Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube

Macro Roundup

  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
Select topics to choose: articles that mention them (broader) or articles mainly about them (focused)
  • Mentions 0
  • Primary focus 0
Showing all 7,294 Macro Roundup articles
When you search for any topic (like GDP, Inflation, or Banking), choose:
Choose search scope

Friday, September 4, 2020

Investor Tax Credits and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from U.S. States

AI Summary. State angel investor tax credits are associated with roughly 18% more angel investments and 27% more individual angel investors, driven by inexperienced, young, and new investors rather than professional angels. The added capital flows mainly to low-growth-potential firms, with no observable effect on new business starts or young-firm employment.

Sabrina Howell National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 4, 2020
Is Database:
Database

New evidence from @SabrinaHowell shows US angel tax credits increase angel investments by 18% & individual angel investors by 27%, but don’t impact professional investors’ decisions, instead favoring low-growth firms.

New evidence from @SabrinaHowell shows US angel tax credits increase angel investments by 18% & individual angel...

Do investor tax credits increase high-growth entrepreneurship?

Core argument: State angel tax credits raise the number of angel investments by about 18% and the number of individual angel investors by about 27%, driven primarily by inexperienced, young, and new investors.

Angel tax credits increase the number of angel investments by ~18% and individual angel investors by ~27%, primarily driven by inexperienced, young, and new investors. However, these credits do not impact professional angel investors' decisions, as they prioritize startups with "home run" potential over tax incentives. The increase in investments flows mainly to low-growth potential firms, with a decline in the average ex-ante growth characteristics of funded startups. Despite the rise in risk-seeking capital, there is no observable effect on entrepreneurial activity, new business starts, or young firm employment, raising concerns about the effectiveness of these credits in fostering high-growth startups and significantly impacting the local economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. State angel tax credits raise the number of angel investments by about 18% and the number of individual angel investors by about 27%, driven primarily by inexperienced, young, and new investors.
  2. Professional angel investors' decisions are unaffected by the credits, as they prioritize startups with "home run" potential, and the added investment flows mainly to low-growth-potential firms, lowering the average ex-ante growth characteristics of funded startups.
  3. Despite the increase in risk-seeking capital, state angel tax credits show no observable effect on entrepreneurial activity, new business starts, or young firm employment.

Matthew Denes, Sabrina Howell, Filippo Mezzanotti, Xinxin Wang, Ting Xu, "Investor Tax Credits and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from U.S. States," National Bureau Of Economic Research, August 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27751

12 countries and more than 30 states across the U.S. have implemented tax credits for angel investors…First, we find that angel tax credits significantly increase state-level angel investment. This increase is connected to a decline in the ex-ante growth characteristics of the marginal startups funded by angels…. We find that angel tax credits increase the number of angel investments by approximately 18%. This effect is amplified when programs impose fewer restrictions and when the supply of alternative startup capital is more limited. Relatedly, angel tax credits increase the number of individual angel investors by about 27%..… Second, we fail to find evidence that these policies had any impact on the real effects that policymakers focus on, such as new business starts or young firm employment. Third, we show that the increase in angel investments is mostly driven by a surge in inexperienced, young, and new investors, with no change in professional angel activity…we document that these new investments primarily flow to low-growth potential firms, measured by pre-investment employment, employment growth, and founder experience. Average ex-ante growth characteristics of angel-backed firms also deteriorate after the implementation of angel tax credits. A decline in quality may be expected in response to a positive funding shock if relaxing financial constraints yields worse performing firms to be financed at the margin…and does not imply that the investments are not privately or socially valuable. However, the large declines raise concerns about the ability of angel tax credits to reach high-growth startups and have a significant impact on the local economy...”

Interesting they also find the tax credits increase investment from new investors, so they do increase the amount of risk seeking capital, but these less skilled investors/capital have no observable effect of entrepreneurial activity.

Great new paper finds that angel tax credit have no impact on professional investor’s decision to invest in a startup, as they look at the “home run” potential, indeed they generally don’t’ even access them“…We find that angel tax credits are a relatively unimportant factor for professional investors when deciding whether or not to invest in a startup. Instead, experienced investors focus on whether or not a startup has the potential to be a home run.Theseinvestors tend not to use tax credits even when they are available because of information, coordination, and administrative costs..”

Ed Comment:Add. I’m surprised tax credits seem to have significant effects. I’m not surprised the increase flows to marginal firms. That seems to suggest the constraint is good ideas and not risk capital. Risk capital seems to have expanded to the limit of good ideas without the credits. Nevertheless, failures adds to the knowledge base.

  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
    • Investment
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

Business Incomes at the Top

AI Summary. Pass-through businesses such as S corporations and partnerships accounted for 95% of U.S. businesses and $1.3tn in income, a structure favored because pass-through income is taxed at individual rates. The share of business income going to the top 1% of earners rose from 20% in 1980 to over 50%.

Eric Zwick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 4, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Tax policy significantly influences business organization, with top earners increasingly deriving income from pass-through entities. In 2018, pass-through businesses accounted for 95% of all U.S. businesses, generating $1.3tn in income.

Does tax policy drive pass-through income growth at the top?

Core argument: Pass-through businesses such as S corporations and partnerships made up 95% of all U.S. businesses in 2018 and generated $1.3tn in income, with that income taxed at individual rates rather than corporate rates.

Tax policy significantly influences business organization, with data showing that top earners increasingly derive income from pass-through entities like S corporations and partnerships. In 2018, pass-through businesses accounted for 95% of all U.S. businesses, generating $1.3tn in income. This shift is partly due to tax advantages, as pass-through income is taxed at individual rates, often lower than corporate rates. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 further incentivized this structure by reducing the top individual tax rate to 37% and introducing a 20% deduction for qualified business income. Consequently, the share of business income among the top 1% of earners rose from 20% in 1980 to over 50% in recent years. This trend underscores the role of tax policy in shaping business structures and income distribution, highlighting the need for policymakers to consider these dynamics when designing tax legislation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pass-through businesses such as S corporations and partnerships made up 95% of all U.S. businesses in 2018 and generated $1.3tn in income, with that income taxed at individual rates rather than corporate rates.
  2. The share of business income accruing to the top 1% of earners rose from 20% in 1980 to over 50% in recent years, as top earners increasingly draw income from pass-through entities.
  3. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 cut the top individual tax rate to 37% and added a 20% deduction for qualified business income, further incentivizing the pass-through structure.

