Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube

Macro Roundup

  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
Select topics to choose: articles that mention them (broader) or articles mainly about them (focused)
  • Mentions 0
  • Primary focus 0
Showing all 7,309 Macro Roundup articles
When you search for any topic (like GDP, Inflation, or Banking), choose:
Choose search scope

Thursday, January 16, 2020

Whos Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer

AI Summary. A US Department of Labor rule sets a four-factor test for determining joint-employer status under federal minimum-wage and overtime law, asking whether an indirect employer hires or fires workers, controls schedules, sets pay, and keeps employment records. This narrower standard replaces broader criteria that reportedly cost US franchisees $17–33bn annually, reducing compliance costs and litigation exposure for national brands.

Michael Strain Bloomberg
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The Trump administration’s regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status, impacting minimum-wage and overtime regulations. This test assesses if an indirect employer hires or fires employees, controls work schedules, determines pay, and maintains employment records.

The Trump administration’s regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status,...

Does a narrower joint-employer test lower franchise compliance and litigation costs?

Core argument: The Obama-era joint-employer standard reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17–33bn annually, a burden the Trump administration's narrower four-factor test is intended to reduce by clarifying employer roles and cutting compliance costs.

The Trump administration's regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status, impacting minimum-wage and overtime regulations. This test assesses if an indirect employer hires or fires employees, controls work schedules, determines pay, and maintains employment records. This narrower standard contrasts with the broader Obama-era criteria, which reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17-33bn annually. By clarifying roles, the reform reduces compliance costs and shields national brands from litigation, potentially benefiting low-wage labor markets. The Department of Labor's guidance under the Fair Labor Standards Act is expected to influence court decisions and is part of a broader discussion on joint-employer status, with the National Labor Relations Board anticipated to issue similar rules soon.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Obama-era joint-employer standard reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17–33bn annually, a burden the Trump administration's narrower four-factor test is intended to reduce by clarifying employer roles and cutting compliance costs.
  2. The Department of Labor's four-factor test determines joint-employer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act by asking whether an indirect employer hires or fires workers, controls schedules, sets pay, and maintains employment records.
  3. The Labor Department guidance, which bears on minimum-wage and overtime obligations and shields national brands from litigation, is expected to influence court decisions, with the National Labor Relations Board anticipated to issue similar rules.

"...Now the Trump administration has adopted a four-factor test to assess whether an indirect employer is a joint employer that would bear legal responsibility for violations of minimum-wage and overtime regulations. Take the example of McDonald’s and an independent franchise. McDonald’s would be deemed a joint employer if it hires or fires employees of the local franchise; supervises and controls employees’ work schedule or other conditions of employment to a substantial degree; determines employees’ pay; and maintains workers’ employment records...."

Michael Strain, "Who’s Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer,"Bloomberg, January 15, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-15/employment-law-confusion-eased-by-team-trump

Who’s Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer

If you’re a typical wage earner, then your employer is obligated to pay you at least the federal minimum wage, along with overtime if you work beyond 40 hours in a given week. But who is your employer? On Sunday, the administration of President Donald Trump brought a common-sense answer to this important and, surprisingly, unresolved question.

Determining who is liable for violations of employment law is more complicated than it may seem. Take a cashier at, say, an independent McDonald’s franchise. Certainly she works for the franchised restaurant. But does she also work for McDonald’s, the national brand? What responsibility does McDonald’s Corp. have for her?

The waters are similarly murky for an employee of a staffing agency or a contractor who is assigned to a business, like a security officer who is assigned to a law firm. If the guard is owed overtime but doesn’t receive it, who should be held accountable? The agency? The law firm? Both?

These issues have grown in importance as companies increasingly contract with outside firms for many services and functions that would once have been taken care of in-house. At large employers, it is now common for building maintenance, security, kitchen, laundry and custodial staff not to work directly for the company they report to each day. Today, it is even common for hotel rooms to be cleaned by employees of temporary staffing agencies. The same goes for the workers who load trucks at retail distribution centers. This remains true as well for activities that have long been outsourced, like payroll and accounting services.

This creates complications for the enforcement of employment law, because what workers actually do on the job — their schedules, the quality standards they are expected to meet, the procedures the need to follow — is often determined by their indirect employer, even though they are direct employees of a staffing agency or a franchise.

How much responsibility do indirect employers have for compliance with employment regulations? The uncertainty around this question has been a burden for businesses, creating compliance costs and duplicate record keeping. It has exposed national brands and businesses that hire contractors to litigation when employment regulations are violated, and in other instances.

Now the Trump administration has adopted a four-factor test to assess whether an indirect employer is a joint employer that would bear legal responsibility for violations of minimum-wage and overtime regulations. Take the example of McDonald’s and an independent franchise. McDonald’s would be deemed a joint employer if it hires or fires employees of the local franchise; supervises and controls employees’ work schedule or other conditions of employment to a substantial degree; determines employees’ pay; and maintains workers’ employment records.

Typically, a company would have to meet some or all of these criteria to be liable for wage and hours violations.

This is a narrower standard for determining joint-employer status than the practice that existed under the administration of President Barack Obama, which expanded the responsibilities of indirect employers in January 2016. The International Franchise Association (the largest organization representing franchises worldwide) argues that the broader criteria previously in place cost U.S. franchisees between $17 and $33 billion per year.

The new rules — which will affect the behavior of workers and employers, and will influence court decisions — are a victory for common sense. They more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of different parties, which will make it easier for them to work together productively and efficiently. Indirect employers will know what steps to take to avoid legal liability and compliance costs and record-keeping costs. National brands will be shielded from litigation over employment issues in local franchises they could not control. Court decisions will become more uniform, which will help businesses. By reducing compliance costs, employers in the low-wage labor market will have more resources to grow their businesses.

Sunday’s Department of Labor guidance is limited to regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a landmark piece of New Deal legislation that determines rules about wages and hours of work and prohibits child labor. It is part of a broader conversation about joint-employer status. The National Labor Relations Board, the government agency responsible for enforcing collective-bargaining laws, is expected to issue a similar rule in the next few weeks, reversing Obama-era policy that made it easier for contractors and workers in franchised businesses to unionize.

These are welcome developments that will, on balance, accrue to the benefit of workers in the low-wage labor market. But it is important to point out that violations of labor law are all too common. A 2017 report by the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive think tank, found that low-wage workers lose billions of dollars per year due to minimum-wage violations alone. Still, the best solution is better enforcement of labor law, not muddying roles and responsibilities in economic relationships.

The Trump administration touts deregulation as one of its major accomplishments. These claims can be overblown. But this guidance is a feather in its cap.

  • Minimum Wage
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Regulation
  • Workforce

How housing became the worlds biggest asset class

AI Summary. Housing has become the world's largest asset class, surpassing farmland and factories, with house prices rising relative to other goods, services, and incomes. The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms over roughly five decades while the median renter's income grew 5%.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Housing has become the world’s largest asset class, surpassing farmland & industrial factories. Median US rent payments rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while median renter’s income grew by only 5%.

How did housing become the world's largest asset class?

Core argument: The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew just 5%.

Over the past 70 years, housing has transformed into the world's largest asset class, surpassing farmland and industrial factories. This shift is marked by a significant increase in house prices relative to other goods and services and incomes. For instance, the median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew by only 5%. This disparity highlights the growing economic weight of housing. The trend reflects broader macroeconomic dynamics, where housing has become a critical component of wealth accumulation and economic stability, influencing policy decisions and investment strategies globally. As housing continues to dominate, its impact on economic inequality and affordability remains a central concern for policymakers and economists.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew just 5%.
  2. Housing has become the world's largest asset class over the past 70 years, surpassing farmland and industrial factories, with house prices rising relative to other goods, services and incomes.
  3. Housing's role in wealth accumulation and economic stability influences policy decisions and investment strategies globally, with inequality and affordability remaining central concerns for policymakers and economists.

Economistreports housing is world’s largest asset class

"...Over the past 70 years housing has undergone a remarkable transformation. Until the mid-20th century house prices across the rich world were fairly stable (see chart). From then on, however, they boomed both relative to the price of other goods and services and relative to incomes. Rents went up, too. The Joint Centre for Housing Studies of Harvard University finds that the median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms between 1960 and 2016 while the median renter’s income grew by 5%.In the18th century farmland was the world’s single-biggest asset class. In the 19th century the factories used to power the Industrial Revolution took the number-one spot. Now it is housing...."

Economist Staff, “How housing became the world’s biggest asset class,"The Economist, January 16, 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/01/16/how-housing-became-the-worlds-biggest-asset-class

  • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
    • Sector
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Housing

Politicians are finally doing something about housing shortages

AI Summary. Rising house prices across rich countries reflect not only supply constraints but looser financial conditions, since falling interest rates let buyers borrow more at manageable monthly payments; a Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing. Where supply is elastic, this effect is weaker.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Cheaper borrowing rates have driven up housing prices in the rich world, not just supply constraints. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing.

Cheaper borrowing rates have driven up housing prices in the rich world, not just supply constraints. A Bank of England...

Are cheaper borrowing costs, not just tight supply, driving house prices?

Core argument: A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing, as falling interest rates let buyers secure larger mortgages while keeping monthly payments manageable.

The escalation of housing prices in the rich world is not solely due to supply constraints but also significantly driven by looser financial conditions. As interest rates have fallen, individuals can secure larger mortgages while maintaining manageable monthly payments, leading to increased demand. This trend is evident in countries like Ireland and Spain, where house prices soared despite a construction boom. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing. While constrained supply remains a factor, the impact of low unemployment, high immigration, and platforms like Airbnb further exacerbates price increases. In areas with elastic housing supply, the effect of looser finance on prices is less pronounced, suggesting that increasing construction could mitigate costs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing, as falling interest rates let buyers secure larger mortgages while keeping monthly payments manageable.
  2. House prices soared in Ireland and Spain despite construction booms, pointing to looser financial conditions rather than supply constraints alone as a driver of rising housing costs in the rich world.
  3. Where housing supply is elastic, looser finance has a less pronounced effect on prices, suggesting that more construction could mitigate housing costs.

Economistreports on theory and evidence that housing price escalation isn’t just supply side (lack of housing) but also demand side, driven by looser financial conditions

"...Yet what a few years ago was an almost universally accepted view among housing economists—that housing is so costly because there is not enough construction—has come under attack, in particular from Ian Mulheirn of the Tony Blair Institute, a think-tank. Members of this vanguard argue that the obsession with supply restrictions misses a more important cause of high house prices: global financial markets. As interest rates have fallen across the rich world, people can take out bigger mortgages and keep their monthly repayments at a manageable level. Landlords are willing to pay more for a house to rent out, because yields on other assets have fallen. Some evidence seems to back up the view that economists’ obsession with housing supply is misguided. In the 2000s both Ireland and Spain experienced soaring house prices, even as construction took off. A recent blogpost from researchers at the Bank of England found that most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 was down to cheaper borrowing.In fact, both causes are important. The loosening in global financial conditions since 2000 has certainly pushed up house prices—as have low unemployment, high immigration and the rise of platforms such as Airbnb, which divert home ownership away from ordinary people. Prices have not risen because building has suddenly became vastly more difficult. At the same time, however, the long-term rise in house prices is largely down to constrained supply. And if builders struggle to erect new dwellings quickly, a given increase in demand is largely channelled into price rises. Giovanni Favara of the Federal Reserve Board and Jean Imbs of the Paris School of Economics find that, though looser finance has led to higher house prices, that was true “to a lesser extent in areas with elastic housing supply, where the housing stock increases instead”. Even the most ardent demand-siders agree that building more would reduce housing costs....."

Economist Staff, "Politicians are finally doing something about housing shortages,"The Economist, January 16, 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/01/16/politicians-are-finally-doing-something-about-housing-shortages

  • Taxation
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Regulation
  • GDP
    • Housing
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • Urban vs Rural

The U.S. Public Debt Valuation Puzzle

AI Summary. The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses, a gap the authors estimate averaged 196% of GDP over the post-war period and widened from 65% to 235% of GDP. Tax revenues rise and fall with the economy while spending moves opposite, giving surpluses a negative present value.

Zhengyang Jiang National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The market value of outstanding US Federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of US GDP.

The market value of outstanding US Federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary...

Does the market value of federal debt exceed expected future surpluses?

Core argument: The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, with this "bubble" averaging 196% of GDP over the post-war period.

The market value of U.S. federal debt surpasses the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, creating a valuation puzzle. This discrepancy arises as tax revenues, being pro-cyclical, have a higher short-run discount rate compared to counter-cyclical government spending, leading to a negative present value of surpluses. The average size of this "bubble" in government debt has been quantified at 196% of GDP over the post-war period, with a significant increase from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% in 2017. This is due to the doubling of government debt from 35% to 75% of GDP and a decline in the surplus claim value from -30% to -160% of GDP. The Treasury markets have not enforced the no-bubble condition, and the bond market vigilantes have seemingly disappeared since the 1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, with this "bubble" averaging 196% of GDP over the post-war period.
  2. The gap between U.S. debt value and surplus claims rose from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% in 2017, as government debt doubled from 35% to 75% of GDP and the surplus claim value fell from -30% to -160% of GDP.
  3. Pro-cyclical tax revenues carry a higher short-run discount rate than counter-cyclical government spending, producing a negative present value of surpluses, while Treasury markets have not enforced the no-bubble condition and bond market vigilantes appear to have vanished since the 1990s.

Just an FYI a factoid from one of the co-authors of "Human Capitalist" that we used in chapter finds that US government debt expected returns exceeds risk free bond yields; they find this puzzling as they don't think it reflects the risks embedded in US government debt. They do not seem to incorporate the risk adverse savings glut and the related safe asset shortage as answers to their “puzzle”

".... The market value of outstanding federal government debt in the U.S. exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of U.S. GDP. When the pricing kernel fits U.S. equity and Treasury prices and the government surpluses are consistent with U.S. post-war data, a government debt valuation puzzle emerges. Since tax revenues are pro-cyclical while government spending is counter-cyclical, the tax revenue claim has a higher short-run discount rate and a lower value than the spending claim. Since revenue and spending are co-integrated with GDP, the long-run risk discount rates of both claims are much higher than the long Treasury yield. These forces imply a negative present value of U.S. government surpluses. Convenience yields for Treasurys are much larger than previously thought and/or U.S. Treasury markets have failed to enforce the no-bubble condition....Missing government assets or market segmentation cannot resolve the puzzle either. One final “resolution” to the puzzle is to argue that there is a bubble in U.S. government debt. Indeed, our approach quantifies the bubble as the difference between the value of outstanding government debt and the value of the surplus claim. Over the post-war period, the average size of the bubble is 196% of GDP. Since 2000, the size of the bubble has tripled from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% of GDP in 2017. This is both because the outstanding value of government debt has doubled from about 35% to 75% of GDP and because the value of the surplus claim has fallen from-30% to-160% of GDP.The Treasury markets do not seem to enforce the transversality condition. The bond market vigilantes seem to have vanished after the 1990s...."

Zhengyang Jiang, Hanno Lustig, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Mindy Z. Xiaolan, "The U.S. Public Debt Valuation Puzzle," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26583

  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

Friday, January 17, 2020

Lets stop pretending that Bernie Sanders wants to duplicate Scandinavia

AI Summary. Scandinavia's earlier experiment with high marginal tax rates and generous benefits weakened work incentives, encouraged tax avoidance and emigration of the wealthy, and subsidized noncompetitive industries, prompting Sweden to cut marginal rates and reform pensions. Today's Scandinavian model includes healthcare co-pays and little reliance on corporate taxation.

James Pethokoukis American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
January 17, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Scandinavia’s experience with socialism in the 1970s & 1980s highlights the economic pitfalls of high marginal tax rates & generous welfare benefits. Sweden reformed its economy by lowering tax rates & implementing pension reforms, balancing risks btw pensioners & taxpayers.

Scandinavia’s experience with socialism in the 1970s & 1980s highlights the economic pitfalls of high marginal...

Why did Scandinavia abandon high tax rates and generous welfare benefits?

Core argument: Scandinavia's high marginal tax rates and generous welfare benefits in the 1970s and 1980s weakened work incentives, encouraged tax avoidance, drove emigration of wealthy individuals, and subsidized noncompetitive industries, producing inflation and economic uncertainty.

Scandinavia's experience with socialism in the 1970s and 1980s highlights the economic pitfalls of high marginal tax rates and generous welfare benefits, which weakened work incentives and encouraged tax avoidance. This led to the emigration of wealthy individuals and the subsidization of noncompetitive industries, resulting in inflation and economic uncertainty. By the early 1990s, Sweden reformed its economy by lowering marginal tax rates and implementing pension reforms, balancing risks between pensioners and taxpayers. These changes, supported by both Social Democrats and right-wing parties, helped Sweden recover economically. In contrast, Bernie Sanders' proposals, such as eliminating patient cost-sharing and heavily taxing businesses, diverge from the current Scandinavian model, which includes co-pays in healthcare and minimal reliance on corporate taxation. This underscores that Sanders' vision does not align with the reformed, pro-business Scandinavian economies of today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Scandinavia's high marginal tax rates and generous welfare benefits in the 1970s and 1980s weakened work incentives, encouraged tax avoidance, drove emigration of wealthy individuals, and subsidized noncompetitive industries, producing inflation and economic uncertainty.
  2. Sweden reformed its economy by the early 1990s by lowering marginal tax rates and enacting pension reforms that balanced risks between pensioners and taxpayers, with support from both Social Democrats and right-wing parties.
  3. Bernie Sanders' proposals to eliminate patient cost-sharing and heavily tax businesses diverge from the current Scandinavian model, which includes co-pays in healthcare and relies minimally on corporate taxation.

"...Here’s a tale of Scandinavian socialism that Team Bernie never tells, via a Milken Review Institute piece from Swedish economist Andreas Bergh: In the 1970s, several well-intended political reforms backfired. The desire to increase income equality through high marginal tax rates and generous welfare benefits weakened work incentives and created strong incentives for tax avoidance. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, many wealthy Swedes - notably Bjorn Borg - left the country to avoid the taxman. Meanwhile, the desire to tame the business cycle and minimize unemployment led to the subsidization of noncompetitive industries. The unions’ desire to drive wages ahead of productivity growth led to inflation, while efforts to restore Sweden’s competitiveness through repeated currency devaluations led to both a lower living standard and investment-sapping uncertainty. Perhaps most important, the mix of subsidies and devaluations sent the signal that firms in trouble could turn to the government for help, rather than be forced to innovate in order to stay competitive. When that happens, economies inevitably pay a price. After the crisis of the early 1990s, the Swedish economy recovered smartly. In many ways, Sweden learned from its mistakes and took measures to avoid large budget deficits and inflationary wage pressures. By the mid-1990s, these changes were institutionalized - and strikingly, often with support from Social Democrats as well as the right-wing parties. Prominent examples include a tax reform that lowered marginal rates substantially and a pension reform that balanced the risks between pensioners and taxpayers by automatically adjusting payments to demographic and economic conditions...."

James Pethokoukis, "Let’s stop pretending that Bernie Sanders wants to duplicate Scandinavia," American Enterprise Institute, January 15, 2020, https://www.aei.org/economics/lets-stop-pretending-that-bernie-sanders-wants-to-duplicate-scandinavia/

Let’s stop pretending that Bernie Sanders wants to duplicate Scandinavia

Bernie Sanders supporters are quick to make clear that their guy doesn’t want to turn America into Cuba or Venezuela or the old Soviet Union. By “democratic socialism,” the US senator from Vermont means Scandinavia, more or less. And what’s wrong with that? The Nordic nations are pretty nice. Even President Trump has conceded that Norway produces a quality immigrant.

But does Sanders really want to import Scandinavian “socialism”? He brags that his universal health-care plan eliminates patient cost-sharing. But Scandinavia has it. Sanders wants to raise a lot revenue though heavy taxes on business and investment. Scandinavia doesn’t. Sanders has a big problem with billionaires. Scandinavia doesn’t. Indeed, as I have written, “The egalitarian Nordic nations have as many billionaires, relatively, as the US and more concentrated wealth, at least as measured by the share of wealth controlled by the top 10 percent.”

I could do on and on, mentioning how the Nordics score highly in the conservative Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index, especially when it comes to government regulation. They’re also free traders, unlike Sanders, who opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement in the 1990s and its successor agreement today. As a JPMorgan analysis cautioned: “Copy the Nordic model if you like, but understand that it entails a lot of capitalism and pro-business policies, a lot of taxation on middle class spending and wages, minimal reliance on corporate taxation and plenty of co-pays and deductibles in its healthcare system.”

Here’s a tale of Scandinavian socialism that Team Bernie never tells, via a Milken Review Institute piece from Swedish economist Andreas Bergh:

In the 1970s, several well-intended political reforms backfired. The desire to increase income equality through high marginal tax rates and generous welfare benefits weakened work incentives and created strong incentives for tax avoidance. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, many wealthy Swedes - notably Bjorn Borg - left the country to avoid the taxman. Meanwhile, the desire to tame the business cycle and minimize unemployment led to the subsidization of noncompetitive industries. The unions’ desire to drive wages ahead of productivity growth led to inflation, while efforts to restore Sweden’s competitiveness through repeated currency devaluations led to both a lower living standard and investment-sapping uncertainty.

Perhaps most important, the mix of subsidies and devaluations sent the signal that firms in trouble could turn to the government for help, rather than be forced to innovate in order to stay competitive. When that happens, economies inevitably pay a price. After the crisis of the early 1990s, the Swedish economy recovered smartly. In many ways, Sweden learned from its mistakes and took measures to avoid large budget deficits and inflationary wage pressures. By the mid-1990s, these changes were institutionalized - and strikingly, often with support from Social Democrats as well as the right-wing parties. Prominent examples include a tax reform that lowered marginal rates substantially and a pension reform that balanced the risks between pensioners and taxpayers by automatically adjusting payments to demographic and economic conditions.

Whatever Sanders wants to turn America into, it doesn’t sound much like Scandinavia as it exists in current reality. Then again, as that JPMorgan report concluded: “A real-life proof of concept for a successful democratic socialist society, like the Lost City of Atlantis, has yet to be found.”

  • Regulation
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages

AI Summary. Analysis finds state and local minimum wage increases have contributed to faster pay growth for low earners, with wages for the bottom third up 4.1% over two years versus 3.6% at the top; without those increases, bottom-third growth would have been closer to 3.3%.

Ernie Tedeschi New York Times
Date Posted:
January 17, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Minimum wage hikes have added 0.4% points to aggregate wage growth, but may not translate into improved living standards if offset by transfer reductions.

Have minimum wage increases driven faster pay growth for low earners?

Core argument: Wages for the bottom third of earners rose 4.1% over the past two years versus 3.6% at the top, and the analysis estimates growth for the bottom third would have been closer to 3.3% without state and local minimum wage increases.

Analysis indicates that state and local minimum wage hikes have significantly influenced wage growth for low earners, with the bottom third experiencing a 4.1% increase over the past two years, compared to 3.6% at the top. However, without these hikes, growth for the bottom third would have been closer to 3.3%. Minimum wage work accounts for about 13% of hours worked by the bottom third, amplifying its impact. Overall, minimum wage increases have added 0.4 percentage points to aggregate wage growth, which has been running at 3.9% annually. Despite these gains, the analysis suggests that the tightening labor market is the primary driver of wage growth, with minimum wage hikes contributing around 1/5 of the increase for low earners. This dynamic raises concerns that wage gains may not translate into improved living standards if offset by reductions in transfer payments.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wages for the bottom third of earners rose 4.1% over the past two years versus 3.6% at the top, and the analysis estimates growth for the bottom third would have been closer to 3.3% without state and local minimum wage increases.
  2. Minimum wage work accounts for about 13% of hours worked by the bottom third, and the analysis estimates minimum wage increases added 0.4 percentage points to aggregate wage growth, which has run at 3.9% annually.
  3. The analysis attributes roughly one-fifth of the wage increase for low earners to minimum wage hikes and identifies the tightening labor market as the primary driver, while noting wage gains may be offset by reductions in transfer payments.

Counterintuitive Ernie analysis suggests that the impact of state and local minimum wage hikes might be skewing our sense of how hot the labor market is. He segments minimum wage workers by those impacted by federal/state/local minimum wages and then looks at relative wage pressure using AHE and finds that absent the hikes wage growth for bottom third would be slower than overall wage growth as opposed to higher. His work suggests that wage growth for Americans in bottom 1/3 of wage earners would have been closer to 3.3% as opposed to 4.1% net the impact of minimum wages. Note he mentions this does not take into account people laid off due to the minimum wage increases.

"...To get a sense of this impact, I have used data in the Current Population Survey to look at minimum wage workers as a group and calculate the pressure their wage gains have put on aggregate wage growth over time, controlling for compositional changes in the share of minimum wage work. Note that this approach doesn’t settle whether minimum-wage increases are a net benefit to Americans, since among other things wage data will by definition capture only those who stayed employed after an increase. If people were laid off because of a minimum-wage increase, their loss of wages wouldn’t factor into the average.This analysis shows that growth in average wages has been running about 3.9 percent per year in the Current Population Survey over the past two years, a bit firmer than the pace right before the Great Recession but below the near 5 percent reached in 2000. But increases to minimum wages at the state and local level have put 0.4 percentage points of upward pressure on this recent growth. Absent that pressure, wage growth in the Current Population Survey over the last two years would have been 3.5 percent.That’s still a fine result, but it’s a bit cooler than the unadjusted data suggest. Wage pressure from minimum wage workers is magnified when you look at only the lowest wages. That’s because while minimum wage work makes up about 6 percent of all usual hours worked, it’s around 13 percent of hours worked by Americans in the bottom third of wages. As the analysis has shown us, wage growth at the bottom is doing well. It has been around 4.1 percent over the last two years — above the 3.6 percent at the top end, and above the overall average of 3.9 percent. But absent the pressure from minimum wage workers, growth at the bottom would have been closer to 3.3 percent...."
Basically overall Ernie finds that AHE growth it’s running 4.1% per year on average in the CPS, and changes in wages for minimum wage workers boosted that by 0.8 percentage points. So ex-hikes, growth at the bottom third looks closer to 3.3%. And when you look at everyone, minimum wage hikes are still registering, though obviously far less, adding 0.4 percentage points to wage growth. He noted in an email, “….A few conclusions from this: first, among workers who stay employed, minimum wages are clearly helping, though as I said earlier this approach can’t weight this benefit against possible costs. In fact, for workers at the bottom, minimum wage hikes have meant the difference between exceeding or falling short of the overall average growth and the growth at the top. Second, minimum wage wages aren’t the biggest reason wages have grown, even at the bottom. The tightening labor market is very likely responsible for the lion’s share of growth. In the bottom third, minimum wage hikes can explain around 1/5 of the wage growth over the last 2 yrs….”

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Ernie Tedeschi, "Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages," New York Times, January 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/upshot/minimum-wage-boost-bottom-earners.html

  • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Poverty/Crime
    • Wages/Income


Loading More Posts

End of content

No more pages to load

© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms