Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, May 1, 2020

AI Summary. The U.S. marriage rate has fallen to a historic low of 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people, down roughly 20% over 18 years from a high of 8.2, with the largest declines in the South. An aging population partially explains the trend, but declines are concentrated among minorities and middle- and lower-income groups, correlating with increased unwed childbearing.

Patrick Brown Joint Economic Committee
Date Posted:
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The U.S. marriage rate hit a new low in 2018, dropping from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people.

Is the falling marriage rate concentrated among lower-income groups and minorities?

Core argument: The U.S. marriage rate fell from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people between 2017 and 2018, a historic low and the first significant change in a decade-long stable trend.

The U.S. marriage rate reached a historic low in 2018, dropping from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people from 2017 to 2018, marking the first significant change in a stable trend over the past decade. This decline continues a long-term trend starting in the mid-1980s, with the rate as high as 8.2 per 1,000 in 2001. Demographic shifts, such as the aging population and a decrease in the 18-54 age group from 52.1% to 48.6% since 2005, partially explain this trend. However, marriage rates have particularly declined among minorities and those in middle and lower economic quintiles, correlating with increased unwed childbearing. While some states saw modest increases due to same-sex marriage legalization, the overall national rate has fallen by about 20% over the past 18 years, with the South experiencing the most significant declines.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. marriage rate fell from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people between 2017 and 2018, a historic low and the first significant change in a decade-long stable trend.
  2. The national marriage rate has fallen about 20% over the past 18 years, down from 8.2 per 1,000 in 2001, with the South experiencing the largest declines.
  3. Brown and Sheffield attribute part of the decline to demographic shifts, including a drop in the 18–54 age group from 52.1% to 48.6% since 2005, while noting steeper declines among minorities and middle and lower economic quintiles, correlating with increased unwed childbearing.

Continued decrease in supervision for low skilled men

"... marriage rates hit an all-time low in 2018, the most recently recorded year. The national marriage rate fell from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people from 2017 to 2018. The dip was the first noticeable change in a fairly-stable trend over the past decade, following a long decline starting in the mid-1980s. As recently as 2001, the national rate was 8.2 marriages per 1,000 people.... There may be some compositional effects at work - as the U.S. population ages, more people move out of what we might consider “prime age” for marriage. Since 2005, the fraction of the U.S. population between the ages of 18 and 54 as a share of the total population has fallen from 52.1 to 48.6 percent. If we control for that dynamic, we can see that some - but not all - of the recent decline in marriage is attributable to demographic factors…..There was even an increase in the adjusted marriage rate, controlling for demographic shifts, from 2009 to 2016. But drop in recent years is noticeable across the board, no matter the analysis….. rates have particularly declined among minorities and those in middle and lower economic quintiles. Decreased marriage is associated with increases in unwed childbearing over the last several decades, particularly for these groups...."

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield, "U.S. Marriage Rates Hit New Recorded Low," United States Congress Joint Economic Committee, April 29, 2020, https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/analysis

U.S. Marriage Rates Hit New Recorded Low

Data released yesterday shows wedding bells are growing ever-fainter in states across America. This decline in marriage can be seen in the data even before any potential impact of the coronavirus, which is expected to lower the numbers even further due to social distancing-related delays.

According to the latest data from the National Center for Health Statistics, marriage rates hit an all-time low in 2018, the most recently recorded year. The national marriage rate fell from 6.9 to 6.5 marriages per 1,000 people from 2017 to 2018. The dip was the first noticeable change in a fairly-stable trend over the past decade, following a long decline starting in the mid-1980s. As recently as 2001, the national rate was 8.2 marriages per 1,000 people.

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Marriage is an intensely personal decision, but also has economic and social dimensions. The dramatic high point in the marriage rate followed the end of World War II, while the Great Depression caused a notable decline in the early 1930s. More recently, reviewing marriage trends by region shows that states that previously had higher rates of marriage, including those in the West and South, have converged to the lower levels which have been normal for decades in the Northeast.

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 3


A heat map, showing the prevalence of marriage per 1,000 people, shows this convergence over time (in this figure as well as most others, Nevada and Hawaii are outliers due to the high numbers of weddings in those states and so are suppressed.)

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Over the past two decades, state-level data has shown near-universal declines in marriage rates. However, a few states saw a modest increase, possibly driven by the legalization of same-sex marriage, notably Massachusetts, California, and Montana. The District of Columbia saw the highest rise, with a 60% increase in weddings over that timeframe.

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Over the past 18 years, the national marriage rate has fallen by about 20 percent, with the decline concentrated among states in the South. At the same time, the divorce rate fell by about 30 percent nationally, possibly a result of self-selection out of marriage by lower-educated or low-income individuals and fewer marriages occurring in the first place. States with the smallest declines in divorce were predominantly located in the northeast, while some states in the South saw divorce rates fall by a third.

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 6


There may be some compositional effects at work - as the U.S. population ages, more people move out of what we might consider “prime age” for marriage. Since 2005, the fraction of the U.S. population between the ages of 18 and 54 as a share of the total population has fallen from 52.1 to 48.6 percent. If we control for that dynamic, we can see that some - but not all - of the recent decline in marriage is attributable to demographic factors. (The green dashed line shows the rate of marriage among the age group we’ve defined, while the blue dotted line shows what the marriage rate would be if the U.S. still had the age profile it did in 2005.) There was even an increase in the adjusted marriage rate, controlling for demographic shifts, from 2009 to 2016. But drop in recent years is noticeable across the board, no matter the analysis.

Patrick Brown and Rachel Sheffield: Extended Excerpt Image 7


While marriage rates have declined for everyone, past Social Capital Project research illustrates that rates have particularly declined among minorities and those in middle and lower economic quintiles. Decreased marriage is associated with increases in unwed childbearing over the last several decades, particularly for these groups.

One of the goals of the Social Capital Project is straightforward: “We want more children in happy married-parent families.” This goal is potentially made more difficult as marriage becomes rarer and more selective. Recognizing the social and economic barriers that cause more couples to put off marriage should be a priority for policymakers, and the SCP will continue to study these trends in detail.

Monday, May 4, 2020

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the top 0.1%'s share of total household wealth rose to 14% from 7%, below earlier estimates of a rise to 22%. On their figures, a graduated wealth tax of 2% above $50m plus a 1% surtax above $1bn would raise $117bn rather than the $207bn implied by earlier estimates, assuming no behavioral response.

James Pethokoukis American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
Is Database:
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New findings by @JamesPethokoukis suggest wealth inequality among top 0.1% is less severe than thought, with a proposed wealth tax generating $117B in 2016, not $207B.

Is wealth concentration at the top smaller than earlier estimates suggest?

Core argument: Zidar, Zwick, and Smith estimate the top 0.1%'s share of total household wealth rose to 14% in 2016 from 7% in 1978, below earlier estimates of a rise to 22%.

Recent findings by Zidar, Zwick, and Smith suggest that wealth inequality among the top 0.1% is less severe than previously estimated, with their share of total household wealth rising to 14% in 2016 from 7% in 1978, compared to earlier estimates of a rise to 22%. This has significant implications for wealth taxation, as a proposed graduated wealth tax—2% on wealth above $50m and a 1% surtax on wealth exceeding $1bn—would generate $117bn in 2016, not the $207bn projected by earlier estimates assuming no behavioral response. This suggests that the potential revenue from taxing the rich may be lower than anticipated, challenging assumptions about the effectiveness of such fiscal policies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Zidar, Zwick, and Smith estimate the top 0.1%'s share of total household wealth rose to 14% in 2016 from 7% in 1978, below earlier estimates of a rise to 22%.
  2. Under the Zidar, Zwick, and Smith estimates, a graduated wealth tax of 2% above $50m plus a 1% surtax above $1bn would have raised $117bn in 2016, versus $207bn under earlier estimates assuming no behavioural response.
  3. The lower estimated wealth concentration at the top suggests revenue from taxing the wealthy would fall short of prior projections.

“…. They find the increase in wealth among the top 0.1 percent over the past 40 years is half as large as previous estimates, like those from Saez and Zucman, would indicate — a rise to 14 percent in 2016 from 7 percent in 1978….. One implication: It could be harder than previously thought to raise lots of dough by “taxing the rich”. For example: A graduated wealth tax — a 2 percent tax on wealth above $50 million and a 1 percent surtax on wealth exceeding $1 billion —would raise $117 billion in 2016 versus $207 billion using previous estimates and assuming no behavioral response…”

James Pethokoukis, “Maybe wealth inequality isn’t as dramatic as we think,” American Enterprise Institute, April 30, 2020, https://www.aei.org/economics/maybe-wealth-inequality-isnt-as-dramatic-as-we-think/

Maybe wealth inequality isn’t as dramatic as we think

How rich are the richest Americans? Perhaps not as rich as you think, at least if you’re the sort of person who obsesses about such things. If you are that sort of person, then you probably know the share of wealth held by the top 0.1 percent of families, according to economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, is nearly as high as in the late 1920s, when “‘The Great Gatsby’ defined an era that rested on the inherited fortunes of the robber barons of the Gilded Age.”

Specifically, Saez and Zucman find the share of total household wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent surged to 22 percent in 2012 from 7 percent in the late 1970s. But there are alternate estimates, such as a new one from Princeton’s Owen Zidar, Chicago Booth’s Eric Zwick, and Treasury’s Matt Smith. They find the increase in wealth among the top 0.1 percent over the past 40 years is half as large as previous estimates, like those from Saez and Zucman, would indicate — a rise to 14 percent in 2016 from 7 percent in 1978.

aybe wealth inequality isn’t as dramatic as we think: Extended Excerpt Image 1


More from the paper “Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich”:

While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the “P90-99” class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90%.

One implication: It could be harder than previously thought to raise lots of dough by “taxing the rich”. For example: A graduated wealth tax — a 2 percent tax on wealth above $50 million and a 1 percent surtax on wealth exceeding $1 billion — would raise $117 billion in 2016 versus $207 billion using previous estimates and assuming no behavioral response.