Wojciech Kopczuk and Eric Zwick, "Business Incomes at the Top," National Bureau Of Economic Research, August 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27752

Ed Comment:Includes important methodology, caveats and good quotes about how one can make the numbers be whatever they want.

Zwick follows up onCapitalist In the Twenty-First Century, paper is just a discussion of how tax policy shapes how business are organized, and some research they plan on doing based off changes from TCJA:

“…First, as the complexities of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 unfold, a number of research opportunities should emerge. On one hand, the law reduced the marginal and effective corporate tax rates, creating—for the first time since 1987—a stronger incentive to shift business income away from a pass-through to a C-corporation structure. As an offset for capital-intensive pass-throughs that are more likely to consider C-corporation form in the first place, the 2017 legislation also introduced a new tax deduction (“Section 199A deduction”) on personal income tax returns that amounts to a 20 percent reduction in taxes on business income in this form. As an acknowledgement of the incentives to characterize entrepreneurial income in the tax-preferred form,this rate is not available to a large number of “specified service businesses,” including lawyers, doctors, consultants, and similar types of firms that rely primarily on human capital. Goodman et al. (2019) simulate the effect of the 199A deduction for pass-through owners based on 2016 data and conclude that while it benefits business owners throughout the income distribution, over 72 percent of tax savings accrues to the top 5 percent. Henry, Plesko and Utke (2018) discuss the complex interaction of tax incentives regarding the choice of the organizational form in the aftermath of the 2017 legislation….”

Doubt you will want to add this to database, Just an FYI on his future research

“…In 2014, 69 percent of the top 1 percent of income earners and 84 percent of the top 0.1 percent of income earners accrued some pass-through business income. In absolute terms, that amounts to more than 1.1 million pass-through owners with annual incomes above $390,000 and 140,000 pass-through owners with annual incomes of more than $1.6 million. In both number and aggregate income, these groups far surpass the top executives at public companies, who have been the focus of much inequality commentary. As shown in Figure 1, the 10,700 top public company executives earned a total of $33 billion in 2014 in salary and options. In contrast, the 14,900 business owners in the top 0.01 percent of the income distribution received more than $100 billion in income from S-corporations and partnerships. In 2014, approximately 270,000 wage earners in the top 1 percent and 27,000 wage earners in the top 0.1 percent worked for public companies, earning a total of $260 billion and $110 billion in wages and salaries, respectively. For every public company employee in the top 1 percent and top 0.1 percent, there are four and five pass-through owners, respectively. In short, the typical top 1 percent earner is not a public company executive or tech billionaire; instead, a top earner is typically a doctor, lawyer, or the owner-operator of a middle-sized business. These top pass-through owners are predominantly working age, in contrast to the older top earners whose income comes from other categories of capital. Looking at those with more than $1 million in annual income, Smith et al. (2019) find that 60-70 percent of the millionaires who get a majority of their income from either wages or pass-through ownership are in their 40s and 50s. However, the millionaires who get a majority of their income from C-corporation dividends or other capital tend to be older with about two-thirds falling into age brackets from their 50s to their 70s….”
Business Incomes at the Top: Comments Image 1

  • Wages/Income
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

A majority of young adults in the U.S. live with their parents for the first time since the Great Depression

AI Summary. 52% of U.S. adults aged 18-29 live with their parents, up from 38% in 2000 and the highest share since the Great Depression, with the total reaching 26.6m. The increase spans racial and ethnic groups, genders, and both metropolitan and rural areas, with the sharpest growth among those aged 18-24 and White young adults.

Richard Fry Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 4, 2020
Is Database:
Database

52% of 18-29 year olds live with a parent, up from 38% in 2000 & +5% since February. Highest share since the Great Depression.

Are more young adults living with their parents than in recent decades?

Core argument: 52% of U.S. young adults aged 18–29 lived with their parents in July, up from 47% in February and 38% in 2000, the highest share since the Great Depression.

In July, 52% of young adults aged 18-29 lived with their parents, marking a significant increase from 38% in 2000 and a rise from 47% in February. This trend, the highest since the Great Depression, reflects broader economic challenges impacting young adults across all demographics, including racial and ethnic groups, genders, and both metropolitan and rural areas. The total number of young adults living with parents reached 26.6m, an increase of 2.6m since February. The sharpest growth was observed among the youngest adults (18-24) and White young adults. This shift underscores the economic pressures faced by this age group, potentially linked to factors such as housing affordability, labor market conditions, and educational expenses, which may have long-term implications for economic mobility and household formation trends.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 52% of U.S. young adults aged 18–29 lived with their parents in July, up from 47% in February and 38% in 2000, the highest share since the Great Depression.
  2. The number of young adults living with their parents reached 26.6m, an increase of 2.6m since February, with the sharpest growth among those aged 18–24 and White young adults.
  3. The rise in young adults living with their parents spans racial and ethnic groups, genders, and both metropolitan and rural areas.

Majority of young adults 18-29 live with parents, though this counts college students as living with parents“…In July, 52% of young adults resided with one or both of their parents, up from 47% in February, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of monthly Census Bureau data. The number living with parents grew to 26.6 million, an increase of 2.6 million from February. The number and share of young adults living with their parents grew across the board for all major racial and ethnic groups, men and women, and metropolitan and rural residents, as well as in all four main census regions. Growth was sharpest for the youngest adults (ages 18 to 24) and for White young adults….”

