Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Tuesday, August 18, 2020

The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees

AI Summary. Hedge funds retained 63.6% of cumulative gross returns through management and incentive fees over a two-decade sample, leaving investors about 36 cents per dollar of gross excess return. Although the nominal incentive fee rate was 19%, the effective rate was 49.6%, a gap the authors attribute to contract asymmetry and investors' return-chasing.

Itzhak Ben-David National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 18, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Hedge funds retained 63.6% of cumulative gross returns btw 1995-2016, leaving investors with 36 cents per dollar of gross excess returns.

How much of hedge fund gross returns do fees absorb?

Core argument: Hedge funds retained 63.6% of cumulative gross returns through management and incentive fees between 1995 and 2016, leaving investors with 36 cents per dollar of gross excess returns.

Between 1995 and 2016, hedge funds retained 63.6% of cumulative gross returns through management and incentive fees, leaving investors with only 36 cents per dollar of gross excess returns. Despite a nominal incentive fee rate of 19%, the effective rate was 49.6%, highlighting a significant disconnect between contractual terms and actual fees paid. This disparity is exacerbated by the asymmetry of performance contracts and investors' tendency to chase returns, leading to suboptimal outcomes. The study underscores the need for investors to critically assess hedge fund fee structures, as the lion's share of returns is absorbed by fees before risk adjustments.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Hedge funds retained 63.6% of cumulative gross returns through management and incentive fees between 1995 and 2016, leaving investors with 36 cents per dollar of gross excess returns.
  2. The effective incentive fee rate on hedge funds was 49.6% versus a nominal rate of 19%, a disconnect between contractual terms and fees actually paid.
  3. The asymmetry of hedge fund performance contracts and investors' tendency to chase returns compound this fee disparity, according to the study.

New NBER has some interesting factoids on hedge fund performance, N=6,000 funds over two decades (1995 to 2016), study finds investors earned 36 cents for each dollar of gross excess returns, with the other 64 cents paid as management and incentives fees.

Would have been interesting if they had been able to carve out RenTec or D.E Shaw.

“…During the 22-year sample period, investors paid about half of their aggregate gross profits as incentive fees—whereas the average contractual incentive fee is below 20%. Moreover, there is a considerable disconnect between returns generated and incentive fees earned across all but the worst-performing 5% of funds. After including management fees, investors collected about 36 cents for each dollar of gross excess return generated by funds on their invested capital. The other 64 cents were paid as management and incentive fees. Adding insult to injury, these results are obtained before adjusting fund returns for risk…..(over a risk-free hurdle rate and before adjusting for any risk).In the cross-section of funds, there is a substantial disconnect between lifetime performance and incentive fees earned. These poor outcomes stem from the asymmetry of the performance contract, investors' return-chasing behavior, and underwater fund closures….We study the long-run outcomes associated with hedge funds' compensation structure. Over a 22-year period, the aggregate effective Hedge funds in our sample charge a nominal incentive fee rate of 19.0% of gross profits, on average. In practice, however, investors paid 49.6% of the cumulative gross profits as incentive fees during our sample period. That is, the effective incentive fee rate is 2.62 times higher than the corresponding nominal rate. Adding management fees to the equation, managers collected the lion’s share of returns over the years. Total fees paid amount to 63.6% of the cumulative gross returns when including management fees…”

The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Itzhak Ben-David, Justin Birru, Andrea Rossi, "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees," National Bureau Of Economic Research, August 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27454

  • Financial Markets
  • Comparisons
    • Historical

The Evolution Of Wealth Inequality Over Half A Century: The Role Of Taxes, Transfers And Technology

AI Summary. Growing wage dispersion accounted for 62.1% of the change in the top 1% wealth share over three decades, while tax and transfer policy changes accounted for nearly half the rise in wealth concentration. The authors project the wealthiest 1% could hold about half of all wealth within two to three decades.

Baris Kaymak MIT
Date Posted:
August 18, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Wage dispersion btw 1980-2010 contributed 62.1% to the change in top 1% wealth share. @BarisKaymak

What drives rising wealth concentration at the top?

Core argument: Wage dispersion accounted for 62.1% of the change in the top 1% wealth share over 1980–2010, with rising wage inequality attributed largely to skill-biased technical change.

Between 1980-2010, wage dispersion was a significant factor, contributing 62.1% to the change in the top 1% wealth share. This period saw increased wage inequality, largely due to skill-biased technical change, which drove higher income and wealth inequality in the U.S. Changes in tax and transfer policies also played a crucial role, accounting for nearly half of the rise in wealth concentration. The share of total transfer payments in GDP rose from 4.1% to 11.9%, driven by programs like Social Security and Medicare, which reduced the need for the bottom 90% to save for retirement, thus lowering their wealth accumulation and amplifying wealth concentration. The model predicts continued wealth concentration over the next two to three decades, with the wealthiest 1% potentially holding about half of the economy's wealth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage dispersion accounted for 62.1% of the change in the top 1% wealth share over 1980–2010, with rising wage inequality attributed largely to skill-biased technical change.
  2. Changes in tax and transfer policies accounted for nearly half of the rise in U.S. wealth concentration, as total transfer payments rose from 4.1% to 11.9% of GDP via programs including Social Security and Medicare.
  3. A model of U.S. wealth inequality predicts continued wealth concentration over two to three decades, with the wealthiest 1% potentially holding about half of the economy's wealth, as transfers reduce the bottom 90%'s need to save for retirement.

Baris Kaymak and Markus Poschke, "The Evolution Of Wealth Inequality Over Half A Century: The Role Of Taxes, Transfers And Technology,"Journal Of Monetary Economics, October 2015, https://markus-poschke.research.mcgill.ca/papers/KP_toptax.pdf

“….. Results highlight the role of increasing wage dispersion during this period as the main driver of trends in inequality…The findings emphasize the role of increasing wage dispersion, often attributed to skill biased technical change, as the main culprit of higher income and wealth inequality in the U.S. Changes in tax and transfer policies over the second half of the 20th century have played a key role, accounting for nearly half of the rise in wealth concentration. Nevertheless, their combined effect on the distribution of income and consumption were limited. The results indicate the equilibrium adjustment in prices, the redistributive nature of transfers and the offsetting effects of taxes and transfers on consumption as main reasons for this limited role. As such, the results call for caution when drawing conclusions regarding welfare, based on income and wealth distributions. An interpretation of our findings is that changes in the transfer policies have been as influential as the changes in tax policies. Yet, unlike the wide coverage of falling top income tax rates, changes in the transfer system has received little attention of late. Our focus has been on two major federal programs: the social security and medicare. Several other programs were introduced during this period, both at the federal and the state level, that could potentially have similar effects on the economy, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit program or the Welfare-to-Work programs. Given the redistributive nature of transfers in U.S., our findings highlight the need for empirical measures of wealth dispersion including claims on the public sector. The findings here suggest that such a measure would generally display a lower concentration of wealth, and a smaller increase over time….. changes in tax policy have to be analyzed in connection with the corresponding changes in transfer policy. During the same period, the share of total transfer payments in GDP increased from 4.1% to 11.9%. The rise in transfer spending was driven by two major programs: Social Security and Medicare, both of which target senior citizens. By subsidizing income and healthcare expenditures for the elderly, these programs curb incentives to save for retirement, a major source of wealth accumulation over the life-cycle. Furthermore, since both programs are redistributive by design, they have a stronger effect on the savings of low and middle income groups. By contrast, those at the top of the income distribution have little to gain from these programs. We argue that the redistributive nature of transfer payments was instrumental in curbing wealth accumulation for income groups outside the top 10% and, consequently, amplified wealth concentration in the U.S….Since the wealth distribution reacts more slowly to the economic environment than income, the full effect of the more recent changes in policy and wage dispersion has not yet fully materialized. Given today's wage structure and barring any further changes in tax and transfer policy,the model predicts two to three more decades of increasing wealth concentration, at which point the wealthiest 1% will eventually hold about half the wealth in the economy, roughly 10 percentage points more than their current share. Should future top wages increase further relative to the rest, the future increase in top wealth shares would be even larger. In contrast to their contribution to wealth inequality, top income tax cuts had no effect on the income distribution. The increase in income inequality is instead almost entirely attributable to the changes in the wage distribution. The difference comes from equilibrium adjustments in prices that work in opposing directions when income and wealth dispersions are concerned. Accumulation of additional wealth in response to tax cuts leads to a decline in the interest rate and an increase in the wage rate. The fall in the equilibrium interest rate discourages savings by lower wealth groups and exacerbates the direct effect of tax cuts on wealth inequality. As for income, the lower interest rate mitigates the rise in top incomes, while a higher wage rate benefits lower income groups as they live mainly off labor income. Therefore, changes in prices amplify the impact of tax cuts on wealth dispersion, while they mitigate their impact on income dispersion …”

It also argues that increased transfers have reduced the need for the bottom 90% to save for retirement which has the effect of lowering their wealth accumulation which has amplified wealth concentration. Finds that btw 1980-2010 wage dispersion contributed 62.1% of the change in top 1% wealth (not income) share

Second paper David sent. This argues that wage dispersion, related to skill based technical change, has been the primary driver of higher income and wealth inequality in the US.

Ed Comment:Mark as important. Lots of great data. But something is amiss. It says the 0.1% total tax rate is 11.5%. if so, I had better fire my tax advisors.

  • Government Spending
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Skill Level
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

Dr. Ed's Blog: Another Roaring Twenties May Be Ahead

AI Summary. High-tech spending on information technology equipment, software, and research and development reached a record $1.32tn at an annual rate, or 50.1% of total US capital spending. The author argues that investment in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and 5G could produce a period of prosperity resembling the 1920s.

Mark Twain Yardeni Research
Date Posted:
August 19, 2020
Is Database:
Database

A new era of economic abundance may be ahead, driven by significant technological advancements & capital investments. High-tech spending reached a record $1.32tn (saar) in Q2-2020, mirroring transformative growth of the 1920s.

Is record high-tech investment setting up a new decade of prosperity?

Core argument: High-tech spending on IT equipment, software, and R&D hit a record $1.32tn (saar) in Q2-2020, equal to 50.1% of total nominal capital spending in GDP.

The potential for a new era of economic abundance is supported by significant technological advancements and capital investments. In Q2-2020, high-tech spending on IT equipment, software, and R&D reached a record $1.32tn (saar), accounting for 50.1% of total capital spending in nominal GDP. This surge in investment, driven by innovations in biotechnology, AI, and 5G, mirrors the transformative economic growth of the 1920s. The urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated global medical and technological efforts, potentially leading to breakthroughs that could combat a wide range of illnesses. As history suggests, these developments may set the stage for a period of prosperity akin to the Roaring Twenties, emphasizing the creation and spread of abundance rather than the distribution of scarcity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High-tech spending on IT equipment, software, and R&D hit a record $1.32tn (saar) in Q2-2020, equal to 50.1% of total nominal capital spending in GDP.
  2. Yardeni argues that investment driven by biotechnology, AI, and 5G innovations mirrors the transformative economic growth of the 1920s and may usher in another Roaring Twenties.
  3. Yardeni argues that the urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated global medical and technological efforts that may yield breakthroughs against a wide range of illnesses.

Dr. Ed channels Andrew Field’s “Great Leap Forward”“…Today’s doomsters could be confounded by biotechnological innovations that deliver not only a vaccine for COVID-19 but for all coronaviruses. Scientists are investigating a dizzying array of approaches to fight COVID-19. Hopefully, beyond finding a cure or a vaccine, one of beneficial outcomes of all this research will be that scientists learnmany more ways to combat illnesses in general and viruses in particular. Typically, it takes roughly a decade for a new vaccine to go through the various stages of development and testing. However, the urgency of the pandemic has mobilized global medical resources as rarely seen in human history. Billions of dollars, provided by both the public and the private sectors, are funding the global campaign to develop tests, vaccines, and cures for the virus….The awesome range of futuristic “BRAIN” technological innovations includes biotechnology, robotics and automation, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology. There are also significant innovations underway in 5G for cellular networks, 3-D manufacturing, electric vehicles, battery storage, blockchain, and quantum and edge computing…. consider the follow stats on technology capital spending in the US: High-tech spending on IT equipment, software, and R&D rose to a record $1.32 trillion (saar) during Q2-2020 (Fig. 1). It jumped to a record 50.1% of total capital spending in nominal GDP during the quarter (Fig. 2). Equipment and software accounted for 31.1%, while R&D accounted for 19.1% of capital spending in nominal GDP (Fig. 3). The 1920s ended with a stock market meltup followed by a meltdown. The 2020s may already be seeing a meltup, begun on March 23. We live in interesting, though not unprecedented, times. The Roaring 1920s could be a precedent for the Roaring 2020s. As Mark Twain observed: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”….”

Dr. Ed's Blog: Another Roaring Twenties May Be Ahead: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Ed Yardeni, “Another Roaring Twenties Bay Be Ahead,” Yardeni Research, August 12, 2020, http://blog.yardeni.com/2020/08/another-roaring-twenties-may-be-ahead.html

Ed Comment:I don't find the static so insightful because we don't know what is happening to the rest of CAPEX which could be falling relatively. Seeing total spending by component as a share of GDP would be better. I think it won't show much rise. In part because the inflation adjusted cost of capital goods is falling. Adding intangibles not included here will show a rise relative to GDP. Nevertheless, I love the quote: From my perspective, economics is about creating and spreading abundance, not about distributing scarcity.

  • Productivity
    • Intangibles
    • Investment

Sorry, Mayor de Blasio: NYC desperately needs its billionaires

AI Summary. In New York City, 1,818 families each earning over $10m paid $2.8bn in local income taxes, nearly 25% of total income tax revenue. Losing these taxpayers would force cuts to services such as trash collection, crime control, and public-sector retirement benefits, and reduce donations that sustain cultural institutions.

Nicole Gelinas New York Post
Date Posted:
August 19, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@NicoleGelinas NYC’s 1,818 families earning > $10MM in 2017 paid almost 25% of income tax, crucial for the city’s fiscal health.

@NicoleGelinas NYC’s 1,818 families earning > $10MM in 2017 paid almost 25% of income tax, crucial for the...

Does a city depend on its wealthiest residents for revenue?

Core argument: In 2017, 1,818 New York City families earning over $10m each paid $2.8bn in local income taxes, nearly 25% of the city's total income tax revenue.

In 2017, 1,818 families in NYC earned over $10m each and contributed $2.8bn in local income taxes, nearly 25% of the total income tax revenue. This small group of high earners plays a crucial role in the city's fiscal health, as they collectively paid $6.1bn in income taxes, accounting for 53% of local income taxes. If this trend continued, they likely contributed $6.7bn for the recent fiscal year, over 10% of NYC's total tax collections. The absence of these contributions would necessitate explaining to middle-class residents why services like trash collection are reduced, to poorer residents why crime control is lacking, and to public-sector workers why early retirement is no longer feasible. Beyond taxes, wealthy individuals support cultural institutions through donations, enhancing NYC's appeal and attracting tourists and residents, thereby strengthening the tax base. Their presence is vital for maintaining the city's livability and economic stability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In 2017, 1,818 New York City families earning over $10m each paid $2.8bn in local income taxes, nearly 25% of the city's total income tax revenue.
  2. New York City's high earners collectively paid $6.1bn in income taxes, 53% of local income taxes, and on that trend likely contributed $6.7bn in the recent fiscal year, over 10% of total city tax collections.
  3. Without these contributions, New York City would face reduced trash collection for middle-class residents, weaker crime control for poorer residents, and the end of early retirement for public-sector workers, alongside fewer donations sustaining cultural institutions.

Nicole Gelinas, "Sorry, Mayor de Blasio: NYC desperately needs its billionaires,"New York Post, August 18, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/08/18/sorry-mayor-de-blasio-nyc-desperately-needs-its-billionaires/

Sorry, Mayor de Blasio: NYC desperately needs its billionaires

Who wants to be a New York City billionaire? Contrary to what the mayor thinks, Gotham needs its superrich.

Last week, The New York Times asked: Which political leader, in this crisis, is going to champion New York as a place where businesses and wealthy people want to be? Kathy Wylde, head of the Partnership for New York City, a coalition of business interests, said we need “a plan.”

To City Hall, the request smacked of outrageous entitlement. “Kick rocks, billionaires,” said the mayor’s spokesperson. The mayor himself was more circumspect. “I am not going to beg anybody to live in the greatest city in the world,” he said.

It’s one thing to opine that the rich must pay their “fair share,” as de Blasio ineffectually nattered on about for years. It’s another thing to say that New York doesn’t need — or want — them.

OK, so what does New York without billionaires — and their envious relations, millionaires — look like?

First, taxes. In 2017 (the last year for which full data is available), 65,053 New York households — about 1.7 percent of tax filers — made above half a million dollars, according to the city’s Independent Budget Office. They paid a whopping $6.1 billion in income taxes to the city, or 53 percent of local income taxes.

If this share of personal-income taxes has held up, they likely paid $6.7 billion in income taxes for the fiscal year that just ended — or more than 10 percent of the city’s total tax collections.

The richest of the rich? In 2017, 1,818 families earned above $10 million each — and paid $2.8 billion in local income taxes, or nearly a quarter of total income taxes.

It’s fine if New York City doesn’t want that cash — but city leaders will have to explain to middle-class people why trash isn’t being picked up as often, explain to poorer residents why it can’t keep crime down and explain to uniformed public-sector workers that they can no longer retire in their 50s.

But taxes are only one aspect. Wealthier people get to choose where they live, more so than many people can. They want to live here, for the same reasons many normal people do: restaurants, shopping, Broadway, the opera, museums, baseball games.

They just also happen to fund those things more than the rest of us. An opera-goer’s ticket doesn’t cover the cost of the show, just as a museum admission price doesn’t cover the cost of displaying its paintings.

Arts organizations depend on the people whose names are on the walls. Donors, in turn, don’t act entirely out of selflessness: They give to a cause whose product they and their peers enjoy.

You may never go to the opera, or Saks, or the museum — but wealthier people cross-subsidize these attractions with big donations or spending, attracting tourists and upper-middle-class residents to the city, further firming up the tax base.

Finally, there’s livability. The wealthy New Yorker perusing The Post from his Hamptons or Florida “second home” may read the article about a robbery spree on the Upper East Side — and decide it’s yet another reason not to return right now.

New York needs wealthier people to stay and care — partly because people in poorer neighborhoods, focused on survivability, have less time and resources to organize themselves in favor of better policing.

Nearly two decades ago, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg clumsily called New York a “luxury city.” But he had a point: Wealthier people would pay higher taxes here because they got a good quality of life.

Now what’s the calculation? Come back to New York — and worry about getting sick from a second wave of COVID-19 (keep in mind you’re probably old), worry about being mugged on the street, be unable to attend a classical-music show at least until next year and have protesters target you at home with deafening middle-of-the night protests?

The rejoinder from the socialists is: People shouldn’t be so rich. On a practical level, wealth distribution cannot be achieved on locally, when financial assets are mobile — and especially when that locality is falling apart.

The rejoinder from the urbanists is de Blasio’s line: Disloyal people should be shamed for being disloyal. But nobody has signed a blood oath to a New York City that doesn’t want them. That leaves poorer New Yorkers who can’t leave — with fewer education and job opportunities, and a greater risk of being felled by a stray bullet.

Nicole Gelinas is a contributing editor to the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal.

Ed Comment:Unfortunately, this is only income tax not property or sales tax which are probably a large share of taxes and regressive.

“…In 2017 (the last year for which full data is available),65,053 New York households — about 1.7 percent of tax filers — made above half a million dollars, according to the city’s Independent Budget Office. They paid a whopping $6.1 billion in income taxes to the city, or 53 percent of local income taxes….The richest of the rich?In 2017, 1,818 families earned above $10 million each — and paid $2.8 billion in local income taxes, or nearly a quarter of total income taxes….”

  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

make it than a highest-SES student with bottom-half scores

AI Summary. A Georgetown study finds that among 10th graders, 31% from the lowest socioeconomic quartile reach the top half of socioeconomic status by age 25, versus 74% from the highest quartile. A high-status sophomore with bottom-half math scores has a 56% chance of ending in the top half, compared with 47% for a low-status student with top-half scores.

Michael Quinn Georgetown University Center On Education And Workforce
Date Posted:
August 19, 2020
Is Database:
Database

High School Sophomore From Highest SES Quartile With A Bottom Half Math Score Has A 56% Of Remaining In Top Half By SES Whereas 10th Grader From Lowest SES Quartile With Top Half Score Has 47% Chance Of Reaching Top Half By SES.

Does family background outweigh test scores in predicting economic mobility?

Core argument: A Georgetown study finds that a high school sophomore from the highest socioeconomic status (SES) quartile with bottom-half math scores has a 56% chance of ending in the top half of SES, versus 47% for a lowest-quartile student with top-half math scores.

Economic mobility is significantly influenced by family SES [Socioeconomic Status], as evidenced by a Georgetown study. Among 10th graders, only 31% from the lowest SES quartile achieve top-half SES status by age 25, compared to 74% from the highest SES quartile. Notably, a high school sophomore from the highest SES quartile with bottom-half math scores has a 56% chance of remaining in the top half of SES, while a student from the lowest SES quartile with top-half math scores has only a 47% chance of reaching the top half. This data underscores that academic merit alone does not guarantee economic success, highlighting the persistent impact of family background on future socioeconomic outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Georgetown study finds that a high school sophomore from the highest socioeconomic status (SES) quartile with bottom-half math scores has a 56% chance of ending in the top half of SES, versus 47% for a lowest-quartile student with top-half math scores.
  2. Among 10th graders in the Georgetown study, 31% from the lowest SES quartile reach top-half SES status by age 25, compared with 74% from the highest SES quartile.
  3. The Georgetown study indicates that academic merit alone does not guarantee economic success and that family background continues to shape socioeconomic outcomes.

Anthony Carnevale Megan Fasules Michael Quinn and Kathryn Peltier Campbell, “Born To Win, Schooled To Lose: Why Equally Talented Students Don’t Get Equal Chances To Be All They Can Be,” Georgetown University Center On Education And Workforce, 2019, https://cew.georgetown.edu/cew-reports/schooled2lose/

“….Less than one third (31%) of tenth graders in the lowest SES quartile earn the income, educational attainment, or occupational prestige to be in the top half of the SES distribution among same-age young adults 10 years later. Meanwhile, 74 percent of young adults whose families were in the highest SES quartile remain in the top SES half as young adults (Figure 16)…..Low-SES students with top-half math scores appear to be more economically mobile than those with bottom scores. However, top math scores alone are not enough to overcome the influence of family SES on economic mobility. Among tenth graders, those from the lowest SES quartile are less likely than their highest SES counterparts to be in the upper SES half after 10 years, regardless of math scores. A tenth grader from the highest SES quartile with bottom-half math scores has a 56 percent chance of remaining in the top half of SES, whereas a tenth grader from the lowest SES quartile with top-half scores has a 47 percent chance of reaching the top half of SES by age 25 (Figure 17).Simply stated, success isn’t based strictly on academic merit: a lowest-SES student with top-half scores is less likely to “make it” than a highest-SES student with bottom-half scores….”

Georgetown study you asked about that found kids from wealthy backgrounds with low test scores were more likely to be well-off by early adulthood than kids from low-income families with high math test scores by a measure of Socioeconomic Status (which is a measure of parental educational attainment, family income, and occupation).

Ed Comment: File this and link it to the study that says that adding the military score eliminates difference in white vs black mobility, which this seems to contradict.The math in this report is hokey. Using only the designator upper and lower half scores rather than the actual score allows large and small differences in scores. For example high-scoring high-SES children probably score much higher on average than high-scoring low-SES children because SES is correlated with scores and scores are in large part hereditary. It is likely the average of the high-scoring low-SES children centers near the mean. So might the average score of the low-scoring high-SES children. The distribution of the 2 groups is very similar despite different SES parents and upbringings. (It may be the case that the 4 bars below are really 3 bars because the two center bars have about the same math scores. So we see very high, near median, and very low.) Without much difference in scores, other variables would come into to play. And high-SES children are more likely to have those variables for the same reasons. Their parent were successful for reasons—extroversion, consciousness, low anxiety, optimism, disproportionately high verbal skills, healthy, strong family environment, supportive culture, good education/apprenticeship, and vice versa.

  • Test Scores
  • Comparisons
    • Race
  • Workforce
    • Education


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