Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
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Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Dropouts Need Not Apply? The Minimum Wage and Skill Upgrading

AI Summary. A $1 increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 1.4% rise in low-wage job postings requiring a high school diploma, and with low-wage workers being older and more likely to hold a diploma. The authors interpret this as firms substituting toward higher-skilled workers, with no similar effect at higher education levels.

Lisa B. Kahn National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

A $1 increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 1.4% share of low-wage job postings that require a high school degree.

Do minimum wage increases push employers toward higher-skilled workers?

Core argument: A $1 increase in the minimum wage correlates with a 1.4% rise in low-wage job postings requiring a high school diploma, with diploma requirements in low-wage jobs rising by about 10% while requirements for higher education levels remain unaffected.

A $1 increase in the minimum wage correlates with a 1.4% rise in low-wage job postings requiring a high school diploma, indicating a shift towards higher-skilled labor. Analysis of 2011-2016 ACS data reveals that workers in low-wage roles are older and more likely to hold a high school diploma post-minimum wage hikes. Burning Glass vacancy data supports this, showing increased diploma requirements after wage increases. This labor-labor substitution suggests firms prefer higher-skilled workers when minimum wages surpass the value of lower-skilled output. The effect is pronounced in low-wage jobs, with diploma requirements rising by about 10%, while higher education levels remain unaffected. The study finds no significant impact on employment shares across other demographics, such as race or gender.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A $1 increase in the minimum wage correlates with a 1.4% rise in low-wage job postings requiring a high school diploma, with diploma requirements in low-wage jobs rising by about 10% while requirements for higher education levels remain unaffected.
  2. Analysis of 2011–2016 American Community Survey data shows workers in low-wage roles are older and more likely to hold a high school diploma after minimum wage increases, and Burning Glass vacancy data likewise show increased diploma requirements following wage increases.
  3. The study interprets the pattern as labor-labor substitution, in which firms prefer higher-skilled workers when minimum wages surpass the value of lower-skilled output, and finds no significant impact on employment shares by race or gender.

New paper speaks to the high cost of low skilled labor, finding a dollar increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 1.4% increase in the share of jobs that require a high school degree.

"... We explore whether minimum wage increases result in substitution from lower-skilled to slightly higher-skilled labor. Using 2011-2016 American Community Survey data (ACS), we show that workers employed in low-wage occupations are older and more likely to have a high school diploma following recent statutory minimum wage increases. To better understand the role of firms, we examine the Burning Glass vacancy data. We find increases in a high school diploma requirement following minimum wage hikes, consistent with our ACS evidence on stocks of employed workers. We see substantial adjustments to requirements both within and across firms…Most research focuses on the equilibrium employment effects of increases in wage floors, though there is recognition that other margins of adjustment may play a role. One important avenue by which firms may adjust in the face of minimum wage increases is through substitution towards higher-skilled labor. The underlying mechanism is straightforward: if the minimum wage exceeds the value of a worker’s output, a firm can eliminate their job or, potentially, find a replacement worker whose productivity meets or exceeds the floor. This phenomenon of “labor-labor substitution” can reduce the impact of minimum wage changes on equilibrium employment levels..... We find that effects are concentrated among individuals employed in low-wage occupations who are, on average, a quarter of a year older and 4 to 5 percent less like to be a young adult (age 16 to 21) or high school dropout, following statutory minimum wage increases that total around $1.70 over the full time period. We see no impacts on employment shares for other demographic groups, including groups defined by race, gender, and country of birth..... With the full set of controls included, a one-dollar increase in the minimum wage is associated with a statistically significant increase of 1.4 percentage points in the share of low-wage job postings that require a high school degree.....we show that the prevalence of requirements for a high school diploma increase following minimum wage hikes. The effect is concentrated among postings for low-wage occupations, where the diploma requirement increases by about 10 percent. Reassuringly, we find no effects for higher levels of education, like college degrees, that should be unaffected by minimum wage increases. We also find little impact on experience and other skill requirements....."

Jeffrey Clemens, Lisa B. Kahn, Jonathan Meer, "Dropouts Need Not Apply? The Minimum Wage and Skill Upgrading," National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27090

  • Minimum Wage
  • Comparisons
    • Other Comparison
    • Skill Level

Research confirms that the cruel minimum wage law has the greatest adverse effects on the most vulnerable workers

AI Summary. Research using American Community Survey data finds that minimum wage increases are associated with a shift in low-wage employment toward older, more educated workers, including more jobs requiring a high school diploma. The authors argue this substitution toward skilled workers reduces employment opportunities for less-educated, less-experienced workers.

Mark Perry American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
May 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Research confirms that minimum wage laws have the greatest adverse effects on the most vulnerable workers, who lose their comparative advantage of offering lower wages.

Do minimum wage increases shift low-wage jobs toward more educated workers?

Core argument: American Community Survey data for 2011–2016 indicate that minimum wage increases shift employment in low-wage jobs toward older, more educated workers, with a rise in high school diploma requirements.

Research highlights the adverse effects of minimum wage laws on low-skilled workers, who lose their comparative advantage of offering lower wages. Data from the American Community Survey (2011-2016) shows that minimum wage hikes lead to a shift in employment towards older, more educated workers, with a notable increase in high school diploma requirements for low-wage jobs. This shift reduces employment opportunities for less-educated, less-experienced workers, exacerbating their vulnerability. Employers tend to substitute unskilled workers with skilled ones, as seen in job vacancy postings that increasingly demand higher qualifications. Consequently, minimum wage laws inadvertently increase unemployment and poverty among the least advantaged workers, as they are unable to compete effectively against more skilled counterparts. This underscores the need for policy considerations that address the unintended consequences of such wage regulations on marginalized groups.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American Community Survey data for 2011–2016 indicate that minimum wage increases shift employment in low-wage jobs toward older, more educated workers, with a rise in high school diploma requirements.
  2. Research argues that employers substitute skilled workers for unskilled ones after minimum wage increases, as reflected in job vacancy postings demanding higher qualifications, raising unemployment and poverty among the least advantaged workers.

Perry reports on new minimum wage research from Jeff Clemens, “…Bottom Line: It should be obvious but this new NBER research provides additional empirical evidence that the greatest adverse effects of the minimum wage law are concentrated on exactly those workers the minimum wage advocates say they are most trying help: lower-skilled, limited experience workers who are the least educated. In other words, the workers who suffer the most from minimum wage laws are the workers who are the least advantaged, least skilled, most marginalized, and most vulnerable, and who are most in need of gaining skills and work experience. And that makes minimum wage laws cruel, detrimental, and misguided, especially for the workers most at risk. To quote Don Boudreaux, “Taking away from workers an important bargaining chip, namely the ability to offer to work at a wage less than the minimum, is the cruelest thing you can do for a lot of these workers.”..”

Mark Perry, "Research confirms that the cruel minimum wage law has the greatest adverse effects on the most vulnerable workers," American Enterprise Institute, May 4, 2020, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/new-research-confirms-that-the-cruel-minimum-wage-law-has-the-greatest-adverse-effects-on-the-most-vulnerable-workers/

Research confirms that the cruel minimum wage law has the greatest adverse effects on the most vulnerable workers

Research confirms that the cruel minimum wage law has the greatest adverse effects on the most vulnerable workers: Extended Excerpt Image 1


It’s an economic reality that workers compete against other workers, not against employers, for jobs, and higher wages in the labor market. And it’s also true that lower-skilled, limited-experience, less-educated workers compete against higher-skilled, more experienced, more educated workers for jobs. As I explained in a 2016 CD post “What economic lessons can we learn about the $15 minimum wage law from an ‘$8 per pound minimum beef price law’?“:

Unskilled workers compete against other workers - especially skilled workers — for a limited number of available jobs at a given point in time. If the minimum wage is increased from $7.25 or $10 to $15 an hour, that will give skilled workers an advantage over unskilled workers, and will take away from unskilled workers the one advantage they currently have to compete against skilled workers - the ability to offer to work for a significantly lower wage than what skilled workers can command. And to the extent that we remove the wage advantage for unskilled workers, we reduce their ability to compete against skilled workers, and reduce employment opportunities for those unskilled workers.

Here’s an example: Suppose an employer can hire two unskilled workers at $7.25 an hour for a total cost of $14.50 an hour and provide them with on-the-job training, or hire one skilled worker for $20 an hour, provide no training, and get the same hourly output as two unskilled workers. Given that choice, the employer hires two unskilled workers and saves $5.50 an hour in labor costs. Now suppose that the minimum wage is raised to $15 an hour, which would require the employer to pay $30 an hour for two unskilled workers. In that case, the employer would switch to hiring one skilled worker at $20 an hour over two unskilled workers, and save $10 an hour in labor costs. Result of a minimum wage hike to $15 an hour? Demand for skilled workers goes up, demand for unskilled workers goes down, and employment opportunities for unskilled workers are reduced.

Here’s how Milton Friedman explained it:

The minimum wage law is most properly described as a law saying that employers must discriminate against people who have low skills. That’s what the law says. The law says that here’s a man who has a skill that would justify a wage of $5 or $6 per hour (adjusted for today), but you may not employ him, it’s illegal, because if you employ him you must pay him $9 per hour. So what’s the result? To employ him at $9 per hour is to engage in charity. There’s nothing wrong with charity. But most employers are not in the position to engage in that kind of charity. Thus, the consequences of minimum wage laws have been almost wholly bad to increased unemployment and increase poverty. What you are doing is to assure that workers whose skills are not sufficient to justify that kind of a wage will be unemployed.

A new NBER research paper “Dropouts Need Not Apply? The minimum wage and skill upgrading” by Jeffrey Clemens, Lisa B. Kahn, Jonathan Meer find empirical evidence of an adverse effect of minimum wage hikes on the least skilled, least educated workers as employers substitute away from those workers to hire higher-skilled, more educated workers with more experience. Below are the introduction from the paper and part of the conclusion:

Introduction:

We explore whether minimum wage increases result in substitution from lower-skilled to slightly higher-skilled labor. Using 2011-2016 American Community Survey data (ACS), we show that workers employed in low-wage occupations are older and more likely to have a high school diploma following recent statutory minimum wage increases. To better understand the role of firms, we examine the Burning Glass vacancy data. We find increases in a high school diploma requirement following minimum wage hikes, consistent with our ACS evidence on stocks of employed workers. We see substantial adjustments to requirements both within and across firms.

Conclusion:

We investigate whether changes in firms’ skill requirements are channels through which labor markets respond to minimum wage increases. We present evidence on two sets of outcomes: observable skill proxies and the skill requirements firms include in online job postings. Data from the American Community Survey show that recent minimum wage changes resulted in increases in the average age and education of the individuals employed in low-wage jobs. Data on job vacancy postings show that the prevalence of a high school diploma requirement increases at the same time. The shift in skill requirements begins within the first quarter of a minimum wage hike. Further, it results from both within-firm shifts in postings and across-firms shifts towards firms that sought more-skilled workers at baseline.

Given the poor labor market outcomes of individuals without high school diplomas, these findings have substantial policy relevance. This possibility was recognized well over a century ago by Smith (1907), who noted that the “enactment of a minimum wage involves the possibility of creating a class prevented by the State from obtaining employment.” Further, negative effects may be exacerbated for minority groups in the presence of labor market discrimination (Becker, 2010; Agan and Starr, 2017; Doleac and Hansen, 2016).

Bottom Line: It should be obvious but this new NBER research provides additional empirical evidence that the greatest adverse effects of the minimum wage law are concentrated on exactly those workers the minimum wage advocates say they are most trying help: lower-skilled, limited experience workers who are the least educated. In other words, the workers who suffer the most from minimum wage laws are the workers who are the least advantaged, least skilled, most marginalized, and most vulnerable, and who are most in need of gaining skills and work experience. And that makes minimum wage laws cruel, detrimental, and misguided, especially for the workers most at risk. To quote Don Boudreaux, “Taking away from workers an important bargaining chip, namely the ability to offer to work at a wage less than the minimum, is the cruelest thing you can do for a lot of these workers.”

  • Minimum Wage

How to escape the trap of excessive debt

AI Summary. Rising US inequality is associated with a savings glut among the top 1% alongside greater dissaving and indebtedness among the bottom 90%, while investment rates have declined despite falling real interest rates. The author argues escaping this debt trap requires shifting income distribution to support demand and investment, or reducing incentives favoring debt over equity financing.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
May 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Rising inequality in the US has led to a savings glut among the top 1% and dissaving among the bottom 90%, creating economic fragility. To escape this debt trap, shift income distribution to foster sustainable demand or consider equity financing for housing and businesses.

How can economies escape a debt trap driven by inequality?

Core argument: Rising US inequality has driven a large increase in saving by the top 1% of income earners while investment rates have declined despite falling real interest rates.

Rising inequality in the US has led to a significant increase in savings by the top 1% of income earners, while investment rates have declined, despite falling real interest rates. This savings glut has been matched by increased dissaving among the bottom 90%, resulting in a feedback loop of weakened demand and lower interest rates. The decline in net indebtedness of the rich since 1982 has been offset by rising indebtedness of the bottom 90%, creating economic fragility. To escape this debt trap, one solution is to shift income distribution to foster sustainable demand and stronger investment without escalating household debt. Alternatively, governments could continue borrowing, but this risks eventual default, impacting the well-off who are principal creditors. Addressing these issues requires diminishing incentives for debt financing over equity and considering equity financing for housing and businesses.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rising US inequality has driven a large increase in saving by the top 1% of income earners while investment rates have declined despite falling real interest rates.
  2. The decline in net indebtedness of the rich since 1982 has been offset by rising indebtedness of the bottom 90%, whose dissaving matches the savings glut and creates economic fragility.
  3. Escaping the debt trap could involve shifting income distribution to support sustainable demand and stronger investment without more household debt, since continued government borrowing risks eventual default that would hit the well-off as principal creditors.

".....Two recent papers illuminate both the forces driving this rise in leverage and its consequences. One, directly related to the views of Eccles, who chaired the US Federal Reserve from 1934 to 1948, is on “The Saving Glut of the Rich and the Rise in Household Debt”. The other, on “Indebted Demand”, explains how debt overhangs weaken demand and lower interest rates, in a feedback loop. The authors of both include Princeton’s Atif Mian and Chicago’s Amir Sufi, well known for their fine past work on debt....The paper on the savings glut makes two points. First, rising inequality in the US has resulted in a large increase in the savings of the top 1 per cent of the income distribution, not matched by a rise in investment. Instead, the investment rate has been falling, despite declining real interest rates. The rising savings surplus of the rich has been matched by the rising dissaving, or consumption above income, of the bottom 90 per cent of the income distribution.... There are two apparent solutions. The first is for governments to keep on borrowing. But, in the very long term, this is likely to lead to some sort of default. The well-off, who are the principal creditors of government, are bound to bear much of the costs, in one way or the other. The alternative is to shift the distribution of income, in order to create more sustainable demand and so stronger investment, without soaring household debt….”

Martin Wolf, "How to escape the trap of excessive debt,"Financial Times, May 5, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/2c5ddbd0-8e09-11ea-9e12-0d4655dbd44f

How to escape the trap of excessive debt

“It is utterly impossible... for the rich to save as much as they have been trying to save, and save anything that is worth saving.” Marriner Eccles, Congressional testimony 1933.

Debt creates fragility. The question is how to escape from the trap. To answer it, we need to analyse why today’s global economy has become so debt-dependent. That did not happen because of the idle whims of central bankers, as many suppose. It happened because of an excessive desire to save relative to investment opportunities. This has suppressed real interest rates and made demand far too reliant on debt.

Two recent papers illuminate both the forces driving this rise in leverage and its consequences. One, directly related to the views of Eccles, who chaired the US Federal Reserve from 1934 to 1948, is on “The Saving Glut of the Rich and the Rise in Household Debt”. The other, on “Indebted Demand”, explains how debt overhangs weaken demand and lower interest rates, in a feedback loop. The authors of both include Princeton’s Atif Mian and Chicago’s Amir Sufi, well known for their fine past work on debt.

As Eccles said so clearly, beyond a point, inequality weakens an economy by driving policymakers into a ruinous choice between high unemployment or ever-rising debt. The paper on the savings glut makes two points. First, rising inequality in the US has resulted in a large increase in the savings of the top 1 per cent of the income distribution, not matched by a rise in investment. Instead, the investment rate has been falling, despite declining real interest rates. The rising savings surplus of the rich has been matched by the rising dissaving, or consumption above income, of the bottom 90 per cent of the income distribution.

How to escape the trap of excessive debt: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The savings of the rich might have led to a current account surplus, as in late-19th-century UK. But the rich of the rest of the world have sought to accumulate US assets, and so generated a persistent US current account deficit. Except when the pre-financial crisis housing bubble drove up private ­investment, this has also remained too weak. The chief users of excess foreign and domestic savings have been less well-off households and the government.

There is a clear link between the saving of the rich and dissaving of the less rich, and the accumulation of credit and debt. Since 1982, the decline in net indebtedness of the rich has been matched by the rise in indebtedness of the bottom 90 per cent. This is why the argument that low interest rates hurt the less well off is absurd. The less well off are not large net creditors. The rich hold claims on the less rich, not only directly, via bank deposits, but via equity holdings in businesses that also hold such claims. This phenomenon of rising household debt and rising inequality is not unique to the US. It is widespread.

How to escape the trap of excessive debt: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Why does the rising debt matter? One answer, as David Levy argues in Bubble or Nothing, is that the economy becomes increasingly driven by finance and fragile, as borrowers become ever more overburdened. Another is the idea of “indebted demand” — a close relative of the idea of “balance-sheet recessions” propounded by the Japanese economist, Richard Koo. As debt soars, people are ever more unwilling to borrow still larger amounts. So interest rates have to fall, to balance supply with demand and avoid a deep slump. In these ways, we have ended up where we were even before Covid-19, with real interest rates at zero. This is one mechanism driving what Lawrence Summers has called “secular stagnation”.

How to escape the trap of excessive debt: Extended Excerpt Image 3


We must focus on the US first, because that is where global demand and supply tend to balance. But similar phenomena of rising inequality and soaring savings are to be seen in other big economies, notably China and Germany. The former used to export its excess savings to the US, but now absorbs it in wasteful investment at home. The latter has driven trading partners into rising debt in the eurozone and beyond.

How to escape the trap of excessive debt: Extended Excerpt Image 4


So, how are we to escape from the debt trap? One step is to diminish the incentive to finance businesses with debt, rather than equity. The obvious way to do so is to eliminate the preference of the former over the latter in almost all tax systems. It is also possible, as Profs Mian and Sufi argued in an earlier book, to shift from debt to equity financing of housing. In addition, we have a huge opportunity now to replace government lending to companies in the Covid-19 crisis with equity purchases. Indeed, at current ultra-low interest rates, governments could create instantaneous sovereign wealth funds very cheaply.

How to escape the trap of excessive debt: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Yet none of this would fix the ongoing dependence of macroeconomic stability on ever more debt. There are two apparent solutions. The first is for governments to keep on borrowing. But, in the very long term, this is likely to lead to some sort of default. The well-off, who are the principal creditors of government, are bound to bear much of the costs, in one way or the other. The alternative is to shift the distribution of income, in order to create more sustainable demand and so stronger investment, without soaring household debt.

In 1933, Eccles also told Congress, “It is for the interests of the well to do... that we should take from them a sufficient amount of their surplus to enable consumers to consume and business to operate at a profit.” That happened, partly by accident and partly deliberately, after the second world war. Ever-rising household and government debt will not stabilise the world economy ­forever. Nor should asset-price bubbles remain so central to our economy. We will have to adopt more radical alternatives. A crisis is a superb a time to change course. Let us start right now.

Just an FYI, Martin Wolf wrote up Mian and Sufi’s Research:

Ed Comment:This is typically muddled wolf but add to savings glut for the useful graphs. I don't think it makes sense to restrict the use of debt when you have a savings glut as he proposes. If we are going to restrict the use of debt it ought to for using debt to fund consumption but I think even that would be mistaken. He wants to blame the rich but shows the trade deficit doubles the amount of savings and then says nothing about it. It never occurs to him that things likely exist for good reason so the successful risk-taking of the 0.1% who create inequality might be driven by their demand for payoffs large enough to allow them to save. Frankly, I have always been concerned that the expected value of risk taking is negative! And they may keep taking risk if they can hold risk averse savings that mitigate some of that risk. In that case, redistributing income that produce savings may have adverse consequence. I.e. There is no income to redistribute because it would gradually go away if you did. Wolf is either a propagandist or too stupid to recognize he ought to consider logic that might lead him to a different conclusion. Which do you think it is?

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Deaths of Despair

AI Summary. 158,000 Americans died from deaths of despair — suicide, drug overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease — in a single year, concentrated among working-class white Americans whose life expectancy has declined since the late 1990s. Economists attribute the pattern to broader economic failures affecting the white working class, with the opioid crisis as one symptom.

Steve Sailer Taki Magazine
Date Posted:
May 6, 2020
Is Database:
Database

White deaths of despair line up with Native American and Russian experience.

Are economic failures driving rising deaths of despair among working-class Americans?

Core argument: In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from deaths of despair — suicide, drug overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease — a trend concentrated among working-class white Americans.

In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from deaths of despair, including suicide, overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease, reflecting a troubling trend among working-class white Americans. This mirrors the experiences of Native Americans and Russian men post-Cold War, who faced similar declines in life expectancy. Economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton highlight that the decline in white lifespans since the late 1990s went largely unnoticed until 2015, despite its severity. The introduction of OxyContin in the mid-1990s and subsequent opioid crisis symbolize broader economic failures impacting the white working class. While Russian life expectancy has rebounded since 2005, the U.S. continues to grapple with this epidemic. The data suggests a complex interplay of economic, social, and health factors contributing to these deaths, underscoring the need for comprehensive policy interventions to address the root causes of despair in these communities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from deaths of despair — suicide, drug overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease — a trend concentrated among working-class white Americans.
  2. Economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton note that the decline in white American lifespans beginning in the late 1990s went largely unnoticed until 2015.
  3. The U.S. pattern mirrors life expectancy declines among Native Americans and Russian men after the Cold War, though Russian life expectancy has rebounded since 2005 while the U.S. epidemic continues.

Steve Sailer, “Deaths of Despair,” Taki Magazine, May 6, 2020, https://www.takimag.com/article/deaths-of-despair/

Deaths of Despair

In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from what we call deaths of despair: suicide, overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease and cirrhosis. This is the equivalent of three full 737 MAXs falling out of the sky every day, with no survivors.

The new book Deaths of Despair: And the Future of Capitalism by economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton attempts to explain their important discovery—the declining lifespans of working-class white Americans since the turn of the century—by way of a strained analogy with the social chaos that African-Americans unleashed upon themselves as soon as the civil rights struggle was won for them in the 1960s:

What happened to inner-city African Americans after midcentury is, we shall argue, a foreshadowing of our account of whites in the 21st century….

But the more I study the White Death of the past two decades, the more I am instead reminded of the tragic trajectory of a now much less publicized American race, Native Americans. Like American Indians, working-class white Americans seem to be living, and dying, like a defeated people, quietly offing themselves with so little to-do that nobody even noticed what was happening to working-class white lifespans for the first fifteen years of this century.

Indians used to be admired by whites for having put up a strong fight for over 250 years, in contrast to blacks, who were relatively easy to dominate. But in this century, whites have lost interest in Indians, who also seem to have lost interest in themselves as the other Indians have come to play a much larger role in American life.

Human beings have always concocted rationalizations for why they deserve privilege. For most of history, a common explanation of why you should be privileged was that your ancestors were warriors and conquerors who had defeated their foes.

In 21st-century America, however, the new fashion for asserting your claim to privilege is that you come from a long line of victims and losers. By intention, this leaves white Americans, the descendants of the men who won The Big One and went to the Moon, psychically dispossessed in their own native land.

Another obvious analog to the White Death in America is how Russian men drank themselves into an early grave during their defeat in the Cold War. Case and Deaton note in passing that life expectancy for Russian males declined by 7.3 years between 1987 and 1994. But since 2005, Russian life expectancy has rebounded.

As the US suffers from its epidemic of deaths, Russia appears to have overcome its own.

It’s worth remembering that the main reason the media paid attention to Case and Deaton’s paper in November 2015 demonstrating that white lifespans had been falling since the end of the 1990s was because Deaton had won the (quasi) Nobel Prize for economics just the month before. This horrible trend had been happening for fifteen years with virtually no news coverage. As Case and Deaton explain, they were shocked to discover in 2014 the life-shortening trends besetting whites.

“As White Privilege became a preoccupation of the press, whites increasingly shot themselves, or drank themselves to death, or overdosed on synthetic or natural opioids.”

Back in 2014-2015, the mainstream media were instead obsessed with proving that the police were racistly gunning down blacks in vastly larger numbers than their propensity toward violence would warrant. In truth, though, blacks only comprise about 30% of all victims of police shootings, while committing 57% of gun homicides. That’s not, by the way, because cops particularly want to kill more whites than blacks. It appears to be mostly because suicide-by-cop is much more of a white thing than a black thing.

In contrast to whites these days, African-Americans in the late 1960s, when they started to overdose and murder each other in ever larger numbers, were a triumphant race, celebrated all over the world for their soul. The black murder rate accelerated in 1964, the year of the landmark Civil Rights Act, and grew higher into the mid-1970s, then peaked during the gangsta-rap/crack era of the early 1990s, then soared again during the Great Awokening in the two years after Ferguson. In other words, blacks seem to shoot each other the most precisely when they are encouraged by whites to feel best about themselves.

The obvious difference between what happened to whites in the early 21st century and what blacks did in the last 35 years of the 20th century is that whites grew more suicidal while blacks grew more homicidal.

Case and Deaton admit that their conceit that whites are following the path of inner-city blacks can’t explain why suicide rates for blacks are so much lower than for whites (not to mention American Indians):

But in deaths from suicide, the parallel breaks down. African Americans are much less likely to kill themselves than are white Americans; their suicide rates in midlife have changed little in the past fifty years and are currently about a quarter of those for whites.

From the 1960s onward, it became increasingly unfashionable to criticize blacks, but trendy to criticize whites. Not surprisingly, blacks reacted to this new dispensation with increasing exuberance, while whites became more depressed and withdrawn. As black egos expanded after their civil rights victories, they increasingly shot each other in knuckleheaded beefs. Meanwhile, as White Privilege became a preoccupation of the press, whites increasingly shot themselves, or drank themselves to death, or overdosed on synthetic or natural opioids.

In Case and Deaton’s view the White Death, which got rolling after the Sackler family’s Purdue Pharma introduced OxyContin in the mid-1990s, symbolizes the failures of Milken Era capitalism that let down the white American working class:

Our main argument in this book is that the deaths of despair reflect a long-term and slowly unfolding loss of a way of life for the white, less educated, working class.

Curiously, however, they insist that immigration can’t possibly be considered even one of the causes for the declining prosperity of white Americans without college degrees since the 1970s. Although they repeatedly allude to the golden age of the American working class during the low-immigration 1945-1973 era, they refuse to admit that there might have been a causal link from the low supply of workers to the high price of labor.

And yet, in the central story line of the White Death, opioids, immigration plays a major role. As reporter Sam Quinones documented in his book Dreamland, as American authorities started to rein in OxyContin prescriptions, addicts switched to Mexican black tar heroin peddled by Mexican dealers seeded by the cartels throughout the American heartland.

Then, the Mexican cartels switched to buying the chemical precursors of ultra-potent fentanyl from Wuhan, China. The fentanyl smuggling business went gangbusters until 2020, when the coronavirus locked down Wuhan and the Trump Administration finally cracked down on travel across the Mexican border.

In Case and Deaton’s book, though, they start their discussion of why immigration hasn’t hurt native workers by asserting their Intersectional Pokémon Points:

One of us is a first-generation immigrant.

That would be Edinburgh-born Angus Deaton, or as the Princeton U. website refers to him, “Professor Sir Angus Deaton.” Wikipedia explains:

In 1983, he left the University of Bristol for Princeton University. He is currently the Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs and Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS) and the Department of Economics at Princeton. Since 2017, he holds a joint appointment with the University of Southern California where he is the Presidential Professor of Economics. He holds both British and American citizenship.

Like the man said, he is a “a first-generation immigrant.”

The book goes on to explain that Sir Angus’ wife, Anne Case, Professor of Economics at Princeton,

…was born in America, but her ancestors came from Ireland to northeastern Pennsylvania in the middle of the nineteenth century, and her family remains influenced by their national and religious heritage.

So don’t think of Professor Case as just a plain white American: The Cases have only been here for 170 years!

The two economists go on to explain that while it might seem like the law of supply and demand suggests that a certain amount of immigration is bad for native workers’ wages, that is only in the short run. In the long run, the economy could adjust to a short burst of immigration. But then it briefly occurs to them that advocates of immigration, such as themselves, don’t want immigration to ever stop, which defeats their logic about immigration not being so bad in the long run:

Yet if each wave is followed by another wave, the economy may never get the chance to fully adjust, and the wages of the less educated could be permanently lower, at least until the immigration stops.

Indeed.

But at that point, Case and Deaton’s crimestop kicks in and they stop pondering the implications of their own runaway train of thought.

Deaths of Despair isn’t a bad book, but it’s constantly derailed by political correctness keeping them from pursuing their own interesting ideas. For example, why do blacks have shorter life expectancies in America than whites?

For African Americans, there is widespread agreement that the worse outcomes, like so many other important outcomes, are tied to long-standing discrimination, as well as to poorer access to high-quality medical care. The superior longevity of Hispanics over non-Hispanic whites has been much researched but not fully explained. It is worth noting that other groups, such as Asian Americans, do better still, better than either Hispanics or whites.

That would seem pretty interesting, but Case and Deaton then largely drop other races besides white and black at that point. “We do not try to tell a coherent story for,” they admit.

They never return to trying to learn anything from the quite different life-expectancy trends of the five main races in the U.S. My impression is that the developments are:

(1) Asians increasingly live, as comedienne Ali Wong says, forever.
(2) Hispanics live much longer than you’d expect.
(3) Whites die increasingly early.
(4) Blacks were living longer until Black Lives Matter encouraged them to start shooting each other again.
(5) American Indians are in free fall, except that old Native Americans tend to live a long time.

I don’t know what all this means, but surely five data points are more useful than restricting yourself to just two? After all, you’ve already won a Nobel Prize: How much do you still have to fear from the enemies of science?

Steve Sailer’s review of Deaton new book. His five takeaways, Asians increasingly live a long time, Hispanics are living longer, whites are dying early, backs were living longer but that’s changing due to crime and American Indians are in “freefall”

Ed Comment:The angus book sounds silly. I think oxy deaths were caused by the unsupervised introduction of oxy and not by despair. We will learn from our mistakes (while the party you support stupidly legalizes marijuana and lets the criminals go) but we already lost a generation of addicts and won’t get them back.

“…the more I study the White Death of the past two decades, the more I am instead reminded of the tragic trajectory of a now much less publicized American race, Native Americans. Like American Indians, working-class white Americans seem to be living, and dying, like a defeated people, quietly offing themselves with so little to-do that nobody even noticed what was happening to working-class white lifespans for the first fifteen years of this century. Indians used to be admired by whites for having put up a strong fight for over 250 years, in contrast to blacks, who were relatively easy to dominate. But in this century, whites have lost interest in Indians, who also seem to have lost interest in themselves as the other Indians have come to play a much larger role in American life…..Another obvious analog to the White Death in America is how Russian men drank themselves into an early grave during their defeat in the Cold War. Case and Deaton note in passing that life expectancy for Russian males declined by 7.3 years between 1987 and 1994. But since 2005, Russian life expectancy has rebounded. As the US suffers from its epidemic of deaths, Russia appears to have overcome its own…. For example, why do blacks have shorter life expectancies in America than whites? For African Americans, there is widespread agreement that the worse outcomes, like so many other important outcomes, are tied to long-standing discrimination, as well as to poorer access to high-quality medical care. The superior longevity of Hispanics over non-Hispanic whites has been much researched but not fully explained. It is worth noting that other groups, such as Asian Americans, do better still, better than either Hispanics or whites.That would seem pretty interesting, but Case and Deaton then largely drop other races besides white and black at that point. “We do not try to tell a coherent story for,” they admit. They never return to trying to learn anything from the quite different life-expectancy trends of the five main races in the U.S. My impression is that the developments are: (1) Asians increasingly live, as comedienne Ali Wong says, forever. (2) Hispanics live much longer than you’d expect. (3) Whites die increasingly early. (4) Blacks were living longer until Black Lives Matter encouraged them to start shooting each other again. (5) American Indians are in free fall, except that old Native Americans tend to live a long time….”

  • Demographics
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
    • Race
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime


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