Richard Fry, Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, "A majority of young adults in the U.S. live with their parents for the first time since the Great Depression," Pew Research Center, September 4, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/04/a-majority-of-young-adults-in-the-u-s-live-with-their-parents-for-the-first-time-since-the-great-depression/

  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Tuesday, September 8, 2020

A General Dimension Of Fenetic Sharing Across Diverse Cognitive Traits Inferred From Molecular Data

AI Summary. Analysis of molecular data estimates that a general genetic factor accounts for 58.36% of the genetic variance across seven cognitive traits. Its contribution varies widely by trait: the authors attribute 95% of the genetic variance in one trail-making test to the general factor, versus 9.5% for reaction time.

Javier de la Fuente, Gail Davies, Andrew Grotzinger, Elliot Tucker-Drob and Ian Deary Nature Human Behaviour
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Genetic g factor accounts for 58.36% of genetic variance across seven cognitive traits, highlighting its significant role in cognitive performance.

Does a general genetic factor explain most variance across cognitive traits?

Core argument: A genetic g factor accounts for 58.36% of the genetic variance across seven cognitive traits inferred from molecular data.

Recent findings reveal that the genetic g factor accounts for 58.36% of the genetic variance across seven cognitive traits, highlighting its significant role in cognitive performance. For trails-B, 95% of the genetic variance is attributed to genetic g, while only 5% is specific to trails-B, indicating a strong genetic overlap with other cognitive phenotypes. Conversely, for RT [Reaction Time], only 9.5% of the genetic variance is linked to genetic g, with 90.5% being specific to RT, suggesting distinct genetic influences. This underscores the importance of understanding the extent to which genetic associations are broadly related to genetic g or specific to individual cognitive traits when analyzing performance on cognitive tests. Such insights could inform economic policies and strategies aimed at enhancing cognitive skills and productivity in the workforce, ultimately impacting GDP growth and competitiveness.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A genetic g factor accounts for 58.36% of the genetic variance across seven cognitive traits inferred from molecular data.
  2. For trails-B, genetic g accounts for 95% of the genetic variance and 5% is specific to the trait, while for reaction time genetic g accounts for 9.5% and 90.5% is trait-specific.
  3. Interpreting genetic associations with cognitive test performance requires distinguishing whether those associations relate broadly to genetic g or are specific to an individual cognitive trait.

Javier de la Fuente, Gail Davies, Andrew Grotzinger, Elliot Tucker-Drob and Ian Deary, "A General Dimension Of Fenetic Sharing Across Diverse Cognitive Traits Inferred From Molecular Data,"Nature Human Behaviour, September 7, 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00936-2

Wow, newNaturestudy finds that the genetic g factor model closely approximated the genetic covariance structure among cognitive tests. Paper says the genetic g factor accounted for 58.36% (SE = 4.84%) of the genetic variance in the seven cognitive traits.

“…The importance of our results may be seen by contrasting the results of trails-B with RT. Analyses of multivariate genome-wide architecture indicated that, for trails-B, 95% of the genetic variance is accounted for by genetic g and only 5% is specific to trails-B. Moreover, all seven loci for trails-B have previously been reported in GWAS of other cognitive phenotypes…. and four of these were implicated as relevant for genetic g at non-significant levels of heterogeneity. In contrast, for RT, analyses of multivariate genome-wide architecture indicated that 9.5% of the genetic variance is accounted for by genetic g while 90.5% of the genetic variance is specific to RT.Many of the 39 loci associated with RT have not been found in univariate GWAS of other cognitive traits…and only four were implicated as relevant for genetic g at non-significant levels of heterogeneity. Therefore, when identifying loci associated with performance on an individual cognitive test, it is essential to know the extent to which its associations are broadly related to genetic g or specifically related to the phenotype under investigation…”

Here they discuss RT (Reaction Time) that you flagged, relative low g variance versus it’s high specific variance

“…Psychometrically, a hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities is commonly agreed, with cognitive tests’ variance accounted for by three different strata of variation (Supplementary Fig. 1), representing (1) each test’s specific variance (s), (2) broad domains of cognitive function (for example, reasoning, processing speed, memory) and (3) g (ref. 5 ). All cognitive tests have some g loading, though this varies from test to test….”

And some of the variance is“…thought to bespecific to that test (its s)…”or the test specific factor.

Ed Comment:but it’s not clear they are actually measuring genes and not traits. I also don’t understand the first diagram below. Its seems to say all traits, except RT (what is RT?) are highly genetic and that only RT lowers the correlation to 58%. I don’t understand the difference between the top and bottom chart but I don’t see how you can ‘average” 58 form the bottom. Scary to rely on something that we don’t understand.

“….It has been known since 1904 that, in humans, diverse cognitive traits are positively intercorrelated. This forms the basis for the general factor of intelligence (g). Here, we directly test whether there is a partial genetic basis for individual differences in g using data from seven different cognitive tests (n = 11,263-331,679) and genome-wide autosomal single-nucleotide polymorphisms. A genetic g factor accounts for an average of 58.4% (s.e. = 4.8%) of the genetic variance in the cognitive traits considered, with the proportion varying widely across traits (range, 9-95%).We distil genetic loci that are broadly relevant for many cognitive traits (g) from loci associated specifically with individual cognitive traits. These results contribute to elucidating the aetiology of a long-known yet poorly understood phenomenon, revealing a fundamental dimension of genetic sharing across diverse cognitive traits….”
A General Dimension Of Fenetic Sharing Across Diverse Cognitive Traits Inferred From Molecular Data: Comments Image 1

Charles Murray Comment: the study suggests the majority of variance in cognitive traits is driven by g. He did add the inverse is possible “Or the other way around: variance in cognitive traits contributes to a general factor.”

