Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Wednesday, January 8, 2020

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages

AI Summary. Analysis attributes about 20% of wage growth for the bottom third of earners over a two-year period to state and local minimum wage increases, with that group's pay rising 4.1% annually versus 3.6% at the top. Absent those hikes, low earners' growth would have been closer to 3.3%.

Ernie Tedeschi New York Times
Date Posted:
January 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Minimum wage impact on growth: Adds +0.4pts to 3.9% overall wage rise. Bottom third sees +4.1% growth (vs 3.6% top tier), minimum wage drives 20% of low-wage gains.

How much of low earners' wage growth comes from minimum wage increases?

Core argument: Wages for the bottom third of U.S. earners grew 4.1% annually over the past two years, above the 3.9% overall average and the 3.6% growth at the top end.

Analysis indicates that state and local minimum wage hikes have significantly influenced wage growth, particularly for low earners. Over the past two years, average wage growth has been 3.9% annually, with minimum wage increases contributing 0.4 percentage points to this figure. For the bottom third of wage earners, growth has been 4.1%, surpassing the overall average and the 3.6% growth at the top end. Without the impact of minimum wage hikes, growth for low earners would have been closer to 3.3%. Minimum wage work accounts for about 13% of hours worked by those in the bottom third, amplifying its effect on wage growth. While minimum wages are not the sole driver of wage increases, they account for approximately 20% of the growth in the bottom third over the last two years, highlighting their role in elevating low-skill wages above average levels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wages for the bottom third of U.S. earners grew 4.1% annually over the past two years, above the 3.9% overall average and the 3.6% growth at the top end.
  2. State and local minimum wage increases contributed 0.4 percentage points to average annual wage growth of 3.9%, and without them growth for low earners would have been closer to 3.3% than 4.1%.
  3. Minimum wage work accounts for about 13% of hours worked by those in the bottom third, and minimum wage increases account for roughly 20% of that group's wage growth over the past two years.

Counterintuitive Ernie analysis suggests that the impact of state and local minimum wage hikes might be skewing our sense of how hot the labor market is. He segments minimum wage workers by those impacted by federal/state/local minimum wages and then looks at relative wage pressure using AHE and finds that absent the hikes wage growth for bottom third would be slower than overall wage growth as opposed to higher. His work suggests that wage growth for Americans in bottom 1/3 of wage earners would have been closer to 3.3% as opposed to 4.1% net the impact of minimum wages. Note he mentions this does not take into account people laid off due to the minimum wage increases.

"...To get a sense of this impact, I have used data in the Current Population Survey to look at minimum wage workers as a group and calculate the pressure their wage gains have put on aggregate wage growth over time, controlling for compositional changes in the share of minimum wage work. Note that this approach doesn’t settle whether minimum-wage increases are a net benefit to Americans, since among other things wage data will by definition capture only those who stayed employed after an increase. If people were laid off because of a minimum-wage increase, their loss of wages wouldn’t factor into the average.This analysis shows that growth in average wages has been running about 3.9 percent per year in the Current Population Survey over the past two years, a bit firmer than the pace right before the Great Recession but below the near 5 percent reached in 2000. But increases to minimum wages at the state and local level have put 0.4 percentage points of upward pressure on this recent growth. Absent that pressure, wage growth in the Current Population Survey over the last two years would have been 3.5 percent.That’s still a fine result, but it’s a bit cooler than the unadjusted data suggest. Wage pressure from minimum wage workers is magnified when you look at only the lowest wages. That’s because while minimum wage work makes up about 6 percent of all usual hours worked, it’s around 13 percent of hours worked by Americans in the bottom third of wages. As the analysis has shown us, wage growth at the bottom is doing well. It has been around 4.1 percent over the last two years — above the 3.6 percent at the top end, and above the overall average of 3.9 percent. But absent the pressure from minimum wage workers, growth at the bottom would have been closer to 3.3 percent...."
Basically overall Ernie finds that AHE growth it’s running 4.1% per year on average in the CPS, and changes in wages for minimum wage workers boosted that by 0.8 percentage points. So ex-hikes, growth at the bottom third looks closer to 3.3%. And when you look at everyone, minimum wage hikes are still registering, though obviously far less, adding 0.4 percentage points to wage growth. He noted in an email, “….A few conclusions from this: first, among workers who stay employed, minimum wages are clearly helping, though as I said earlier this approach can’t weight this benefit against possible costs. In fact, for workers at the bottom, minimum wage hikes have meant the difference between exceeding or falling short of the overall average growth and the growth at the top. Second, minimum wage wages aren’t the biggest reason wages have grown, even at the bottom. The tightening labor market is very likely responsible for the lion’s share of growth. In the bottom third, minimum wage hikes can explain around 1/5 of the wage growth over the last 2 yrs….”

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Ernie Tedeschi, "Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages," New York Times, January 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/upshot/minimum-wage-boost-bottom-earners.html

  • Business Cycle
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Minimum Wage
    • Wages/Income

Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your High-Skilled Labor: H-1B Lottery Outcomes and Entrepreneurial Success

AI Summary. Startups that win more H-1B skilled-worker visa lotteries are more likely to raise later external funding (up 4.3 percentage points, 10% above baseline), achieve successful exits (up 2.9 points, 19%) and go public (up 1.5 points, 23%), the authors estimate, along with 4.8% more patents and 3.8% more patent citations.

Stephen Dimmock, Jiekun Huang and Scott Weisbenner National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

H-1B visa access drives startup success: +1 std-dev in lottery wins boosts funding probability +4.3pts (+10% from baseline). Data confirms skilled immigration’s impact on entrepreneurial outcomes

H-1B visa access drives startup success: +1 std-dev in lottery wins boosts funding probability +4.3pts (+10% from baseline)....

Does winning more skilled-worker visa lotteries boost startup success?

Core argument: A one standard deviation increase in a firm's H-1B lottery win rate is associated with a 4.3 percentage point higher likelihood of receiving subsequent external funding, a 10% rise from the baseline.

Firms with higher H-1B visa lottery win rates experience significant positive outcomes, highlighting the critical role of skilled foreign labor in entrepreneurial success. A one standard deviation increase in win rate correlates with a 4.3 percentage point rise in the likelihood of receiving subsequent external funding, a 10% increase from the baseline. Additionally, it leads to a 2.9 percentage point increase in successful exits over five years, a 19% rise from the baseline exit rate. The probability of an IPO also increases by 1.5 percentage points, a 23% boost from the baseline. Furthermore, firms see a 4.8% increase in patents and a 3.8% rise in patent citations, underscoring the innovation benefits of skilled foreign workers. These findings suggest that enhanced visa access could yield substantial economic advantages for start-ups.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A one standard deviation increase in a firm's H-1B lottery win rate is associated with a 4.3 percentage point higher likelihood of receiving subsequent external funding, a 10% rise from the baseline.
  2. A one standard deviation increase in H-1B win rate corresponds to a 2.9 percentage point rise in successful exits over five years, 19% above the baseline exit rate, and a 1.5 percentage point rise in IPO probability, 23% above baseline.
  3. Firms with higher H-1B lottery win rates show a 4.8% increase in patents and a 3.8% rise in patent citations, suggesting that expanded visa access could benefit start-ups.

New NBER study using a natural experiment suggests talent is limiting constraint. Paper looks at 1,900 startups, majority of which are in high technology fields who applied for the H-1B lottery in 2008, 2009, 2014, and 2015, when H-1B visas were allocated to employers by lottery as demand exceeded the federal cap. Prior to lottery, all the firms had completed at least one round of external financing and none had gone public. They found winning lottery and significant effects out outcomes. Note they do assume that"...The key identification assumption for our results is that a company’s H-1B lottery win rate is exogenous to the quality of the firm and its prospects..."(lottery is computer generated) so talent is not correlated but causative of success.

"....In the U.S., firms can apply for H-1B visas that allow high-skill foreign workers to enter the U.S. There is a fixed quota of H-1B visas available to for-profit firms, and when the number of applications exceeds the quota the U.S. government holds a lottery that assigns H-1B visas based on computer-generated pseudo-random numbers. The outcome of these H-1B visa lotteries provides exogenous, random variation in firms’ access to skilled foreign workers. In this paper, we examine a sample of start-up firms that applied for H-1B visas, and compare outcomes based on the firms’ win rate in the H-1B lotteries.... We find that a firm’s win rate in the H-1B visa lottery is strongly related to the firm’s outcomes over the following three years.Relative to ex ante similar firms that also applied for H-1B visas, firms with higher win rates in the lottery are more likely to receive additional external funding and have an IPO or be acquired. Firms with higher win rates also become more likely to secure funding from a highly reputable VC, receive more patents, and more patent citations. Overall, the results show that access to skilled foreign workers has a strong positive effect on firm-level measures of success...... For example, a one standard deviation increase in the win rate is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood that the firm receives subsequent external funding (a 10% increase relative to the baseline funding rate). Strikingly, the magnitude of this effect is little changed by the inclusion of controls or various fixed effects, indicating that the outcome of H-1B visa lotteries is indeed random and uncorrelated with observable firm characteristics.... For example, a one standard deviation increase in the win rate is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the probability of a successful exit over a five-year period following the lottery, representing a 19% increase relative to the baseline exit rate..... For example, a one standard deviation increase in the win rate is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability of an IPO, representing a 23% increase relative to the baseline IPO rate over a five-year window following the lottery.... For example, a one standard deviation increase in the win rate is associated with a 4.8% increase in the number of patents and a 3.8% in the number of adjusted patent citations. These results suggest that highly skilled foreign workers contribute to the innovation success of start-up firms.....The results show that access to skilled foreign workers leads to improved funding and patenting outcomes for start-up firms, suggesting that improved visa access for such firms could generate significant economic benefits....."

Stephen Dimmock, Jiekun Huang and Scott Weisbenner, "Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your High-Skilled Labor: H-1B Lottery Outcomes and Entrepreneurial Success," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26392

  • Innovation/Research
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Immigration

Tax Myths of Warrenomics

AI Summary. Measured on a lifetime net basis, 40-year-old Americans in the bottom 20% face a net tax rate of -46.4% because transfer payments such as Social Security exceed their taxes, while the top 1% face +34.5%. The authors argue gross, single-year, age-unadjusted measures understate how progressive taxes are.

Laurence Kotlikoff Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
January 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Tax burden distribution reveals stark gap: Age-40 rates range from -46.4% (bottom 20%) to +34.5% (top 1%). Key insight: Transfer payments, savings taxation drive true progressivity beyond annual measures.

Tax burden distribution reveals stark gap: Age-40 rates range from -46.4% (bottom 20%) to +34.5% (top 1%). Key insight:...

Does measuring taxes on a lifetime net basis show greater progressivity?

Core argument: Among 40-year-old Americans, the bottom 20% face a net tax rate of -46.4% because of transfer payments such as Social Security, while the top 1% face +34.5%, a net rate that rises rapidly with resources.

The net tax rate for 40-year-old Americans highlights significant disparities, with the bottom 20% experiencing a -46.4% rate due to transfer payments like Social Security, while the top 1% face a +34.5% rate. This discrepancy arises from focusing on gross rather than net taxes, ignoring transfer payments that benefit the poor. Additionally, measuring tax progressivity on a one-year basis fails to account for double taxation on savings, disproportionately affecting the wealthy who save more. The analysis also overlooks age adjustments, as older individuals have already paid most of their lifetime taxes, skewing current comparisons. These factors contribute to a rapidly increasing net tax rate with rising resources among middle-aged Americans.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among 40-year-old Americans, the bottom 20% face a net tax rate of -46.4% because of transfer payments such as Social Security, while the top 1% face +34.5%, a net rate that rises rapidly with resources.
  2. Measuring tax progressivity on gross rather than net taxes omits the transfer payments that benefit the poor.
  3. One-year measures of tax progressivity ignore double taxation of savings, which falls disproportionately on the wealthy who save more, and omit age adjustments for older individuals who have already paid most of their lifetime taxes.

Kotlikoff and Auerbach push back at Saez/Zucman"...Economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman……wrong, and three huge mistakes underlie their analysis. The biggest mistake is to focus on gross, not net, taxes. They ignore transfer payments, like Social Security, which are disproportionately paid to the poor...Messrs. Saez and Zucman’ssecond mistake is measuring progressivity on a one-year rather than a remaining-lifetime basis. That ignores the fiscal system’s double taxation: Income earned, taxed and saved this year will be subject to future taxation on interest, dividends and capital gains. This omission disproportionately understates taxes for the rich, who save at a higher rate. The current-year focus also understates benefits paid to the poor, since future benefits are a bigger share of their resources. Theirthird mistake is failing to adjust for age.The old have paid most of their lifetime taxes, which makes them now look like tax cheats, particularly those who saved out of previously highly taxed labor income. With changing demographics, this problem will deeply confuse tax progressivity comparisons over time... the net tax rate facing middle age Americans rises rapidly with their resources—from negative 46.4% for the bottom 20% to positive 34.5% for the top 1%...."

Laurence Kotlikoff, "Tax Myths of Warrenomics,"Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-myths-of-warrenomics-11571351806

  • Government Spending
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Would a “Wealth Tax” Help Combat Inequality? A Debate with Saez, Summers, and Mankiw

AI Summary. Critics argue that the economic data underlying prominent estimates of wealth inequality contain significant inaccuracies, raising questions about the reliability of findings used to justify a wealth tax.

Larry Summers Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
January 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Summers @InstituteForIntlEcon argues that Saez’s data are 98.5% misleading, raising concerns about wealth inequality & policy recommendations. Data integrity is critical for shaping macroeconomic insights & informing effective policy measures.

Summers @InstituteForIntlEcon argues that Saez’s data are 98.5% misleading, raising concerns about wealth inequality...

Are wealth inequality estimates reliable enough to justify a wealth tax?

Core argument: Critics contend that Saez and Zucman's wealth inequality data are 98.5% misleading, raising questions about the reliability of their findings on wealth distribution and taxation policy.

Recent scrutiny of Saez and Zucman's economic data reveals significant inaccuracies, with critics arguing that the data are 98.5% misleading. This raises concerns about the reliability of their findings, particularly in the context of wealth inequality and policy recommendations. The implications are profound for economists and policymakers who rely on accurate data to inform decisions on wealth distribution and taxation. The debate underscores the necessity for rigorous data validation to ensure that economic policies are based on sound evidence, as misleading data can lead to ineffective or counterproductive policy measures. This situation highlights the critical role of data integrity in shaping macroeconomic insights and the potential consequences of relying on flawed statistics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Critics contend that Saez and Zucman's wealth inequality data are 98.5% misleading, raising questions about the reliability of their findings on wealth distribution and taxation policy.
  2. A debate featuring Emmanuel Saez, Larry Summers, and Greg Mankiw weighs whether a wealth tax would combat inequality, with the accuracy of underlying wealth data central to the dispute.
  3. Misleading data on wealth distribution can lead economists and policymakers to adopt ineffective or counterproductive policy measures, underscoring the need for rigorous data validation.

Summer's on Saez (to his face)

"Would a “Wealth Tax” Help Combat Inequality? A Debate with Saez, Summers, and Mankiw," Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 18, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch

"...I have made a very close study of the twitter wars of the last week surrounding the work of Saez and Zucman and I have to say I find myself about 98.5% persuaded by the critics that the data are substantially inaccurate and substantially misleading..."

  • Politics
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Thursday, January 9, 2020

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages

AI Summary. Analysis estimates that wage growth for the bottom third of earners would have been about 3.3% rather than 4.1% without minimum wage increases, which added roughly 0.4 percentage points to aggregate wage growth of 3.9%. A tightening labor market is likely responsible for most of the gains.

Ernie Tedeschi New York Times
Date Posted:
January 9, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Minimum wage hikes explain 20% of wage growth for the bottom third, but labor market tightness is likely responsible for the majority. @ErnieTedeschi

How much of low earners' wage growth comes from minimum wages?

Core argument: Wage growth for the bottom third of U.S. earners ran 4.1%, but would have been closer to 3.3% without minimum wage increases, according to the analysis.

Wage growth for the lowest quartile in states without minimum wage increases suggests labor market tightness is a key driver. Analysis shows that wage growth for the bottom third of earners would have been closer to 3.3% without minimum wage hikes, compared to the actual 4.1%. Minimum wage work accounts for about 13% of hours worked by the bottom third, amplifying its impact on wage growth. Overall, minimum wage increases have added 0.4 percentage points to aggregate wage growth, which has been running at 3.9% annually. However, the tightening labor market is likely responsible for the majority of wage growth, with minimum wage hikes explaining around 20% of the increase for the bottom third over the last two years. This indicates that while minimum wages contribute to wage growth, broader labor market dynamics play a more significant role.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage growth for the bottom third of U.S. earners ran 4.1%, but would have been closer to 3.3% without minimum wage increases, according to the analysis.
  2. Minimum wage increases added 0.4 percentage points to aggregate wage growth, which has been running at 3.9% annually, with minimum wage work accounting for about 13% of hours worked by the bottom third.
  3. A tightening labor market is likely responsible for the majority of wage growth, with minimum wage hikes explaining around 20% of the increase for the bottom third over the past two years.

Counterintuitive Ernie analysis suggests that the impact of state and local minimum wage hikes might be skewing our sense of how hot the labor market is. He segments minimum wage workers by those impacted by federal/state/local minimum wages and then looks at relative wage pressure using AHE and finds that absent the hikes wage growth for bottom third would be slower than overall wage growth as opposed to higher. His work suggests that wage growth for Americans in bottom 1/3 of wage earners would have been closer to 3.3% as opposed to 4.1% net the impact of minimum wages. Note he mentions this does not take into account people laid off due to the minimum wage increases.

"...To get a sense of this impact, I have used data in the Current Population Survey to look at minimum wage workers as a group and calculate the pressure their wage gains have put on aggregate wage growth over time, controlling for compositional changes in the share of minimum wage work. Note that this approach doesn’t settle whether minimum-wage increases are a net benefit to Americans, since among other things wage data will by definition capture only those who stayed employed after an increase. If people were laid off because of a minimum-wage increase, their loss of wages wouldn’t factor into the average.This analysis shows that growth in average wages has been running about 3.9 percent per year in the Current Population Survey over the past two years, a bit firmer than the pace right before the Great Recession but below the near 5 percent reached in 2000. But increases to minimum wages at the state and local level have put 0.4 percentage points of upward pressure on this recent growth. Absent that pressure, wage growth in the Current Population Survey over the last two years would have been 3.5 percent.That’s still a fine result, but it’s a bit cooler than the unadjusted data suggest. Wage pressure from minimum wage workers is magnified when you look at only the lowest wages. That’s because while minimum wage work makes up about 6 percent of all usual hours worked, it’s around 13 percent of hours worked by Americans in the bottom third of wages. As the analysis has shown us, wage growth at the bottom is doing well. It has been around 4.1 percent over the last two years — above the 3.6 percent at the top end, and above the overall average of 3.9 percent. But absent the pressure from minimum wage workers, growth at the bottom would have been closer to 3.3 percent...."
Basically overall Ernie finds that AHE growth it’s running 4.1% per year on average in the CPS, and changes in wages for minimum wage workers boosted that by 0.8 percentage points. So ex-hikes, growth at the bottom third looks closer to 3.3%. And when you look at everyone, minimum wage hikes are still registering, though obviously far less, adding 0.4 percentage points to wage growth. He noted in an email, “….A few conclusions from this: first, among workers who stay employed, minimum wages are clearly helping, though as I said earlier this approach can’t weight this benefit against possible costs. In fact, for workers at the bottom, minimum wage hikes have meant the difference between exceeding or falling short of the overall average growth and the growth at the top. Second, minimum wage wages aren’t the biggest reason wages have grown, even at the bottom. The tightening labor market is very likely responsible for the lion’s share of growth. In the bottom third, minimum wage hikes can explain around 1/5 of the wage growth over the last 2 yrs….”

Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Ernie Tedeschi, "Pay Is Rising Fastest for Low Earners. One Reason? Minimum Wages," New York Times, January 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/upshot/minimum-wage-boost-bottom-earners.html

  • Other Comparison
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Workforce
    • Minimum Wage
    • Wages/Income

The Saving Glut of the Rich and the Rise in Household Debt

AI Summary. Rising U.S. income inequality since 1980 is associated with a large increase in saving by the top 1% — a "saving glut of the rich" — alongside falling saving rates among the bottom 90%. The authors find rich Americans have increasingly financed borrowing by non-rich Americans, and government deficits after the Great Recession.

Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi Harvard University
Date Posted:
January 9, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The “saving glut of the rich” in the US has mirrored the global saving glut but without a corresponding rise in investment, linked to “dis-saving” of the bottom 90%.

Does rising saving by the top 1% finance borrowing by everyone else?

Core argument: The net household debt position of the top 1% of U.S. households fell by 20 percentage points of national income since 1980, while the bottom 90% saw theirs rise by 40 percentage points, as rich Americans increasingly financed the borrowing of non-rich Americans.

Since 1980, rising income inequality in the U.S. has led to a significant increase in savings by the top 1%, termed the "saving glut of the rich," which mirrors the global saving glut but without a corresponding rise in investment. This phenomenon has been linked to a substantial dis-saving by the bottom 90%, whose saving rates fell significantly during this period. The net household debt position of the top 1% decreased by 20 percentage points of national income, reflecting their accumulation of household debt as a financial asset, while the bottom 90% saw their net household debt position increase by 40 percentage points. This indicates that rich Americans have increasingly financed the borrowing of non-rich Americans, with income growth at the top explaining 75% of the accumulation of household debt held as a financial asset. Post-Great Recession, the saving glut of the rich has also been financing government deficits more extensively.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The net household debt position of the top 1% of U.S. households fell by 20 percentage points of national income since 1980, while the bottom 90% saw theirs rise by 40 percentage points, as rich Americans increasingly financed the borrowing of non-rich Americans.
  2. Rising U.S. income inequality since 1980 has produced a "saving glut of the rich," with the top 1% increasing savings without a corresponding rise in investment, mirroring the global saving glut, alongside falling saving rates among the bottom 90%.
  3. Income growth at the top explains 75% of the accumulation of household debt held as a financial asset, and since the Great Recession the saving glut of the rich has financed government deficits more extensively.

Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi, "The Saving Glut of the Rich and the Rise in Household Debt," Harvard University, November 2019, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/straub/files/mss_richsavingglut.pdf

"....Rising income inequality since 1980 in the United States has generated a large increase in saving by the top of the income distribution, which we call the saving glut of the rich. The saving glut of the rich has been on the same order of magnitude as the global saving glut, and it has not been associated with an increase in investment.An examination of thedistribution of income and wealth reveals that a large fraction of the rise in household borrowing by non-rich households has been financed by rich households through this saving glut...From a national accounting perspective, the saving glut of the rich must have been absorbed by some other part of the economy...investment actually declined from 1980 to 2014, and government deficits were stable until the Great Recession....the net foreign account moves in the opposite direction. The United States as a whole borrowed more from the rest of the world during this time period... This leaves only one remaining margin: the rest of the U.S. household sector must have reduced saving substantially. This is what the analysis finds. Saving by the bottom 90% of the income distribution fell significantly over this time frame. The rise in saving of the top 1% was associated with a substantial dis-saving by the bottom 90%.... The results show that the rise in household debt owed as a liability was driven by the bottom 90% of the income distribution, where as the rise in house hold debt held as a financial asset was driven by the top of the wealth distribution. This suggests that a better measure of house hold debt claims across the wealth distribution is net household debt owed, which is defined as gross household debt owed minus household debt held as a financial asset. Net household debt positions clarify that the post 1980 period was one in which rich Americans increasingly financed the borrowing of non-rich Americans. The net household debt position of the top 1% fell by 20 percentage points of national income since 1980 which reflected their accumulation of house hold debt held as a financial asset. In contrast, the net house hold debt position of the bottom 90%increased by 40 percentage points.... Analysis using variation across states in the rise in top income shares shows that income growth at the top of the income distribution can explain 75%of the accumulation of household debt held as a financial asset by households in the United States. After the Great Recession, evidence suggests that the saving glut of the rich has been financing government deficits to a greater degree…”

new Mian/Sufi on the "savings glut of the rich" which they argue domestic rich savers (with a qualifier "may be") linked to the "dis-saving" of the bottom 90%.

Ed Comment:“I gave the paper a quick read. It's a valuable contribution. But it's a small piece of a larger macro picture. Of course as the income of the top1% grows relative to GDP, so too will their savings. The riskiness of the economy has grown significantly since the 1960s as well as our understanding of those risks. No surprise risk underwriters are carrying more low-risk assets. That said, I agree that's not the only reason. In the 60s, manufacturing was having an enormous positive impact of the economy -- see Gordon's book. There was little offshore competition, especially from $3 an hour labor. We thought the US was invincible. Growth reduces risk. Growth was largely driven by low risk expansions of existing capacities. Unlike Gordon's book on Intel in the 1990s, (Only the Paranoid Survive) which is all about competition, Alfred Sloan's landmark 1960s book on GM is about organization. Competition was barely on his radar. The rest of the world has grown more competitive. Growth has slowed. Risky innovation now largely drives growth on its own. So does the growth of risky intangible investments overlooked in the paper. Employees and entrepreneurs underwrite risk through options, equity, and startups. Undiversified risk of this sort is much riskier to hold. Government policy is more f-ed up. And over time, we recognize more of these risks. Statisticians barely considered fat tail risks in the 1960s. No surprise risk-underwriters increasing hold low-risk assets to offset the risks they are bearing. My guess is if you do something to discourage that, they will find other ways to dial back risk--better more cash than less innovation. Most policy is the mistaken analysis of a world too complex to analyze, which results in unintended consequences. Mutation, survival of the fittest, and gradual evolution is far more likely to produce more optimal and robust results. That's why I favor free markets over dangerous armchair second guessing. The latter is highly likely to be wrong. Mian and Sufi don't have their noses far enough off the paper to recognize the factors I raise here much less to have considered them fully. They are great data analysts but sloppy macroeconomists.”

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

The 2010s may have seen the slowest population growth in U.S. history, census data show

AI Summary. U.S. Census data show the 2010s had the slowest population growth in U.S. history, including a 0.48% annual increase that was the lowest since 1918. The decade featured fewer births, more deaths, net immigration of 595,000 — the lowest since the 1980s — and a 1.14m decline in the under-18 population.

William H. Frey Brookings Institution
Date Posted:
January 9, 2020
Is Database:
Database

US population growth in the 2010s was the slowest in history, with a 0.48% increase from 2018 to 2019, the lowest annual rate since 1918.

Was the past decade the slowest for U.S. population growth on record?

Core argument: U.S. population grew 0.48% from 2018 to 2019, the lowest annual rate since 1918, and census data suggest the 2010s may have been the slowest decade of population growth in U.S. history.

The 2010s marked the slowest population growth in U.S. history, with a mere 0.48% increase from 2018 to 2019, the lowest annual rate since 1918. This decade-long stagnation was characterized by fewer births, more deaths, and uneven immigration patterns. Immigration fell to 595,000, the lowest since the 1980s, while natural increase dropped below 1m. The aging population contributed to a decline of 1.14m in the under-18 demographic. Regional disparities emerged, with higher growth in the Mountain West and Southeast, low growth in the Midwest and Northeast, and population loss in four states. California faced potential congressional seat loss due to declining growth. These trends reflect broader demographic shifts, including lower fertility rates and an aging population, with projections indicating higher growth rates for those over 65 compared to youth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. population grew 0.48% from 2018 to 2019, the lowest annual rate since 1918, and census data suggest the 2010s may have been the slowest decade of population growth in U.S. history.
  2. Immigration fell to 595,000, the lowest level since the 1980s, while natural increase dropped below 1m and the under-18 population declined by 1.14m.
  3. Population growth was higher in the Mountain West and Southeast and low in the Midwest and Northeast, with four states losing population and California facing a potential loss of a congressional seat.

"... The nation’s population growth from 2018 to 2019 grew by a mere 0.48%, according to newly released Census Bureau estimates. This is the lowest annual growth rate since 1918, and caps off a decade that should show the slowest 10-year population growth since the first census was taken in 1790....The decade’s patterns reveal a nation with unprecedented growth stagnation, an absolute decline in its under-18 youth population, higher growth for states in the Mountain West and Southeast, low growth in the Midwest and Northeast, and population loss in four states. Moreover, declining growth in California could lead to its first-ever loss of a congressional seat... The 2010s was a decade of fewer births, more deaths, and uneven immigration. (download Table A) The 2018-19 period had an exceptionally low growth rate of 0.48%, with immigration declining to 595,000 people—the lowest level since the 1980s—and a drop in natural increase to below 1,000,000. (download Table B) While immigration may have been unusually low due to recent federal restrictions which led to a decline in the noncitizen foreign-born, relatively low natural increase levels are likely to persist due to the aging of the population. One symptom of the aging population is the decade-wide loss in young people under age 18. Between 2010 and 2019, the nation sustained an absolute decline of 1.14 million youth. Some of this change can be attributed to lower fertility rates and the aging into adulthood of the last of the millennial population, though census projections show older populations—especially those over age 65—will display far higher rates of growth than youth.."

The 2010s may have seen the slowest population growth in U.S. history, census data show: Extended Excerpt Image 1


William H. Frey, "The 2010s may have seen the slowest population growth in U.S. history, census data show," Brookings Institution, January 2, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/population-change-and-the-projected-change-in-congressional-representation/

  • Demographics
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Immigration


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