon. The first was by the American mathematician Claude Shannon, regarded as the founder of information theory. In 1948, Shannon showed that the information content of a message could be quantified with what he called the information entropy. “In the 19th century, no one knew about information,” said Takahiro Sagawa, a physicist at the University of Tokyo. “The modern understanding of Maxwell’s demon was established by Shannon’s work.”

The second vital piece of the puzzle was the principle of erasure. In 1961, the German American physicist Rolf Landauer showed that any logically irreversible computation, such as the erasing of information from a memory, would result in a minimal nonzero amount of work converted into heat dumped into the environment, and a corresponding rise in entropy. Landauer’s erasure principle provided a tantalizing link between information and thermodynamics. “Information is physical,” he later proclaimed.

In 1982, the American physicist Charles Bennett put the pieces of the puzzle together. He realized that Maxwell’s demon was at core an information-processing machine: It needed to record and store information about individual particles in order to decide when to open and close the door. Periodically it would need to erase this information. According to Landauer’s erasure principle, the rise in entropy from the erasure would more than compensate for the decrease in entropy caused by the sorting of the particles. “You need to pay,” said Gonzalo Manzano, a physicist at the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information in Vienna. The demon’s need to make room for more information inexorably led to a net increase in disorder.

Then in the 21st century, with the thought experiment solved, the real experiments began. “The most important development is we can now realize Maxwell’s demon in laboratories,” said Sagawa.

In 2007 scientists used a light-powered gate to demonstrate the idea of Maxwell’s demon in action; in 2010, another team devised a way to use the energy produced by the demon’s information to coax a bead uphill; and in 2016 scientists applied the idea of Maxwell’s demon to two compartments containing not gas, but light.

“We switched the roles of matter and light,” said Vlatko Vedral, a physicist at the University of Oxford and one of the study’s co-authors. The researchers were ultimately able to charge a very small battery.

Others wondered if there might be less demanding ways to use information to extract useful work from a similar system. And research published in February in Physical Review Letters seems to have found a way to do so. The work makes the demon into a gambler.

The team, led by Manzano, wondered if there was a way to implement something like Maxwell’s demon but without the information requirements. They imagined a two-compartment system with a door, as before. But in this case, the door would open and close on its own. Sometimes particles would randomly separate themselves into hotter and colder compartments. The demon could only watch this process and decide when to turn the system off. In theory this process could create a small temperature imbalance, and therefore a useful heat engine, if the demon was smart about when to end the experiment and lock any temperature imbalance in place, much as a smart gambler on a hot streak knows when to leave the table. “You can either play all night on the roulette table, or you can stop if you win $100,” said Édgar Roldán, a physicist at the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Italy who was a co-author on the study. “We’re saying we don’t need such a complicated device as Maxwell’s demon to extract work in the second law. We can be more relaxed.” The researchers then implemented such a gambling demon in a nanoelectronic device, to show it was possible.

Ideas like this could prove useful in designing more efficient thermal systems, like refrigerators, or even in developing more advanced computer chips, which may be approaching a fundamental limit dictated by Landauer’s principle.

For the time being, though, our laws of the universe are safe, even when placed under the greatest scrutiny. What has changed is our understanding of information in the universe, and with it our appreciation of Maxwell’s demon, first a troublesome paradox, and now an invaluable concept — one that has helped to illuminate the remarkable link between the physical world and information.

  • Science

Summers at FT

AI Summary. Fiscal stimulus totaling 14% of GDP — including a $900bn package, a $1.9tn package, and a $2tn household savings overhang — far exceeds what the economy requires and is not justified by pre-pandemic secular stagnation, the author argues. He warns of resource misallocation and macroeconomic problems akin to the policy errors of the 1960s.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:
April 27, 2021
Is Database:
Database

@LHSummers argues that the current fiscal policy under Biden is excessive and not justified by secular stagnation; notes that pre-Covid, a gap btw private savings and investment led to deflationary tendencies, but the current fiscal stimulus, totaling 14% of GDP, far exceeds the necessary response.

@LHSummers argues that the current fiscal policy under Biden is excessive and not justified by secular stagnation; notes...

Is fiscal stimulus far exceeding what the economy needs?

Core argument: Larry Summers argues that fiscal stimulus totaling 14% of GDP far exceeds what the economy requires and is not justified by secular stagnation.

Larry Summers argues that the current fiscal policy under Biden is excessive and not justified by secular stagnation. He notes that pre-Covid, a gap between private savings and investment led to deflationary tendencies, but the current fiscal stimulus, totaling 14% of GDP, far exceeds the necessary response. Summers highlights that the $900bn December package, $1.9tn recent package, and $2tn savings overhang create a risk of overshooting economic needs. He criticizes the lack of quantification in macro policy, suggesting that the stimulus is politically motivated rather than economically justified. Summers warns of potential resource misallocation and macroeconomic issues, drawing parallels to the 1960s economic missteps.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Larry Summers argues that fiscal stimulus totaling 14% of GDP far exceeds what the economy requires and is not justified by secular stagnation.
  2. Summers points to the $900bn December package, the $1.9tn package, and a $2tn savings overhang as creating a risk of overshooting economic needs.
  3. Summers criticizes the lack of quantification in macroeconomic policy, contends the stimulus is politically rather than economically motivated, and warns of resource misallocation and macroeconomic problems akin to the 1960s missteps.

Summer’s on how to think about secular stagnation and current fiscal policy, “…How does this square with my earlier views on secular stagnation? I looked at the global economy and, indeed, at the US economy during the pre-Covid period and what I saw was that, at near-zero real interest rates, there was a quite substantial gap between private savings and investment, driven by demography, cheap capital goods, inequality and technology. That substantial gap meant a deflationary tendency, one towards sluggishness and for savings to flow into existing assets and create asset bubbles. So, I felt that savings absorption was a central macroeconomic problem and the order of the problem was 3 or 4 per cent of GDP at very low interest rates that themselves carry substantial risks. Now, when we’re talking about fiscal stimulus totalling 14 per cent of GDP in its first round, when we’re also talking about extraordinary monetary measures, structural effects of Covid — notably a large savings overhang — it seems to me that we are way overdoing the requisite response. I always thought of economics as a quantitative field...... no one was advocating a programme of this magnitude last December. This was not anyone’s economic analysis. So, the argument might be right — but it was not an argument anyone had come to before it became politically expedient….”

John Cochrane, "Summers at FT,"The Grumpy Economist, April 23, 2021, https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2021/04/summers-at-ft.html

Summers at FT

Martin Wolf's FT interview with Larry Summers is a great read. It would be a great read for its articulate numeracy if Larry were a Republican, stepping down from the Trump CEA or Treasury. That he is on the the other team makes it ever more poignant.

If you look at the economy at the beginning of this year, prevailing forecasts were that Covid would reduce wages and salaries to American households by $20bn-$30bn a month, with that figure declining over the year. So, that would be a $250bn-$300bn hole in wages and salaries over the course of the year.

So, I look at this hole and then I see $900bn of stimulus in the December package, $1.9tn of stimulus in the recently passed package and $2tn in the savings overhang, which is also likely to be spent. I see the Fed with its foot on the accelerator as hard as any Fed has ever done....

So, I look at that dwindling hole. Then I look at expenditures that aren’t hard to add into the multiple trillions, and I see substantial risk that the amount of water being poured in vastly exceeds the size of the bathtub.

Wait Larry, aren't you Mr. Secular Stagnation, Hysterisis, borrow and spend?

How does this square with my earlier views on secular stagnation? I looked at the global economy and, indeed, at the US economy during the pre-Covid period and what I saw was that, at near-zero real interest rates, there was a quite substantial gap between private savings and investment, driven by demography, cheap capital goods, inequality and technology.

That substantial gap meant a deflationary tendency, one towards sluggishness and for savings to flow into existing assets and create asset bubbles. So, I felt that savings absorption was a central macroeconomic problem and the order of the problem was 3 or 4 per cent of GDP at very low interest rates that themselves carry substantial risks.

Now, when we’re talking about fiscal stimulus totalling 14 per cent of GDP in its first round, when we’re also talking about extraordinary monetary measures, structural effects of Covid — notably a large savings overhang — it seems to me that we are way overdoing the requisite response.

I always thought of economics as a quantitative field...

Not all of this makes sense to me. The stories of excess savings seem ephemeral, how savings vs. investment has anything to do with inflation -- a nominal question at the scale of decades -- and how any of that privileges "savings flow into existing assets and create asset bubbles" is a head-scratcher.

Most of all, I am dubious of the hydraulic Keynesianism to which macro policy has returned. Find your GDP gap, divide by 1.5 (actually, here, divide by 1) that equals the amount to borrow and spread around.

But I am here to praise not to quibble. At least hydraulic Keynesianism is quantitative, in a back of the envelope sense. Larry is pointing to the complete lack of quantification in macro policy otherwise.

Later,

Let me put it in a different way and it’s sort of ironic. The bet that we can do this is a bet on secular stagnation being even more true than I had supposed. For this to be right, the long-term demand gap has to be far larger than I had imagined.

I don’t think that, until recently, the principal criticism of my views on secular stagnation was that I was very much underestimating its force. So I find it not a preponderant probability

In other words, MMT has won. I do chuckle a little at Summers and others, passed on the left by MMT, saying "no, we didn't mean that much stimulus, or that much slack." But Summers is and was quantitative, he did not subscribe to the "how much? MORE" attitude of the current left.

Of course, people in the Administration can also add. So the logical conclusion is that "stimulus" therefore is just a talking point, not a serious policy. They're taking Rahm Emmanuel's advice to heart and not letting the opportunity go to waste, not for macro benefit but to hand money out to where they want to hand money out. Larry essentially says as much.

...no one was advocating a programme of this magnitude last December. This was not anyone’s economic analysis. So, the argument might be right — but it was not an argument anyone had come to before it became politically expedient.

On infrastructure (this is the last bill, not the current one, but I think Larry will probably say the same given how little actual infrastructure is in this one)

I could have been comfortable with a headline figure well in excess of $1.9tn if it had been a large-scale, multiyear programme of public investment responding to our deepest societal concerns. But that’s not what this is.

It transfers to state and local governments that don’t have any new budget problem, according to the latest figures. It’s paying people, who have been unemployed, more in unemployment insurance than they earned when they were working. It’s giving cheques to families in the 90th percentile of income distribution.

It doesn’t seem prudent on resource allocation grounds, as well as being problematic on macroeconomic grounds.

Larry then goes back to the back of the stimulus envelope

..there’s much discussion that suggests you can’t measure the GDP gap but, gosh, employment is 10m people lower than it might otherwise have been, so there’s got to be enormous slack.

As a rough calculation, if employment is 10m people short, that’s about 6 per cent of the labour force and, it appears, those who are not employed have wages of perhaps 60 per cent of the average worker. In terms of the shortfall in effective labour input, you’re at 60 per cent of 6 per cent, which is about 3.6 per cent.

So, in employment terms that gets you to just about the same gap that you come to in terms of more traditional estimates. You also don’t see the Fed or others substantially revising upwards their estimates of potential GDP.

There is a lot more on taxes, the possibility of closing the gap by taxing the rich, and size of government I could quibble with, but leave that alone. Kudos to Larry for speaking out so forcefully when "his team" is headed in the wrong direction.

A last golden paragraph:

...in many ways, today’s situation is a bit like the 1960s. It was then hoped that the laws of economic arithmetic could be suspended and that it would all work out. That experiment didn’t work out well for Lyndon Johnson, economically, and it didn’t work out well for the Democratic party, politically. I think there is a significant risk that something of the same kind will happen today.

I hope Larry will next look at climate policy, which is suffering a similar lack of quantification. Has anyone seen a single cost-benefit analysis?

  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle

How People Get Rich Now

AI Summary. Risk-adjusted returns to high-impact entrepreneurship have improved as barriers to entry fell, shifting wealth creation from large capital-intensive firms toward smaller startups; of 73 new fortunes in one recent year, 56 came from founders' or early employees' equity, versus an earlier era dominated by oil and real estate.

Paul Graham PaulGraham.com
Date Posted:
April 27, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Risk-adjusted returns to high-impact entrepreneurship have improved significantly from 1982-2021, driven by reduced barriers to entry.

Risk-adjusted returns to high-impact entrepreneurship have improved significantly from 1982-2021, driven by reduced barriers...

Has startup founding replaced capital-intensive industry as the path to wealth?

Core argument: Of the 73 new fortunes made in 2020, 56 came from founders' or early employees' equity, a shift from 1982, when oil and real estate dominated new wealth creation.

From 1982 to 2021, risk-adjusted returns to high-impact entrepreneurship have improved significantly due to reduced barriers to entry. The shift from large capital-intensive firms to smaller, agile startups has enabled more individuals to create wealth through entrepreneurship. In 2020, 73 new fortunes were made, with 56 from founders' or early employees' equity, compared to 1982 when oil and real estate dominated new wealth creation. The rise of tech companies, which venture capitalists favor for their technological edge, marks a qualitative change in wealth generation. The decreasing cost of starting a startup, driven by technological advancements, has shifted the power balance between founders and investors, increasing valuations and making entrepreneurship more accessible. This trend reflects a return to historical norms where individual entrepreneurship was a primary path to wealth creation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the 73 new fortunes made in 2020, 56 came from founders' or early employees' equity, a shift from 1982, when oil and real estate dominated new wealth creation.
  2. Risk-adjusted returns to high-impact entrepreneurship improved significantly from 1982 to 2021 as barriers to entry fell and wealth creation moved from large capital-intensive firms to smaller, agile startups.
  3. The declining cost of starting a startup, driven by technological advances, has shifted the power balance between founders and investors, raising valuations and making entrepreneurship more accessible.

Paul Graham on why inequality has increased, structural shift in the economy from large capital intensive firms to small ones has enable entrepreneurship, “…It’s easier now to start and grow a company than it has ever been. That means more people start them, that those who do get better terms from investors, and that the resulting companies become more valuable. Once you understand how these mechanisms work, and that startups were suppressed for most of the 20th century, you don’t have to resort to some vague right turn the country took under Reagan to explain why America’s Gini coefficient is increasing. Of course the Gini coefficient is increasing. With more people starting more valuable companies, how could it not be?…”

Paul Graham, “How People Get Rich Now,” PaulGraham.com, April 2021, http://paulgraham.com/richnow.html

His evidence, “…How are people making these new fortunes? Roughly 3/4 by starting companies and 1/4 by investing. Of the 73 new fortunes in 2020, 56 derive from founders’ or early employees’ equity (52 founders, 2 early employees, and 2 wives of founders), and 17 from managing investment funds. There were no fund managers among the 100 richest Americans in 1982. Hedge funds and private equity firms existed in 1982, but none of their founders were rich enough yet to make it into the top 100. Two things changed: fund managers discovered new ways to generate high returns, and more investors were willing to trust them with their money. But the main source of new fortunes now is starting companies, and when you look at the data, you see big changes there too. People get richer from starting companies now than they did in 1982, because the companies do different things. In 1982, there were two dominant sources of new wealth: oil and real estate. Of the 40 new fortunes in 1982, at least 24 were due primarily to oil or real estate. Now only a small number are: of the 73 new fortunes in 2020, 4 were due to real estate and only 2 to oil. By 2020 the biggest source of new wealth was what are sometimes called “tech” companies. Of the 73 new fortunes, about 30 derive from such companies. These are particularly common among the richest of the rich: 8 of the top 10 fortunes in 2020 were new fortunes of this type. Arguably it’s slightly misleading to treat tech as a category. Isn’t Amazon really a retailer, and Tesla a car maker? Yes and no. Maybe in 50 years, when what we call tech is taken for granted, it won’t seem right to put these two businesses in the same category. But at the moment at least, there is definitely something they share in common that distinguishes them. What retailer starts AWS? What car maker is run by someone who also has a rocket company? The tech companies behind the top 100 fortunes also form a well-differentiated group in the sense that they’re all companies that venture capitalists would readily invest in, and the others mostly not. And there’s a reason why: these are mostly companies that win by having better technology, rather than just a CEO who’s really driven and good at making deals. To that extent, the rise of the tech companies represents a qualitative change. The oil and real estate magnates of the 1982 Forbes 400 didn’t win by making better technology. They won by being really driven and good at making deals. And indeed, that way of getting rich is so old that it predates the Industrial Revolution. The courtiers who got rich in the (nominal) service of European royal houses in the 16th and 17th centuries were also, as a rule, really driven and good at making deals….”

He argues the post war period was an outlier in American economic history, note he seemingly falls for Lind’s uncompelling argument that the post war economy wasn’t competitive which was a deterrent to entrepreneurship, “…So it’s not 2020 that’s the anomaly here, but 1982. The real question is why so few people had gotten rich from starting companies in 1982. And the answer is that even as the Herald Tribune’s list was being compiled, a wave of consolidation was sweeping through the American economy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, financiers like J. P. Morgan combined thousands of smaller companies into a few hundred giant ones with commanding economies of scale. By the end of World War II, as Michael Lind writes, “the major sectors of the economy were either organized as government-backed cartels or dominated by a few oligopolistic corporations.” In 1960, most of the people who start startups today would have gone to work for one of them. You could get rich from starting your own company in 1890 and in 2020, but in 1960 it was not really a viable option. You couldn’t break through the oligopolies to get at the markets. So the prestigious route in 1960 was not to start your own company, but to work your way up the corporate ladder at an existing one. Making everyone a corporate employee decreased economic inequality (and every other kind of variation), but if your model of normal is the mid 20th century, you have a very misleading model in that respect…. But though the breakup of J. P. Morgan’s economy created a new world in the technological sense, it was a reversion to the norm in the social sense. If you only look back as far as the mid 20th century, it seems like people getting rich by starting their own companies is a recent phenomenon. But if you look back further, you realize it’s actually the default. So what we should expect in the future is more of the same. Indeed, we should expect both the number and wealth of founders to grow, because every decade it gets easier to start a startup. Part of the reason it’s getting easier to start a startup is social. Society is (re)assimilating the concept. If you start one now, your parents won’t freak out the way they would have a generation ago, and knowledge about how to do it is much more widespread. But the main reason it’s easier to start a startup now is that it’s cheaper. Technology has driven down the cost of both building products and acquiring customers. The decreasing cost of starting a startup has in turn changed the balance of power between founders and investors. Back when starting a startup meant building a factory, you needed investors’ permission to do it at all. But now investors need founders more than founders need investors, and that, combined with the increasing amount of venture capital available, has driven up valuations.

  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Americans do not want the woke racism our schools are peddling

AI Summary. Polling finds 62% of Americans prefer that K-12 schools expose students to diverse perspectives rather than progressive viewpoints, including 69% of white, 51% of Hispanic, and 44% of Black respondents. It also finds 58% favor teacher preparation focused on core skills over social justice advocacy, and 84% endorse equal treatment based on merit.

Samuel Abrams American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 27, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Polling data shows 62% of Americans favor diverse perspectives over progressive views in K-12 schools, with 84% agreeing on equal treatment based on merit. @SamuelAbrams

Polling data shows 62% of Americans favor diverse perspectives over progressive views in K-12 schools, with 84% agreeing on...

Do Americans prefer viewpoint diversity in schools over progressive instruction?

Core argument: Polling finds 62% of respondents favor exposing K-12 students to diverse perspectives rather than progressive viewpoints, with support at 69% among white respondents, 51% among Hispanic respondents, and 44% among Black respondents.

Polling data indicates limited public support for social justice education, with 62% of respondents favoring exposure to diverse perspectives over progressive viewpoints in K-12 schools. Among racial groups, 69% of white respondents, 44% of Black respondents, and 51% of Hispanic respondents prefer viewpoint diversity. Additionally, 58% of respondents believe teacher preparation should focus on core skills rather than social justice advocacy. The data reveals that 84% of Americans agree on equal treatment based on merit, highlighting a preference for traditional educational values over divisive narratives. This suggests that the current educational focus on progressive ideologies is misaligned with public sentiment, potentially impacting the social fabric and economic stability by fostering division rather than unity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Polling finds 62% of respondents favor exposing K-12 students to diverse perspectives rather than progressive viewpoints, with support at 69% among white respondents, 51% among Hispanic respondents, and 44% among Black respondents.
  2. In the polling, 58% of respondents say teacher preparation should focus on core instructional skills rather than social justice advocacy.
  3. The polling data indicates 84% of Americans agree that people should be treated equally on the basis of merit.

Survey results suggest there is little support for "woke" ideas in general population, "..., when respondents were asked how people should be treated —specifically, do you believe that all people should be treated equally based on merit — there is essentially parity. 84% of all respondents agree with this statement and just 8% do not. 86% of whites, 82% of Blacks, and 81% of Hispanics agree here too. Americans clearly believe in equal treatment for all....”
When specifically asked about favoring a progressive world view, "...There are racial differences present in the data, but it is important to note that no racial group wanted to prioritize social justice concerns over a real diversity of views. 69% of white respondents opted to expose students to a variety of perspectives over a narrow progressive worldview. The number in support of a multiplicity of views dropped to 44% among Black respondents but this 44% is the plurality among Blacks for just 29% of Black respondents want the progressive idea and another 27% were unsure. Similarly, 51% of Hispanic or Latino identifiers selected viewpoint diversity with a third (33%) wanting a narrower view and 15% unsure.Collectively, the data reveal that there are understandable differences in racial outlook, but the overtly woke attitudes and approaches being taken by K-12 schools are completely out of step with reality for pluralities of all racial groups and the nation as a whole rejects this social justice approach...."

Samuel Abrams, "Americans do not want the woke racism our schools are peddling,"American Enterprise Institute, April 23, 2021, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/americans-do-not-want-the-woke-racism-our-schools-are-peddling/

Americans do not want the woke racism our schools are peddling

In the past few weeks, it has become apparent that the extreme progressive impulses infecting higher education in the United States have moved from campus quads and dormitories into our nation’s middle and high schools and even into our kindergartens. In New York City alone, the uptown Dalton School has seen an uprising and departure of numerous high-level staff over questions of curriculum and social justice. Downtown, a Grace Church School teacher published anopen letterexplaining that the school’s new “anti-racist” ideology induces shame in white students for being oppressors; he has witnessed the harmful impact that these ideas have had on children including silencing inquiry such that “children are afraid to challenge the repressive ideology that rules our school.”

Most recently, a Brearley School parent penned anopen letterto the entire community of parents explaining he was pulling his daughter from the school because of its “obsession with race” and the fact that the school abandoned its principle of teaching how to think for teaching what to think. In response, Brearley doubled-down on its position and argued that this letter was both offensive and harmful; it was nothing of the sort.

While theselettershave undoubtedly impacted their writers, these public statements show that the wave of progressive, woke, critical-race theory influenced “anti-racist” dogma that has penetrated our K-12 schools is finally being called out for what is it: racist, reductionist, anti-intellectual, and dangerous. And, I wanted to add some more fuel to those leading this important pushback: despite the impression that an illiberal, totalitarian movement has seized the world of education, new data shows that majorities of citizens want viewpoint diversity in our K-12 world, they want our schools to give their students an education based on skills, facts, and history and they do not approve of these divisive and racist ideas which masquerade as progressive and inclusive values.

Thanks to Data from the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), it becomes immediately apparent that the woke ideas in the K-12 universe do not have the wide support of the public. ACTA surveyed a large number of Illinois residents — a microcosm of the American experience possessing not only a diverse citizenry, but large and small cities along with rural areas — about their attitudes toward these anti-racist ideas and support for woke and equitable thinking is not widely accepted at all.

Consider the following: Respondents were asked if K-12 teachers should work to expose students to a variety of perspectives about the country’s founding and history, and to equip them to think critically about its successes and failures OR if K-12 teachers should embrace progressive viewpoints and perspectives when teaching U.S. history, to encourage students to advocate for social justice causes. Almost two-thirds (62%) believed that it was more important to expose students to a variety of perspectives, compared to just 23% who preferred that teachers embrace progressive viewpoints and perspectives; 15% were not sure where they stood.

There are racial differences present in the data, but it is important to note that no racial group wanted to prioritize social justice concerns over a real diversity of views. 69% of white respondents opted to expose students to a variety of perspectives over a narrow progressive worldview. The number in support of a multiplicity of views dropped to 44% among Black respondents but this 44% is the plurality among Blacks for just 29% of Black respondents want the progressive idea and another 27% were unsure. Similarly, 51% of Hispanic or Latino identifiers selected viewpoint diversity with a third (33%) wanting a narrower view and 15% unsure. Collectively, the data reveal that there are understandable differences in racial outlook, but the overtly woke attitudes and approaches being taken by K-12 schools are completely out of step with reality for pluralities of all racial groups and the nation as a whole rejects this social justice approach.

The survey also asked about teacher preparation programs for the classroom and whether schools should prioritize teaching progressive viewpoints and social justice advocacy to help teachers overcome their own biases and build more inclusive classrooms OR if these programs should focus on making teachers better equipped to help students develop core skills and competencies, not on social justice or progressive politics. 58% of respondents preferred skills, while just a third (34%) wanted progressive politics.

When white respondents are considered, 63% advocated for core skills compared to 28% who thought about social justice considerations. This looks notably different from Black respondents who were fairly evenly divided: 44% sided with the progressive viewpoint position while 42% preferred skills. This is remarkable because this is a fairly even split and not a landslide in support for anti-racist thinking despite the rhetoric being churned out at K-12 schools. For those with Hispanic backgrounds, we see the same pattern with 51% falling on the progressive side and 44% landing on the skills side. This is a slight skew and shows, again, that there are not significant majorities which support the woke, anti-racist messages and teachings happening in our schools. The silence despite the data is most likely due to the fear that many have when they speak up and challenge these impulses.

Finally, when respondents were asked how people should be treated — specifically, do you believe that all people should be treated equally based on merit — there is essentially parity. 84% of all respondents agree with this statement and just 8% do not. 86% of whites, 82% of Blacks, and 81% of Hispanics agree here too. Americans clearly believe in equal treatment for all and not the divisive, anti-racist narratives coming from many of our K-12 schools today.

In short, many schools are fixated on race and difference and this is dangerous. Viewing people as members of narrow and simplistic racial groupings foolishly suggests that one should be defined by race and little more. This is an absurd way to understand people, dividing us rather than unifying us and finding common ground based on shared humanity and history. This is the antithesis of what our schools should be teaching, which include the values of real diversity in all forms and social inclusion. These recent examples of pushback are hopefully the start of a much larger effect to dismantle the progressive, ant-racist ideas which are infecting all levels of our education system. Our educational institutions anchor our nation and help teach and propagate our values and these institutions cannot be ceded to the seemingly growing woke and progressive waves corrupting the free exchange of ideas and our core ideas about learning. The data show that Americans reject anti-racism and the pushback against these ideas must continue as our nation’s core values and social fabric depend on it.

  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12

Risky Business Cycles

AI Summary. The authors identify a shock that accounts for roughly 90% of fluctuations in the equity risk premium and more than half of unconditional fluctuations in output, consumption, investment, and employment, with little change in real interest rates. They argue that reallocation of savings toward less risky, low-marginal-product investments can amplify or cause business cycles.

Susanto Basu, Giacomo Candian, Ryan Chahrour & Rosen Valchev National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 27, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Research by @SusantoBasu @GiacomoCandian @RyanChahrour @RosenValchev finds shifting savings into less risky investments can amplify or cause business cycles, as safe savings vehicles with low marginal products drive larger aggregate contractions.

Research by @SusantoBasu @GiacomoCandian @RyanChahrour @RosenValchev finds shifting savings into less risky investments can...

Do shifts in risk appetite drive business cycles?

Core argument: The paper identifies a single shock accounting for roughly 90% of equity risk-premium fluctuations, whose rise coincides with substantial declines in output, consumption, investment, employment, and stock returns alongside minimal changes in real interest rates.

The paper identifies a shock that accounts for around 90% of equity risk-premium fluctuations, significantly impacting macroeconomic variables. This shock leads to a rise in the equity premium, resulting in substantial declines in output, consumption, investment, employment, and stock returns, with minimal changes in real interest rates. The shock explains over half of the unconditional fluctuations in these macro aggregates and a larger portion of their covariance. Notably, it causes a shift from full-time to part-time employment, challenging standard macroeconomic models. The findings suggest that reallocating savings into less risky investments can amplify or cause business cycles, as safe savings vehicles with low marginal products drive larger aggregate contractions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The paper identifies a single shock accounting for roughly 90% of equity risk-premium fluctuations, whose rise coincides with substantial declines in output, consumption, investment, employment, and stock returns alongside minimal changes in real interest rates.
  2. The identified shock explains over half of the unconditional fluctuations in output, consumption, investment, and employment, and a larger share of their covariance.
  3. The shock shifts employment from full-time to part-time, which the paper presents as a challenge to standard macroeconomic models, and the authors argue that reallocating savings into safe vehicles with low marginal products can amplify or cause business cycles.

NBER argues that shocks that drive changes in equity risk premia also explains most business-cycle comovements in aggregates, "... We identify a shock that explains the bulk of fluctuations in equity risk premia, and show that the shock also explains a large fraction of the business-cycle comovements of output, consumption, employment, and investment. Recessions induced by the shock are associated with reallocation away from full-time permanent positions, towards part-time and flexible contract workers. A real model with labor market frictions and fluctuations in risk appetite can explain all of these facts, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The size of risk-driven fluctuations depends on the relationship between the riskiness and productivity of different stores of value: if safe savings vehicles have relatively low marginal products, then a flight to safety will drive a larger aggregate contraction...."

Core of paper, "....The identified shock explains the vast majority (around 90%) of unconditional equity risk-premium fluctuations and drives persistent changes in expected excess returns with a half-life of roughly four years. Having isolated the major source of risk premium fluctuations in the data, we next examine the effects of this shock on several important macroeconomic quantities and prices. We find that an increase in the equity premium, driven by our shock, is also associated with substantial falls in output, consumption, investment, employment, and stock returns, and only a small change in real interest rates.2 Thus,our shock generates the type of comovement across macro quantities (and a “smooth” risk-free rate) that is consistent with the main stylized facts about business cycles.The identified shock also explains a substantial proportion of the overall fluctuations in macro aggregates - including over half of the unconditional fluctuations in output, consumption, investment, employment, and stock returns. Furthermore, the shock we identify explains an even greater portion of the covariance in the key variables of interest. For example, we find that the covariance of output and stock returns driven by our shock is even larger than the unconditional covariance between these two variables, implying that all other shocks in the data jointly drive these variables in opposite directions. In addition to the main business cycle variables described above, we explore the effects of our shock on a set of additional variables that are not commonly included in businesscycle studies. In particular, we show that the identified shock, while causing a fall in aggregate hours and in total employment, leads part-time employment to rise significantly, both in absolute terms and as a share of total employment. This fact poses a particular challenge for many standard macroeconomic models which, whether driven by aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks, generally imply that different types of labor should move in the same direction...."

Susanto Basu, Giacomo Candian, Ryan Chahrour & Rosen Valchev, "Risky Business Cycles," National Bureau Of Economic Research, April 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28693

Ed Comment 1/2: This seems to parallels my view. Private sector gradually expands to the outer limits of the private sector’s willingness and capacity to bear risk. Shock destroys equity and causes a reassessment of the risk upward. Economy contracts to compensate. And then gradually searches for a new optimal reallocation of resources, which takes time.
Ben Comment 1/2:Seems like the paper nods in the direction of Ed’s thinking but doesn’t really go there. Ed’s thinking (as I understand it): people take more and more risks. As those risks pile up, it becomes more likely one of those risks comes up bad. When that risk comes up bad, people pull back on their whole risk budget. The analogy is the mouse in the field who keeps going farther afield to find food. Importantly, there is a link between the amount of risk being taken and the subsequent shock to the risk budget. This paper shocks the risk parameter directly but that shock is decoupled from whatever risks might have built up in the economy. So while the paper does work through shocking a risk taking parameter, the cause of the shock is exogenous (while Ed’s thinking, as laid out above) has endogenous risk taking shocks. What I mean is, there’s no sense in which the expansion leads to the decline in risk taking. The decline in risk taking is much closer to “animal spirits” than anything Ed’s said (at least to me). Additionally, the shocks in this paper work through the labor market and not through business start ups or additional risk underwriting. Essentially, long term labor contracts are risky, so in this model when risks aversion goes up, companies substitute long term employees with short term employees. These short termers are less productive, so output goes down, investment goes down and consumption goes down. They match the facts of the world in aggregate but the mechanisms they work through are significantly different. Maybe you could interpret these long term labor relationships as risk underwriting, but to me they seem to fall into a different category. From an empirical point of view, I don’t think these guys have very much. They’re hiding a principle component analysis in their VAR (eq 8) and then saying they’ve found something. But what they’ve found is a statistical artifact that is highly correlated (by construction!) with the data series they’re interested and given it a name. Fine, that’s a thing to do but I’m not sure how much insight it gives you, especially with economic and financial data. Structural VAR models are hard and mostly aren’t structural because they end up projecting things we see in the economy in more convenient ways. They get answers but I’m not sure they get insights.
Ed Comment 2/2:It seems to me all shocks are in part exogenous at least from our "inside the economy" perspective. That is, we don’t see them coming. So while I do think that increased risk-taking (and misallocations) increases the probability of undesirable risky outcomes manifesting themselves, the triggering is sort of exogenous. My view that private sector risk-taking gradually rises to the privates sector's willingness and capacity to bear risk is somewhat different than my view about rats overreacting and scurrying back to the den. The rat story is about the logic of over-reacting to intermittent data samples. Perhaps one could argue that the only reason we aren't optimally maximizing risk is because we have overreacted in fear. But that seems too simplistic to me. what if we are taking too much risk at the end of the cycle? Clearly we would be doing that for a different reason (that fear). So I think end of cycle risk-taking might be driven by different dynamics that rat-scurrying. On the other hand one might say the same rat-like think is the very thing cause us to take too much risk, namely that we just keep taking more until bad things happen. That's say we might be taking less and less (more) for secondary reasons. Risk-taking crosses a spectrum from saving but not investing (Keynesian paradox of thrift in recession when everyone is scared), to consuming more (equilibrium), to investing more (heading to an higher equilibrium), to investing more in risky investments (heading there faster), and, possibly to consuming more. I think that if the financial markets grow and I grow more confident and buy art/a jet/second home (I save and invest less) that somehow I'm taking more risk.
Ben Comment 2/2: Thanks for clarifying. It still reads to me like there’s a link between the overall quantity of risk and the pull back in risk taking - that link is missing from the paper. I also think a lot of people are going to look at this paper pretty askance. Directly shocking a deep parameter gives your model so much flexibility that it’s hard to interpret the results in a meaningful way. This is where things start looking more like behavioral economics. Not a bad thing but there are a lot of economists who don’t really go in for it. Just my take

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

Thursday, April 29, 2021

The six states that gained congressional seats vs. the seven states that lost seats: How do they compare on a variety of measures?

AI Summary. The six states that gained congressional seats after the 2020 Census, including Texas and Florida, had a lower average state tax burden (7.9% vs 9.5%) and lower average top individual income tax rate (4.4% vs 6.5%) than the seven states that lost seats, including New York and California.

Mark Perry American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 29, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Americans are “voting with their feet” moving from high-tax states to lower-tax states with better job opportunities & fiscal health. The 6 states that gained congressional seats had a 2.9% real GDP growth rate in 2019 vs 1.6% in the 7 states that lost seats.

Do states gaining congressional seats have lower taxes and faster growth?

Core argument: The six states gaining congressional seats after the 2020 Census, including Texas and Florida, had an average state tax burden of 7.9% versus 9.5% in the seven states that lost seats, including New York and California.

The 2020 Census revealed that six states, including Texas and Florida, gained congressional seats, while seven states, such as New York and California, lost seats, highlighting a trend of Americans relocating to lower-tax, business-friendly states. The six gaining states exhibited an average state tax burden of 7.9% compared to 9.5% in the losing states. Additionally, the average top individual income tax rate was 4.4% in the gaining states versus 6.5% in the losing states. Economic performance indicators further support this trend: the gaining states had a 2.9% real GDP growth rate in 2019, surpassing the national average of 2.2%, while the losing states lagged at 1.6%. These migration patterns suggest that Americans and businesses are "voting with their feet," moving from economically stagnant, high-tax states to more vibrant, low-tax environments with better job opportunities and fiscal health, as reflected in changes in congressional representation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The six states gaining congressional seats after the 2020 Census, including Texas and Florida, had an average state tax burden of 7.9% versus 9.5% in the seven states that lost seats, including New York and California.
  2. Average top individual income tax rates were 4.4% in the six seat-gaining states compared with 6.5% in the seven seat-losing states.
  3. Real GDP growth in 2019 was 2.9% in the seat-gaining states, above the 2.2% national average, while the seat-losing states grew 1.6%.

The six states that gained congressional seats vs. the seven states that lost seats: How do they compare on a variety of measures?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Mark Perry, "The six states that gained congressional seats vs. the seven states that lost seats: How do they compare on a variety of measures?" American Enterprise Institute, April 27, 2021, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/the-six-states-that-gained-congressional-seats-vs-the-seven-states-that-lost-seats-how-do-they-compare-on-a-variety-of-measures/

The six states that gained congressional seats vs. the seven states that lost seats: How do they compare on a variety of measures?

Based on population shifts recorded in the 2020 Census, there were six US states that gained congressional House seats: Texas (2), Colorado, Montana, Oregon, Florida, and North Carolina; and seven states that lost seats: New York, Illinois, California, Ohio, Michigan, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Like I’ve done in the past for other measures of US migration (see here and here), we can ask the question: What significant differences are there between America’s six states that gained population and congressional seats and the seven states that lost population and congressional seats when they are compared on a variety of recent measures of business climate, individual and corporate tax burdens, state fiscal health, utility (electricity) costs, economic performance, and labor market dynamism? In other words, why are some states like Texas and Florida gaining businesses, residents, and House seats and why are states like California, New York, and Illinois losing businesses, population and House seats?

Assuming that many Americans and US companies “move/vote with their feet” when they relocate from one state to another, is there any empirical evidence to suggest that Americans are moving to states that are relatively more economically vibrant, dynamic, and business-friendly, with lower tax and regulatory burdens, lower energy costs, with more economic and job opportunities, from states that are relatively more economically stagnant with higher taxes and more regulations, higher energy costs, and with fewer economic and job opportunities?

The six states that gained congressional seats vs. the seven states that lost seats: How do they compare on a variety of measures?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


The table above (click to enlarge) summarizes a comparison between the two groups of US states (six House seat gainers and seven House seat losers) on 11 different measures of economic performance, labor market dynamism, business climate, electricity and housing costs, tax climate, and fiscal stability for those 13 states. And on each of those 11 measures, there is empirical evidence that the six gaining states are on average out-performing the seven losing states, suggesting that migration patterns in the US do reflect Americans and firms “voting/moving with their feet” from high-tax, business-unfriendly, fiscally unhealthy, economically stagnant states with relatively high utility (electricity) costs to lower-tax, more business-friendly, fiscally healthy and economically vibrant states with lower energy costs. Let’s review those 11 measures, one at a time:

1. Right-to-Work. Three (half) of the six US states gaining House seats are Right-to-Work (RTW) states, while five of the seven losing states are forced-unionism states (all except Michigan and West Virginia). In my Analysis of the top ten inbound and top ten outbound US states in 2019 based on state-to-state migration data from Census, there was even stronger evidence of migration patterns based on states’ union policies. Nine of the top ten inbound US states in 2019 were Right-to-Work (RTW) states (all except Colorado), while eight of the top ten outbound states were forced-unionism states. According to many studies like this one by my AEI colleague Jeff Eisenach (emphasis mine):

There is a large body of rigorous economic research on the effects of RTW laws on economic performance. Overall, that research suggests that RTW laws have a positive impact on economic growth, employment, investment, and innovation, both directly and indirectly.

Therefore, it would make sense that American businesses and workers are leaving low-growth, forced-unionism states like New York and California for higher-growth, RTW states like Texas and Florida with more dynamic labor markets and greater job opportunities.

2. State Tax Burden. Last month, Wallet Hub released a study on the “Overall Tax Burden by State” that measures the percentage of each state’s total personal income that goes to state and local taxes in the form of (a) individual income taxes, (b) property taxes, and (c) sales and excise taxes. The average state tax burden for the six gaining states is 7.9% compared to a 9.5% average tax burden for the seven losing states. Three of the states losing House seats ranked in the top ten highest-taxed states: New York (No. 1 at 12.79%), Illinois (No. 9 at 9.52%), and California (No. 10 at 9.48%).

3. Income Taxes. a) According to the Tax Foundation, the average top individual income tax rate for the six gaining states was 4.4% in 2020 compared to an average top tax rate of 6.5% in the seven outbound states. Two of the gaiing states — Florida and Texas — have no state individual income tax.

b) Similarly, the average top corporate tax rate based on Tax Foundation data in the six gaining states was 4.3% last year compared to 6.8% in the seven losing states. It’s an ironclad law of economics that if you tax something you get less of it, and it’s therefore, no surprise that Americans and businesses are leaving relatively high tax states and moving to relatively low tax states.

4. Forbes Best States for Business. Based on its most recent annual state ranking that measures six business categories: business costs, labor supply, regulatory environment, current economic climate, growth prospects, and quality of life, Forbes rated four of the six gaining states among the nine best states for business in 2019 — North Carolina at No. 1, Texas at No. 2, Florida at No. 5 and Colorado at No. 9. The average Forbes ranking for the six gaining states last year was 11 out of 50 (top quarter) compared to the average ranking of 34 out of 50 (bottom half) for the seven losing states.

5. Business Tax Climate Rankings. Every year The Tax Foundation calculates and reports its State Business Tax Climate Index based on each US state’s corporate income taxes, individual income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, and unemployment insurance taxes. In the most recent Tax Foundation rankings, two of the seven losing states — New York and California — were among the three US states along with No. 50 New Jersey with the worst business tax climate. For the six gaining states, all but Montana were in the top half of states for the best (lowest) tax climate. The average business tax climate ranking for the six gaining states was 11 (top quarter) compared to an average ranking of 34 (bottom half) for the seven losing states.

6. State Fiscal Stability Rankings. US News and World Report recently ranked US states by “fiscal stability” based on both on a short-term and long-term basis (No. 1 being the most fiscally stable state and No. 50 the most fiscally unstable state). State credit ratings and public pension liabilities measure long-term financial health, while asset liquidity and a state’s budget management (spending vs. revenue) are used to measure short-term health. According to the report, “The fiscal stability of a state’s government is vital to ensuring the success of government-sponsored programs and projects and the quality of life of the state’s residents.”

The average fiscal stability ranking for the six gaining states is 17 (top one-third) compared to the average ranking of 35 for the seven losing states. Three of the six gaining states ranked among the ten most fiscally stable states — North Carolina at No. 7, Florida at No. 8 and Texas at No. 10. Two of the seven losing states ranked among the most fiscally unstable states — Pennsylvania at No. 47 and Illinois dead last at No. 50.

7. Average Electricity Cost by state is another factor that might contribute to businesses and households moving from states with relatively high energy costs to states with lower energy costs. According to the most recent data from the Energy Information Administration on the “Average Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers,” the average price of electricity for all sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation) is 9.4 cents per kilowatt-hour in the six gaining states. For the seven losing states, the average cost of electricity is 11.3 cents per kilowatt-hour, which is more than 20% higher than the gaining states. Compared to the US average price of electricity is 10.29 cents per kilowatt-hour, the average price of electric power in the six gaining states is almost 9% below the national average and the average price in the seven losing states is nearly 10% above average. Because electricity costs affect both the cost of living for households and the cost of operation for businesses, it’s not surprising that the states with higher electricity costs are losing population while the states with lower energy costs have gained businesses and residents.

8. Economic Performance. The last three categories in the table above show economic performance measures for each of the 13 states for (a) state real GDP growth rate in 2019, b) the average state jobless rate in 2019, and c) the annual employment growth in 2019. Figures for 2020 are available but were so distorted by the effects of the pandemic that I’m using 2019 figures here as more representative. For the six gaining states, the average real GDP growth rate in 2019 was 2.9% (above the national average of 2.2%), the average jobless rate was 3.4% (below the national average of 3.7%), and the average annual job growth was 1.9% (above the national average of 1.35%). In contrast, the average figures for the seven losing states were below-average 1.6% for real GDP growth, above-average 4.2% for the jobless rate, and below-average 0.6% for annual job growth. In other words, compared to the seven losing states, output grew almost twice as fast (2.9% vs. 1.6%) in the six gaining states, the average jobless rate was almost a percentage point lower (3.4% vs. 4.0%), and annual employment growth was more than three times higher (1.9% vs. 0.6%).

Those three key economic indicators suggest that the gaining states are stronger economically on average than the seven losing states with faster economic growth, and more robust labor markets with lower jobless rates and greater rates of job creation.

Bottom Line: Based on population changes between 2000 and 2020 recorded in the 2020 Census that will be reflected in changes in House seats, the migration patterns of US households (and businesses) followed the predictable patterns that have been documented in previous CD studies. To answer the questions posed above, there are significant differences between the six states that gained House seats and seven states that lost seats when they are compared on a variety of 11 measures of economic performance, business climate, tax burdens for businesses and individuals, fiscal stability, electricity costs, and labor market dynamism. There is empirical evidence that Americans and businesses “vote with their feet” when they relocate from one state to another, and the evidence suggests that Americans are moving away from economically stagnant, fiscally unhealthy states with higher tax burdens and unfriendly business climates with higher energy costs and fewer economic and job opportunities, to fiscally sound states that are more economically vibrant, dynamic and business-friendly, with lower tax and regulatory burdens, lower energy costs and more economic and job opportunities. And the fact that those population shifts are reflected in changes in Congressional delegations every ten years is an effective way to reward economically successful, low-tax, business-friendly states like Texas and Florida and punish economically stagnant, high-tax, business-unfriendly states like New York and California. Let’s hope for even more changes in House seats ten years from now in 2030 as states might better learn the economic lesson that they have to compete to attract and retain businesses, residents, and workers.

Ed Comment:Why do high tax states have substantially lower fiscal stability? Thinking out loud... "Older" states have greater legacy pension liability. But you would think they have offsetting economies of scale and that talented people (i.e., people who pay more taxes than they consume in gov services) were migrating to them. Seems clear that local Dems wrecked them. Rust belt is full of high quality engineers and blue-collar workers, but unions made them to be too highly paid to be competitive, so they are losing jobs because they can't adapt. AC made sunbelt more attractive, but Calif is losing. That seems nuts. Housing costs (land use restrictions) must be a factor. But immigration should drive up housing and growth. If you factor out immigration, migration would be even worse.
Mark Perry on the new Census numbers, "...To answer the questions posed above, there are significant differences between the six states that gained House seats and seven states that lost seats when they are compared on a variety of 11 measures of economic performance, business climate, tax burdens for businesses and individuals, fiscal stability, electricity costs, and labor market dynamism. There is empirical evidence that Americans and businesses “vote with their feet” when they relocate from one state to another, and the evidence suggests that Americans are moving away from economically stagnant, fiscally unhealthy states with higher tax burdens and unfriendly business climates with higher energy costs and fewer economic and job opportunities, to fiscally sound states that are more economically vibrant, dynamic and business-friendly, with lower tax and regulatory burdens, lower energy costs and more economic and job opportunities...."

  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

Irelands free-college experiment: Lessons and warnings for US policymakers

AI Summary. Ireland's tuition-free undergraduate policy raised enrollment by 20% over a decade while funding per student fell 25%, as government budgets did not keep pace with student numbers. Faculty-to-student ratios worsened and research output declined, and the number of Irish universities in the global top 200 fell from 3 to 1.

Jason D. Delisle American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 29, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Ireland’s free college experiment has led to a decline in its universities’ international rankings, highlighting potential pitfalls for similar policies elsewhere. @JasonDDelisle.

Does free college tuition reduce university funding and educational quality?

Core argument: Ireland's tuition-free undergraduate education raised enrollment 20% over a decade while funding per student fell 25%, as government budgets failed to keep pace with growing student numbers.

Ireland's implementation of tuition-free undergraduate education has led to a decline in its universities' international rankings, highlighting potential pitfalls for similar policies elsewhere. The policy, introduced to increase access to higher education, resulted in a 20% rise in enrollment over a decade. However, funding per student decreased by 25% as government budgets failed to keep pace with growing student numbers. This financial strain has impacted the quality of education, with faculty-to-student ratios worsening and research output declining. Consequently, Irish universities have slipped in global rankings, with the number of institutions in the top 200 falling from 3 to 1 over the past decade. This case underscores the importance of balancing access with sustainable funding to maintain educational standards and international competitiveness.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ireland's tuition-free undergraduate education raised enrollment 20% over a decade while funding per student fell 25%, as government budgets failed to keep pace with growing student numbers.
  2. The number of Irish universities in the global top 200 fell from 3 to 1 over the past decade, alongside worsening faculty-to-student ratios and declining research output.
  3. Ireland's experience underscores the importance of balancing expanded access to higher education with sustainable funding to maintain educational standards and international competitiveness.

Irelands free-college experiment: Lessons and warnings for US policymakers: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Jason D. Delisle and Arthur M. Hauptman, "Ireland’s free-college experiment: Lessons and warnings for US policymakers," American Enterprise Institute, April 28, 2021, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/irelands-free-college-experiment-lessons-and-warnings-for-us-policymakers/

Ed Comment:Turns out finances aren’t the relevant constraint as so many claim. No surprise, brain power and other hidden traits (e.g., conscientiousness) are the predominant constraint.
Report from AEI looks at the experience of Ireland after they put into place tuition-free higher education during the 1990s, "...In the mid-1990s, Ireland abolished tuition for full-time undergraduates to expand access to higher education and address social inequalities. Under this “free-fees” policy, 90 percent of full-time Irish undergraduates do not pay tuition (which most Europeans typically refer to as “tuition fees”). However, students pay other fees that policymakers have increased substantially since the free-fees policy was put in place. This “student contribution” is now €3,000 ($3,600) per student, per year, although many low-income students receive grants to offset it..."
Paper finds that higher education enrollment has increased after tuition was culled, however much of this was likely due to demographics, particularly inflows of younger immigrants, "...At first glance, the Irish higher education system appears to have benefited from the free-fees policy. More students now enroll in higher education, and graduation rates have remained high since the policy was adopted. Attainment rates have also soared in recent decades. Ireland now boasts one of the highest attainment rates in the world: More than half of Irish workers hold at least a baccalaureate degree, and 70 percent hold some form of tertiary degree. The number of full-time students enrolled in Irish higher education has doubled since free tuition fees were established in the mid-1990s, from roughly 95,000 students in 1995 to more than 180,000 in 2018. The Irish population itself increased during that time by only about one-third. A closer look at trends over time suggests that there were two principal drivers of Ireland’s rapid growth in enrollment—but only one appears linked to the free-fees policy. In 1995, when free fees were introduced, Irish youth under age 20 represented 34 percent of the total population. In nearby European countries, the share was 25 percent.26Thus, Ireland had more built-in demand for higher education than most of its neighbors did. Those demographics would have driven enrollment higher even without the free-fees policy..."

They sort of buried the lead, educational spending relative to GDP dropped and during this period of time. "...Ireland’s universities have fallen considerably in rankings, such as the QS World University Rankings and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings..."Given US schools are world beaters this sort of policy risk undermining our elite research universities.

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