Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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Monday, June 1, 2020

Monopsony And Outside Option

AI Summary. In imperfectly competitive labor markets, the authors estimate that a $1 increase in the value of workers' outside options raises wages by $0.24–$0.37, and that moving employer concentration from the 75th to the 95th percentile lowers wages by 5%. The estimated effect of employer concentration on wages is 3x larger for occupations with low mobility into other occupations.

Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury and Bledi Taska Harvard University
Date Posted:
June 1, 2020
Is Database:
Database

A $1 increase in outside options value leads to $0.24-$0.37 higher wages, according to @GregorSchubert @AnnaStansbury @BlediTaska @HarvardUniversity. Employer concentration reduces wages by 5%, explaining 21% of wage variation within occupations.

A $1 increase in outside options value leads to $0.24-$0.37 higher wages, according to @GregorSchubert @AnnaStansbury...

How much do workers' outside options and employer concentration affect wages?

Core argument: A $1 increase in the value of workers' outside options is associated with $0.24–$0.37 higher wages in imperfectly competitive labor markets.

In imperfectly competitive labor markets, the value of workers' outside options significantly impacts wages. A $1 increase in the value of outside options results in $0.24-$0.37 higher wages. Employer concentration, moving from the 75th to the 95th percentile, reduces wages by 5%, explaining 21% of wage variation within occupations across cities. Additionally, outside-occupation options account for 13% of wage variation. The interaction between employer concentration and outside options is crucial; the effect of concentration on wages is three times higher for occupations with low outward mobility. This highlights the importance of considering outside-occupation options in understanding wage dynamics and suggests that higher-skilled workers are attracted to cities with deeper labor markets due to better outside options.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A $1 increase in the value of workers' outside options is associated with $0.24–$0.37 higher wages in imperfectly competitive labor markets.
  2. Moving employer concentration from the 75th to the 95th percentile reduces wages by 5%, explaining 21% of wage variation within occupations across cities, while outside-occupation options account for 13%.
  3. The effect of employer concentration on wages is three times higher for occupations with low outward mobility, and higher-skilled workers are drawn to cities with deeper labor markets offering better outside options.

Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury and Bledi Taska, “Monopsony And Outside Options,” Harvard University, May 2020, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stansbury/files/schubertstansburytaskamain_2.pdf

“…In imperfectly competitive labor markets, the value of workers’ outside option matters for their wage. But which jobs comprise workers’ outside option, and to what extent do they matter? We measure the effect of outside options on wages in the U.S, in two components: within-occupation options, proxied by employer concentration, and outside-occupation options, identified using new occupational mobility data. Using a new instrument for employer concentration, based on differential local exposure to national firmlevel trends, we find that moving from the 75th to the 95th percentile of employer concentration (across workers) reduces wages by 5%. Differential employer concentration can explain 21% of the interquartile wage variation within a given occupation across cities. In addition, we use a shift-share instrument to identify the wage effect of local outside-occupation options: differential availability of outside-occupation options can explain a further 13% of within-occupation wage variation across cities.Moreover, the two interact: the effect of concentration on wages is three times as high for occupations with the lowest outward mobility as for those with the highest. Our results imply that (1) employer concentration matters for wages for a large minority of workers, (2) wages are relatively sensitive to the outside option value of moving to other local jobs, and (3) failure to consider the role of outsideoccupation options in the concentration-wage relationship leads to bias and obscures important heterogeneity. Interpreted through the lens of a Nash bargaining model, our results imply that a $1 increase in the value of outside options leads to $0.24-$0.37 higher wages…..”

Primary takeaway within a given occupation concentration can explain ~ 21% of wage variation across metro areas, being able to purse a job outside a workers primary occupation matters. Within an occupation differential outside occupation job options can explain ~ 13% of wage variation.

New Anna Stansbury on impact of employer concentration on workers job/wage options; implicitly helps explain why higher skilled workers are moving to cities with deeper labor markers.

Ed Comment:What companies/industries represent the 95th percentile of concentration? Are the skills in those industries truly unique to those companies? Why don’t worker just use their skills in other industries? Ie why doe industry concentration matter?
Steve Comment:Sadly they don’t give data on local area concentration by sector/industry in the paper So there concentration measure is by local labor market (so in an extreme example, if you were a male living in Aspen in 1900 you could either work at the mine or leave, few other options, and those wages would likely be set relative to what the mining company would pay) Here is the example she uses: “…Our instrument exploits the fact that (a) increases in local labor market concentration are often driven by specific, already-large, firms growing, (b) these large firms usually operate across many labor markets, (c) that different local labor markets are differentially exposed to the growth of these large national firms based on the initial share of employment with that firm, and (d) that the employment growth of these large firms nationally is likely to be orthogonal to productivity changes or other conditions in a specific local labor market. The intuition behind the instrument can be explained with a hypothetical example of baristas in Portland, OR, and in Hartford, CT. Imagine there are two large coffee chains in each city: Starbucks, and Dunkin’. In Portland, Starbucks is relatively more dominant than Dunkin’, and the reverse in Hartford, meaning that Starbucks’ local employment share is much larger in Portland than in Hartford. In years where Starbucks grows substantially faster than Dunkin’ nationwide, employer concentration of baristas will grow by more in Portland than in Hartford…” They are using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by metropolitan areas using the Burning Glass database of online job postings (this is at the bottom of page 2 top of 3) Workers with other skills who can find work outside of the concentrated industry do have higher wages, it just seems by there measures most workers don’t have the skill or desire to move to new occupations (Figure 11)
Ed Comment:Sure sems weird. I get how an isolated factory or coal mine in a rural area might enjoy lower wages than the national average for their skill level, but 1) that seems rare and 2) exponential not linear, 3) the increase demand it creates surely raises the wages in the town from what they would have been. Baristas in urban coffee shops seems unfathomable unless the workers are getting nonpecuniary benefits from working somewhere—job security or growth/development opportunities with faster growing competitors, for example. Regardless, how does she reconcile it to the other paper that says it’s not the case?
Steve Comment:I’m working on an answer to that question, the answer likely is the monopsony factor (so firm power) is a factor but just a very small factor versus the “worker power” factor that she wrote about with Summers, and the later (worker power, inability to extract higher rents) is more convincing an explanation versus local industry concentration overall
Ed Comment:The last paper says monopsony is a significant fact. The prior paper said it was not. Monopsony would pocoure in isolated towns where employers have very high share. Loss of labor power should occer everywhere.

Steve Comment: Her answer: “…Dear Steve, Thank you for your email! Your question makes a lot of sense. The way to reconcile them is that one paper focuses on levels and the other focuses on changes. So: I would say that the Monopsony and Outside Options paper suggests that there is relatively high monopsony power impacting workers in specialized occupations and/or in low-population density places (our findings suggest employer concentration affects probably about a quarter of workers to some degree). The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis paper does not argue that there is no monopsony power, but argues that there is no evidence that monopsony power has increased over time. So, while monopsony power may be important for some workers, it cannot explain things like the decline in the aggregate labor share.I hope this answers your question but happy to discuss more if not! All the best, Anna…”

Ed Comment:Makes sense. no rise. Aren’t rural workers choosing monopsony? I’m always suspicious that their finding mean what I said they do: that rural factories or coal mines enjoy lower wages than the national average for the skill level of their workforce. And this provides evidence of monopsony, even though the increase demand for employment the employer creates raises wages in the town from what they would have been otherwise, the latter of which is never mentioned by an intentionally misleading author.
Steve Comment:You can add another layer on that in the rural factory towns in the Midwest/upper Midwest rust belt are depopulating. So the individuals that remain are very much choosing monopsony.

  • Inequality
  • Comparisons
    • Geography (Urban/Rural)
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

The Use and Misuse of Income Data and Extreme Poverty in the United States

AI Summary. The authors estimate that while 3.6m non-homeless US households report cash income below $2 per person per day, over 90% are not in extreme poverty once in-kind transfers and administrative records are used, with errors or omissions in reported cash income accounting for nearly 80% of misclassifications. Among those still classified as extremely poor, 90% are single individuals.

Bruce Meyer National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
June 2, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@BruceMeyer Analysis reveals that while 3.6m non-homeless households report cash income below $2/person/day, over 90% are not in extreme poverty after accounting for in-kind transfers & correcting survey data with administrative records.

@BruceMeyer Analysis reveals that while 3.6m non-homeless households report cash income below $2/person/day, over 90% are...

Does survey income data overstate extreme poverty in America?

Core argument: Of the 3.6m non-homeless U.S. households reporting cash income below $2/person/day, over 90% are not in extreme poverty once in-kind transfers are counted and survey data are corrected with administrative records, the analysis finds.

Analysis reveals that while 3.6m non-homeless households report cash income below $2/person/day, over 90% are not in extreme poverty after accounting for in-kind transfers and correcting survey data with administrative records. More than half of these households have incomes above the poverty line when considering administrative data, and many are at least middle class based on material well-being. Errors or omissions in cash income reports lead to nearly 80% of misclassifications. Among those still classified as extremely poor, 90% are single individuals. This suggests that the current low rate of extreme poverty is not significantly impacted by welfare reform, contrary to some claims.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the 3.6m non-homeless U.S. households reporting cash income below $2/person/day, over 90% are not in extreme poverty once in-kind transfers are counted and survey data are corrected with administrative records, the analysis finds.
  2. Errors or omissions in cash income reports account for nearly 80% of misclassifications of extreme poverty, and more than half of these households have incomes above the poverty line using administrative data, with many at least middle class on material well-being measures.
  3. Among households still classified as extremely poor, 90% are single individuals, and the analysis suggests the low rate of extreme poverty is not significantly affected by welfare reform, contrary to some claims.

“….Recent research suggests that rates of extreme poverty, commonly defined as living on less than $2/person/day, are high and rising in the United States. We re-examine the rate of extreme poverty by linking 2011 data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and Current Population Survey, the sources of recent extreme poverty estimates, to administrative tax and program data. Of the 3.6 million non-homeless households with survey-reported cash income below $2/person/day, we find that more than 90% are not in extreme poverty once we include in-kind transfers, replace survey reports of earnings and transfer receipt with administrative records, and account for the ownership of substantial assets. More than half of all misclassified households have incomes from the administrative data above the poverty line, and several of the largest misclassified groups appear to be at least middle class based on measures of material well-being. In contrast, the households kept from extreme poverty by in-kind transfers appear to be among the most materially deprived Americans. Nearly 80% of all misclassified households are initially categorized as extreme poor due to errors or omissions in reports of cash income. Of the households remaining in extreme poverty, 90% consist of a single individual. An implication of the low recent extreme poverty rate is that it cannot be substantially higher now due to welfare reform, as many commentators have claimed….”

Bruce Meyer, Derek Wu, Victoria Mooers, Carla Medalia, "The Use and Misuse of Income Data and Extreme Poverty in the United States," National Bureau Of Economic Research, May 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25907

  • Government Spending
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime
    • Unemployment/Participation


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