Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
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Wednesday, January 15, 2020

Big Companies Have Never Dominated the SP 500 Like They Do Now

AI Summary. The top five publicly traded U.S. companies account for a record 18% of the S&P 500's market capitalization, exceeding concentration levels reached during the tech bubble. U.S. large-cap stocks are trading near decade highs relative to small caps, and firms with large overseas earnings are outperforming domestically focused peers.

Justina Lee Bloomberg
Date Posted:
January 15, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The top 5 US companies now account for a record 18% of the S&P 500’s capitalization, surpassing levels seen during the tech bubble.

Have the largest US companies reached record dominance of the stock market?

Core argument: The top five publicly traded U.S. companies account for a record 18% of the S&P 500's capitalization, surpassing the concentration seen during the tech bubble, as the index tests its record high.

As the S&P 500 Index tests its record high, the top five publicly-traded American companies now account for a record 18% of the benchmark's capitalization, surpassing levels seen during the tech bubble. This concentration highlights a significant shift in market dynamics, with U.S. large-cap equities reaching near-decade highs compared to small caps. Additionally, firms with substantial overseas earnings are performing near their highest levels since April relative to domestic-focused peers. These trends underscore the increasing dominance of a few large firms in the U.S. equity market, raising questions about market concentration and its implications for competition and economic resilience.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top five publicly traded U.S. companies account for a record 18% of the S&P 500's capitalization, surpassing the concentration seen during the tech bubble, as the index tests its record high.
  2. U.S. large-cap equities have reached near-decade highs relative to small caps.
  3. Firms with substantial overseas earnings are trading near their highest levels since April relative to domestic-focused peers.

Good Morgan Stanley Chart (Vis Bloomberg) implicit support forAutor/Dorn/Katz/Patterson/Van Reenen’s conclusion that,".... While the prediction that rising market toughness could generate an increase in concentration and the profit share may seem counterintuitive, the ambiguous relationship between concentration, profit shares, and the stringency of competition often arises in industrial organization...".

Justina Lee and Luke Kawa, "Big Companies Have Never Dominated the S&P 500 Like They Do Now," Bloomberg, January 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-13/big-companies-have-never-dominated-the-s-p-500-like-they-do-now

“…As the S&P 500 Index once again tests its record high, the top five publicly-traded American companies now make up a record 18% share of the benchmark’s capitalization -- higher than the tech bubble, Morgan Stanley said on Monday. U.S. large-cap equities have jumped to near the highest in more than 10 years against small capsin the early days of this new decade. Companies that make the most money overseas are near the highest since April versus domestic peers, Goldman Sachs baskets show….”

  • Sector
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Demographically-adjusted LFPR

AI Summary. The US labor force participation rate, adjusted for shifts in the population's age structure, remains within 20 basis points of its 1999–2000 average, while the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers has reached a new high.

Ernie Tedeschi ernietedeschi
Date Posted:
January 15, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Labor force stability stronger than raw data: Demographically-adjusted LFPR stays within 20bps of 1999-2000 average. Prime-age EPOP hits record despite population shifts.

Has labor force participation held steady after adjusting for aging?

Core argument: The demographically-adjusted labor force participation rate remains within 20 basis points of its 1999–2000 average, holding stable despite fluctuations in employment and participation rates.

Recent data indicates that the demographically-adjusted Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) remains remarkably stable, staying within 20 basis points of its 1999-2000 average. This stability is noteworthy given the fluctuations in employment and participation rates, with the prime age Employment-Population Ratio (EPOP) reaching a new high. The consistency of the demographically-adjusted LFPR suggests resilience in the labor market despite demographic shifts. This measure accounts for changes in population age structure, providing a clearer picture of labor market dynamics. The close alignment with historical averages underscores the effectiveness of this adjustment in capturing true labor force engagement, offering valuable insights for economists and policymakers monitoring labor market health and potential economic growth trajectories.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The demographically-adjusted labor force participation rate remains within 20 basis points of its 1999–2000 average, holding stable despite fluctuations in employment and participation rates.
  2. The prime age employment-population ratio has reached a new high, alongside the stability of the demographically-adjusted participation rate.
  3. Adjusting the labor force participation rate for changes in population age structure aligns the measure closely with historical averages, offering a clearer picture of labor market dynamics for economists and policymakers.