“…The importance of our results may be seen by contrasting the results of trails-B with RT. Analyses of multivariate genome-wide architecture indicated that, for trails-B, 95% of the genetic variance is accounted for by genetic g and only 5% is specific to trails-B. Moreover, all seven loci for trails-B have previously been reported in GWAS of other cognitive phenotypes…. and four of these were implicated as relevant for genetic g at non-significant levels of heterogeneity. In contrast, for RT, analyses of multivariate genome-wide architecture indicated that 9.5% of the genetic variance is accounted for by genetic g while 90.5% of the genetic variance is specific to RT.Many of the 39 loci associated with RT have not been found in univariate GWAS of other cognitive traits…and only four were implicated as relevant for genetic g at non-significant levels of heterogeneity. Therefore, when identifying loci associated with performance on an individual cognitive test, it is essential to know the extent to which its associations are broadly related to genetic g or specifically related to the phenotype under investigation…”

Here they discuss RT (Reaction Time) that you flagged, relative low g variance versus it’s high specific variance

“…Psychometrically, a hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities is commonly agreed, with cognitive tests’ variance accounted for by three different strata of variation (Supplementary Fig. 1), representing (1) each test’s specific variance (s), (2) broad domains of cognitive function (for example, reasoning, processing speed, memory) and (3) g (ref. 5 ). All cognitive tests have some g loading, though this varies from test to test….”

And some of the variance is“…thought to bespecific to that test (its s)…”or the test specific factor.

Steve Comment: From my read of the paper the distinction is as follows“…somevariance in each cognitive test was thought to be shared with all other cognitive tests (g)…”So that’s g or general intelligence, that’s the common factor.

Ed Comment:What are g and s? what is common vs specific?

His chart is derived from this table which (I think) is showing that for some cognitive traits the genetic variance is primarily g driven while for others is s driven. Let me see if I can track down some reactions to the research from people in the field that might help me understand what it says it found.

Steve Comment: RT is “reaction time” so motor speed, “…Data for the present study came from the UK Biobank (UKB), a biomedical cohort study that collects a wide range of genetic and health-related measures from a population-based sample of community-dwelling participants in the United Kingdom. Participants were measured on up to seven cognitive traits using tests that often show substantial concurrent validity with established psychometric tests of cognitive abilities, and modest to good test-retest reliability26:reaction time (RT, n=330,024, which assesses perceptual motor speed);matrix pattern recognition (n=11,356, non-verbal reasoning);verbal numerical reasoning (VNR, n=171,304,verbal and numeric problem solving; the test is called ‘fluid intelligence’ in UKB);symbol digit substitution (n=87,741, information processing speed);memory pairs-matching test (n=331,679, episodic memory);tower rearranging (n=11,263, executive functioning);andtrail-making test-B (trails-B, n=78,547, executive functioning).Scores on all tests were coded such that higher scores represented more optimal (that is, faster or more accurate) performance….”

Charles Murray Comment: the study suggests the majority of variance in cognitive traits is driven by g. He did add the inverse is possible “Or the other way around: variance in cognitive traits contributes to a general factor.”

Steve Comment: From my read of the paper the distinction is as follows“…somevariance in each cognitive test was thought to be shared with all other cognitive tests (g)…”So that’s g or general intelligence, that’s the common factor.

Ed Comment:What are g and s? what is common vs specific?

His chart is derived from this table which (I think) is showing that for some cognitive traits the genetic variance is primarily g driven while for others is s driven. Let me see if I can track down some reactions to the research from people in the field that might help me understand what it says it found.

Steve Comment: RT is “reaction time” so motor speed, “…Data for the present study came from the UK Biobank (UKB), a biomedical cohort study that collects a wide range of genetic and health-related measures from a population-based sample of community-dwelling participants in the United Kingdom. Participants were measured on up to seven cognitive traits using tests that often show substantial concurrent validity with established psychometric tests of cognitive abilities, and modest to good test-retest reliability26:reaction time (RT, n=330,024, which assesses perceptual motor speed);matrix pattern recognition (n=11,356, non-verbal reasoning);verbal numerical reasoning (VNR, n=171,304,verbal and numeric problem solving; the test is called ‘fluid intelligence’ in UKB);symbol digit substitution (n=87,741, information processing speed);memory pairs-matching test (n=331,679, episodic memory);tower rearranging (n=11,263, executive functioning);andtrail-making test-B (trails-B, n=78,547, executive functioning).Scores on all tests were coded such that higher scores represented more optimal (that is, faster or more accurate) performance….”

  • Evolution/Heredity
  • Science

Immigration and Entrepreneurship In The United States

AI Summary. Across administrative data, the US Census Bureau's Survey of Business Owners, and Fortune 500 analysis, immigrants start firms at higher rates than the native-born and found more firms of every size. The authors argue this makes immigrants job creators who expand labor demand more than labor supply.

Pierre Azoulay, Benjamin Jones, J. Daniel Kim and Javier Miranda National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Immigrants start firms at higher rates than native-born individuals, expanding labor demand more than labor supply, according to @BenjaminJones and the @nberpub.

Do immigrants create more jobs than they fill?

Core argument: Immigrants in the US start firms at higher rates than native-born individuals and establish more firms of every size, a "right shift" in entrepreneurship documented across administrative data, the Census Bureau's 2012 Survey of Business Owners, and Fortune 500 analysis.

Immigrants significantly contribute to expanding labor demand in the US through entrepreneurship, as evidenced by multiple data sets including administrative data, the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 Survey of Business Owners, and Fortune 500 analysis. Immigrants start firms at higher rates than native-born individuals and tend to establish more firms of every size, indicating a "right shift" in entrepreneurship. This shift positions immigrants as key job creators, expanding labor demand more than labor supply. The findings suggest that immigrants play larger roles as employers rather than employees, offering a more comprehensive view of their economic impact. This entrepreneurial activity helps resolve existing puzzles where empirical evidence often shows more positive economic effects from immigration than labor-supply focused perspectives suggest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigrants in the US start firms at higher rates than native-born individuals and establish more firms of every size, a "right shift" in entrepreneurship documented across administrative data, the Census Bureau's 2012 Survey of Business Owners, and Fortune 500 analysis.
  2. Immigrant entrepreneurship expands US labor demand more than labor supply, positioning immigrants as job creators playing larger roles as employers than as employees.
  3. Immigrant entrepreneurship helps resolve puzzles in which empirical evidence shows more positive economic effects from immigration than labor-supply-focused perspectives suggest.

