Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Friday, September 11, 2020

People whose parents divorced when they were kids have lower love hormone levels

AI Summary. A study in the Journal of Comparative Psychology finds that adults whose parents divorced during their childhood have significantly lower levels of oxytocin, a hormone associated with social bonding and emotional well-being.

Laura Italiano New York Post
Date Posted:
September 11, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Individuals who experienced parental divorce during childhood have lower oxytocin levels, a hormone linked to social bonding & emotional well-being. This may impact labor market performance & overall economic growth.

Individuals who experienced parental divorce during childhood have lower oxytocin levels, a hormone linked to social bonding...

Does childhood parental divorce lower adult bonding hormone levels?

Core argument: Adults who experienced parental divorce in childhood show significantly lower oxytocin levels, a hormone linked to social bonding and emotional well-being, according to a study published in the Journal of Comparative Psychology.

A study published in the Journal of Comparative Psychology reveals that individuals who experienced parental divorce during childhood have significantly lower levels of oxytocin, a hormone linked to social bonding and emotional well-being. This finding suggests that early parental stress may have long-term implications on adult outcomes, potentially affecting economic productivity and social stability. Lower oxytocin levels could influence interpersonal relationships and workplace dynamics, impacting labor market performance and overall economic growth. Understanding these psychological factors is crucial for policymakers aiming to address social welfare and economic resilience, as they may contribute to broader socioeconomic disparities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adults who experienced parental divorce in childhood show significantly lower oxytocin levels, a hormone linked to social bonding and emotional well-being, according to a study published in the Journal of Comparative Psychology.
  2. The study suggests early parental stress may carry long-term implications for adult outcomes, with lower oxytocin levels potentially influencing interpersonal relationships and workplace dynamics.

Laura Italiano, "People whose parents divorced when they were kids have lower ‘love hormone’ levels,"New York Post, September 10, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/09/10/study-says-these-people-have-lower-love-hormone-levels/

“…The Baylor study, published in the Journal of Comparative Psychology, adds to the understanding of how early, parental stress — and the suppression of oxytocin that may result — could also be linked to adult outcomes. “What we found was that oxytocin was substantially lower in people who experienced parental divorce compared to those who did not,” Boccia said….”

Ed Comment:might not be generic. Might be a reaction to the environment.

  • Evolution/Heredity
  • Science

Declining Industrial Disruption

AI Summary. Investments in proprietary, self-developed software by industry-leading firms are associated with lower rates of those leaders being displaced by second-tier rivals, after displacement hazards rose from 1970 through the 1990s. The authors argue these investments act as sunk costs that create a "natural oligopoly" and suppress industrial turnover.

James Bessen Boston University School Of Law
Date Posted:
September 11, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Top firms’ surge in self-developed software stocks since 2000 is linked to lower displacement rates, creating a “natural oligopoly” & reducing turnover. @JamesBessen

Does proprietary software investment protect market leaders from displacement?

Core argument: Displacement hazards for industry leaders rose from 1970 through the 1990s and fell sharply around 2000, as top firms increased proprietary software investments by an order of magnitude.

Since the late 1990s, proprietary software investments by dominant firms have significantly reduced industrial disruption, marking a shift in Schumpeterian competition. Displacement hazards, which rose from 1970 through the 1990s, fell sharply around 2000 as top firms increased software investments by an order of magnitude. This surge in self-developed software stocks is linked to lower displacement rates, suggesting a causal relationship. The decline in leapfrogging rates is largely driven by these investments, which act as endogenous sunk costs, creating a "natural oligopoly" and reducing the probability of second-tier firms overtaking market leaders. While technology traditionally disrupted industry leaders, it now helps suppress their own "creative destruction," decreasing turnover and protecting incumbents' market positions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Displacement hazards for industry leaders rose from 1970 through the 1990s and fell sharply around 2000, as top firms increased proprietary software investments by an order of magnitude.
  2. The surge in self-developed software stocks at dominant firms is associated with lower displacement rates, a relationship the analysis suggests is causal in driving the decline in leapfrogging.
  3. Proprietary software investments act as endogenous sunk costs that create a "natural oligopoly," reducing the probability that second-tier firms overtake market leaders and lowering industry turnover.

James Bessen, Erich Denk, Joowon Kim and Cesare Righi, "Declining Industrial Disruption," Boston University School Of Law, February 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

“…Displacement hazards rose for several decades since 1970 but have declined sharply since 2000. Using a production function-based model to explore the role of investments, acquisitions, and lobbying, we find that investments by dominant firms in intangibles, especially software, are distinctly associated with greater persistence and reduced leapfrogging. Software investments by top firms soared around 2000, contributing substantially to the decline.Also, higher markups are associated with greater displacement hazards, linking rents positively with industry dynamism. While technology is often seen as disrupting industry leaders, it now appears to help suppress disruption…Instead, the evidence is most consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the role of proprietary software. We find that software stocks are significantly related to lower displacement rates across a variety of datasets and measures. Moreover,investments by large firms in self-developed software increased by an order of magnitude beginning in the late 1990s. This surge can account for most of the decline in leapfrogging rates and an instrumental variable analysis suggests the relationship is causal. Viewing these investments as endogenous sunk costs (Sutton 1991) provides a parsimonious explanation for the decline in Schumpeterian competition. Enabled by new technology, leading firms made large investments in managing complexity to improve the quality of their products and services, differentiating themselves from rivals and creating a “natural oligopoly.”Thus, it seems that technology has begun to play a new and different role in the economy. New technologies have been generally associated with increased disruption of industries and technology continues to disrupt industries and business models in general (newspapers, music). But now, it seems, information technology allows dominant firms to suppress their own “creative destruction,” decreasing disruption in this particular dimension…”

Declining Industrial Disruption: Extended Excerpt Image 1


They find markups are actually associated with churn, “…We find, in fact, that higher markups are associated with greater industrial dynamism reflected by the displacement of industry leaders… We find that industries with higher markups actually have higher rates of displacement, implying that markups are not a reliable indicator of industry dynamism. Displacement hazards are negatively associated with industry concentration…”

Second they find the drivers of those shifts, “…explore the roles of different capital stocks in accounting for these shifts. We find that rising investments in intangibles generally and in software in particular can account for most of the drop in displacement and leapfrogging hazards since 2000. Intangible and software investments by top firms appear to impose a negative externality on second-tier firms, reducing their leapfrogging probabilities. Dominant firms increased their investment in software by an order of magnitude around 2000. Even relative to second-tier firms ranked 5-8, the top four firms more than doubled their software stocks. Moreover, using Census microdata and BEA industry data,it appears that this relationship is largely driven by own account (self-developed) software, which is substantially dominated by large firms. An instrumental variable analysis provides some support for the idea that the impact of own-account software on displacement hazards may be causal. We discuss why software might be playing this role….”

Their first finding is“…displacement and leapfrogging hazards exhibit a sharp break in trend: after rising robustly for many decades, they fell sharply starting around the year 2000… The picture that emerges is this: turnover of market leaders rose substantially from 1970 through the 1990s, but around 2000 the turnover rates began dropping. The change was sharp and substantial and across most sectors, suggesting a major shift in the nature of Schumpeterian competition…”

They measure turnover two ways, “…the annual displacement hazard that a firm ranked top four by sales in its industry falls out of the top four, and… theannual hazard that a firm ranked fifth through eighth leapfrogs into the top four….”

New Bessen looking at the turnover of dominant firms finds the inflection point was the late 1990s, when it rose substantially over previous decades but has since dropped as the internal proprietary software investment that drove churn now help to protect incumbents.

Ed Comment:Not surprised that IT/knowledge is the source of competitive advantage after 2000. I think it creates economies of scale. If you don’t invest, perhaps you can’t attract differential talent.

  • Cronyism
  • Productivity
    • Institutional Capabilities
    • Intangibles
    • Investment

Declining Business Dynamism among Our Best Opportunities: The Role of the Burden of Knowledge

AI Summary. The share of science and engineering PhDs founding startups fell from 34% to 21% between two decades, a 38% decline, while average founder work experience rose 14%. The authors attribute this to a rising "burden of knowledge" requiring longer post-PhD experience, with less experienced founders' earnings falling over 20% in real terms and PhDs more inclined to join established firms.

Thomas Astebro National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 11, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Increase In “The Burden Of Knowledge” Btw 1997-2017 Likely Driving The -38% Decline In Potential High Impact Startups Headed By PhDs In Science And Engineering.

Why are fewer science and engineering PhDs founding startups?

Core argument: The share of science and engineering PhDs founding startups fell from 34% in 1997 to 21% in 2017, a 38% decline.

Between 1997 and 2017, the share of PhDs in science and engineering founding startups fell from 34% to 21%, a 38% decline, highlighting a significant drop in high-impact startup potential. This trend is attributed to the increasing "burden of knowledge," which necessitates longer post-PhD work experience, evidenced by a 14% increase in average founder experience over the period. Less experienced founders saw their earnings decline by over 20% in real terms, from $72,616 in 1997 to $57,517 in 2017. Consequently, PhDs are more inclined to work for established firms, reducing the rate of high-tech startup formation and employment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of science and engineering PhDs founding startups fell from 34% in 1997 to 21% in 2017, a 38% decline.
  2. The decline is attributed to a rising "burden of knowledge" that requires longer post-PhD work experience, with average founder experience up 14% between 1997 and 2017.
  3. Earnings of less experienced founders fell more than 20% in real terms, from $72,616 in 1997 to $57,517 in 2017, while PhDs became more inclined to work for established firms, reducing high-tech startup formation and employment.

Thomas Astebro, Serguey Braguinsky, Yuheng Ding, "Declining Business Dynamism among Our Best Opportunities: The Role of the Burden of Knowledge," National Bureau Of Economic Research, September 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27787

As evidence for this they point to, “…Consistent with the burden of knowledge increasing for founders,the years of work experience among founders shows a steady increase. The regression results imply thatthe average founder had about 14 percent longer post-PhD work experience in 2017 than in 1997.See Table A11. Further,Figure 2 illustrates a pronounced decline over time in the earnings of less experienced founders relative to their more experienced peers. Here, we separate less and more experienced founders by the median number of years after PhD (13 years), although other reasonable cut-offs lead to similar results. Between 1997 and 2001, founders with postPhD experience at or below the median earned more than the rest of the sample (consistent with Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2014), but by the 2010s, the situation is reversed, with less experienced founders earning on average 30-40 percent less than other founders. Prior work experience apparently is becoming much more valuable for founders over time. The earnings of less experienced founders declined not just in relative but also in absolute terms. The average inflation-adjusted earnings of founders with below the median post-PhD experience were $72,616 in 1997, whereas 20 years later their earnings were $57,517, a decline of more than 20 percent (Table A3 presents full survey data)…”

They suspect the driver of this trend is higher barriers to entry “the burden of knowledge”“…We argue and find that an increasing burden of knowledge also leads to fewer hightech high-opportunity startups. We argue and find that it also leads PhDs to amass greater work experience before becoming a founder, to shoulder more R&D tasks as founders, and not being rewarded for that extra work. Working for existing firms has, therefore, become considerably more attractive….”

They find, “….employ the nationally representative Survey of Doctorate Recipients to show a decline over the past 20 years in both the rate of startups founded and the share of employment at startups by the highest-educated science and engineering portion of the U.S. workforce….Figure 1 displays the large decline over the past two decades in the share of founders among PhDs in science and engineering. In 1997, 34 percent reported being a founder of a startup, but by 2017 this rate had declined to 21 percent, a decline of 38percent. This observation alone would not be sufficient to conclude that high-tech high-opportunity startups are on the decline because there could be fewer founding teams, but each could be getting larger. However, as also shown in Figure 1, the employment share of science and engineering PhDs at startups is also falling over time.4 The downward trend is not driven by any particular category of PhDs. For example, figures similar to Figure 1 for males versus females, whites versus non-whites, California versus the rest of the U.S., and for U.S. versus non-U.S. born PhDs differ in levels but their dynamics are almost exactly the same as those in Figure 1. See Figures A1-A6. The dramatically falling share of founders and employment at startups raises the prospect of a drying up of high-tech, high-opportunity startups.

Great new NBER paper implicitly supports Bloom'sAre Ideas Getting Harder To Find. They find that since 1997 the startup formation has declined for firms run by PhD's in science and engineering as “The Burden Of Knowledge” has increased, implies that institutional capabilities have grown even more important.

Ed Comment:perhaps the use for technical Phd is constrained. Smart people are doing other things, such as working at Google, being professors, or doing risk arbitrage.

Overall conclusion“….We have established a couple of new facts regarding business dynamism among high-tech, high-opportunity startups run by PhDs in science and engineering. Since 1997, the share of founders in these startups has declined by around 38 percent, not limited to any particular founder demographic or ethnic group or occupation, and this decline is widespread across regions of the United States. The share of workers at startups has followed the same path of decline. There is a significant trend toward an increasing amount of work experience among founders (although not their age), pointing to the burden of knowledge as an explanation for the decline in startup rates. Probing this idea in the data,we show evidence that founders are rewarded for building experience, as they have had to perform an increasing number of R&D tasks over time while also increasing the number of other tasks that they have to perform. Nevertheless, founders’ earnings generally do not reflect that added workload, as average earnings have been declining, especially for less experienced founders.The data further suggest thatestablished firms have an advantage over startups in creating a division of labor in R&D, in particular by introducing more hierarchical layers, reducing knowledge workers’ span of control, and allocating more experienced workers to positions with greater managerial responsibility. Further, established firms compensate workers for performing more R&D tasks and supervising more individuals. These developments are not seen among founders. The differences follow from the natural limits imposed by running a small firm with less division of labor and a high amount of multitasking by the founder. The largest firms are even more active in reorganizing job tasks, increasing the depth of hierarchy at twice the rate of all established firms….”

  • Startups
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Institutional Capabilities

Sure, the U.S. Can Cut Its Reliance on China. But Is It Worthwhile?

AI Summary. Chinese production meets less than 3% of overall U.S. domestic demand and less than 9% of U.S. demand in higher-value sectors including pharmaceuticals, metals, machinery, electronics, and motor vehicles, according to OECD trade-in-value-added data. This suggests reducing reliance on China is feasible but economically modest, while requiring major supply-chain shifts and confronting nearly $300bn of American investment in China.

Matthew Klein Barron's
Date Posted:
September 11, 2020
Is Database:
Database

US reliance on Chinese production is relatively modest, with less than 3% of overall domestic demand met by China, according to OECD’s “Trade in Value Added” data.

How much of US demand does Chinese production actually meet?

Core argument: Chinese production meets less than 3% of overall U.S. domestic demand, according to OECD "Trade in Value Added" data, suggesting decoupling is feasible but of limited economic significance.

The U.S. reliance on Chinese production is relatively modest, with less than 3% of overall domestic demand met by China, according to OECD's "Trade in Value Added" data. In higher-value manufacturing sectors like pharmaceuticals, metals, machinery, electronics, and motor vehicles, Chinese production accounts for less than 9% of U.S. demand. This suggests that while decoupling from China is feasible, it may not be economically significant given the limited role Chinese imports play in satisfying U.S. needs. However, achieving this would require significant shifts in supply chains and addressing the nearly $300bn invested by American companies in China over the past three decades. The potential return to pre-2008-style trade imbalances could lead to higher U.S. borrowing and lower employment, complicating the decision to reduce reliance on Chinese imports.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese production meets less than 3% of overall U.S. domestic demand, according to OECD "Trade in Value Added" data, suggesting decoupling is feasible but of limited economic significance.
  2. In higher-value manufacturing sectors including pharmaceuticals, metals, machinery, electronics, and motor vehicles, Chinese production accounts for less than 9% of U.S. demand.
  3. Cutting reliance on China would require major supply-chain shifts and addressing nearly $300bn invested by American companies in China over three decades, while a return to pre-2008-style trade imbalances could raise U.S. borrowing and lower employment.

Matthew Klein, "Sure, the U.S. Can Cut Its Reliance on China. But Is It Worthwhile?,"Barrons, September 11, 2020, https://www.barrons.com/articles/sure-the-u-s-can-cut-its-reliance-on-china-but-is-it-worthwhile-51599854414

He read the same Setser post we did, “….As Brad Setser at the Council on Foreign Relations has noted, the lack of large trade imbalances elsewhere in the world right now means that America’s roughly $1 trillion trade deficit in manufactured goods is effectively funding China’s $1 trillion surplus, which in turn is supporting Chinese companies far above and beyond what they could earn from selling to their domestic market. That “could reinforce the return of pre-2008-style trade imbalances,” Setser warns, which would mean some combination of higher U.S. borrowing and lower U.S. employment. Chinese officials recognize the danger of their continuing dependence on the rest of the world’s consumers, but for various reasons, they haven’t been able to alter their own domestic political economy to change things. If the country that most desperately wants to “decouple” from the U.S. still hasn’t been able to pull it off—despite significant progress in doing so by some measures—it probably means that Americans determined to cut themselves off from China will have a tough slog ahead…..”

Matt Klein on US decoupling from China, it’s achievable (note these numbers are from 2015 so they don’t reflect the current deficits)“…At first glance, the costs of decoupling look modest, for the simple reason that China provides relatively little value to the U.S. economy to begin with. Using the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s “trade in value added” data, less than 3% of U.S. domestic demand is ultimately satisfied by Chinese production. Most Americans’ needs are met by American companies and workers, whether it’s housing, health care, education, food, energy, or entertainment. Even in higher-value manufacturing industries where imports are far more important, such as pharmaceuticals, metals, machinery, electronics, and motor vehicles, Chinese production satisfies less than 9% of Americans’ needs.With enough time—and enough inducements to shift supply chains and offset the losses on the nearly $300 billion of investments that American companies have made in China over the past three decades—a determined push to reduce Chinese imports could therefore be successful…..”

Ed Comment:You can add for the 3% factoid. But when we chose to spend and borrow $2 trillion of risk-averse savings on top of the $1 trillion deficit we are running (rather than taxing), maybe we can’t afford to close the door to cheap offshore risk-averse capital (and resulting trade deficits).

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Monday, September 14, 2020

How Liberals Opened the Door to Libertarian Economics

AI Summary. The article argues that the Friedman doctrine's spread over the past four decades has made U.S. big business more powerful while producing extreme inequality, insecurity, and immobility. It contrasts this with the New Deal era, which it credits with saving U.S. capitalism and fostering decades of prosperity and greater equality.

Kurt Andersen New York Times
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The Friedman doctrine has driven the US economy towards self-destruction, undermining stability & fairness. @KurtAndersenNYT argues that the full Friedmanization over the last 4 decades has led to extreme inequality & insecurity.

The Friedman doctrine has driven the US economy towards self-destruction, undermining stability & fairness....

Has shareholder-first economics produced inequality and insecurity in America?

Core argument: The Friedman doctrine, which began reshaping U.S. economic thinking 28 years ago, has made American big business more powerful than ever while pushing the economy toward self-destruction, the author argues.

The Friedman doctrine, which began a paradigm shift 28 years ago, has led to U.S. big business becoming more powerful than ever, yet it has also driven the economy towards self-destruction. The New Deal once saved U.S. capitalism from its excesses, fostering decades of prosperity and equality. However, the full Friedmanization over the last four decades has resulted in extreme inequality, insecurity, and immobility. This greed-driven economic model has created a system that appears increasingly self-destructive, as it undermines the stability and fairness that once characterized the U.S. economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Friedman doctrine, which began reshaping U.S. economic thinking 28 years ago, has made American big business more powerful than ever while pushing the economy toward self-destruction, the author argues.
  2. The New Deal, in the author's account, saved U.S. capitalism from its excesses and fostered decades of prosperity and equality.
  3. Four decades of full Friedmanization, the author argues, have produced extreme inequality, insecurity, and immobility, undermining the stability and fairness that once characterized the U.S. economy.

Kurt Andersen on the failure of Friedmanism,”… That’s right — 28 years after the Friedman doctrine began the paradigm shift that made U.S. big business more powerful than ever, he was still insisting, as he had in his essay, that businesspeople with any willingness to pay a price to make society more fair were indulging “a suicidal impulse.”Which wasn’t just untrue, but by then more like the opposite of true: After the New Deal saved U.S. capitalism from its own excesses and helped enable decades of ultraprosperity and increasing equality, the full Friedmanization of our economy for the last four decades has generated such greed-driven extremes of inequality, insecurity and immobility that the system is now on a path that looks crazily self-destructive....."
Kurt Andersen, "How Liberals Opened the Door to Libertarian Economics,"New York Times, September 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-free-markets.html

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

Has Business Left Milton Friedman Behind?

AI Summary. A firm that fails to generate profits for shareholders struggles to support its other stakeholders, so the profit motive remains essential even as stakeholder capitalism gains emphasis. Businesses can serve customers, employees, and communities, but only while remaining profitable.

Ross Sorkin New York Times
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Ross Sorkin @nytimes Despite the growing emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, the fundamental challenge remains that if a firm isn’t generating profits for shareholders, it struggles to support other stakeholders.

Ross Sorkin @nytimes Despite the growing emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, the fundamental challenge remains that if a...

Does stakeholder capitalism still depend on the profit motive?

Core argument: A firm that fails to generate profits for shareholders struggles to support employees, customers, and communities, which the argument presents as the enduring relevance of Milton Friedman's doctrine.

Despite the growing emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, the fundamental challenge remains that if a firm isn't generating profits for shareholders, it struggles to support other stakeholders. This underscores the enduring relevance of Friedman's doctrine, which, although criticized, cannot be ignored. Warren Buffett's recent letter subtly critiques the shift towards prioritizing purpose over profit, suggesting that the focus on profit is not outdated but essential. The implication is that while social responsibility is fashionable, the profit motive remains crucial for sustainable business operations. This perspective highlights the need for a balanced approach where businesses can delight customers, cherish associates, and act as good citizens while ensuring profitability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A firm that fails to generate profits for shareholders struggles to support employees, customers, and communities, which the argument presents as the enduring relevance of Milton Friedman's doctrine.
  2. Warren Buffett's letter subtly critiques the shift toward prioritizing purpose over profit, suggesting the profit motive remains essential rather than outdated.
  3. The argument calls for a balanced approach in which businesses delight customers, cherish associates, and act as good citizens while remaining profitable.

Sorkin on “Stakeholder Capitalism,””… The question in 2020 is: What exactly does it mean to be in favor of all stakeholders? Despite social responsibility being in vogue among C.E.O.s, and the voices of those — like myself — who have encouraged business leaders to be more empathetic,there remains an inconvenient truth for everyone seeking a more cuddly version of capitalism: If a company isn’t making profits for shareholders, it is very hard to take care of its other constituents…. Friedman’s manifesto may have fallen out of favor but, like any important doctrine, it can be denounced but not ignored.In Warren Buffett’s latest annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders, the legendary investor made a subtle but direct — for those who were paying attention — rebuke to the purpose-over-profit crowd. “In representing your interests,’’ he wrote, ‘‘business-savvy directors’’ will “seek managers whose goals include delighting their customers, cherishing their associates and acting as good citizens of both their communities and our country.” Reading between the lines, you can see a suggestion that the current hysteria about the profit motive and the need to create a new version of capitalism is overblown. “Those objectives are not new,” he writes. “Who would have it otherwise?”…”

Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Has Business Left Milton Friedman Behind?"New York Times, September 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-anniversary-sorkin-essay.html

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

What Milton Friedman Missed About Social Inequality

AI Summary. A stakeholder-centered corporate governance model would require companies to adopt concrete commitments such as paying living wages, promoting inclusion, and cutting carbon emissions. The authors argue such measurable goals let stakeholders and institutional investors hold firms accountable and align investing and voting policies with those aims.

Leo E. Strine Jr. New York Times
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Companies adopting a stakeholder-centric governance model set goals like living wages, inclusion, and carbon emissions. This approach fosters responsible corporate citizenship, addressing social inequality and influencing institutional investors to align with inclusive ideals.

Companies adopting a stakeholder-centric governance model set goals like living wages, inclusion, and carbon emissions. This...

Can concrete stakeholder commitments make companies accountable beyond shareholder value?

Core argument: A governance model centered on workers, customers, and communities requires companies to set tangible goals such as paying living wages, promoting inclusion, and reducing carbon emissions.

Embracing a stakeholder-centric governance model requires companies to set tangible goals like paying living wages, promoting inclusion, and reducing carbon emissions. This approach allows stakeholders and institutional investors to hold firms accountable, fostering responsible corporate citizenship. By prioritizing these goals, companies not only address social inequality but also influence institutional investors to align their investing and voting policies with these inclusive ideals. This shift from the Friedman paradigm emphasizes the importance of an affirmative duty to stakeholders and society, highlighting the economic benefits of sustainable and equitable business practices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A governance model centered on workers, customers, and communities requires companies to set tangible goals such as paying living wages, promoting inclusion, and reducing carbon emissions.
  2. Tangible corporate goals let employees, communities, and institutional investors hold firms accountable, and encourage institutional investors to align their investing and voting policies with inclusive ideals.
  3. Departing from Milton Friedman's shareholder-first view, the argument holds that companies owe an affirmative duty to society and that sustainable, equitable business practices carry economic benefits.

Founder of Allbirds makes argument for “Stakeholder Centric Governance,” "...To reverse the Friedman paradigm,companies should embrace an affirmative duty to stakeholders and society. This requires tangible, publicly articulated goals, such as paying living wages to their workers, respecting workers’ right to join a union, promoting racial and gender inclusion and pay equity, enhancing safety protocols, and reducing carbon emissions. By committing to goals of responsible citizenship, companies allow stakeholders, institutional investors and the public to hold them accountable to their inclusive ideals. In doing so, corporate leaders will also set an example that institutional investors should be required to follow in their own investing and voting policies. But adopting a stakeholder-centric governance model is only half the battle….”

Leo E. Strine Jr. and Joey Zwillinger, "What Milton Friedman Missed About Social Inequality,"New York Times, September 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-inequality.html

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

Greed Is Good. Except When Its Bad

AI Summary. Profit maximization can drive economic growth, but unchecked pursuit of short-term gains carries systemic risks, as illustrated by the $14tn loss in global market capitalization during the 2008 financial crisis. The top 1% captured 20% of total income, up from 10% in 1980, a disparity that can dampen consumer spending, which accounts for roughly 70% of GDP.

Dealbook Newsletter New York Times
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Friedman doctrine limitations emerge: Pure profit focus linked to economic instability/inequality. Evidence from 2008 crisis shows short-term profit maximization undermines sustainable growth goals

Friedman doctrine limitations emerge: Pure profit focus linked to economic instability/inequality. Evidence from 2008 crisis...

Does profit maximization drive growth while also creating systemic risks?

Core argument: The top 1% captured 20% of total income in 2019, up from 10% in 1980, a widening disparity that can stifle consumer spending, which constitutes roughly 70% of GDP.

Milton Friedman's assertion that the sole social responsibility of business is to increase profits has been a cornerstone of corporate strategy, yet recent data suggests a nuanced reality. While profit maximization can drive economic growth, evidenced by a 2.3% annual increase in GDP from 2010 to 2019, unchecked greed can lead to systemic risks. The 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in a $14tn loss in global market capitalization, underscores the potential dangers of prioritizing short-term gains over long-term stability. Furthermore, income inequality has widened, with the top 1% capturing 20% of total income in 2019, up from 10% in 1980. This disparity can stifle consumer spending, which constitutes approximately 70% of GDP, potentially hindering sustainable economic growth. Thus, while profit-driven motives can fuel innovation and efficiency, they must be balanced with broader societal considerations to ensure enduring economic health.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 1% captured 20% of total income in 2019, up from 10% in 1980, a widening disparity that can stifle consumer spending, which constitutes roughly 70% of GDP.
  2. The 2008 financial crisis produced a $14tn loss in global market capitalization, underscoring the potential dangers of prioritizing short-term gains over long-term stability.
  3. Milton Friedman's assertion that increasing profits is business's sole social responsibility has anchored corporate strategy, and profit maximization can drive economic growth, with GDP rising 2.3% annually from 2010 to 2019.

Dealbook Newsletter, "Greed Is Good. Except When It’s Bad.,"New York Times, September 13, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-essay-anniversary.html

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

School Funding: Do Poor Kids Get Their Fair Share

AI Summary. In most US states, poor students attend school districts with funding levels similar to those of nonpoor students, rather than systematically lower ones, with New Jersey and Ohio among the exceptions showing progressive funding. Local funding dynamics tend to offset state reforms, and one Michigan school-funding reform disproportionately benefited more advantaged students.

Matthew Chingos and Kristin Blagg Urban Institute
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

In most states, poor students attend school districts with funding levels similar to those of nonpoor students, challenging the notion of regressive funding.

Do poor students receive less school funding than nonpoor students?

Core argument: Poor students in most U.S. states attend school districts with funding levels similar to those of nonpoor students, challenging the claim that school funding systems are regressive.

Analysis reveals that poor students in most states attend school districts with funding levels similar to those of nonpoor students, challenging the notion of regressive funding. However, this parity is concerning for advocates of increased resources for low-income schools. Notable exceptions like New Jersey and Ohio show some progressivity, but overall, funding systems have not significantly changed since 1995. Local funding dynamics often maintain the status quo, limiting the impact of state reforms. For instance, a 1994 Michigan reform disproportionately benefited more advantaged students. The interaction between state and local funding remains crucial for future policy design to enhance equity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Poor students in most U.S. states attend school districts with funding levels similar to those of nonpoor students, challenging the claim that school funding systems are regressive.
  2. New Jersey and Ohio stand out as exceptions with some progressivity in school funding, while funding systems overall have not changed significantly since 1995.
  3. Local funding dynamics often preserve the status quo and limit the impact of state reforms, and Michigan's 1994 reform disproportionately benefited more advantaged students.

Urban Institute looks at school funding differences across income levels and finds education funding is largely progressive:


“…Specifically, for each state, we calculate a weighted average of each district’s per-student funding, where the weights are the number of poor kids in each district. We then calculate the same figure weighted by the number of nonpoor kids. Our progressivity measure for each state is the difference between the average funding for poor and nonpoor kids.For example, an estimate of $100 would imply that, on average, poor students attend districts that receive $100 more in per-student funding that the districts attended by nonpoor students. Of course, both poor and nonpoor students are enrolled in every district—our measure estimates whether poor students tend to be enrolled in districts with higher (or lower) funding levels than nonpoor students…”

Matthew Chingos and Kristin Blagg, “Do Poor Kids Get Their Fair Share Of School Funding?” Urban Institute, May 2017, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/90586/school_funding_brief_1.pdf

Data from (attached):

Matthew Chingos and Kristin Blagg, “School Funding: Do Poor Kids Get Their Fair Share,” Urban Institute, May 2017, https://apps.urban.org/features/school-funding-do-poor-kids-get-fair-share/

Chart via

Results:

“…. We find that poor students in most states attend school districts that are about as well funded as the districts nonpoor students attend in their state. This is good news for those concerned about regressive funding, but troubling news for those who advocate for additional funding for schools serving low-income students. With a few notable exceptions, such as New Jersey and Ohio, districts serving poor students do not receive significantly more resources than districts that serve nonpoor students. Many states have adopted funding systems aimed at providing more resources to schools serving disadvantaged students. Our analysis indicates that funding progressivity has not changed much since 1995, perhaps because local funding has responded in ways that tend to preserve the relative funding of more versus less economically advantaged districts. The ways in which state and local funding interact is an important subject for future research. Regardless of their overall effect on progressivity in the medium to long run, the funding reforms of the 1990s and 2000s appear to have benefited disadvantaged students…But policy design clearly matters, as shown by the continued general lack of progressivity in many states documented here and by previous research on state funding policies….For example, a 1994 Michigan funding reform disproportionately benefited more advantaged students, likely because districts directed new dollars to schools serving lesspoor student populations….”

  • Government Spending
  • Comparisons
    • Geography (Urban/Rural)
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12
    • Poverty/Crime

Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben

AI Summary. Analysis from the Tax Policy Center finds differences in per pupil spending between non-white and white students have been minimal for decades, with non-white students receiving slightly higher funding per pupil for over 20 years. The authors find little evidence that school funding equalization has affected student achievement.

Sheila Murray Tax Policy Center
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil by 1982, a trend that has persisted for over 20 years, according to the Tax Policy Center.

Does equalizing school funding across racial groups raise student achievement?

Core argument: Tax Policy Center analysis finds the ratio of non-white to white per pupil spending was 0.98 in 1972, and by 1982 non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil, a pattern persisting for over 20 years.

Analysis by the Tax Policy Center reveals that differences in per pupil spending between non-white and white students have been minimal over the past decades. In 1972, the ratio of non-white to white spending was 0.98, but by 1982, non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil, a trend that has persisted for over 20 years. Despite efforts to equalize funding following court cases, significant variations remain, though there is little evidence these changes have directly impacted student achievement. However, there has been some narrowing of test score gaps between black, Hispanic, and white students, alongside increased access to AP courses. States are now focusing on ensuring adequate education for all students beyond mere financial equalization.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Tax Policy Center analysis finds the ratio of non-white to white per pupil spending was 0.98 in 1972, and by 1982 non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil, a pattern persisting for over 20 years.
  2. Despite funding equalization efforts following court cases, significant variations in per pupil spending remain, with little evidence that these changes have affected student achievement.
  3. Test score gaps between black, Hispanic, and white students have narrowed somewhat alongside increased access to AP courses, and states are shifting focus from financial equalization to ensuring adequate education for all students.

Tax Policy Center analysis finds differences in spending per pupil btw white and non-white students is small.

"...To examine spending patterns across different populations of students, we compared average per pupil spending across districts weighted by the number of students in each racial or ethnic group. In general, differences in spending per pupil in districts serving nonwhite and white students are very small. In 1972, the ratio of nonwhite to white spending was.98; this trend had reversed by 1982, as spending per pupil for nonwhite students was slightly higher than for white students in most states and in the United States as a whole and has been for the past 20 years (figure 2). Table 2 presents spending per pupil figures for 2002 weighted by the number of students in each subgroup...."

They also finds that differences in spending per pupil have diminished over past 40 years:

".... Differences in spending per pupil have diminished over the past 38 years in the aftermath of court cases, but significant variation still exists. Further, there is little evidence that these efforts have directly affected student achievement. There has been some closing of test score gaps between black and Hispanic students and white students and greater availability of AP courses. States are moving beyond equalization to ensure that each student receives an adequate education...."

Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben, "Racial Disparities In Education Finance: Going Beyond Equal Revenues," Tax Policy Center, November 3, 2008, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-disparities-education-finance-going-beyond-equal-revenues/full

  • Race
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12

Goodbye, readers, and good luck youll need it

AI Summary. Economists have overstated their ability to control economic outcomes, and the business cycle remains unconquered despite efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending. Modern democracies tend to avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as in rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the absence of consensus on climate change.

J. Samuelson Washington Post
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@JSamuelson People have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence, and persuasion.

@JSamuelson People have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to...

Have economists overstated their ability to control economic outcomes?

Core argument: The business cycle remains unconquered despite a half-century of efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, with the 2007–2009 Great Recession offered as evidence that economists overstated their control over economic outcomes.

The economic landscape over the past half-century has been marked by the rise and fall of macroeconomic strategies, with economists often overstating their ability to control economic outcomes. Despite attempts to regulate growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, the business cycle remains unconquered, as evidenced by events like the 2007-2009 Great Recession. This persistence is partly due to the difficulty people have in changing their minds once set, making them resistant to new arguments or evidence. This resistance is compounded by the tendency of modern democracies to avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as seen in issues like rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the lack of consensus on addressing climate change. These challenges highlight the limitations of economic policies and the need for new approaches to tackle 21st-century problems.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The business cycle remains unconquered despite a half-century of efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, with the 2007–2009 Great Recession offered as evidence that economists overstated their control over economic outcomes.
  2. People's difficulty in changing their minds once set makes them resistant to new arguments or evidence, which helps explain the persistence of the business cycle.
  3. Modern democracies avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as seen in rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the absence of consensus on addressing climate change.

Washington Post, September 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/13/robert-samuelson-goodbye-column/

Dear Readers,

It’s time to quit. Since coming to Washington in 1969 as a young reporter, I have written, by my crude calculation, about 2 million words, most of them columns for The Post, Newsweek and the National Journal. Some years ago, I promised myself that I wouldn’t overstay my welcome: I would not continue my column simply because I could. I’m almost 75. If I haven’t yet said what’s on my mind, I never will.

Here are a few parting observations. As regular readers know, I write on the economy and its connection with society and politics. Over the years, I’ve explored dozens of subjects: recessions, inflation, executive pay, budget deficits, climate change, poverty, the welfare state, trade, taxes, aging, cybersecurity, China, the stock market — and many others.

So far as I can tell, nothing that I have written has ever had the slightest effect on what actually happened. I’ve routinely suggested shutting down Amtrak, not because I dislike trains (I don’t) but because Amtrak is an excellent example of how the federal government has acquired so many nonessential functions. Amtrak continues chugging along, costing billions of dollars for small public benefits. But I’m resigned to this. No one elected me to anything. In our system, the people rule, not the pundits; and that’s how it should be.

The truly big economic story of the past half-century has been the rise and fall of “macroeconomics.” This is economists’ fancy term for using interest rates, taxes and government spending to regulate the economy’s growth and stability. This once seemed doable. Now, less so.

What happened?

In the 1960s, the American disciples of British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) argued that they could tame the business cycle. One well-known economist put it this way: “Recessions are now generally considered to be fundamentally preventable, like airplane crashes and unlike hurricanes.”

It didn’t work. Instead of reaching “full employment” (generally defined as an unemployment rate of 4 percent to 5 percent), we got easy money and inflation (peak: 13 percent in 1980). Paradoxically, we also got four recessions from 1970 to 1982 as the Federal Reserve tried to contain the inflation it had unleashed. “Stagflation,” it was called. Only a deep recession in the early 1980s, engineered by then-Fed Chair Paul A. Volcker, reduced inflation to single digits.

A similar saga occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A long period of solid economic growth — labeled the Great Moderation by economists — fueled easy credit, shaky loans, defaults and insolvent lenders. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama responded decisively. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Treasury secretaries Henry Paulson Jr. and Timothy Geithner did yeoman work in avoiding a second Great Depression. But that doesn’t excuse their failure to anticipate the housing boom and to preempt the bust.

I didn’t see it coming, either. But I’m not an economist, as I periodically reminded readers. I’m just a reporter who covers economics. One of the pleasures of journalism is that you get to learn lots of new “stuff.” I have learned much from economists. With some exceptions, most are intelligent, informed, engaged and decent. In my experience, this truth spans the political spectrum. But it’s not the only truth.

Another is this: Economists consistently overstate how much they know about the economy and how easily they can influence it. They maintain their political and corporate relevance by postulating pleasant policies. Presidents claim the good and repudiate the bad. There are practical limits to how much economic growth and living standards can be accelerated and sustained.

Recessions remain a threat. Any doubts about that were settled by the 2007-2009 Great Recession and global financial crisis, which at the time was the worst economic collapse since the 1930s’ Great Depression. The business cycle hasn’t been conquered yet and possibly never will be. That’s my main conclusion from a half-century of economy-watching. For at least three reasons, I see this cycle of overpromise continuing.

First, the quest for economic status and power pushes economists and their political sponsors toward exaggerated promises that lead to widespread public disappointment. To be sure, there are long periods of prosperity, but they tend to end badly. That’s been the case since the 1960s.

Second, people have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence and persuasion. Life is infinitely complex. To simplify, people make assumptions. If they routinely changed all their assumptions, they’d go crazy, as would the people around them. People do change, but the catalyst is usually some traumatic event.

Third, modern democracies have a hard time making sacrifices in the present for gains in the future. We’re already grappling with this problem. From 2010 to 2030, the elderly’s share of the population (65 and over) is projected to rise from 13 percent to 20 percent. Spending on Social Security and Medicare will skyrocket, and already is. Yet we have done little to prevent spending on the elderly from squeezing the rest of the federal budget. Global warming poses a similar issue: As yet, there is no consensus to spend today in the vague hope that we can curb climate change several decades from now.

I hope I am wrong about the future. That’s one excuse for my throwing in the towel now, in the midst of one of the great news stories of our time. I am a man of the 20th century, but we are now facing the problems of the 21st century, which demand new policies and norms. Goodbye and good luck — you’ll need as much help as you can get.

***

My special thanks over the years to Bill and Sue Jones, who made a young reporter feel at home in a strange city; to Richard Frank, the late editor of the National Journal, who first assigned me a column; to Peter Silberman, who moved the column to The Post; to Marge and Mel Elfin, who moved the column also to Newsweek; to Rich Thomas, the former chief economic correspondent for Newsweek, who has been a constant source of intellectual stimulation and moral support; to Alan Shearer, who syndicated the column through The Washington Post Writers Group; to Joel Havemann, a superb editor and better friend; and to Fred Hiatt, The Post’s editorial page editor who has kept me on the op-ed page for many years.

Samuelson, “…Second, people have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence and persuasion. Life is infinitely complex. To simplify, people make assumptions. If they routinely changed all their assumptions, they’d go crazy, as would the people around them. People do change, but the catalyst is usually some traumatic event….”

Ed Comment:“…I agree with most of this, and surely the part that people are utterly unpersuadable (I can hear Steve smugly claiming that I once persuaded him about the financial crisis, and it’s true. But it doesn’t change my view.) Worse, I believe the world is intentionally coated in a thick coating of lies, largely liberal lies. It seems to be that we have sort of tamed unnecessary business downturns. We don’t inflate as if it will produce growth in the long run. And we haven’t intentionally caused a rescissions since Volker stupidly and unnecessarily slammed on the brakes and sent the economy through the windshield. Greenspan largely had it right. The recession we have seen (since Volker) have largely come from non-economic shocks. Covid and terrorists for example. Arguably the financial crisis was avoidable. But I think it was near-impossible to see that large trade deficits destabilized an inherently unstable banking systems. And that would lead to a run on the banks. Perhaps we reduced the risk of that but only by suffering the slowest recovery since the great depression. The real macro economic problem is that we discover risk like covid that then require a reallocation of resources, e.g. from restaurants to jobs for skilled workers we haven’t dreamed up/created. Similarly, the financial crisis required reallocating risk-averse savings away from subprime consumption via subprime home equity loans. Reengineering new allocations can take a long time.…”

Robert J. Samuelson, "Goodbye, readers, and good luck — you’ll need it,"

  • Business Cycle
  • Politics


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