Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Tuesday, November 26, 2019

Double counting accounting: How much profit of multinational enterprises is really in tax havens?

AI Summary. Revised estimates find that double counting in official data on U.S. multinationals' foreign affiliate income — particularly equity income from indirectly owned affiliates — inflates measures of profit shifting to tax havens. Adjusting for this, the authors estimate U.S. corporate tax revenue lost to profit shifting at 4% ($10bn) to 13% ($32bn), about one-third of prior estimates.

Jennifer Blouin Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
November 26, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Revised estimates suggest the U.S. Treasury loses only one-third of previously estimated revenue to BEPS due to double counting in accounting practices.

Revised estimates suggest the U.S. Treasury loses only one-third of previously estimated revenue to BEPS due to double...

Does double counting in official data overstate profit shifting to tax havens?

Core argument: Revised estimates put the U.S. corporate tax base lost to base erosion and profit shifting in 2012 at 4% ($10bn) to 13% ($32bn), roughly one-third of previously estimated revenue losses.

Revised estimates suggest that the U.S. Treasury loses only one-third of the previously estimated revenue to base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) due to double counting in accounting practices. The misinterpretation of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data, particularly the treatment of equity income from indirectly-owned foreign affiliates, has led to inflated figures. In 2016, equity income accounted for 67% of aggregate foreign affiliate income for U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs), indicating profits are reported in multiple jurisdictions. Adjusting for this, the U.S. corporate tax base lost to BEPS in 2012 is estimated between 4% ($10bn) and 13% ($32bn), significantly lower than previous estimates. This correction reduces the perceived magnitude of BEPS, challenging influential studies that overstate the issue due to accounting misallocations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Revised estimates put the U.S. corporate tax base lost to base erosion and profit shifting in 2012 at 4% ($10bn) to 13% ($32bn), roughly one-third of previously estimated revenue losses.
  2. Equity income accounted for 67% of aggregate foreign affiliate income for U.S. multinationals in 2016, indicating that the same profits are reported in multiple jurisdictions in Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
  3. Correcting the treatment of equity income from indirectly-owned foreign affiliates in Bureau of Economic Analysis data reduces the measured magnitude of profit shifting and challenges influential studies that overstate it through accounting misallocations.

Boom. new paper undermines Zucman, argues that the current baseline on base erosion and profit shifting is wrong due to double counting. the change in estimates are giant, their revised estimate is that Treasury only loses 1/3 of the current estimates to to BEPS. Not in a position to judge the accounting, but if they are correct, and they make a compelling case, giant.

"...To illustrate the impact of our adjustment to resolve the issues,we offer revised estimates of the U.S. revenue lost to BEPS that are on average only one third of those found in the literature....We explain that the large share of BEA aggregate income reported in tax havens is due to a significant misinterpretation of the BEA’s U.S. international economic accounts data. The confusion stems from the accounting treatment of the activity of U.S. MNEs’ indirectly owned foreign affiliates. For BEA reporting, a foreign affiliate (parent) that owns another foreign affiliate (affiliate) will be required to report the income of the affiliate on its own income statement. This income on the foreign parent’s books is referred to in the BEA data as the equity income from investments. Equity income only arises from foreign affiliates that are indirectly-owned owned by the U.S. parent (i.e., affiliates owned by other foreign affiliates directly held by the U.S. parent). Equity income is neither dividend income nor does it represent an asset (cash or otherwise) flow between a foreign parent affiliate and its affiliate. It is only an accounting construct that is necessary because national statistics require MNEs to report affiliate-level financial information by jurisdiction....For example, in 1990 equity income represented 27% of aggregate foreign affiliate net income but, in 2016, equity income comprises 67 percent of the aggregate foreign affiliate income for U.S. MNEs. This means that in 2016 two-thirds of foreign profits are reported in at least two different countries - once in the country of the parent affiliate and once in the country of the affiliate that generated the profit from its underlying operations....Once we adjust the BEA’s income measures for equity income, we estimate the U.S. corporate tax base lost to BEPS in 2012 of between 4% ($10 billion) and 13% ($32 billion). Similarly, Zucman (2015, p. 105-106) fails to adjust for equity income in his analysis of the 2013 BEA data leading to his conclusion that 55 percent of foreign affiliate income is earned in tax havens resulting in a revenue loss of $130 billion a year (41.4% of U.S. tax revenue in 2013). Our revised estimate using his methodology is only $80 billion (25.4% of U.S. tax revenue in 2013).....Putting an end to the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is on the national agenda of nearly every country in the world. While many influential papers suggest that the scope and magnitude of the BEPS problem is quite large, we show that these magnitudes are likely overstated due to the accounting treatment of indirectly-owned foreign affiliates in the BEA’s U.S. international economic accounts data. We explain how this accounting treatment leads to double counting of foreign income and to misallocations to the incorrect jurisdiction. We demonstrate an appropriate correction, and show that the correction significantly reduces the magnitude of the BEPS estimates...."
Jennifer Blouin and Leslie A. Robinson, "Double counting accounting: How much profit of multinational enterprises is really in tax havens?," Social Science Research Network, November 21, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation

Why are prime-age men less likely to be employed vs. 2000

AI Summary. The decline in labor force participation among prime-age men is attributed to demographic shifts in workforce composition, school enrollment that has not fallen during recoveries, and a structural rise in men taking on home and family care roles, while disability has not been a lasting factor.

Ernie Tedeschi @ernietedeschi
Date Posted:
November 26, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Demographic shifts, increased school enrollment, and rising home/family care responsibilities have influenced the decline in prime-age male labor force participation rate since 2000, @ernietedeschi.

Why are fewer prime-age men working than two decades ago?

Core argument: The decline in prime-age male labor force participation since 2000 is attributed to demographic shifts in workforce composition, higher school enrollment, and rising home and family care responsibilities among men.

The decline in prime-age male labor force participation rate (LFPR) since 2000 is influenced by several factors, including demographic shifts, increased school enrollment, and rising home/family care responsibilities. Demographic changes have altered the composition of the workforce, while educational enrollment has not decreased as expected during economic recoveries, affecting both men and women. Additionally, the structural rise in home/family care roles for men over the past 40 years has contributed to this trend. Contrary to previous assumptions, disability has not been a permanent factor, while school non-involvement in the labor force (NILF) has shown a more lasting impact. These elements collectively explain the employment gap among prime-age men compared to two decades ago.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The decline in prime-age male labor force participation since 2000 is attributed to demographic shifts in workforce composition, higher school enrollment, and rising home and family care responsibilities among men.
  2. School-related non-involvement in the labor force has had a more lasting effect on prime-age male participation than disability, which the analysis finds has not been a permanent factor, contrary to prior assumptions.
  3. Educational enrollment has not declined as expected during economic recoveries, affecting participation for both men and women, while men's home and family care roles have risen structurally over the past 40 years.

Ernie, ".... Yes. But/and let's also be sober about the drivers of lower prime-age male LFPR that we should be concerned about, and the drivers we shouldn't....don’t think we should dismiss concerns over the fall in the top line rate, but the fact that demography, school, and home/family care are top-tier factors driving the delta since 2000 is worth considering.Now I’m off my PC but home/family has been structurally rising for men for at least 40 years. The cyclical enrollment story makes a lot of sense in theory but we haven’t seen that margin decline in the recovery for either men or women....5 years ago I would have predicted that school NILF was a long lagged cyclical factor and disability was a permanent one. I would have been wrong: in fact it’s been the reverse..."

Why are prime-age men less likely to be employed vs. 2000: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Ernie Tedeschi, "Why are prime-age men less likely to be employed vs. 2000," @ernietedeschi, November 26, 2019, https://twitter.com/ernietedeschi/status/1199355009605001216

  • Other Comparison
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

Making Capitalism Great Again?

AI Summary. A critique argues that giving government a larger role in allocating capital risks substituting political agendas for private ownership interests and inviting collusion rather than the voluntary cooperation of markets. It contends that attempting to engineer economic outcomes through regulation and the tax code will not resolve deeper cultural problems.

William McGurn Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 26, 2019
Is Database:
Database

William McGurn critiques Rubio’s advocacy for increased state involvement in capital allocation, arguing it could undermine market cooperation & lead to collusion.

William McGurn critiques Rubio’s advocacy for increased state involvement in capital allocation, arguing it could...

Does giving government a larger role in allocating capital undermine markets?

Core argument: William McGurn argues that Marco Rubio's call for greater state involvement in capital allocation risks undermining the market's natural cooperation and producing collusion.

William McGurn critiques Marco Rubio's advocacy for increased state involvement in capital allocation, arguing that such a shift could undermine the market's natural cooperation and lead to collusion. McGurn suggests that allowing politicians to decide where capital is invested risks prioritizing government agendas over private ownership interests, requiring a level of faith in government intervention that exceeds historical norms. He emphasizes that the current system, where workers freely choose their labor markets, fosters genuine cooperation. McGurn warns that engineering economic outcomes through regulation and tax codes may not address deeper cultural issues, highlighting a lack of modesty in assuming government can effectively redesign capitalism. This critique underscores concerns about the potential inefficiencies and unintended consequences of expanding state roles in economic decision-making.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. William McGurn argues that Marco Rubio's call for greater state involvement in capital allocation risks undermining the market's natural cooperation and producing collusion.
  2. McGurn contends that letting politicians decide where capital is invested risks prioritizing government agendas over private ownership interests, requiring faith in government intervention beyond historical norms.
  3. McGurn warns that engineering economic outcomes through regulation and the tax code may not address deeper cultural problems, and faults the lack of modesty in assuming government can redesign capitalism.

McGurn’s offers’ a moral and practical defense of the current system

"....outlines of a post-Trump form of Republican populism. But there are serious objections that can’t be answered merely by dismissing critics as soulless libertarians....The solution, he says, is an economy where politicians such as himself make more of the decisions about where capital gets invested...some of us believe that cooperation is what you get in a market where workers are free to decide to whom they’ll sell their labor—and to whom they won’t.....Experience, moreover, also tells us that when competition is tethered the result isn’t cooperation. It’s collusion.....who are the real materialists, if the answer to a cultural meltdown isn’t to address the human soul but to say, “Don’t worry, we can engineer it all through regulation and the tax code”?...This kind of thing speaks to the larger objection: a want of modesty....So when Mr. Rubio and his allies complain that the high priests of capitalism dismiss his ideas out of hand, it isn’t because they believe him stupid... it’s because they believe that trusting Washington to give us a new and improved capitalism by repurposing private companies to serve the priorities of the government rather than those of their owners requires a faith far greater than any ever demanded by the Lord...."

William McGurn, "Making Capitalism Great Again?,"Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/making-capitalism-great-again-11574726835

  • Cronyism
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Politics
  • Productivity

Saturday, November 30, 2019

The Middle Class Always Pays

AI Summary. European welfare states are funded heavily by middle-class taxpayers: median earners in Germany pay 43% of income in taxes, those in the 60th and 70th percentiles up to 52%, with payroll taxes supplying 37% of government revenue in France and Germany and value-added taxes averaging 21%.

Editorial Board Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 30, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The US middle class pays less in taxes than their European counterparts, with median earners in Germany paying 43% of their income in taxes. @WSJ.

The US middle class pays less in taxes than their European counterparts, with median earners in Germany paying 43% of their...

Can large welfare states be financed without heavily taxing the middle class?

Core argument: Median earners in Germany pay 43% of their income in taxes, close to the rate paid by the highest earners, while Germans in the 60th and 70th income percentiles pay up to 52%.

In Europe, the middle class bears a significant tax burden, with median earners in Germany paying 43% of their income in taxes, similar to the highest earners. Germans in the 60th and 70th income percentiles pay up to 52%. This is due to high consumption and payroll taxes, which are crucial for funding Europe's extensive welfare states. For instance, payroll taxes account for 37% of government revenue in France and Germany. In contrast, the U.S. relies more on income taxes from the affluent, with a top marginal rate of 37% only applying to incomes over $612,350. However, European-style policies like Medicare for All could shift more tax burden onto the U.S. middle class, as seen with expanded payroll taxes in Europe. Additionally, VATs averaging 21% and excise taxes further strain middle-class finances in Europe, highlighting the challenges of financing large welfare states without heavily taxing the middle class.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Median earners in Germany pay 43% of their income in taxes, close to the rate paid by the highest earners, while Germans in the 60th and 70th income percentiles pay up to 52%.
  2. Payroll taxes account for 37% of government revenue in France and Germany, and VATs averaging 21% plus excise taxes add to the middle-class burden funding Europe's welfare states.
  3. The U.S. relies more on income taxes from the affluent, with a top marginal rate of 37% applying only to incomes above $612,350, and European-style policies such as Medicare for All could shift more of the tax burden onto the U.S. middle class.

Editorial Board, "The Middle Class Always Pays," Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-middle-class-always-pays-11574967052

“…Calculating how all this affects different income groups combines analysis of tax rates with consumption patterns and the like. Where economists have crunched the numbers, the result is grim for the middle class. Researchers at the DIW think tank in Berlin looked at Germany’s tax system in 2017 and found that median earners pay roughly the same proportion of income in taxes as the highest earners do—43%. Germans in the 60th and 70th percentiles of income pay a higher proportion of earnings in taxes than anyone else, approaching 52%.The wealthiest paid more tax on income and investment, but consumption and payroll taxes walloped the middle class. This is how Berlin balances its budget. American voters, beware. Politicians promising that Medicare for All and a Green New Deal can be financed by the rich are lying to you. The middle class will pay because that’s where the real money is….”

Europe shows how the Warren-Sanders agenda really works.

Most European nations have larger welfare and entitlement states than the U.S., though they spend less on defense. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, government spending as a share of GDP ranges from about 56% in France to 44% in Germany and 41% in Britain.

The U.S. share of about 40% is financed largely by income taxes on the affluent and the payroll tax that funds Social Security and Medicare, plus state and local taxes and borrowing. Europe has learned the hard way that the rich aren’t rich enough to pay for their entitlements, so the Continent duns the middle class.

***

Start with the income tax. Most European governments tax most household income more heavily than Washington does because they impose their highest marginal rates on lower levels of income. Germany’s second-highest marginal income-tax rate of 42% kicks in for married households earning around €112,000 ($124,000). An American couple with that income pays a marginal rate of only 22% and would need to earn $612,350 before paying the top marginal rate of 37%.

Sweden’s top marginal income-tax rate of about 55% applies to earnings as low as $47,000, and in the U.K. the second-highest rate of 40% hits taxpayers earning £50,000 ($64,000). By this standard America’s income tax is highly progressive. The U.S. top marginal rate applies only to taxpayers whose wages are 9.3 times the average wage. In Belgium the top marginal rate ensnares workers earning 1.1 times the average, and in the Netherlands 1.4 times.

The income tax isn’t enough to finance Europe’s vast welfare states, so governments also impose payroll taxes they describe as “social insurance contributions.” For a single American earning the average wage, the employer and employee payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare average 16% of gross labor costs, according to the OECD.

In Britain the share for similar social-benefit payroll taxes is a little over 20%, and in Sweden and Germany about 40%. Such middle-class payroll taxes account for 35% of government revenue in Spain, 30% in Italy, and 37% in France and Germany, and without them Europe’s welfare systems would be bankrupt.

Elizabeth Warren has figured this out. Her Medicare for All plan includes an expanded payroll tax for employers that she says isn’t a tax on the middle class, but Europeans know better. Employer payroll taxes for social insurance account for as much as 25% of revenue in France or 20% in Belgium. This is a hidden tax on the middle class because it reduces the cash employers can offer in salaries.

Europe also imposes a value-added tax (VAT) with a flat rate averaging 21% on almost all consumption. These taxes account for up to a quarter of total government revenue in many countries. They’re regressive since lower-income households devote a larger share of income to consumption taxed by a VAT.

There are other middle-class revenue grabs. Excise taxation, including on fuel, accounts for 3% of total revenue in the U.S., but above 7% in Britain and 6.4% in Italy. As last year’s yellow-vest protests showed in France (where fuel and other excise taxes account for nearly 6% of annual revenue), this burden is more onerous for middle-class suburbanites and tradesmen than on the Ferrari-driving 0.1%.

Britain also soaks its middle class with a stamp tax on property purchases, amounting to about 1% of the price for the median home nationwide, and up to 3% for the median home in London. This discourages property transactions, making it harder for older middle-class households to cash out of their home equity while raising a barrier for the younger middle class to climb onto the property ladder.

***

Calculating how all this affects different income groups combines analysis of tax rates with consumption patterns and the like. Where economists have crunched the numbers, the result is grim for the middle class.

Researchers at the DIW think tank in Berlin looked at Germany’s tax system in 2017 and found that median earners pay roughly the same proportion of income in taxes as the highest earners do—43%. Germans in the 60th and 70th percentiles of income pay a higher proportion of earnings in taxes than anyone else, approaching 52%. The wealthiest paid more tax on income and investment, but consumption and payroll taxes walloped the middle class. This is how Berlin balances its budget.

American voters, beware. Politicians promising that Medicare for All and a Green New Deal can be financed by the rich are lying to you. The middle class will pay because that’s where the real money is.

  • Cross-country
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation


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