Pierre Azoulay, Benjamin Jones, J. Daniel Kim and Javier Miranda, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship In The United States,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, September 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27778

“…We use three independent data sets. Our primary analysis uses administrative data to studyall new firms in the United States from 2005-2010 (“administrative data”).Our second analysis studies theU.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 Survey of Business Ownersto examine a representative sample of U.S. businesses and their founders (“representative sample”). Our third analysis studies the Fortune 500 to consider the country’s largest firms and their founders (“Fortune 500”).We describe these data sets here, with additional detail in the appendix…..”

The three datasets

Their conclusion: “….Overall, the entrepreneurial lens suggests that immigrants appear to play a relatively strong role in expanding labor demand relative to labor supply, compared to the native-born population…”

“…First, reflecting existing research, immigrants start firms at higher rates than native-born individuals do….Second, immigrants do not simply start small firms. Rather, they tend to start more firms at every size, compared to U.S.-born individuals. This is the key finding of the paper. There is effectively a “right shift” in entrepreneurship for immigrants, with immigrants playing relatively large roles as employers rather than employees, compared to U.S.-born individuals. Overall, the findings suggest that immigrants appear to “create jobs” (expand labor demand) more than they “take jobs” (expand labor supply) in the U.S. economy.By studying immigrants as both entrepreneurs and workers, one produces a fuller picture of the impact of immigration. The new facts can help resolve existing puzzles where empirical evidence, including natural experiments and longer-run historical analysis, often suggests more positive economic effects from immigration than labor-supply oriented perspectives produce….”

The net effect of this is immigrants appear to create more jobs (expand labor demand) than they take jobs (expand labor supply):

“…Using administrative data, a representative sample, and Fortune 500 data, we present new findings on the size of firms these different founder populations create. Across all three data sets,we find that immigrants present a “right shift” in new venture formation, where immigrants tend to start more firms of each size per member of their population….”

New NBER finds immigrants play an outsized role in American high-growth entrepreneurship versus native born workers:

Ed Comment:As long as the entrepreneurialism is not bodegas and cheap hotels.

  • Startups
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Immigration

The Grumpy Economist: Debt Matters

AI Summary. Interest rates did not signal the inflation of the 1970s or the disinflation of the 1980s in advance, and low rates preceded both Greece's debt crisis and Lehman Brothers' collapse. The author argues that bond markets cannot be relied on to warn of a debt crisis in which government spending unmatched by taxes produces sharp inflation that devalues debt.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Interest Rates Did Not Signal The Inflation Of The 1970’s Or Disinflation Of The 1980s @JohnCochrane The bond market’s failure to signal these significant economic changes highlights the potential risk of a debt crisis.

Do bond markets warn in advance of debt trouble?

Core argument: Interest rates gave no advance warning of the 1970s inflation or the 1980s disinflation, suggesting that reliance on interest rates alone as indicators of economic shifts can mislead.

Despite common assumptions, interest rates did not provide advance warning of the inflation in the 1970s or the disinflation in the 1980s. This suggests that relying solely on interest rates as indicators of economic shifts can be misleading. The bond market's failure to signal these significant economic changes highlights the potential risk of a debt crisis, where unchecked government spending without corresponding tax increases could lead to sharp inflation. Such inflation could devalue debt, posing severe economic consequences. Historical examples, like Greece's low interest rates before their crisis and Lehman's borrowing at low rates until collapse, underscore that interest rates often fail to predict financial turmoil. This emphasizes the need for comprehensive economic analysis beyond interest rate trends to anticipate and mitigate potential crises.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Interest rates gave no advance warning of the 1970s inflation or the 1980s disinflation, suggesting that reliance on interest rates alone as indicators of economic shifts can mislead.
  2. Government spending left unmatched by tax increases could produce a debt crisis marked by sharp inflation that devalues outstanding debt.
  3. Greece borrowed at low interest rates before its crisis and Lehman borrowed at low rates until its collapse, illustrating that interest rates often fail to predict financial turmoil.

Cochrane on the risk of rising debt levels (a follow up post of his is attached) he notes that the bond market did not give advance warning of inflation during the 1970’s or the disinflation of the 1980s.

My takeaway is he thinks the government might be able to generate inflation if the government keeps spending without raising taxes

“…The danger the US faces, the danger we should repeat and keep in mind, is a debt crisis. We print our own money, so the result may be a sharp inflation that wipes away the value of debt rather than an even more disruptive default, but the consequences will be almost as dire…..Yes, I've warned about this before, and no, it hasn't happened yet. Well, if you live in California you live on an earthquake fault. That the big one hasn't happened yet doesn't mean it never will. No, interest rates do not signal such problems. (Alan Blinder, covering such matters in the Wall Street Journal, "if the U.S. Treasury starts to supply more bonds than the world's investors demand, the markets will warn us with higher interest rates and a sagging dollar. No such yellow lights are flashing.) They never do. Greek interest rates were low right up until they weren’t. Interest rates did not signal the inflation of the 1970s, or the disinflation of the 1980s. Lehman borrowed at low rates until it didn’t. Nobody expects a debt crisis, or it would have already happened….”

Also sent you a follow up post. 1/2

John Cochrane, “Debt Matters,” The Grump Economist, September 4, 2020, https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/09/debt-matters.html

  • Taxation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Inflation

The Grumpy Economist: More on debt

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects U.S. primary deficits of 6–8% of GDP over the next decade, far larger than the 1–2% contribution from the gap between interest rates and growth, implying debt relative to GDP will be driven mainly by deficits rather than that gap.

John Cochrane The Grumpy Economist
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The CBO projects primary deficits of 6-8% of GDP over the next decade, overshadowing the 1-2% impact of r-g. @JohnCochrane

Are deficits, not interest rates minus growth, driving rising debt?

Core argument: CBO projects U.S. primary deficits of 6–8% of GDP over the next decade, overshadowing the 1–2% contribution of r-g (the interest rate minus the growth rate) to debt dynamics.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that over the next decade, the U.S. will experience primary deficits ranging from 6-8% of GDP, significantly overshadowing the 1-2% impact of r-g [interest rate minus growth rate]. This suggests that debt/GDP dynamics will be primarily driven by these substantial deficits rather than variations in r-g. If crises continue to escalate annual deficits by 10% of GDP, the situation could worsen. Additionally, initiatives like the Green New Deal and federal assumptions of student, state, and local debts could further exacerbate the debt/GDP ratio, indicating a challenging fiscal landscape ahead.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects U.S. primary deficits of 6–8% of GDP over the next decade, overshadowing the 1–2% contribution of r-g (the interest rate minus the growth rate) to debt dynamics.
  2. Because projected primary deficits exceed the r-g effect several times over, debt/GDP dynamics would be driven primarily by those deficits rather than by variations in interest rates relative to growth.
  3. Crises that add 10% of GDP to annual deficits, along with the Green New Deal and federal assumption of student, state, and local debts, could push the debt/GDP ratio higher still.

John Cochrane, “More On Debt,” The Grump Economist, September 6, 2020, https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/09/more-on-debt.html

“…As we look forward, debt/GDP dynamics for the next 20 years are going to be dominated by the primary surplus/deficit, not plausible variation in r-g. The CBO's 10 years of 6-8% of GDP overwhelm 1-2% of r-g.If each crisis continues to ratchet up 10% of GDP deficits per year, more so. The Green New Deal, and large federal assumption of student debts, state and local debts, pension obligations, and so forth would add far more to debt/GDP than decades of r vs. g...”

Cochrane argues that the debt/GDP dynamics of the next 20 years will be dominated by primary surplus or deficit not changes in r versus g. 2/2

Ed Comment:Add. I would guess this ends with inflation. At some point—in a crisis for example where they can’t sell debt, the fed just prints money and buys debt. at some point inflation expectations have to grow. That’s why I think I should be holding equity and not debt.

  • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Inflation

Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich

AI Summary. New estimates of U.S. wealth distribution indicate the top 10% of households hold 68.7% of total wealth and the top 1% hold 31.2%, with the top 1% holding as much as the bottom 90% combined. Median wealth for white households is $171,000, about 10x the $17,100 median for Black households.

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The top 1% in the US holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%, with the top 10% controlling 68.7% of total wealth.

How concentrated is wealth among the richest U.S. households?

Core argument: The top 1% of U.S. households hold 31.2% of total wealth — as much as the bottom 90% combined — while the top 10% control 68.7%, according to the estimates.

The latest estimates on wealth distribution in the U.S. reveal that the top 1% holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%, highlighting significant economic inequality. The top 10% of households control 68.7% of total wealth, with the top 1% alone holding 31.2%. This concentration of wealth has implications for tax policy, as it suggests that taxing the rich could address fiscal imbalances and fund public services. The disparity is further underscored by racial wealth gaps, where white households have a median wealth of $171,000, ten times that of Black households at $17,100. These figures emphasize the need for policies that address both wealth concentration and racial disparities to promote economic equity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 1% of U.S. households hold 31.2% of total wealth — as much as the bottom 90% combined — while the top 10% control 68.7%, according to the estimates.
  2. White households have a median wealth of $171,000, ten times the $17,100 median for Black households.
  3. The concentration of U.S. wealth at the top suggests that taxing the rich could address fiscal imbalances and fund public services.

Here are CBS’s claims (I used your language describing them as opposed to theirs)

I’ve added in descending order research that refutes or provides context for their claims. Please let me know if this is directionally what you were looking for.

Steve

“….40% can’t cover a $400 expense (fed) disputed…”

We read the Fed report when it was released and pointed out it’s being misrepresented. However Michael Strain refuted it effectively in the Bloomberg op-ed, “…It turns out the claim that nearly half of Americans are a flat tire away from financial crisis is largely based on an inaccurate reading of one survey question. The question comes from theannual“Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households” by the Federal Reserve. Thereportfinds, in 2018, that 61% of adults would cover a $400 unexpected expense using cash (or its equivalent). Politicians and many in the media seem to be subtracting 61 from 100, and concluding that 39% of people, to use Warren’s phrase, “can’t come up with” the money they’d need to handle this situation….”

CBS News, “Income Inequality, and coronavirus’ economic fallout,” CBS News, September 6, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/income-inequality-and-coronavirus-economic-fallout/

CBS claims live here:

Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn and Jay Shambaugh, “Examing The Black-White Wealth Gap,” Brookings, February 27, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/

Brookings provides some context for driver of the wealth gap btw black and white families with the same income, “…Why are high- and middle-income white families so much wealthier than Black families with the same incomes? We note a few reasons. White families receive much larger inheritances on average than Black families. Economists Darrick Hamilton and Sandy Darity conclude that inheritances and other intergenerational transfers “account for more of the racial wealth gap than any other demographic and socioeconomic indicators.”In addition, the income groups in figure 2 are based on a snapshot of family income, which does not fully capture lifetime income. Black families who make it to the top of the income distribution in a particular year are more likely than white families to drop out of the top in subsequent years, and their respective wealth levels reflect this difference. Likely less important, but still notable, high- and middle-income Black families are more likely than their white counterparts to be called upon to assist family members and neighbors…”

Rakesh Kochhar and Anthony Cilluffo, “How Wealth Inequlaity Has Changed In The U.S. Since The Great Recession, By Race, Ethnicity And Income,” Pew Research Center, November 1, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/

They are attributing this to Pew’s analysis of SCF data, “… In 2016, the median wealth of white households was $171,000. That’s 10 times the wealth of black households ($17,100)– a larger gap than in 2007 – and eight times that of Hispanic households ($20,600), about the same gap as in 2007. (Asians and other racial groups are not separately identified in the SCF data.)…”

“…Black network 10% of white federal reserve…Hispanic 12% (same source)…”

Amazon’s pre-Covid peak for 2020 2,170.22 on February 19, it’s trough was March 12 1,676.61. Currently it’s 3,182.78 From February to today it’s up 46.65% from trough to today it’s up 89.83%. From the 18thto today it’s up just over 40%.

You are correct the work is benchmarked to March 18th.

“….Net worth of 600 billionaires increased (20%), I suspect they start at the market bottom and not the day before the drop… Bezo net worth up $43.8 B (again probably at the trough)…

https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf

Thomas Stengle, “Covid-19 Impact,” U.S. Department Of Labor, September 3, 2020,

According to Labor Department this checks out, as of mid august 29mm persons were getting UI insurance

“…..29mm collecting unemployment…”

USDA “How Many People Lived In Food-Insecure Households?” USDA Economic Research Service, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx

9.5mm adults and 540,000 (.7% of children)lived in households which one of more children experienced very low food security defined as“…In these food-insecure households, normal eating patterns of one or more household members were disrupted and food intake was reduced at times during the year because they had insufficient money or other resources for food…”

If you look at the USDA statistics themselves37.2mm individual were in the broader food insecure households(this is defined as “These food-insecure households obtained enough food to avoid substantially disrupting their eating patterns or reducing food intake by using a variety of coping strategies, such as eating less varied diets, participating in Federal food assistance programs, or getting emergency food from community food pantries”

Paul Roderick Gregory, “If Children Are Hungry In America, It Is The Parents’ Fault,” The Mercury News, July 1, 2013, https://www.mercurynews.com/2013/07/01/hoover-fellow-if-children-are-hungry-in-america-it-is-the-parents-fault/

“…The 20 percent of families that are classified as “food insecure” worry food will run out, substitute cheaper foods, serve unbalanced meals or cut meal sizes at least once in the past 12 months. Such measures are far from the concept of regular hunger that celebrity media ads, sponsored by Feeding America, imply. Meanwhile, the USDA’s specific questions about child hunger are dutifully ignored. They are inconveniently low. The USDA’s most direct measures of child hunger show that around 1 percent of families with children have a child who experienced hunger (skipping meals or not eating for a whole day) at least one day in the last 12 months. This is a far cry from “1 in 5” children going to bed hungry we hear regularly in the media. The USDA’s figures for an incidence of child hunger on an average day show that one tenth of 1 percent of children were hungry on an average day. This adds up to two hungry children per ZIP code.Adult hunger should be higher than child hunger because USDA studies show children are given preference when food is low. The USDA finds, however, that on an average daily basis, one quarter of one percent of all adults do not eat for a whole day due to lack of money. That is 21/2 per thousand….”

Paul Roderick Gregory from Hoover has debunked this myth

“…54mm food insecure (feeding America)…”

His FPMis “..matches President Johnson’s initial standard. Second,these initial 1963 thresholds must be held constant in real terms over time by updating them each year using an unbiased measure of inflation. Third, the metric for evaluating success should include the full array of anti-poverty programs utilized by the government, including in-kind transfers and transfers administered through the tax code. No existing poverty measure meets all three of these conditions. We create a poverty measure, which we refer to as the Full-Income Poverty Measure (FPM), which meets all three of these conditions…”

Obviously Burkhauser finding that poverty rate based on President Johnson’s standards fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 to 2.3 percent in 2017 are also useful. What did Will Rogers say during the depression“We are the first nation in the history of the world to go to the poorhouse in an automobile”

Jeff Larrimore, Jacob Mortenson and David Splinter, “Presence and Persistence of Poverty in U.S. Tax Data,” Federal Reserve Board and Joint Committee on Taxation, February 2020, http://www.davidsplinter.com/LMS_PersistencePoverty_2020.pdf

“….There is substantial mobility in and out of poverty. For example, 41 percent of those in poverty in 2007 were out of poverty in the following year. However, many of those who are poor spend multiple years in poverty or escape poverty only to fall back into it. Of those who were in poverty in 2007, one-third are in poverty for at least half of the years through 2018….”

FRED actually has 41mm, however I think David Splinter’s research that shows the transitory nature of poverty for younger people is a better way to contextualize that number (granted he finds older people who are poor stay poor)

“…38mm in poverty (census)….”

Sarin’s SS paper may also be also useful here, she is showing that the Top 10% (so not top 5%) have around ~ 60% of total wealth with the top 1% accounting about half that with Social Security

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, “Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July 19, 2019, http://ericzwick.com/wealth/wealth.pdf

Smith/Zidar/Zwick agree“…Overall, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the “P90-99” class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Relative to a top 0.1% wealth share of more than 20% under equal returns, we estimate a top 0.1% wealth share of and find that the rise since 1980 in top wealth shares falls by ….”

“Distribution Of Household Wealth In The U.S. Since 1989,” Distributional Financial Accounts Federal Reserve, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/

This is directionally correct according to the Fed’s Z1 data the top 10% 68.7% of US wealth with the top 1% holding 31.2%, so presumably 96-99 get you there

“….5% own 2/3s of the wealth (sourced to oddly the NBER)….”

Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan, “Consumption And Income Inequality In The US Since The 1960s,” Center For Economics And Policy Research, January 15, 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/consumption-and-income-inequality-us-1960s

Meyer’s work on consumption inequality is also an effective rebuttal

Sylvain Catherine, Max Miller and Natasha Sarin, “Social Security and Trends in Inequality,” University of Pennsylvania, February 29, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

Perhaps a better rebuttal is Sarin SS paper that found that wealth inequality has not increased in the past three decades after accounting for social security given she is Summer’s protégé

Gerald Auten and David Splinter, “Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-term Trends,” December 20, 2019, http://davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-Tax_Data_and_Inequality.pdf

Three recent paper’s come to mind that provide context, first the initial Auten/Splinter that found the top.1% income share had gone up, but not nearly as much as Saez suggests it has net taxes.

U.S. Census Bureau, “Income Gini Ratio For Households By Race Of Householder, All Races,” Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GINIALLRH

CBS is also citing Census which claims“The Gini index was significantly higher in 2018 than 2017 for the United States”but they are usingMedian Household Income showing.482 for 2017 and.485 for 2018.So that checks, even if we can point to the Household Gini to pushback.

According to FRED the Income Gini Ratio ForHouseholds By Race of Householders, All Racesticked down btw 2017 and 2018 (last year with available data from ) (from Census) from. 489 to.486

“…income inequality at highest level in 50 years Census 2109….”

Michael Strain, “Americans May Be Strapped, But the Go-To Statistic Is False,” Bloomberg, June 4, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-04/the-400-emergency-expense-story-is-wrong

  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income

Income And Poverty In The Covid-19 Pandemic

AI Summary. The fiscal response to the Covid-19 pandemic is estimated to have reduced the poverty rate by 1.5 percentage points, or 14%, through Economic Impact Payments and expanded unemployment insurance benefits. Family income at the 25th percentile rose about $3,000 (6.4%), the median $2,500 (2.8%), and the 75th percentile $1,300 (0.9%).

Jeehoon Han, Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Fiscal Response To Covid Pandemic Reduced Poverty Rate By 1.5 Percentage Points, or 14%.

How much did pandemic fiscal relief reduce poverty and raise incomes?

Core argument: The fiscal response to the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the poverty rate by 1.5 percentage points, or 14%, a statistically significant decline driven by Economic Impact Payments and enhanced Unemployment Insurance benefits.

The fiscal response to the Covid-19 pandemic significantly reduced the poverty rate by 1.5 percentage points, or 14%, marking a statistically significant decline. This reduction was driven by government interventions such as Economic Impact Payments and enhanced Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The 25th percentile of family income rose from about $46,000 in early 2020 to approximately $49,000 by mid-year, a $3,000 increase or 6.4%, reflecting the impact of these fiscal measures. Median income also saw a rise of $2,500 (2.8%), while the 75th percentile experienced a modest increase of $1,300 (0.9%). These income gains highlight the effectiveness of fiscal policies in mitigating economic hardships during the pandemic, particularly for lower-income families who benefited from targeted government support.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The fiscal response to the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the poverty rate by 1.5 percentage points, or 14%, a statistically significant decline driven by Economic Impact Payments and enhanced Unemployment Insurance benefits.
  2. Family income at the 25th percentile rose from about $46,000 in early 2020 to roughly $49,000 by mid-year, a $3,000 or 6.4% increase attributed to pandemic fiscal measures.
  3. Median family income rose $2,500, or 2.8%, while income at the 75th percentile rose $1,300, or 0.9%.

Meyer’s finds that the fiscal response to the Covid 19 pandemic lead to a fall in poverty of 1.5 percentage points:

“…The results in Figure 1 indicate that poverty was falling fairly steadily in the period leading up to the pandemic. Between November 2019 and February 2020, poverty fell by 0.9 percentage points. This decline then accelerates once the pandemic hits. Between the pre and post periods poverty fell by 1.5 percentage points (or about 14 percent), and this difference is statistically significant…”

Steve Post

Academic Paper

Government Spending

Business Cycle

Poverty/Crime

Wages/Income

Factoid

Suggusted Tags

Jeehoon Han, Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan, “Income And Poverty In The Covid-19 Pandemic,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, August 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27729.pdf

“…Looking beyond poverty estimates, we also consider how the COVID-19 pandemic affected different points in the distribution of income. In Figure 2 we report estimates of the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of family income (equivalized to a family with 2 adults and 2 children) for the period from January 2019 to June 2020. Then, in Table 2, we report estimates of the 25th percentile for each month between January and June of 2020, as well as changes in the 25th percentile between the pre-and post-onset of COVID-19 periods. Results similar to those in Table 2 but for the 50th and 75th percentiles are reported in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. The results in Figure 2 show that income for each of the percentiles we report remains flat for the period from January 2019 through February 2020. Then, incomes start to rise after that. The 25th percentile of family income increased from about $46,000 in January and February to about $49,000 in April, May, and June, a statistically significant increase of about $3,000, or 6.4 percent (Table 2).11 This increase seems reasonable given the government benefits low income families were potentially eligible for, including a $3,400 Economic Impact Payment (for a married couple with two children) and UI benefits that included a $600 per week top off. We also see a rise in income at higher percentiles, although the extent of the rise is smaller as we move up the distribution. Median income (Appendix Table 8) rose by about $2,500 (2.8 percent) during this period and this rise is statistically significant. At the 75th percentile (Figure 2 and Appendix Table 9), incomes rose more modestly, by about $1,300 (0.9 percent), and this rise is not statistically significant.A rise in income at the 75th percentile would not be too surprising given that those with incomes at this level would potentially still be eligible for the expanded government benefits. The equivalized income values for the 75th percentile are about $145,000 for a married couple with 2 children and about $65,000 for an individual. These values are below the income thresholds for receiving the full amount of the Economic Impact Payment….”

Meyer’s also looks at the distributional impact of the fiscal response, found the 25 percentile of family income saw an ~ $3,000 gain

  • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime
    • Wages/Income


Loading More Posts

End of content

No more pages to load

© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms