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Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Predictable Financial Crises

AI Summary. Historical data indicate that when credit and asset prices grow rapidly over three years, the probability of a financial crisis within the next three years is 40%, versus 7% in stable periods. The authors find 63% of crises were preceded by such credit-market overheating, which also forecasts weaker medium-term economic growth.

Robin Greenwood, Samuel Hanson, Andrei Shleifer and Jakob Ahm Sorensen National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 4, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Rapid credit/asset price growth increases financial crisis likelihood by 40% over 3yrs, compared to 7% in stable periods. @nberpub

Rapid credit/asset price growth increases financial crisis likelihood by 40% over 3yrs, compared to 7% in stable periods....

Does rapid credit and asset price growth predict financial crises?

Core argument: When credit and asset prices grow rapidly over three years, the probability of a financial crisis within the next three years rises to 40%, versus 7% in stable periods, according to historical data.

Historical data indicates that rapid credit and asset price growth significantly increases the likelihood of financial crises. Specifically, when credit and asset prices grow rapidly over three years, the probability of a crisis within the next three years rises to 40%, compared to 7% in stable periods. The "R-zone" indicator, identifying periods of potential credit-market overheating, shows a 13% crisis probability at a 1-year horizon for business credit growth and 14% for household credit growth. This predictability suggests that macro-financial policies should counteract credit booms. Notably, 63% of crises were preceded by an R-zone event, and global R-zone variables enhance crisis predictability. For instance, Germany's crisis probability was 37% in 2007 due to global factors, leading to a crisis in 2008. Additionally, R-zone events forecast GDP contractions, with rapid credit growth predicting lower GDP growth over the medium term.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. When credit and asset prices grow rapidly over three years, the probability of a financial crisis within the next three years rises to 40%, versus 7% in stable periods, according to historical data.
  2. The "R-zone" indicator of credit-market overheating implies a 13% one-year crisis probability for business credit growth and 14% for household credit growth, and 63% of crises were preceded by an R-zone event.
  3. Global R-zone variables improve crisis predictability, with Germany's crisis probability at 37% in 2007 on global factors ahead of its 2008 crisis, and R-zone events also forecast GDP contractions.

Shleifer (this is very much in the spirit of his last book) supports Kindleberger-Minsky view that that financial panics are a predictable function of the boom-bust credit cycle:

“….Using historical data on post-war financial crises around the world, we show that crises are substantially predictable. The combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with about a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth has been elevated. Our evidence cuts against the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and points toward the Kindleberger-Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom-bust credit cycles. The predictability we document favors macro-financial policies that “lean against the wind” of credit market booms…. . First…crises can be predicted using past credit growth in simple linear forecasting regressions. We show that both nonfinancial business and household credit growth forecast the onset of a future crisis. However, the degree of predictability is modest, even at horizons of up to five years. Schularick and Taylor (2012) find that a one standard deviation rise in real 1-year credit growth leads to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of a crisis over the next five years. Repeating their analysis on our sample with BVX’s crisis chronology, we obtain virtually the same result….Second, we show that the degree of predictability rises substantially when we focus on large credit expansions that are accompanied by asset price booms. Specifically, when nonfinancial business credit growth is high and stock market valuations have risen sharply, or when household credit growth is high and home prices have risen sharply, the probability of a subsequent crisis is substantially elevated. The combination of rapid credit growth and asset price growth in the same sector is a natural signal of an outward shift in the supply of credit, which then sows the seeds of its own destruction… Our results are robust to different classifications of financial crises such as those in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017). However, we do not use data on credit spreads in this paper, which would likely increase the predictability of crises, because the historical scarcity of these data would substantially reduce our sample. To demonstrate these results, we construct a simple indicator variable called the Redzone, or the “R-zone” for short, that identifies periods of potential credit-market overheating. Specifically, we say that a country is in the “business R-zone” if nonfinancial business credit growth over the past three years is in the top quintile of the historical distribution, and stock market returns over the same window are in the top tercile. The probability of a crisis at a 1- year horizon is 13% if a country is in the business R-Zone, a substantial increase over the unconditional probability of 4%. The comparable 1-year probability is 14% if a country is in the household R-zone—i.e., if household credit growth and home price growth are jointly elevated. Crucially, the degree of predictability increases dramatically with horizon. The probability of experiencing a financial crisis within the next three years is 45% for countries 3 that are in the business R-zone, and 37% for countries in the household R-zone. Put differently, even after entering the R-zone, crises are slow to develop, suggesting that policymakers have time to act based on early warning signs….Third, we show that overheating in the business and household credit markets are separate phenomena. Both independently predict the arrival of future crises, but they are particularly dangerous in the rare instances—e.g., Japan in 1988—when they occur in tandem. 63% of the crises in our sample were preceded by either a household or business R-zone event within the prior three years. Perhaps not surprisingly, the United States was in the household R-zone from 2002-2006 and a financial crisis arrived in 2007….Fourth, overheating in credit markets naturally has a global component and is correlated across countries. We construct global business R-zone and global household R-zone variables which measure the fraction of countries in our sample that are in the R-zone in each year. We find that including these global variables in our forecasting regressions substantially increases the predictability of crises. For example, while Germany was nowhere near the R-zone in 2007, 33% of countries were in the business R-zone and 36% were in the household R-zone at the time. As a result, the predicted probability of experiencing a crisis within 3 years was 37% for Germany in 2007 and, indeed, Germany experienced a crisis in 2008. Furthermore, when we account for these global variables, we estimate that the probability of a subsequent crisis in the U.S. rose from 31% in 2002 when U.S. first entered the household R-zone to 51% in 2006…..Fifth, we show that R-zone events predict future contractions in real gross domestic product (GDP)…show that periods of credit market overheating predict lower real GDP growth at a horizon of two years. Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2019) demonstrate that rapid credit growth—especially household credit growth—forecasts low real GDP growth over the medium run. Adrian, Grinberg, Liang, and Malik (2018) find that financial stability measures—which include credit growth—predict higher downside risks to GDP growth. We show that the business and household R-zones also reliably predict GDP contractions, which we define as a 2% decline in real GDP in a year.This result is only partially driven by the well-known fact that financial crises themselves are associated with GDP contractions (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a)….”

Robin Greenwood, Samuel Hanson, Andrei Shleifer and Jakob Ahm Sorensen, “Predictable Financial Crises,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, June 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27396

  • Financial Crisis
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets

Public To Private Equity In The United States: A Long-Term Look

AI Summary. Almost none of Amazon's $1.3tn value was created while private, versus 3% for Google and 17% for Facebook, and intangible investment now exceeds tangible investment by 1.5x. With fewer physical assets, companies need less capital and can stay private longer, while public-listing survival rates fell from 92% for pre-1970 listings to 63% for 2000s listings.

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan Morgan Stanley
Date Posted:
August 4, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Almost none of Amazon’s $1.3tn value was built in the private market, with only 3% of Google’s & 17% of Facebook’s value originating there.

Does the shift to intangible investment keep companies private longer?

Core argument: Almost none of Amazon's $1.3tn value was created in private markets, with only 3% of Google's and 17% of Facebook's value originating there.

The evolution of equity markets reveals that almost none of Amazon's $1.3tn value was built in the private market, with only 3% of Google's and 17% of Facebook's value originating there. This shift is partly due to a change in investment forms over the last 40 years, where intangible investments now surpass tangible ones by 1.5 times. Companies require less capital due to fewer physical assets, allowing them to remain private longer. The number of public companies has fluctuated, with a decline in survival rates from 92% for pre-1970 listings to 63% for those in the 2000s. This trend is driven by acquisitions and the rise of "superstar" firms, which benefit from increasing returns in intangible-based businesses. The concentration of industries and the dominance of leading companies have led to higher economic rents, reducing the need for young companies to go public to raise capital.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Almost none of Amazon's $1.3tn value was created in private markets, with only 3% of Google's and 17% of Facebook's value originating there.
  2. Intangible investment now exceeds tangible investment by 1.5 times, and companies holding fewer physical assets require less capital, allowing them to stay private longer.
  3. Survival rates for public listings fell from 92% for companies listed before 1970 to 63% for those listed in the 2000s, a decline attributed to acquisitions and the rise of "superstar" firms.

Some good charts from a new MS research note on the rise of evolution of equity markets plus this really good factoid, “…Virtually none of the $1.3 trillion in value that Amazon built was in the private market. Three percent of the value created by Alphabet, which controls Google, was in the private market, and that percentage was about 17 percent for Facebook. And the implied value of Uber in the private market was more than 100 percent of the total value created, as the company’s market capitalization is below what its IPO price implied….”

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, “Public To Private Equity In The United States: A Long-Term Look,” Morgan Stanley, August 4, 2020, https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/articles_publictoprivateequityintheusalongtermlook_us.pdf

MS:“….the mix of tangible and intangible investments has changed over the last 40 years. In the late 1970s tangible investments were nearly double those of intangible investments. Today, intangible investments are one-and-a-half times larger than tangible investments. A watershed change in the form of investment has occurred over a couple of generations.This shift has a few implications for our discussion. To begin, companies need less capital because they need fewer physical assets. For example, sales per employee for Facebook, Inc. were nearly double those of Ford Motor Company in 2019. From 1956 to 1976 the number of public companies grew fivefold, as many companies needed to finance “their mass production and mass distribution.” Today, companies simply do not require as much capital as they once did. This, along with freer access to private capital, allows private companies to remain private longer.Anotherimplication is that the rate of change, which we can measure by longevity, appears to be speeding up. The idea is that if longevity is decreasing, the rate of change is increasing. About 1,500 companies went public during the 1970s, 3,000 in the 1980s, 3,900 in the 1990s, and 2,100 in the 2000s. Companies that had listed before 1970 had a 92 percent probability of surviving the next five years, and those listed in the 2000s had a probability of only 63 percent. The chance of survival has dropped in each successive decade. The main reason companies delist is that they are acquired. This contributes to the last implication.In corporate America, the strong are getting stronger. This is giving rise to “superstar” firms. For example, the gap in return on invested capital between a U.S. company in the top 10 percent and the median has risen sharply in recent decades. Consolidation explains a large part of this. Measures of concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, have shown a substantial increase for many industries since the mid-1990s. These include industries that rely on tangible assets.When the proper conditions are in place, certain businesses exhibit increasing returns, which include very high market shares and economic profits. Increasing returns are pronounced in intangible-based businesses, and there has been a growing gap between the intangible spending of the large firms relative to small ones.The shift from tangible to intangible assets has had a meaningful effect on the mix between public and private companies. That many young companies have less capital intensity means they don’t need to go public to raise capital. The mix of the companies that are public has shifted to more reliance on intangible investment, which in turn has led to a reduction in longevity. And the economics of information goods, combined with the concentration of traditional industries and the outsourcing of low-value-added activities, means that a handful of leading companies earn much higher economic rents than their competitors and businesses of the past….”

  • Financial Markets
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Wednesday, August 5, 2020

Joe Stiglitz reviews Bjorn Lomborg’s new book

AI Summary. The author argues that reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 could cost $1.5tn a year, or 2% of global GDP, while lowering global temperatures by only 0.5°C by 2100. He contends that spending on innovation and adaptation would be more cost-effective, and that current climate policies divert developing economies' funds from infrastructure and development.

Benjamin Zycher American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
August 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Bjorn Lomborg’s analysis highlights the economic implications of global warming remediation, emphasizing that the cost of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 could reach $1.5tn annually, equating to 2% of global GDP. @BenjaminZycher

Bjorn Lomborg’s analysis highlights the economic implications of global warming remediation, emphasizing that the cost...

Is spending on innovation and adaptation more cost-effective than net-zero targets?

Core argument: Bjorn Lomborg estimates that achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 would cost $1.5tn annually, equal to 2% of global GDP, while reducing global temperatures by only 0.5°C by 2100.

Bjorn Lomborg's analysis highlights the economic implications of global warming remediation, emphasizing that the cost of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 could reach $1.5tn annually, equating to 2% of global GDP. He argues that such expenditures may not yield proportional benefits, as the projected reduction in global temperatures by 2100 would be a mere 0.5°C. Lomborg suggests reallocating resources towards innovation and adaptation strategies, which could offer more cost-effective solutions. He also points out that current climate policies disproportionately affect developing economies, potentially hindering their growth by diverting funds from essential infrastructure and development projects. This perspective invites policymakers to reconsider the balance between immediate climate action and long-term economic sustainability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bjorn Lomborg estimates that achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 would cost $1.5tn annually, equal to 2% of global GDP, while reducing global temperatures by only 0.5°C by 2100.
  2. Lomborg argues that reallocating resources toward innovation and adaptation strategies could offer more cost-effective responses to global warming than current net-zero spending.
  3. Lomborg contends that current climate policies disproportionately affect developing economies by diverting funds from essential infrastructure and development projects, potentially hindering their growth.

Benjamin Zycher is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Joe Stiglitz reviews Bjorn Lomborg’s new book

Benjamin Zycher, “Joe Stiglitz reviews Bjorn Lomborg’s new book,“American Enterprise Institute, August 4, 2020, https://www.aei.org/articles/joe-stiglitz-reviews-bjorn-lomborgs-new-book/

Ed Comment::…Add to global warming. I don't know how much of the research the author who is reviewing Stiglitz's review of lomborg's book) cites is propaganda from the fossil fuel industry and other dubious sources, but it's pretty shocking if it's half true. The cost of remediation is astronomical. As discussed below, Stiglitz considers the IPCC report “Global Warming of 1.5°C” to be a pillar of rigorous analysis. And so let us quote the supporting documentation (page 2-78) on the cost of climate policy: The midpoint of the range for 2030 is $3,156 per ton in year 2017 dollars. That works out to a tax of over $29 per gallon of gasoline. (Combustion of a gallon of gasoline/ethanol 10 percent blend emits about 18.9 pounds of CO2.) The impact of extraordinary effort to reduce emissions is near zero. The entire Paris agreement, if implemented immediately and enforced strictly: 0.17 degrees C. There are no warming trends. The Northern and Southern Hemisphere sea ice changes tell different stories. Manmade impact on global warming accounts for only a third of the temperature rise. The latest research in the peer-reviewed literature suggests that mankind is responsible for about half a degree of the global temperature increase of about 1.5 degrees C since 1850. We will make the 2 degree C target if we do nothing The standard argument from the international advocates of climate policy for years was a need to limit ACC to 2 degrees C by 2100, officially reduced by the IPCC in 2018 to 1.5 degrees C, for the obvious reason that given ongoing and likely trends, the 2 degree C limit is going to be achieved without any climate policies at all. Thus has the climate left moved the policy goalposts, a dynamic that has received vastly less critical attention than it deserves. …”

In a recent New York Times review of Bjorn Lomborg’s new book, “False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet” (Basic Books, 2020), Joseph E. Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 2001, performs a real public service. Not in terms of his criticisms of the book; as discussed below, virtually every argument Stiglitz made is incorrect. But instead, Stiglitz’s review provides us with a distilled encapsulation of the determined avoidance of evidence, the weak arguments, and the mendacity that for decades have defined the climate alarmist camp.

Let us review Stiglitz’s complaints about Lomborg’s book:

The cost of limiting anthropogenic climate change (ACC) to 1.5-2 degrees C would not be high, but instead “moderate.”
Lomborg underestimates the damage caused by ACC: rising sea levels (“Wall Street could be underwater by 2100”); “more intense hurricanes, more droughts, more floods”; and the like.
Lomborg’s analysis fails to take “due account of risk.” Accordingly, “caution” requires us to take steps now to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, because we do not have “another planet we could all move to.”
It is required “ethically” that we evaluate the future costs and benefits of climate policies at a low discount rate to avoid imposing large damages on “our children in 50 years.”
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report of 2019, titled “Global Warming of 1.5°C,” is a serious guide for evaluating climate policy.
Yes, we face many problems, but “as the advocates of the Green New Deal point out, investments that reduce climate change can usher in a new era of prosperity.”

The “moderate” cost of climate policies

The sine qua non of climate policies is a substantial increase in the cost of energy. No other outcome is possible because any effort to reduce GHG emissions must be driven by reductions in the use of fossil fuels, that is, a policy-induced reduction in the supply of energy. It is no accident that Congress has never been willing politically to enact serious (or any) limits on emissions of GHG, and so the Obama administration attempted to impose such constraints by regulatory fiat.

As discussed below, Stiglitz considers the IPCC report “Global Warming of 1.5°C” to be a pillar of rigorous analysis. And so let us quote the supporting documentation (page 2-78) on the cost of climate policy:

estimates for a Below-1.5°C pathway range from 135-5500 USD tCO2-eq in 2030, 245-13000 USD tCO2-eq in 2050, 420-17500 USD tCO2-eq in 2070 and 690-27000 USD tCO2-eq in 2100.

The midpoint of the range for 2030 is $3,156 per ton in year 2017 dollars. That works out to a tax of over $29 per gallon of gasoline. (Combustion of a gallon of gasoline/ethanol 10 percent blend emits about 18.9 pounds of CO2.) Put aside the higher figures among the ranges and the upward shifts as the end of the century approaches: Can anyone believe that such taxes on conventional energy are feasible politically anywhere in the world? Does Stiglitz? Does Stiglitz view the Green Climate Fund — an integral part of the Paris climate agreement ostensibly intended to compensate the less-developed economies for the costs of reducing GHG emissions — as unneeded on the grounds that those costs will be “moderate”?

The economic downturn attendant upon the COVID-19 pandemic has reduced global GHG emissions by about 17 percent. Assume that reduction to be permanent; the temperature effect by 2100 would be a decline of about 0.1 degrees C, as predicted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) climate model. (Given the standard deviation of the surface temperature record, about 0.11 degrees C, that effect would be barely detectable.) The global cost thus far in terms of lost gross domestic product (GDP) has been roughly 5 percent. Yes, the long-run GDP effect might be smaller than the recent experience, as markets find ways to make the adjustment process easier, but the argument that substantial reductions in GHG emissions would not impose massive costs is not to be taken seriously. What evidence supports Stiglitz’s assertion that the cost of a “net-zero” emissions policy would be “moderate”?

Sea levels, hurricanes, droughts, etc.

Stiglitz’s failure to provide any systematic evidence on climate phenomena is telling but unsurprising. ACC incontrovertibly is “real” in that increasing GHG concentrations are having detectable effects. But that does not tell us the magnitude of the observable impacts on climate phenomena. Temperatures are rising, but as the Little Ice Age ended around 1850, it is not easy to separate natural from anthropogenic effects on temperatures and other climate parameters. The latest research in the peer-reviewed literature suggests that mankind is responsible for about half a degree of the global temperature increase of about 1.5 degrees C since 1850.

There is little trend in the number of “hot” days for 1895-2017; 11 of the 12 years with the highest number of such days occurred before 1960. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has maintained since 2005 the US Climate Reference Network, comprising 114 meticulously maintained temperature stations spaced more or less uniformly across the lower 48 states, 21 stations in Alaska, and two stations in Hawaii. The reported data show no trend over the available 2005-20 reporting period. A reconstruction of global temperatures over the past one million years, using data from ice sheet formations, shows there is nothing unusual about the current warm period.

Global mean sea level has been increasing for thousands of years at about 3.3 mm per year; it may or may not be accelerating, and any such acceleration might be the result of anthropogenic or natural causes. The Northern and Southern Hemisphere sea ice changes tell different stories.

US tornado activity shows either no trend or a downward trend since 1954. Tropical storms, hurricanes, and accumulated cyclone energy show little trend since satellite measurements began in the early 1970s. The number of US wildfires shows no trend since 1985, and global acreage burned has declined over past decades. The Palmer Drought Severity index shows no trend since 1895. US flooding over the past century is uncorrelated with increasing GHG concentrations.

The available data do not support the ubiquitous assertions about the dire impacts of declining pH levels in the oceans. Global food availability and production have increased more or less monotonically over the past two decades on a per capita basis. As noted above, the IPCC itself in its Fifth Assessment Report was deeply dubious (page 12-78) about the various severe effects often asserted to be looming as impacts of anthropogenic warming.

“Risk,” “caution,” and steps to be taken now

Stiglitz’s rhetoric about the unavailability of “another planet” to which humanity could move tells us nothing about the prospective effects of the policies he favors. His implicit assumption is that his favored policies would yield significant climate effects. The reality is that even policies aggressive in terms of reducing GHG emissions would have effects either small or effectively equal to zero by the end of the century, using the EPA climate model under highly favorable assumptions, in particular an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 4.5 degrees C.

Full implementation of the Obama administration climate action plan would have reduced temperatures in 2100 by 0.015 degrees C. The most prominent recent proposals for a US carbon tax are those promoted by the Alliance for Market Solutions and the Climate Leadership Council; the temperature reduction in 2100 yielded by each proposal would be 0.015 degrees C. The entire Paris agreement, if implemented immediately and enforced strictly: 0.17 degrees C. The contemporaneous agreement between the Obama administration and China, if one were to take the agreement seriously: an additional 0.01 degrees C. The electricity component of the Green New Deal: 0.17 degrees C. A net reduction of GHG emissions to zero by the entire Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: 0.35 degrees C.

Assume a truly serious international effect to reduce GHG emissions: a 20 percent reduction by China, a 30 percent reduction by the rest of the industrialized world, and a 20 percent reduction by the rest of the developing world, all in addition to the US reductions as envisioned in the Obama climate action plan, and all by 2030. The temperature effect by 2100: a bit more than 0.5 degrees C. Does Stiglitz believe that policies yielding such reductions in emissions — or ones even greater — are remotely plausible politically?

Ethics and the interests of future generations

Stiglitz’s argument that an artificially low discount rate is appropriate as a tool with which to give sufficient weight to the interests of future generations is not correct. Consider a baby born in a cave some tens of thousands of years ago, in a world with environmental quality virtually unaffected by mankind. That child at birth would have had a life expectancy of about 10 years; had it been able to choose, it willingly would have given up some environmental quality in exchange for a longer life expectancy engendered by better housing, food, water, medical care, and safety, ad infinitum.

In other words, the central interest of future generations is a bequest from previous generations of the most valuable possible capital stock, of which environmental quality is one important dimension among many. There always are unavoidable trade-offs among them. Satisfaction of that bequest preference on the part of future generations requires efficient resource allocation by the current generation, a process not consistent with the use of an artificially low discount rate. If regulatory and other policies implemented by the current generation yield less wealth currently and a smaller total capital stock for future generations — defined broadly to include environmental values — then some additional emissions of pollutants and GHG by the current generation would be preferred (efficient) from the viewpoint of those future generations.

The IPCC 1.5 degree report

The problems inherent in the report cited favorably by Stiglitz are legion, but let us consider here only one among them: The application of only the most extreme among the IPCC scenarios of atmospheric concentrations of GHG, “Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5.” For the period 1959-2019, the average annual increase in GHG concentrations was about 1.6 parts per million (ppm). For 1985-2019, the figure is about 1.9ppm. For 2000-19: about 2.2ppm. Under RCP 8.5, the assumed annual average for 2018-2100 is 11.9ppm — that is, over six times the average since 1985 and over five times the average since 2000, in a world transitioning from coal to natural gas, however slowly and unevenly. RCP 8.5 is a scenario approaching impossibility.

At a more political level, Stiglitz merely repeats the recent alarmist position that the “safe” limit for ACC now is 1.5 degrees C. The standard argument from the international advocates of climate policy for years was a need to limit ACC to 2 degrees C by 2100, officially reduced by the IPCC in 2018 to 1.5 degrees C, for the obvious reason that given ongoing and likely trends, the 2 degree C limit is going to be achieved without any climate policies at all. Thus has the climate left moved the policy goalposts, a dynamic that has received vastly less critical attention than it deserves.

The “new era of prosperity”

Consider a massive earthquake that destroys a substantial part of a nation’s capital stock, including facilities producing and consuming energy. Humans being what they are, the destruction will lead to new investment, rebuilding, expanded employment in construction, and the like. Can anyone believe that society is wealthier because of all this, compared with a world in which the destruction did not take place?

Of course not. Such an outlook is an example of the age-old “broken windows” fallacy: A broken window, by providing employment for the window repair sector, increases economic activity and aggregate wealth. Obviously, that cannot be correct, as it ignores the uses to which the resources devoted to the window repair would have been used had the window never been broken.

Climate policies, again by definition efforts to increase sharply the cost of conventional energy, would destroy some nontrivial part of the economic value of the energy-using and -producing capital stock. Many impacts would ensue, but a “new era of prosperity” is not among them.

This is as basic as economics can be. But Stiglitz — not merely an economist, but a Noble laureate — is happy to endorse it as part of his ideological drive to support the policy imperatives of the climate left. Can he possibly believe this? That the answer is not obvious is deeply troubling.

*********

Lomborg’s book is an important review of the benefits and costs of policies to reduce GHG emissions, but it and his general outlook on ACC are subject to wholly reasonable criticisms. He believes, and has stated numerous times, that it is a real problem with negative prospective consequences. What evidence supports that assertion? How does he know that the net effects of ACC will be negative? After all, the “greening” phenomenon — carbon dioxide fertilization — is very real, and far more humans are killed by cold than by heat. A future glaciation is a virtual certainty, however distant in time, and ACC might provide an important benefit. Moreover, the pitfalls of such government policies as carbon taxes are no secret, as Lomborg recognizes explicitly, and his willingness to rely on model projections for a century or more does not inspire confidence.

But those are mere quibbles in the context of Lomborg’s book and obviously are not Stiglitz’s concerns in any event. Lomborg is no skeptic of mainstream climate science, but that is not nearly enough, in that his policy argument — which Stiglitz does not attempt even superficially to refute — fails to provide support for the ideological preferences of the climate alarmists. That is why Stiglitz studiously avoids a systematic review of the evidence, an evaluation of the future climate effects of his preferred policy prescriptions — as predicted by the climate models he cites — and an honest discussion of costs and benefits. Instead, Stiglitz’s central stance is that a crisis is upon us, we do not have “another planet we could all move to,” the costs of dealing with the crisis would be “moderate,” and anyone in disagreement with that outlook is engaged in “mind pollution.” That is a stance deeply unserious.

One would think The New York Times would have found a way to obscure more effectively its obvious intent to publish a scathing review of Lomborg’s book. One would think the same about The New York Times’ ideological opposition to fossil fuels, its support for a massive increase in central planning by the federal and international bureaucracies, and its anti-human stance against the alleviation of grinding poverty among the world’s poorest. One would think The New York Times editors could have found a reviewer a bit more subtle and more willing to offer a few relevant facts, even if unrepresentative of systematic realities. One would think the climate left would adopt a stance of greater modesty after decades of apocalyptic warnings that have failed to come to pass. And in all those dimensions: One would be wrong.

  • Global Warming

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows

AI Summary. Crime data show gun arrests in New York City fell from 113 in one week to 22 five weeks later while shootings rose from 23 to 63, and an analysis found homicides up 24% across the 50 largest US cities. Court slowdowns and reduced police presence have been cited as contributing factors.

Alan Feuer New York Times
Date Posted:
August 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Urban violence: Top 50 cities see homicides +24%. NYC case study: Gun arrests plunge -81% (113→22) as shootings spike +174% (23→63). Data reveals pandemic/protest impact on enforcement.

Do falling gun arrests coincide with rising shootings in big cities?

Core argument: A Wall Street Journal analysis found homicides up 24% across the 50 largest US cities, with shootings and gun violence also rising even as other major crimes declined.

In the 15 largest US cities, a notable percentage change in total homicides Y/Y has been observed, with a significant decline in gun arrests correlating with an increase in shootings. In New York City, gun arrests dropped from 113 in the week of May 24 to just 22 by June 28, while shootings rose from 23 to 63 over the same period. This trend is not isolated to NYC; a Wall Street Journal analysis found homicides up 24% across the 50 largest US cities, with shootings and gun violence also increasing. The pandemic's impact on the criminal justice system, including court slowdowns and reduced police presence due to protests, has been cited as contributing factors. Despite other major crimes declining, the rise in gun violence poses a risk to urban safety and economic stability, potentially reversing decades of progress in crime reduction.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Wall Street Journal analysis found homicides up 24% across the 50 largest US cities, with shootings and gun violence also rising even as other major crimes declined.
  2. In New York City, gun arrests fell from 113 in the week of May 24 to 22 by June 28, while shootings rose from 23 to 63 over the same period.
  3. Court slowdowns tied to the pandemic and reduced police presence during protests have been cited as factors in the rise in gun violence, which poses a risk to urban safety and economic stability.

Alan Feuer, "The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows,"New York Times, August 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/nyregion/nyc-shootings-coronavirus.html

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows

In the past few weeks, Mayor Bill de Blasio and his police commissioner, Dermot F. Shea, have tied the steep rise in shootings in New York City to a breakdown in the criminal justice system that they contend has allowed criminals back out on the streets.

The mayor and commissioner have cited a range of causes that they have portrayed as outside their control: the pandemic and the George Floyd protests, as well as measures approved by the State Legislature, including one that eliminated cash bail for many defendants.

But a confidential analysis of police data, conducted by city officials but not released to the public, offers little if any evidence to back up their claims. In fact, the analysis, obtained by The New York Times, suggests the state’s new bail law and the mass release of inmates from city jails in recent months because of the coronavirus outbreak played almost no role in the spike in shootings.

Of the 1,500 inmates let out of Rikers from March 16 to April 30, only seven had been rearrested on a weapons charge by mid-July, according to the confidential analysis.

Nearly 2,000 people who in July had open gun cases were allowed to go home to await trial, but only about 40 of those defendants were arrested on another weapons charge while they were out, the analysis said.

Instead, the analysis points to a different possible reason for the wave of shootings: The number of arrests for gun crimes has plummeted.

While murders and shootings have surged, reports of other major crimes have actually fallen in recent months. Still, the spike in gun violence has stirred deep fears that the city might be sliding back to an era of random violence on the streets. Recent shooting victims have included a two teenagers going to play basketball and a baby boy.

New York City is not alone. Shootings have skyrocketed in major cities across the country, and that surge has led to intense political fights over whether efforts to rein in the police, including the Defund the Police movement touched off by the killing of George Floyd, are playing a role.

On Sunday, another 19 people were shot in New York City, one fatally. Through the first seven months of this year, shootings were up 72 percent over the same period last year and murders rose 30 percent, even as reports of other violent crimes like rape, assault and robbery fell.

The police say feuds between street gangs are behind most of the incidents, and so far detectives have been unable to make enough arrests to stop reprisals. The pandemic and the need to divert investigators to cover widespread protests have set back investigations, police officials said.

In recent days, Mr. de Blasio has been particularly critical of the courts, saying that the lack of trials because of the pandemic and the inability of prosecutors to push cases forward with indictments were “a huge piece” of the spike in violent crime.

“The bottom line is our criminal justice system needs to get back to full strength,” Mr. de Blasio said. “Our courts not only need to reopen, they need to reopen as fully and as quickly as possible.”

But prosecutors, court officials and defense lawyers have pushed back against that theory.

Lawrence Marks, the state’s chief administrative judge, told the NY1 cable news station that the mayor’s attacks on the courts were “false, misleading and irresponsible.”

Judge Marks countered that the rise in violent crime was more likely a result of the sharp drop in gun arrests in recent months, a position that the department’s own data seems to buttress.

In mid-May, gun arrests citywide began to drop precipitously, the city analysis of police data shows. During the week of May 24, there were 113 gun arrests. During the week of June 7, there were 71 such arrests. By the week of June 28, there were only 22.

Over the same period, the data shows, shootings started rising. During the week of May 24, there were 23 shootings; in the week of June 7, there were 40. In the week of June 28, the number of shootings spiked to 63.

At a new conference on Tuesday, Mr. de Blasio said the city had deployed more officers to troubled precincts, and gun arrests were beginning to rise again. During the week ending on July 27, arrests for firearms climbed up back up to 54, the police said.

The confidential analysis that was obtained by The Times was prepared by city officials with Police Department data and shared with the city’s district attorneys’ offices. It was provided to The Times by an official who wanted to counter the mayor’s narrative, but wished to remain anonymous because the report was not intended to be released.

On Tuesday, Mr. de Blasio denied that he had ever blamed the rise in violent crime solely on the changes the pandemic had wrought on the courts. He said he had always cited a “perfect storm” of causes, including the virus’s devastating effect on the city’s economy.

Still, he said that the slowdown in the courts and the lack of trials had affected the behavior of some people, sending a signal that there would not be consequences for their acts. “And it affects the ability to ensure that someone who should not be on the street, isn’t,” he added.

“You cannot take away all the underpinnings of normal life and expect the same outcome, and then when you don’t have all of the pieces of the criminal justice system working, that does affect the reality,” he said.

But the city’s own analysis suggests the bail law, which allows many defendants accused of nonviolent crimes to be released before trial without posting bail, had little to do with the rise in violence. It notes that shooting incidents stayed relatively stable for more than four months after the legislation was passed.

The analysis also indicates that the courts are processing gun crimes at close to the same rate as before the pandemic. According to the Police Department’s data, there were 2,181 unresolved gun cases in July — slightly fewer than the 2,285 gun cases that were open in December 2019.

Similarly, the courts handled 642 gun and murder arraignments from October 2019 to December 2019. Between April and June of this year, they handled 819 gun and murder arraignments — and all of them were conducted remotely by video.

“The way we are processing arrests has not changed at all,” said Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., the Manhattan district attorney. “In May, the volume and severity of the arrests we were handling was the same as it was in January. We’re open.”

Darcel D. Clark, the Bronx district attorney, said that her office’s complaint room, where new crimes are charged, was “running at full strength” — albeit virtually.

“It is wrong to say that the district attorneys are not prosecuting or that the court system is not functioning,” Ms. Clark said.

Court records in Brooklyn, which has seen some of the worst gun violence in recent weeks, suggest there is little sign that the release of people from jail was driving most of the shootings there.

From June 15 to July 15, according to court records, the Brooklyn district attorney’s office opened a total of five prosecutions of defendants for shootings or for homicides with guns.

None of the defendants, an analysis of the records showed, had been released from Rikers Island because of the pandemic or had been sent back home on a separate case under the new, more lenient bail law. Nor were they free because of the slowdown in court proceedings, the records showed.

Still, Michael LiPetri, the Police Department’s chief of crime control strategies, said that the virus’s effects on the criminal justice system were being felt on the streets.

Early in the pandemic, Chief LiPetri said, many suspects arrested on gun charges who in the past would have been asked to post bail were instead released without bail to stem the spread of disease in jail.

So far this year, he said, 40 percent of all gun suspects were released on their own recognizance, compared to only 25 percent last year, and about 35 percent had bail set, compared to 55 percent last year.

The large number of people being sent home to await trial, even with a serious gun charge, he said, had created a permissive atmosphere, especially among gang members who the police believe are driving the wave of shootings.

“When people get arrested and then get out, their crew members start feeling comfortable carrying firearms,” he said.

Chief LiPetri acknowledged the number of gun arrests had dropped off, saying that the force was stretched thin because of the pandemic and the need to redeploy people to cover protests.

In the past month, he said, the department has started moving robbery detectives to work on violent crime and has shifted more than 300 officers in administrative positions to precincts with high numbers of shootings.

“We were stretched — even an agency as big as the N.Y.P.D.,” he said.

Jon Hilsenrath, "Homicide Spike Hits Most Large U.S. Cities,"Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/homicide-spike-cities-chicago-newyork-detroit-us-crime-police-lockdown-coronavirus-protests-11596395181

Homicide Spike Hits Most Large U.S. Cities

A sharp rise in homicides this year is hitting large U.S. cities across the country, signaling a new public-safety risk unleashed during the coronavirus pandemic, and amid recession and a national backlash against police tactics.

The murder rate is still low compared with previous decades, and other types of serious crime have dropped in the past few months. But researchers, police and some residents fear the homicide spike, if not tamed, could threaten an urban renaissance spurred in part by more than two decades of declining crime.

A Wall Street Journal analysis of crime statistics among the nation’s 50 largest cities found that reported homicides were up 24% so far this year, to 3,612. Shootings and gun violence also rose, even though many other violent crimes such as robbery fell.

Police, researchers, mayors and community leaders see a confluence of forces at work in the homicide spike. Institutions that keep city communities safe have been destabilized by lockdown and protests against police. Lockdowns and recession also mean tensions are running high and streets have been emptied of eyes and ears on their communities. Some attribute the rise to an increase in gang violence.

Some cities with long-running crime problems saw their numbers rise, including Philadelphia, Detroit and Memphis, Tenn. Chicago, the worst-hit, has tallied more than one of every eight homicides.

Less-violent places have been struck as well, such as Omaha, Neb., and Phoenix. In all, 36 of the 50 cities studied saw homicide rise at double-digit rates, representing all regions of the country.

“I was surprised at the consistency of the increase across all of the different cities,” said Jens Ludwig, a University of Chicago professor and director of its Crime Lab, which researches crime, after examining the Journal data.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Police and academics who study crime have long debated why homicide rates rise or fall, citing variables including demographics, incarceration rates, drug epidemics, the economy and policing. That debate has been thrown a new curve: fallout from the pandemic. Moreover it is complicated by the fact that other kinds of crime are falling. Reported robberies were down 11% among the 41 largest cities that made robbery data available.

One explanation for the divergence between homicide and other crime might reside in what is known as “routine activity theory,” which holds that crime is a function of three factors: The supply of offenders, the supply of victims and the intervention between the two by society’s guardians—including police, schools and churches.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Police in many departments said robberies, burglaries and rapes are down so far this year because more people stayed home during Covid-19 lockdowns, leaving fewer prospective victims on the streets, in bars or other public places. Burglars weren’t likely to break into homes filled with people under lockdown, they say.

Homicides, on the other hand, are up because violent criminals have been emboldened by the sidelining of police, courts, schools, churches and an array of other social institutions by the reckoning with police and the pandemic, say analysts and law-enforcement officials in several cities.

Anecdotally, many police departments point to a rising tide of gang violence, in which rival groups of mainly young offenders battle over control of neighborhoods, catching rivals and innocents in the process.

Schools let out young adults in March because of the pandemic and after-school activities largely stopped. Churches and other social institutions were restrained for the sake of social distancing. Police first were hit by coronavirus and then blowback in the neighborhoods they patrol after the killing in Minneapolis of George Floyd, a Black man, while in police custody.

“Gangs are built around structure and lack thereof,” said Jeff La Blue, a spokesman for the Fresno police department. “With schools being closed and a lot of different businesses being closed, the people that normally would have been involved in positive structures in their lives aren’t there.” He noted shootings and stabbings have soared in his community. “Nerves are high. People are short on money.”

Some researchers say the upward trend in murder might be evidence of a fraying of the social order. “Everything that society does that might shape public safety was turned upside-down during the pandemic,” Mr. Ludwig said.

Police say homicide increases are hitting low-income, mostly Black and Latino communities especially hard. The crime maps published by many cities show homicides aren’t up in city centers where antipolice protests are happening, but instead in low-income neighborhoods outside of those city centers.

In Portland, for instance, the police department didn’t see any homicides around protests in July, a department spokeswoman said. Through June, its latest crime maps show, all of its homicides happened east and south of the city center.

Mr. Ludwig studied maps of homicides in Chicago and found killings were concentrated in the south and west, “the most disadvantaged neighborhoods that were already suffering the most from longstanding economic challenges and the coronavirus,” he said. The pace is accelerating: Of 433 homicides in Chicago as of July 26, 106 were in the previous 28 days.

Mr. Trump has blamed increased violence in U.S. cities on Democratic Party leadership in hard-hit municipalities. His decision to send federal agents into U.S. cities, he said, was to help fight violent crime.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 3


In addition to sending federal agents to Portland to protect government property from protesters, the White House said it is sending agents to other cities including Detroit, Albuquerque, Chicago, Milwaukee, Kansas City and Cleveland as part of a program aimed at curbing violent crime. The program, known as Operation LeGend, is named after LeGend Taliferro, a boy who was killed in Kansas City this year.

Though many of America’s biggest cities are run by Democrats, the rise in killings is a bipartisan problem. Homicides are rising at a double-digit rate in most of the big cities run by Republicans, including Miami, San Diego, Omaha, Tulsa, Okla., and Jacksonville, Fla., as well as in cities run by Democrats and in the two major cities run by Independents: San Antonio and Las Vegas.

The Journal’s statistical analysis was based on individual police department reports about crime in their cities. Some public-information departments made data available. The University of Chicago’s Crime Lab helped fill in some blanks and reviewed the Journal data.

Chicago police say conflict springs from tit-for-tat gang violence, including drive-by shootings. In one recent attack on the city’s South Side, shooters in a Chevrolet Malibu fired 60 times from a car, injuring 15 people attending the funeral of a man who himself had been killed in a drive-by shooting days before, apparently in retaliation for an earlier shooting, according to local reports. People at the latest funeral returned gunfire.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 4


The recession and coronavirus lockdowns are hurting programs aimed at curbing the violence in Chicago, said Eduardo Bocanegra, senior director of READI Chicago, a mostly privately funded program that provides employment and counseling services to men at risk of becoming, at turns, victims of violence or attackers.

“Men in my program are being killed right now,” he said, noting that five people in the program, which currently has about 220 people enrolled, were killed in the five weeks from Memorial Day to July 4, including one who was walking away from a confrontation.

State and city grants that he expected to come through were put on hold. Mr. Bocanegra has cut staff from 120 to 100 and trimmed enrollment in the program from 18 months to 12. It has gotten harder to place men in the program into jobs, he said, and he worries it is only going to get tougher to tap funds as organizations fight for scarce public and philanthropic dollars.

Michael LiPetri, chief of crime control strategies at the New York Police Department, said the city’s rise in homicide is worst in Brooklyn, where shootings have broken out at large gatherings such as barbecues in public parks and outdoor dice games.

The department is moving officers to Brooklyn from larceny units, where the work has slowed. City policy has made it harder to keep the peace, Mr. LiPetri said. He cited a city council decision in June that exposes New York officers to criminal charges if they kneel on the chest or back of suspects. Public anger at police is also an impediment, he said: “It is impossible for a New York City police officer to break up those large gatherings.”

New York, Detroit and Fresno officers all said the easing of bail requirements in their states likely returned some dangerous criminals to the streets.

Mayor Bill de Blasio has acknowledged police concerns about the new restrictions on police tactics but in July said, “I believe we can make it work.” In a statement to the Journal, the New York mayor’s office added, “It’s a perfect storm out there. Not only are the courts not fully open, but don’t fail to notice that there is a historic pandemic and economic crisis right now.”

Homicide this year is still far lower than it was in the past. In 1990, for example, New York City alone had 2,262 murders, about equal to the total number of killings in the nation’s largest 25 cities so far this year.

Between 1993 and 2018, violent crime in U.S. cities dropped 54%. After 2000, the pace of that decline in cities was faster than in suburbs and rural communities, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics crime victimization surveys.

It is hard to tell if the long-run trends that transformed many U.S. cities for the better are now reversing, or if instead this will be a spike. A great deal hangs on that question, experts say.

“If the city descends into the level of danger that we saw in the 1970s, that will be a challenge for all of America,” said Edward Glaeser, an urban economist at Harvard University.

Alan Feuer, "The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows,"New York Times, August 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/nyregion/nyc-shootings-coronavirus.html

"... In mid-May, gun arrests citywide began to drop precipitously, the city analysis of police data shows. During the week of May 24, there were 113 gun arrests. During the week of June 7, there were 71 such arrests. By the week of June 28, there were only 22. Over the same period, the data shows, shootings started rising. During the week of May 24, there were 23 shootings; in the week of June 7, there were 40. In the week of June 28, the number of shootings spiked to 63...."

Ed Comment:“…Steve's party making America great again. I find it interesting that they don't show murder rate changes before and after George Floyd instead of since the start of the year or even better, since the start of covid. Then we could see the effect of covid vs Floyd. There has clearly been a spike in killings since Floyd and, based on their data, significantly higher in cities with democratic mayors. And sadly, those cities probably had more murders per capita so they are growing more off a larger base. Ironically, I'm starting to wonder the policing protection required to get boys not to join gangs for protection is worth it. Are there many innocent victims? Do gangs scare off innocent homeowners? Perhaps they do…”

Ed Comment:“…It’s seems clear that homicides are correlated to policing efforts by the police. Presumably, gun collection is indicative of that. With all the guns in America, surely a person who wants to kill someone can find a gun to do it. Maybe there is shortage of guns available to criminals! But that seems hard to believe. With crime down and murders up, it looks like murders are driven by the negative feedback loop of “kill or be killed,” which would drive people to gangs for protection, which might only increase the cycle of violence. I’m surprised the police seem to be able to provide enough protection, whether directly through active policing or indirectly by increasing the risk of carrying a gun enough to have a significant impact on homicides, to significantly impact gun violence. The police, when working, seems to have an impact and be deeply engaged with criminals. That’s not what we see when we see police on the streets of NYC.The reduction in gun collection is probably more symbolic of reduced policing than anything. But the symbol wouldn’t be powerful if police weren’t effective when they are policing. I’m surprised the symbolic impact is so big and works so fast. Maybe policing and gun collections are irrelevant. Perhaps Criminals just grew more determined to kill each other in the wake of Floyd regardless of any change in police behavior. I don’t think low apparent recidivism is enough to conclude the bail laws aren’t somewhat responsible. How many murders are unsolved? Lots of those murders could be committed by “kill or be killed” parolees seeking revenge. Maybe it’s a one time blip that will go away regardless of what the police do….”

  • Poverty/Crime


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