Ernie's updated his demographically-adjusted LFPR on the new jobs numbers; both employment and participation rates rose. Prime age EPOP made a new high and his demographically adjusted LFPR remains within 20bp of its 1999-2000 average.

Ernie Tedeschi, "Demographically-adjusted LFPR," January 10 2020, https://twitter.com/ernietedeschi/status/1215642083857510401

  • Business Cycle
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

Thursday, January 16, 2020

Whos Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer

AI Summary. A US Department of Labor rule sets a four-factor test for determining joint-employer status under federal minimum-wage and overtime law, asking whether an indirect employer hires or fires workers, controls schedules, sets pay, and keeps employment records. This narrower standard replaces broader criteria that reportedly cost US franchisees $17–33bn annually, reducing compliance costs and litigation exposure for national brands.

Michael Strain Bloomberg
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The Trump administration’s regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status, impacting minimum-wage and overtime regulations. This test assesses if an indirect employer hires or fires employees, controls work schedules, determines pay, and maintains employment records.

The Trump administration’s regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status,...

Does a narrower joint-employer test lower franchise compliance and litigation costs?

Core argument: The Obama-era joint-employer standard reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17–33bn annually, a burden the Trump administration's narrower four-factor test is intended to reduce by clarifying employer roles and cutting compliance costs.

The Trump administration's regulatory reform introduces a four-factor test to determine joint-employer status, impacting minimum-wage and overtime regulations. This test assesses if an indirect employer hires or fires employees, controls work schedules, determines pay, and maintains employment records. This narrower standard contrasts with the broader Obama-era criteria, which reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17-33bn annually. By clarifying roles, the reform reduces compliance costs and shields national brands from litigation, potentially benefiting low-wage labor markets. The Department of Labor's guidance under the Fair Labor Standards Act is expected to influence court decisions and is part of a broader discussion on joint-employer status, with the National Labor Relations Board anticipated to issue similar rules soon.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Obama-era joint-employer standard reportedly cost U.S. franchisees $17–33bn annually, a burden the Trump administration's narrower four-factor test is intended to reduce by clarifying employer roles and cutting compliance costs.
  2. The Department of Labor's four-factor test determines joint-employer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act by asking whether an indirect employer hires or fires workers, controls schedules, sets pay, and maintains employment records.
  3. The Labor Department guidance, which bears on minimum-wage and overtime obligations and shields national brands from litigation, is expected to influence court decisions, with the National Labor Relations Board anticipated to issue similar rules.

"...Now the Trump administration has adopted a four-factor test to assess whether an indirect employer is a joint employer that would bear legal responsibility for violations of minimum-wage and overtime regulations. Take the example of McDonald’s and an independent franchise. McDonald’s would be deemed a joint employer if it hires or fires employees of the local franchise; supervises and controls employees’ work schedule or other conditions of employment to a substantial degree; determines employees’ pay; and maintains workers’ employment records...."

Michael Strain, "Who’s Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer,"Bloomberg, January 15, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-15/employment-law-confusion-eased-by-team-trump

Who’s Your Boss? Team Trump Has a Clear New Answer

If you’re a typical wage earner, then your employer is obligated to pay you at least the federal minimum wage, along with overtime if you work beyond 40 hours in a given week. But who is your employer? On Sunday, the administration of President Donald Trump brought a common-sense answer to this important and, surprisingly, unresolved question.

Determining who is liable for violations of employment law is more complicated than it may seem. Take a cashier at, say, an independent McDonald’s franchise. Certainly she works for the franchised restaurant. But does she also work for McDonald’s, the national brand? What responsibility does McDonald’s Corp. have for her?

The waters are similarly murky for an employee of a staffing agency or a contractor who is assigned to a business, like a security officer who is assigned to a law firm. If the guard is owed overtime but doesn’t receive it, who should be held accountable? The agency? The law firm? Both?

These issues have grown in importance as companies increasingly contract with outside firms for many services and functions that would once have been taken care of in-house. At large employers, it is now common for building maintenance, security, kitchen, laundry and custodial staff not to work directly for the company they report to each day. Today, it is even common for hotel rooms to be cleaned by employees of temporary staffing agencies. The same goes for the workers who load trucks at retail distribution centers. This remains true as well for activities that have long been outsourced, like payroll and accounting services.

This creates complications for the enforcement of employment law, because what workers actually do on the job — their schedules, the quality standards they are expected to meet, the procedures the need to follow — is often determined by their indirect employer, even though they are direct employees of a staffing agency or a franchise.

How much responsibility do indirect employers have for compliance with employment regulations? The uncertainty around this question has been a burden for businesses, creating compliance costs and duplicate record keeping. It has exposed national brands and businesses that hire contractors to litigation when employment regulations are violated, and in other instances.

Now the Trump administration has adopted a four-factor test to assess whether an indirect employer is a joint employer that would bear legal responsibility for violations of minimum-wage and overtime regulations. Take the example of McDonald’s and an independent franchise. McDonald’s would be deemed a joint employer if it hires or fires employees of the local franchise; supervises and controls employees’ work schedule or other conditions of employment to a substantial degree; determines employees’ pay; and maintains workers’ employment records.

Typically, a company would have to meet some or all of these criteria to be liable for wage and hours violations.

This is a narrower standard for determining joint-employer status than the practice that existed under the administration of President Barack Obama, which expanded the responsibilities of indirect employers in January 2016. The International Franchise Association (the largest organization representing franchises worldwide) argues that the broader criteria previously in place cost U.S. franchisees between $17 and $33 billion per year.

The new rules — which will affect the behavior of workers and employers, and will influence court decisions — are a victory for common sense. They more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of different parties, which will make it easier for them to work together productively and efficiently. Indirect employers will know what steps to take to avoid legal liability and compliance costs and record-keeping costs. National brands will be shielded from litigation over employment issues in local franchises they could not control. Court decisions will become more uniform, which will help businesses. By reducing compliance costs, employers in the low-wage labor market will have more resources to grow their businesses.

Sunday’s Department of Labor guidance is limited to regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a landmark piece of New Deal legislation that determines rules about wages and hours of work and prohibits child labor. It is part of a broader conversation about joint-employer status. The National Labor Relations Board, the government agency responsible for enforcing collective-bargaining laws, is expected to issue a similar rule in the next few weeks, reversing Obama-era policy that made it easier for contractors and workers in franchised businesses to unionize.

These are welcome developments that will, on balance, accrue to the benefit of workers in the low-wage labor market. But it is important to point out that violations of labor law are all too common. A 2017 report by the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive think tank, found that low-wage workers lose billions of dollars per year due to minimum-wage violations alone. Still, the best solution is better enforcement of labor law, not muddying roles and responsibilities in economic relationships.

The Trump administration touts deregulation as one of its major accomplishments. These claims can be overblown. But this guidance is a feather in its cap.

  • Minimum Wage
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Regulation
  • Workforce

How housing became the worlds biggest asset class

AI Summary. Housing has become the world's largest asset class, surpassing farmland and factories, with house prices rising relative to other goods, services, and incomes. The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms over roughly five decades while the median renter's income grew 5%.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Housing has become the world’s largest asset class, surpassing farmland & industrial factories. Median US rent payments rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while median renter’s income grew by only 5%.

How did housing become the world's largest asset class?

Core argument: The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew just 5%.

Over the past 70 years, housing has transformed into the world's largest asset class, surpassing farmland and industrial factories. This shift is marked by a significant increase in house prices relative to other goods and services and incomes. For instance, the median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew by only 5%. This disparity highlights the growing economic weight of housing. The trend reflects broader macroeconomic dynamics, where housing has become a critical component of wealth accumulation and economic stability, influencing policy decisions and investment strategies globally. As housing continues to dominate, its impact on economic inequality and affordability remains a central concern for policymakers and economists.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms from 1960 to 2016, while the median renter's income grew just 5%.
  2. Housing has become the world's largest asset class over the past 70 years, surpassing farmland and industrial factories, with house prices rising relative to other goods, services and incomes.
  3. Housing's role in wealth accumulation and economic stability influences policy decisions and investment strategies globally, with inequality and affordability remaining central concerns for policymakers and economists.

Economistreports housing is world’s largest asset class

"...Over the past 70 years housing has undergone a remarkable transformation. Until the mid-20th century house prices across the rich world were fairly stable (see chart). From then on, however, they boomed both relative to the price of other goods and services and relative to incomes. Rents went up, too. The Joint Centre for Housing Studies of Harvard University finds that the median American rent payment rose 61% in real terms between 1960 and 2016 while the median renter’s income grew by 5%.In the18th century farmland was the world’s single-biggest asset class. In the 19th century the factories used to power the Industrial Revolution took the number-one spot. Now it is housing...."

Economist Staff, “How housing became the world’s biggest asset class,"The Economist, January 16, 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/01/16/how-housing-became-the-worlds-biggest-asset-class

  • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
    • Sector
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Housing

Politicians are finally doing something about housing shortages

AI Summary. Rising house prices across rich countries reflect not only supply constraints but looser financial conditions, since falling interest rates let buyers borrow more at manageable monthly payments; a Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing. Where supply is elastic, this effect is weaker.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Cheaper borrowing rates have driven up housing prices in the rich world, not just supply constraints. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing.

Cheaper borrowing rates have driven up housing prices in the rich world, not just supply constraints. A Bank of England...

Are cheaper borrowing costs, not just tight supply, driving house prices?

Core argument: A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing, as falling interest rates let buyers secure larger mortgages while keeping monthly payments manageable.

The escalation of housing prices in the rich world is not solely due to supply constraints but also significantly driven by looser financial conditions. As interest rates have fallen, individuals can secure larger mortgages while maintaining manageable monthly payments, leading to increased demand. This trend is evident in countries like Ireland and Spain, where house prices soared despite a construction boom. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing. While constrained supply remains a factor, the impact of low unemployment, high immigration, and platforms like Airbnb further exacerbates price increases. In areas with elastic housing supply, the effect of looser finance on prices is less pronounced, suggesting that increasing construction could mitigate costs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Bank of England study attributes most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 to cheaper borrowing, as falling interest rates let buyers secure larger mortgages while keeping monthly payments manageable.
  2. House prices soared in Ireland and Spain despite construction booms, pointing to looser financial conditions rather than supply constraints alone as a driver of rising housing costs in the rich world.
  3. Where housing supply is elastic, looser finance has a less pronounced effect on prices, suggesting that more construction could mitigate housing costs.

Economistreports on theory and evidence that housing price escalation isn’t just supply side (lack of housing) but also demand side, driven by looser financial conditions

"...Yet what a few years ago was an almost universally accepted view among housing economists—that housing is so costly because there is not enough construction—has come under attack, in particular from Ian Mulheirn of the Tony Blair Institute, a think-tank. Members of this vanguard argue that the obsession with supply restrictions misses a more important cause of high house prices: global financial markets. As interest rates have fallen across the rich world, people can take out bigger mortgages and keep their monthly repayments at a manageable level. Landlords are willing to pay more for a house to rent out, because yields on other assets have fallen. Some evidence seems to back up the view that economists’ obsession with housing supply is misguided. In the 2000s both Ireland and Spain experienced soaring house prices, even as construction took off. A recent blogpost from researchers at the Bank of England found that most of the rise in British house prices since 2000 was down to cheaper borrowing.In fact, both causes are important. The loosening in global financial conditions since 2000 has certainly pushed up house prices—as have low unemployment, high immigration and the rise of platforms such as Airbnb, which divert home ownership away from ordinary people. Prices have not risen because building has suddenly became vastly more difficult. At the same time, however, the long-term rise in house prices is largely down to constrained supply. And if builders struggle to erect new dwellings quickly, a given increase in demand is largely channelled into price rises. Giovanni Favara of the Federal Reserve Board and Jean Imbs of the Paris School of Economics find that, though looser finance has led to higher house prices, that was true “to a lesser extent in areas with elastic housing supply, where the housing stock increases instead”. Even the most ardent demand-siders agree that building more would reduce housing costs....."

Economist Staff, "Politicians are finally doing something about housing shortages,"The Economist, January 16, 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/01/16/politicians-are-finally-doing-something-about-housing-shortages

  • Taxation
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Regulation
  • GDP
    • Housing
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • Urban vs Rural

The U.S. Public Debt Valuation Puzzle

AI Summary. The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses, a gap the authors estimate averaged 196% of GDP over the post-war period and widened from 65% to 235% of GDP. Tax revenues rise and fall with the economy while spending moves opposite, giving surpluses a negative present value.

Zhengyang Jiang National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 16, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The market value of outstanding US Federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of US GDP.

The market value of outstanding US Federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary...

Does the market value of federal debt exceed expected future surpluses?

Core argument: The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, with this "bubble" averaging 196% of GDP over the post-war period.

The market value of U.S. federal debt surpasses the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, creating a valuation puzzle. This discrepancy arises as tax revenues, being pro-cyclical, have a higher short-run discount rate compared to counter-cyclical government spending, leading to a negative present value of surpluses. The average size of this "bubble" in government debt has been quantified at 196% of GDP over the post-war period, with a significant increase from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% in 2017. This is due to the doubling of government debt from 35% to 75% of GDP and a decline in the surplus claim value from -30% to -160% of GDP. The Treasury markets have not enforced the no-bubble condition, and the bond market vigilantes have seemingly disappeared since the 1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The market value of U.S. federal debt exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of GDP, with this "bubble" averaging 196% of GDP over the post-war period.
  2. The gap between U.S. debt value and surplus claims rose from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% in 2017, as government debt doubled from 35% to 75% of GDP and the surplus claim value fell from -30% to -160% of GDP.
  3. Pro-cyclical tax revenues carry a higher short-run discount rate than counter-cyclical government spending, producing a negative present value of surpluses, while Treasury markets have not enforced the no-bubble condition and bond market vigilantes appear to have vanished since the 1990s.

Just an FYI a factoid from one of the co-authors of "Human Capitalist" that we used in chapter finds that US government debt expected returns exceeds risk free bond yields; they find this puzzling as they don't think it reflects the risks embedded in US government debt. They do not seem to incorporate the risk adverse savings glut and the related safe asset shortage as answers to their “puzzle”

".... The market value of outstanding federal government debt in the U.S. exceeds the expected present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses by a multiple of U.S. GDP. When the pricing kernel fits U.S. equity and Treasury prices and the government surpluses are consistent with U.S. post-war data, a government debt valuation puzzle emerges. Since tax revenues are pro-cyclical while government spending is counter-cyclical, the tax revenue claim has a higher short-run discount rate and a lower value than the spending claim. Since revenue and spending are co-integrated with GDP, the long-run risk discount rates of both claims are much higher than the long Treasury yield. These forces imply a negative present value of U.S. government surpluses. Convenience yields for Treasurys are much larger than previously thought and/or U.S. Treasury markets have failed to enforce the no-bubble condition....Missing government assets or market segmentation cannot resolve the puzzle either. One final “resolution” to the puzzle is to argue that there is a bubble in U.S. government debt. Indeed, our approach quantifies the bubble as the difference between the value of outstanding government debt and the value of the surplus claim. Over the post-war period, the average size of the bubble is 196% of GDP. Since 2000, the size of the bubble has tripled from 65% of GDP in 2000 to 235% of GDP in 2017. This is both because the outstanding value of government debt has doubled from about 35% to 75% of GDP and because the value of the surplus claim has fallen from-30% to-160% of GDP.The Treasury markets do not seem to enforce the transversality condition. The bond market vigilantes seem to have vanished after the 1990s...."

Zhengyang Jiang, Hanno Lustig, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Mindy Z. Xiaolan, "The U.S. Public Debt Valuation Puzzle," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26583

  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit


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