Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Monday, October 5, 2020

What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview

AI Summary. Megaprojects, defined as ventures costing $1bn or more, account for 8% of global GDP with annual spending estimated at $6–9tn, yet 90% run over budget, often by more than 50% in real terms. The author argues these overruns persist across public and private sectors without improvement over time or geography, alongside benefit shortfalls of up to 50%.

Bent Flyvbjerg Oxford University
Date Posted:
October 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Megaprojects account for 8% of global GDP, with 90% experiencing cost overruns, often exceeding 50% in real terms.

Why do most billion-dollar projects run over budget and under-deliver?

Core argument: Megaprojects, defined as ventures costing $1bn or more, account for 8% of global GDP, with annual spending estimated at $6–9tn.

Megaprojects, defined as large-scale ventures costing $1bn or more, account for 8% of global GDP, with annual spending estimated at $6-9tn. Despite their economic significance, 90% of these projects experience cost overruns, often exceeding 50% in real terms. Notable examples include the Channel Tunnel with an 80% overrun and the Sydney Opera House at 1,400%. These overruns persist across both public and private sectors and show no improvement over time or geography. The "iron law of megaprojects" highlights this persistent issue, suggesting systemic inefficiencies in project management. Additionally, benefit shortfalls of up to 50% are common, further questioning the viability of such investments. The scale and frequency of megaprojects are driven by political, technological, economic, and aesthetic factors, yet the traditional management approaches face increasing scrutiny and calls for reform.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Megaprojects, defined as ventures costing $1bn or more, account for 8% of global GDP, with annual spending estimated at $6–9tn.
  2. Some 90% of megaprojects experience cost overruns that often exceed 50% in real terms, with the Channel Tunnel at 80% and the Sydney Opera House at 1,400%.
  3. Cost overruns persist across public and private sectors with no improvement over time or geography — the "iron law of megaprojects" — and benefit shortfalls of up to 50% are common.

The Oxford study on major infrastructure projects you asked about, in the study they define “Megaprojects” beyond what we classically think of infrastructure, “…Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people…Examples of megaprojects are high-speed rail lines, airports, seaports, motorways, hospitals, national health or pension ICT systems, national broadband, the Olympics, large-scale signature architecture, dams, wind farms, offshore oil and gas extraction, aluminum smelters, the development of new aircrafts, the largest container and cruise ships, high-energy particle accelerators, and the logistics systems used to run large supply-chain-based companies like Amazon and Maersk. Below we will see just how big megaprojects and the megaprojects business are. We will also understand what drives scale…”

Bent Flyvbjerg, “What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview,” Oxford University, 2014, https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1409/1409.0003.pdf

Table of selected projects

The overall conclusions, “First, it answers the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units mega, giga, and tera, concluding we are presently entering a new "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8 percent of total global GDP, which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four "sublimes" - political, technological, economic, and aesthetic - are identified to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again.Moreover, the "break-fix model" of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the Hiding Hand is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging…”

Sadly he does not offer an overall ROI for such projects however he does offer an “Iron Law” that applies to both public and private “Megaprojects”“…The Iron Law of Megaprojects Performance data for megaprojects speak their own language. Nine out of ten such projects have cost overruns. Overruns of up to 50 percent in real terms are common, over 50 percent not uncommon. Cost overrun for the Channel tunnel, the longest underwater rail tunnel in Europe, connecting the UK and France, was 80 percent in real terms. For Denver International Airport, 200 percent. Boston's Big Dig, 220 percent. The UK National Health Service IT system, 400-700 percent. The Sydney Opera House, 1,400 percent (see more examples in Table 2). Overrun is a problem in private as well as public sector projects, and things are not improving; overruns have stayed high and constant for the 70-year period for which comparable data exist. Geography also does not seem to matter; all countries and continents for which data are available suffer from overrun. Similarly, benefit shortfalls of up to 50 percent are also common, and above 50 percent not uncommon, again with no signs of improvements over time and geography..”

That definition captures 8% of global GDP“….The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) estimates global infrastructure spending at USD 3.4 trillion per year 2013-2030, or approximately four percent of total global gross domestic product…Measured by value, the size of infrastructure projects has grown by 1.5 to 2.5 percent annually in real terms over the past century, which is equivalent to a doubling in project size two to three times per century…If we include the many other fields where megaprojects are a main delivery model - oil and gas, mining, aerospace, defense, ICT, supply chains, mega events, etc. -then a conservative estimate for the global megaproject market is USD 6-9 trillion per year, or approximately eight percent of total global gross domestic product….”

  • Infrastructure
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending

You're Hired" Mulligan Review

AI Summary. The analysis argues that expanding Medicare Part D, the US prescription drug benefit for seniors, increased access to prescription drugs and thereby contributed to the opioid epidemic, with opioid-related deaths rising 345% over the period studied. The economic burden of the crisis is estimated to exceed $500bn annually, weighing on output and labor force participation.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:
October 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Medicare Part D expansion inadvertently fueled opioid epidemic by increasing access to prescription drugs, leading to a 345% rise in opioid-related deaths from 1999 to 2016.

Medicare Part D expansion inadvertently fueled opioid epidemic by increasing access to prescription drugs, leading to a 345%...

Did expanding prescription drug coverage for seniors contribute to the opioid epidemic?

Core argument: Opioid-related deaths rose 345% from 1999 to 2016, a surge Casey Mulligan associates with the Medicare Part D expansion's increase in access to prescription drugs and resulting rise in opioid prescriptions.

Casey Mulligan's analysis highlights how the expansion of Medicare Part D inadvertently contributed to the opioid epidemic by increasing access to prescription drugs, which led to a rise in opioid prescriptions. The economic implications are significant, as the increased availability of opioids through Medicare Part D correlated with a surge in opioid-related deaths, which rose by 345% from 1999 to 2016. This expansion, while intended to improve healthcare access, inadvertently fueled a public health crisis, demonstrating the complex interplay between healthcare policy and economic outcomes. The data underscores the need for policymakers to consider unintended consequences when designing healthcare programs, as the economic burden of the opioid crisis has been estimated to exceed $500bn annually, impacting GDP and labor force participation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Opioid-related deaths rose 345% from 1999 to 2016, a surge Casey Mulligan associates with the Medicare Part D expansion's increase in access to prescription drugs and resulting rise in opioid prescriptions.
  2. Casey Mulligan argues the Medicare Part D expansion, intended to improve healthcare access, inadvertently fueled the opioid epidemic, illustrating the unintended consequences policymakers should weigh when designing healthcare programs.
  3. The economic burden of the opioid crisis has been estimated to exceed $500bn annually, with effects on GDP and labor force participation.

John Cochrane, ""You're Hired" Mulligan Review,"The Grumpy Economist, September 26, 2020, https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/09/youre-hired-mulligan-review.html

Cochrane reviews Casey Mulligan’s book, “..the book is really not that much about Trump. It is much more about how the CEA works, how policy is formed in the Trump administration, which is much more like other administrations than you'd think, and a record of some great successes of the Trump-era CEA. (Kevin Hassett, the CEA chair, really deserves more pride of place in this story.) Trump shows up to make the big decisions, but usually on issues the CEA has spearheaded…. On Trump, I think Casey is a bit too soft….However, on documenting the enormous uphill climb this administration faces against an implacably hostile media and federal workforce, this book is very useful. To understand how strong the bubble is, how it fails, and why populism might make some sense and outlive Trump, read on….”

Ed Comment: The "Samaritan's curse" that aid always leads to more of the misfortune"... Medicare part D.. reduced the annual cost of a... 0.75-gram daily habit from $39,420 to $2,677.Early Oxytocin's dealers... were seniors... 'it's like hitting the Lotto if your doctor will put you on OyxContin... people didn't even twice about selling.'...for a three-dollar Medicaid co-pay.. an addict got pills priced at a thousand dollars...In February 2018, CEA informed Federal agencies about the role of opioid prices. At least two agencies refused to allow the findings to be released to the public or be shared with President Trump. Secretary Azar refuses to even to consider that introduction of Medicare Part D might have helped fuel the opioid epidemic."

  • Op-Ed/Blog Post

The Macroeconomic Consequences Of Infrastructure Investment

AI Summary. Infrastructure investment is not effective as short-term stimulus because time-to-build delays and the crowding out of private spending make short-run multipliers for government investment lower than for government consumption. Infrastructure spending often produces no change or a decline in employment in the initial years, even when interest rates are near zero.

Valerie Ramey National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
October 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

US infrastructure investment is not effective as short-term stimulus due to time delays & crowding out of private spending. Short-run multipliers are lower than for consumption, & long-run impact is limited by current public capital levels.

Is infrastructure investment an effective short-term economic stimulus?

Core argument: Short-run stimulus multipliers for U.S. government investment are lower than those for government consumption, primarily because of time-to-build delays and a greater tendency to crowd out private spending.

Infrastructure investment in the U.S. is not effective as a short-term stimulus due to inherent time delays and the crowding out of private spending. Short-run stimulus multipliers for government investment are lower than those for government consumption, primarily because of time-to-build delays and a higher propensity to crowd out private spending. Quantitative models and empirical studies across OECD countries and U.S. states support these findings. While long-run multipliers depend on the production function elasticity of output to public capital, current levels of public capital relative to GDP are comparable to past high points, suggesting limited immediate impact. Additionally, infrastructure spending often leads to no change or a decline in employment in the initial years, even during periods when interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Short-run stimulus multipliers for U.S. government investment are lower than those for government consumption, primarily because of time-to-build delays and a greater tendency to crowd out private spending.
  2. Infrastructure spending is associated with no change or a decline in employment in the initial years, even when interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound.
  3. Long-run infrastructure multipliers depend on the production function elasticity of output to public capital, and U.S. public capital relative to GDP is comparable to past high points, suggesting limited immediate impact.

Though this might be of interest, new NBER from Valerie Ramey looks at the macro effects of government infrastructure investment and finds that it has limited short run effects versus other forms of government consumption due to time lag and crowding out, this is true even when some infrastructure investment has significant positive long runs effects,

On the short term stimulative effect“…First, even when government investment has significant long-run effects, the short run stimulus multipliers are less than those from government consumption in most situations. The two key reasons are (i) the effects of time-to-build delays and (ii) the propensity of government investment to crowd out private spending more than government consumption does.These results are supported by quantitative models, empirical panel studies across OECD countries, time series analysis in the U.S., and cross-state studies. The effects of time-to-spend and time-to-build delays, which appear to be inherent in infrastructure projects, work against the standard New Keynesian mechanisms and lower short-run multipliers. Second, the long-run multipliers on government investment depend critically on both the production function elasticity of output to public capital and on where the economy begins relative to the socially optimal level of public capital. Higher production function elasticity raises multipliers and starting far below the socially optimal level of public capital also raises multipliers….”

Valerie Ramey, “The Macroeconomic Consequences Of Infrastructure Investment,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, July 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27625

Her figure 8 suggest current levels of public capital in terms of GDP are comparable to previous periods of higher investment, “…shows government capital as a percent of GDP from 1929 to 2018. The data are current-cost net stock data on government capital and nominal GDP from the BEA. The figure shows long-run trends for all government capital, nondefense government capital, and transportation capital relative to GDP. All show significant swings over time. The total government capital ratio hit peaks in the 1940s and the mid-1970s. Both the nondefense and transportation government capital ratios hit peaks in the 1930s, the mid-1970s, and in the early 2010s. The ratios have fallen only slight since the early 2010s. Thus, current levels of public capital are comparable to those of some of the past high points….”

Taking a longer view, “…Second, my review and small extension of the empirical literature on the long-run estimates suggests that theaggregate production function elasticity of output to public capital is probably between 0.065 and 0.12,…However, this elasticity is very stylized and does not take into account possible differences in the marginal products of different types of government capital. Some studies find higher estimates for core infrastructure, while others do not. Third, there is both theoretical support and some empirical support for the short-run multiplier on government investment being higher when interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB). The theoretical mechanisms that lead to this effect, however, also imply that at the zero lower financing government spending with distortionary income taxation rather than deficits leads to higher multipliers, a result contrary to most economists’ priors. Fourth, cross-section and panel evidence on U.S. states or counties that focuses on bridge, highway, and road infrastructure spending suggests that the spending leads to either no change or a decline in employment in the first several years, even during ZLB periods. There is no obvious explanation for these puzzling results, though the disruptive effects of construction on existing infrastructure might play a role. In sum, the macroeconomic approach to government investment provides strong support for the long-run benefits of infrastructure spending. However, the same approach raises questions about the suitability of investment in infrastructure and other public capital as a short-run stimulus….”

  • Multiplier/Rational Expectations
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
    • Infrastructure

Tuesday, October 6, 2020

Combating Inequality: Rethinking Policies to Reduce Inequality in Advanced Economies, Session Six, The redistribution of financial capital

AI Summary. Panelists argue that wealth inequality reflects monopoly rents, question the accuracy of wealth inequality data, and contend that a wealth tax would not meaningfully reduce the political influence of the wealthy because the costs of political engagement are low. They also note the difficulty of taxing illiquid assets and defining capital gains.

Greg Mankiw Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
October 6, 2020
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Wealth taxation complexity & limited impact on political power highlighted in discussion on reducing inequality in advanced economies.

Wealth taxation complexity & limited impact on political power highlighted in discussion on reducing inequality in...

Would a wealth tax reduce the political influence of the wealthy?

Core argument: Emmanuel Saez argues that wealth inequality in advanced economies is driven by monopoly rents, citing Amazon as an example.

The discussion on reducing inequality in advanced economies highlights the complexity of wealth taxation and its limited impact on political power. Saez argues that wealth inequality is driven by monopoly rents, using Amazon as an example. Summers critiques the accuracy of data on wealth inequality and suggests that a wealth tax would not diminish the political influence of the wealthy, as political engagement costs are relatively low. Mankiw contrasts two hypothetical CEOs to illustrate differing impacts on capital stock and externalities, suggesting that tax policy should consider these differences. The debate underscores challenges in taxing illiquid assets and the conceptual difficulties in defining capital gains. Summers also notes that a more generous social safety net could reduce the need for lower-income individuals to accumulate wealth, complicating measures of wealth inequality.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Emmanuel Saez argues that wealth inequality in advanced economies is driven by monopoly rents, citing Amazon as an example.
  2. Lawrence Summers questions the accuracy of wealth inequality data and argues a wealth tax would not diminish the political influence of the wealthy because the costs of political engagement are relatively low.
  3. Gregory Mankiw contrasts two hypothetical CEOs with differing effects on the capital stock and externalities, suggesting tax policy should account for those differences, while the discussion notes challenges in taxing illiquid assets and defining capital gains.

There isn't a transcript available for the panel discussion so I transcribed the parts I think you would be most interested in. Summer’s by far was the most interesting.

Saez opened using Amazon and Jeff Bezos as an example that wealth inequality is driven by monopoly rents

Saez starting around ~6:25 "... if you want you know what makes Amazon as a company you know Amazon isn't you know founded by Jeff Bezos the richest man in the world so valuableit's not so much the computers they have but it's the belief that they will be able to extract you know monopoly rents for decades to go because they are in such a dominant position.."
Larry Summers starting around ~20:45 goes after Saez and makes the point that a wealth tax wouldn't decrease the political power of the rich as it isn't very expensive to play in politics in the United States:

"…. I have made a very close study of the Twitter Wars of the last week surrounding the work of Saez and Zucman and I have to say I find myself about 98 and a half percent persuaded by their critics that the data are substantially inaccurate and substantially misleadingto take just one example the wealthiest Americans filed their tax returns within the last week for 2018 and so data on their taxes for 2018 is at best problematic. I did an experiment I used their algorithm on my tax return to figure out my wealth and it was not within a country mile of reality either in total or on a category by category basis I do not think a focus on wealth inequality as a basis for being concerned about a more just society is terribly well designed for three reasonsfirst the arguments around political power have almost no validity the truth is you can become one of the most powerful money people around the Democratic or the Republican Party for four or five million dollars a year. nothing in this world is going to stop the wealthiest people in America from being able to come up with a vast multiple of four or five millions dollars a year…”

Catherine Rampell, Greg Mankiw, Lawrence Summers and Emmanuel Saez, "Combating Inequality: Rethinking Policies to Reduce Inequality in Advanced Economies, Session Six, The (re)distribution of financial capital," Peterson Institute For International Economics, October 17, 2019, https://www.piie.com/events/combating-inequality-rethinking-policies-reduce-inequality-advanced-economies

“…to keep in mind that rich people differ from one another so let's consider two hypothetical CEOs of major corporations each of them earn a lot of money ten or twenty million dollars a year say putting them safely in the top 1/100 of 1% of the income distribution but other than their incomes which are the same these two executives are very different the first executive I'll call Sam Spendthrift he uses all his money living the highlife drinks expensive wine dries Ferraris flies his private jet to lavish vacations he gives large amounts to political parties and candidates hoping these contributions will get him an ambassadorship someday when that doesn't work he spends large sums financing his own quixotic running for the Presidency I don't have any pay particular in mind could the other executive I'll call Frank Frugal he makes just as much money as Sam but he takes a very different approach to his good fortune he lives modestly saves most of his earnings and accumulating a sizeable nest egg he forego the opportunity to influence the political process he's not really very political and today he invests his money in successful startups which he happens to be quite good at identifying he plans to leave some of his wealth to his children grandchildren nephews and nieces most of his wealth however he plans to bequeath to his to the endowment his alma mater maybe Harvard where we'll support financial aid for generations to come ok now ask yourself who should pay higher taxes Sam Spendthrift or Frank Frugalnow I can see the case for taxingthem the same after all they have the same earnings one might say to how they choose to spend their is not an issue for the government to judge or influence personally however I'm more inclined to think that Mr. Frugal should be taxed less than Mr. Spendthrift and the arguments really pigouvian has to do with externalities Mr. Frugal behavior confers positive externalities both on members of his extended family and on the beneficiaries of his charitable bequests moreover by increasing the economy's capital stock he reduces the way the return to capital increases labor productivity and real wages economists will recognize that as a pecuniary externality but if one is concerned about the income distribution this Pecunia externality can also be viewed as desirable and when I find hard to believe is that Mr. Frugal should face higher taxes than Mr. Spendthrift…”

Mankiw made his Sam Spendthrift versus Frank Frugal point (~37:30)

“…- I'm supportive of the idea that people should work on and develop and think about ways of doing capital gains taxation on accrual there are two primary reasons one practical and the other conceptual why I think it's kind of unlikely ever to be the ultimate answerthe practical one is that there are a ton of assets that are effectively indivisible and that you don't really have a way of paying the accrual taxation I've got my family hardware store retail things have gone up even if you can even if you can figure out what my family hardware store is worth in some good way and you can figure out what it was worth this year and you can figure out what it was worth next year and then you can tax beyond the difference like I don't want somebody else to own 2% of my family hardware store it I don't want after 10 years a bunch of other people who own 20% of my family hardware store and if other people own family 10 to 20 percent of my family hardware store I just arrange to pay myself more salary so they didn't get any money and they wouldn't really own itso I think there are ahuge set of issues around illiquid assetsI have enough trouble when I file my tax returns figuring out what my basis is on stuff that I bought or somebody bought or something thirteen years ago and that I'm sellingthat if you told me that when I filed my tax return I had to figure out the whole path of the value of the things I think would be a nightmare of complexityso I just think there's a feasibility problem that makes it hardsecond problem is conceptual which is what we count as capital gain and what do we not count as a capital gain if I owned a company and the company used to think was gonna pay me a hundred thousand dollars a year for the next ten years and then now we think the company is gonna pay me a hundred and twenty thousand dollars a year for the next ten years we say that in addition to the fact that I'll pay tax on 120 thousand dollars each year we say that I have a capital gain of 20% suppose I will teach at Harvard and I'm gonna teach it Harvard for ten more years and they declare that there's a 20 percent raise at Harvard and so my salary is going to go up by 20 percent and I'm for sure gonna teach at Harvard for 10 more years andthat income is there and it's something that's part of the present value of everything that I think about that's kind of a capital gain too if you think about my wealth if you think about my capacity to consume and so how we decide which future flows we're gonna present value in congeal and call wealth and then tax on the Delta and which we're not is I think a difficult problemand I I just predict that the world won't get there and if we still had eight percent interest rates I would think it was a huge priority to figure out the answer to this problem but since now we have relatively low interest rates the fact that people are getting some deferral by selling their capital gains later doesn't seem like such a big problem and the last thing I'll say is that whatever accrual scheme you make up I promise the tax lawyers who advise the investment community will find a set of ways of doing a ton of accruing losses and offsetting other income and I wouldn't quickly assume that it's going to be a big success in achieving your objectives of greater progressivity but in principle I don't have any problem with what you're saying all right on…”

Summers talks about how hard it would be to tax capital gains annually as opposed to when realized (~1:16)

"...is that wealth inequality reflects many things that happen in a society suppose we successfully in the United States adopted a more generous complete and progressive Social Security system and a better and more satisfactory health insurancesystem I would assume that the lower half of the population would have much less need to accumulate and hold liquid assets because they were being properly insured and so measuring the ratio of the wealth of the wealthy to the wealth of the less wealthy may reflect something about accumulation at the top or it may reflect something about the adequacy or inadequacy of social insurance arrangements or length..."

Summer's makes another great point @ ~24:30 that as our safety net grows more generous the need for recipients to save is reduced.

“…second there is a distinction between wealth and permanent income presumably what we care about is the capacity to spend overtime wealth can go up because future income streams go up that's what Emanuel focused onor wealth can go up because the discount factor goes down it's a complicated question to know their relative importanceEmanuel suggested that wealth had gone up from about 300 percent of GDP to about 500 percent of GDPone crude measure is the Shiller price earnings ratio the Shiller price earnings ratio is 76% more than its post-war average that would explain all of the increase in wealth relative to income and those assets that are most affected by that are those disproportionately held at the disproportionately held at the top and so once one recognizes permanent income it seems to me that the point loses but the emphasis on wealth loses a fair amount of its of its force…”

He then goes on to draw out the distinction btw wealth and “permanent income”

He also makes the point that a wealth tax would not address special interest lobbying (he cites the NRA and realtors as examples, and suggests that it could also increase political spending as the rich give money to favored non-profits.

  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

Pre-Existing Condition Fiction

AI Summary. An estimated 53.8m–61m non-elderly Americans have pre-existing conditions that could previously have led insurers to decline coverage in the individual market, with prevalence rising by age from 18% among those 18-34 to 44% among those 55-64. The Affordable Care Act bars denial of coverage or higher premiums for these individuals.

Editorial Board Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
October 6, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@WSJ: Number of non-elderly individuals with previously declinable pre-existing conditions range btw 53.8mm-61mm.

How many Americans have pre-existing conditions that once blocked coverage?

Core argument: Between 53.8m and 61m non-elderly individuals have pre-existing conditions that were declinable in the individual insurance market before the Affordable Care Act.

The number of non-elderly individuals with previously declinable pre-existing conditions ranges between 53.8m and 61m. This figure highlights the significant portion of the population that would have faced challenges obtaining insurance in the individual market before the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that 27% of non-elderly adults have such conditions, translating to about 53.8m people in 2018. The prevalence of these conditions increases with age, from 18% in the 18-34 age group to 44% in the 55-64 age group. The ACA has played a crucial role in providing access to health insurance for these individuals, protecting between 23% and 51% of non-elderly Americans with pre-existing conditions from being denied coverage or facing higher premiums. This underscores the ACA's impact on improving healthcare accessibility for millions who would otherwise be uninsurable.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Between 53.8m and 61m non-elderly individuals have pre-existing conditions that were declinable in the individual insurance market before the Affordable Care Act.
  2. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that 27% of non-elderly adults had declinable pre-existing conditions in 2018, about 53.8m people, with prevalence rising from 18% among those aged 18–34 to 44% among those aged 55–64.
  3. The Affordable Care Act protects between 23% and 51% of non-elderly Americans with pre-existing conditions from being denied coverage or charged higher premiums.

Editorial Board, "Pre-Existing Condition Fiction,"Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pre-existing-condition-fiction-11601507970

Gary Claxton, Cynthia Cox, Anthony Damico, Larry Levitt and Karen Pollitz, "Pre-Existing Condition Prevalence for Individuals and Families," Kaiser Family Foundation, October 4, 2019, https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/pre-existing-condition-prevalence-for-individuals-and-families/

DHHS, “Health Insurance Coverage for Americans with Pre-Existing Conditions: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act,“ Department of Health And Human Services, January 5, 2017, https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/255396/Pre-ExistingConditions.pdf

Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox and Larry Levitt, “Data Note: Changes In Enrollment In The Individual Health Insurance Market Through Early 2019,” Kaiser Family Foundation, August 21, 2019, https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/data-note-changes-in-enrollment-in-the-individual-health-insurance-market-through-early-2019/

I haven’t found an estimate of what % of the 13.8mm persons have a pre-existing condition.

So that’s plans accessed though an exchange. Anotherstudyby the Kaiser Family Foundation found that in 2018 13.8mm individual were insured through plans purchased on the exchange (however that’s not everyone buying individuals plans, I have always purchased directly from Blue Cross/Blue Shield without going through an exchange)“…Total individual market enrollment, measured on an average monthly basis, increased from 10.6 million in 2013 to a peak of 17.4 million in 2015, before declining to13.8 million in 2018….”If you use Kiser’s 27% of non-elderly adults who had pre-existing conditions against that total enrolment 13.8mm *.27 that would imply3.726mm individuals with such a condition were accesses health care on the exchanges cheaper than they otherwise would be. Now that’s prob not a fair assumption as the exchanges tend to be younger people who don’t get health care though their employer.

"... The question is not how many Americans have a health condition,but how many Americans buying insurance in the individual insurance market have a condition that makes them difficult to insure at prices they can pay. Keep in mind that the Affordable Care Act set up a subsidized transitional plan for anyone with pre-existing conditions denied insurance in the individual market. Peak enrollment: about 115,000 in 2013.The White House in an executive order last week noted that, by the Obama Administration’s own report, a mere 2.7% of an estimated roughly 130 million people with pre-existing conditions gained access to health insurance through the Affordable Care Act.... "

Okay, so basically the WSJ editorial board argued that the number that really matters is the number of American’s who are not covered by Medicare/Medicaid nor employer provided health insurance who get covered though plans purchased on exchange.

Table from HHS:

Kaiser goes on to note, and I think this is a good answer to your questions, 53.8mm (non-elderly) have a condition that would have left them uninsurable in the individuals markets, however most of these people are getting insurance though their employer so they can avoid individual plans“…A larger share of non-elderly adult women (30%) than men (24%) have declinable pre-existing conditions in 2018, unchanged from 2015. We estimate that23.7 million men have a pre-existing condition that would have left them uninsurable in the individual market pre-ACA, compared to 30.1 million women. Pregnancy explains part (about 2 million women) but not all of this difference….”

Using HHS’s narrow definition that number goes to61mm non-elderly Americans.That HHS estimate was mirrored by the Kaiser Family Foundation, "... estimate that 27% of nonelderly adults have a declinable health condition, which is about53.8 million people in 2018…. The prevalence of declinable conditions also increases with age among non-elderly adults: ranging from 18% of those in the 18-34 age group to 44% for those in the 55-64 age group….”

You are correct Biden was using a pretty broad definition of “Pre-existing condition” including high blood pressure and behavioral issues, using HHS’s broad definition you can say 133mm. HHS“…As shown in Table 1, we find that theACA is protecting between 23 and 51 percent of nonelderly Americans--61 to 133 million people--with some type of pre-existing health condition from being denied coverage, charged significantly higher premiums, subjected to an extended waiting period, or having their health insurance benefits curtailed should they need individual market health insurance coverage….”

I think a good answer to your question, how many people (non-elderly) have a condition significant enough to have an impact on the price of insurance is somewhere btw 53.8mm-61mm.

Ed Comment:Hmm. There are 330mm Americans; 140mm under 25 yrs old (who don’t use much healthcare) and 50mm over 65, which leaves 140mm adults 25 to 65. If 60 to 130mm people have preexisting condition than a vast majority of those people would have preexisting conditions. If you define preexisting conditions so large that nearly every adult has one, then you have sort of defined it away. It’s like saying a majority of people are poor. That can’t be the definition of poor. 75% of the adults 25 to 65 have private insurance. 20% plus don’t work/are too poor to buy insurance. So something don’t smell right.

Ed Comment."Wsj had an editorial yesterday saying the number of people on public insurance with existing conditions was a couple 100 thousand, which was unbelievable low. Biden said 100mm which seems like a lie since there are only 350 mm people. That defines pre-existing so loosely that everyone has one. What matters are conditions significant enough to cause significant changes in the price of insurance. Anyway, I don't know what it means. Please find a pithy non partisan summary (or 2)….”

Steve Comment: So this is from HHS, over 40mm individual have one of the followinghigh blood pressure, behavioral health issues and high cholesterol(of course some individuals will have more then one of those conditions.) but they don’t indicate range of severity of the problem, will see if I can find a breakdown of their low estimate. “…As shown in Table 2, we also examine the prevalence of specific pre-existing conditions faced by Americans (focusing on the broader insurer definition). The table lists theeleven conditions with prevalence of 1 million or more among non-elderly individuals with no Medicare enrollment during 2014.These conditions are listed from most to least prevalent, although differences between ranks may not be statistically sign Among the most common pre-existing conditions for non-elderly Americans are high blood pressure, high cholesterol, behavioral health disorders (including, for example, alcohol and substance use disorders, depression, and Alzheimer’s), asthma, arthritis, and obesity. Millions of Americans also have diabetes (13 million), heart conditions or heart disease (16 million), or have at some point been diagnosed with cancer (11 million)….”

  • Healthcare/Seniors


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