Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
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Tuesday, July 9, 2019

Animated chart of the day: Worlds top ten manufacturing nations, 1970 to 2017

AI Summary. China's share of global manufacturing output rose from 3-4% to overtake Italy and France, then Germany, Japan, and the United States, making it the world's largest manufacturing nation. The United States produced $2.18tn of manufacturing output in 2017, equivalent to the combined output of Japan, Germany, and Korea.

Mark Perry American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
July 9, 2019
Is Database:
Database

China’s ascent as a manufacturing leader began in the mid-1990s, surpassing Italy & France by 1996, Germany by 2001, Japan by 2007, & the USA by 2010. The USA maintained significant manufacturing strength, producing $2.18tn in 2017.

How did China become the world's largest manufacturing nation?

Core argument: China's global manufacturing share held at 3–4% until the mid-1990s, after which it passed Italy and France by 1996, Germany by 2001, Japan by 2007, and the USA by 2010.

China's ascent as a manufacturing leader began in the mid-1990s, transitioning from a stable 3-4% share of global output to surpassing Italy and France by 1996, Germany by 2001, Japan by 2007, and the USA by 2010. Despite China's rise, the USA maintained significant manufacturing strength, producing $2.18tn in 2017, equivalent to the combined output of Japan, Germany, and Korea, and exceeding the combined output of Germany, Korea, India, Italy, and France ($2.14tn). This underscores the USA's continued industrial prowess even as China emerged as the top manufacturing nation. The data highlights a shift in global manufacturing dynamics, with China taking the lead but the USA retaining substantial production capacity, reflecting its enduring economic influence.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's global manufacturing share held at 3–4% until the mid-1990s, after which it passed Italy and France by 1996, Germany by 2001, Japan by 2007, and the USA by 2010.
  2. The USA produced $2.18tn of manufacturing output in 2017, equal to the combined output of Japan, Germany, and Korea.
  3. USA manufacturing output of $2.18tn in 2017 exceeded the combined $2.14tn produced by Germany, Korea, India, Italy, and France.

Mark Perry, "Animated chart of the day: World’s top ten manufacturing nations, 1970 to 2017," American Enterprise Institute, July 5, 2019, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/animated-chart-of-the-day-worlds-top-ten-manufacturing-nations-1970-to-2017/

Animated chart of the day: World’s top ten manufacturing nations, 1970 to 2017

Animated chart of the day: Worlds top ten manufacturing nations, 1970 to 2017: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Here’s another animated “bar chart race” visualization showing the world top ten manufacturing nations by share of global manufacturing output from 1970 to 2017 using data from the statistics division of the United Nations. A few observations:

1. The USSR was the world’s second largest manufacturing nation from 1970 until Japan surpassed the USSR in 1984 to rise to the No. 2 position.

2. After overtaking Russia in the mid 1980s, Japan quickly rose as a manufacturing powerhouse and almost overtook the USA by the mid-1990s including in 1993 when Japan produced 22.1% of world output vs. 22.9% for the USA and in 1995 when Japan produced 22.0% of the world’s manufacturing vs. USA’s 22.23% share.

3. China’s rise as a leading world manufacturer starting in the mid-1990s after a long period of producing a fairly stable share of only 3-4% of the world’s factory output from 1970 to 1995. By 1996, China was out-producing both Italy and France for the first time and outproduced Germany starting in 2001 before surpassing Japan in 2007 and the USA in 2010.

4. Despite falling to the No. 2 position behind China, the USA still produced as much manufacturing output in 2017 ($2.18 trillion) as Japan, Germany and Korea combined ($2.18 trillion) and more than Germany, Korea, India, Italy and France combined ($2.14 trillion).

  • Productivity
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical

Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How It Matters and Why

AI Summary. Across 30 OECD countries, lower government debt-to-GDP ratios are associated with more expansionary fiscal responses to financial crises and milder downturns afterward. The authors find this link persists after accounting for direct measures of sovereign market access such as long-term bond rates and credit ratings.

Christina Romer National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 9, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Countries with lower debt ratios pursue more expansionary fiscal policies, resulting in milder downturns post-crisis. @ChristinaRomer

Does lower government debt allow stronger fiscal responses to financial crises?

Core argument: Across 30 OECD countries since 1980, a debt-to-GDP ratio one standard deviation below average is associated with a high-employment surplus 4 percentage points smaller, indicating more expansionary fiscal policy where debt is lower.

Evidence shows a country's fiscal response to crises is linked to its debt-to-GDP ratio. Data from 30 OECD countries since 1980 indicates that countries with lower debt ratios pursue more expansionary fiscal policies, resulting in milder downturns post-crisis. Specifically, a debt ratio one standard deviation below the average correlates with a high employment surplus 4 percentage points smaller than those with higher debt. This suggests the debt ratio's impact is not solely through market access but significantly influences policymaker decisions. Direct measures of sovereign market access, like long-term bond rates or credit ratings, do not diminish the debt ratio's effect on fiscal outcomes, highlighting its role beyond being a market access proxy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across 30 OECD countries since 1980, a debt-to-GDP ratio one standard deviation below average is associated with a high-employment surplus 4 percentage points smaller, indicating more expansionary fiscal policy where debt is lower.
  2. Countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios pursue more expansionary fiscal policies and experience milder post-crisis downturns, according to cross-country evidence.
  3. Direct measures of sovereign market access, including long-term bond rates and credit ratings, do not diminish the debt ratio's estimated effect on fiscal outcomes, suggesting the ratio influences policymaker decisions beyond serving as a market-access proxy.

"....There is compelling evidence that a country’s fiscal response to a crisis is correlated with its prior debt-to-GDP ratio. Countries that face a crisis with lower debt pursue more expansionary fiscal policy than countries that face a crisis with higher debt. Indeed,our estimates based on data for 30 OECD countries since 1980 suggest that facing a crisis with a debt ratio one standard deviation below the sample average is associated with a high employment surplus in the aftermath of a crisis that is roughly 4 percentage points smaller (that is, more expansionary) than facing a crisis with a debt ratio one standard deviation above the average. Moreover, this large difference in the policy response is associated with a large difference in the aftermath: low-debt countries experience much milder downturns following a crisis than high-debt countries.This paper seeks to understand why the prior debt-to-GDP ratio appears to matter for the fiscal response to crises. We find that including direct measures of sovereign market access, such as long-term government bond rates or sovereign credit ratings, does not eliminate, or even greatly attenuate, the estimated impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the high-employment surplus following crises. This strongly suggests that the debt ratio does not matter simply through its impact on current market access or because it is a proxy for market access. Rather, an important part of why it matters appears to be through its impact on policymaker choices...."

Christina Romer and David Romer, "Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How It Matters and Why," National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25768

  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy

15 Minimum Wage Would Bring Mixed Fortunes for U.S. Workers

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects that raising the federal minimum wage to $15 would cost 1.3m jobs, within a range of 0 to 3.7m. The same analysis projects wage increases for 17m workers earning below $15 an hour, possible gains for 10m earning slightly above it, and 1.3m Americans lifted out of poverty.

Eric Morath Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The @WSJ reports a CBO study finds raising the federal minimum wage to $15 by 2025 could result in 1.3m jobs lost, but also increase wages for 17m workers & lift 1.3m Americans out of poverty.

What are the trade-offs of raising the federal minimum wage?

Core argument: The CBO estimates that raising the federal minimum wage to $15 by 2025 could cost 1.3m jobs, within a range from 0 to 3.7m jobs lost.

A CBO [Congressional Budget Office] report indicates that raising the federal minimum wage to $15 by 2025 could result in the loss of 1.3m jobs, with a potential range from 0 to 3.7m jobs lost. However, this policy could also increase wages for 17m workers earning below $15 per hour and potentially benefit an additional 10m workers earning slightly above this threshold. Furthermore, the wage hike is projected to lift 1.3m Americans out of poverty. These findings highlight the complex trade-offs involved in implementing a higher minimum wage, balancing potential job losses against significant wage gains and poverty reduction for millions of workers. The economic implications underscore the need for careful consideration by policymakers as they weigh the benefits of increased earnings against the risks of employment reductions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The CBO estimates that raising the federal minimum wage to $15 by 2025 could cost 1.3m jobs, within a range from 0 to 3.7m jobs lost.
  2. The CBO projects a $15 minimum wage would raise pay for 17m workers earning below $15 per hour, and could also benefit about 10m workers earning slightly above that threshold.
  3. The CBO projects a $15 federal minimum wage would lift 1.3m Americans out of poverty.

new CBO report on a national minimum wage finds it would likely lead to significant job loses

"....If the federal minimum wage were raised to $15 an hour in 2025, as House Democrats have proposed, a significant number of Americans would likely lose their jobs, a study released Monday by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office found..... The study’s estimate of 1.3 million jobs lost is the median figure in a range from zero to 3.7 million eliminated jobs.....But the study also estimates that in an average week in 2025—the year after the House measure would take full effect—a $15-an-hour minimum wage would boost the pay of 17 million workers who would otherwise earn less than $15 per hour. It could also raise the pay of 10 million workers who otherwise would earn slightly more than $15 an hour. Raising the federal minimum to $15 would lift 1.3 million Americans out of poverty, the CBO said...."
Eric Morath, "$15 Minimum Wage Would Bring Mixed Fortunes for U.S. Workers,"Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/15-minimum-wage-would-leave-1-3-million-american-jobless-lift-as-many-out-of-poverty-11562611503

  • Minimum Wage
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

Wednesday, July 10, 2019

The Distribution of Household Income, 2016

AI Summary. Market income for the top fifth of US households grew 101% over roughly four decades, compared with 32% for the bottom fifth and 32%–46% for the middle three fifths. The top fifth's share of total market income rose from 43% to 55%, while the bottom fifth's share fell from 6% to 4%.

CBO Staff Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
July 10, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1979 and 2016, market income for the top quintile grew by 101%, while the bottom quintile saw a modest increase of 32%. The data suggests that policy interventions may be necessary to address the growing economic divide.

How has market income growth differed across household income groups?

Core argument: Market income for the top quintile of U.S. households grew 101% between 1979 and 2016, versus 32% for the bottom quintile and 32%–46% for the middle three quintiles.

Between 1979 and 2016, market income for the top quintile grew by 101%, while the bottom quintile saw a modest increase of 32%. The middle three quintiles experienced growth rates ranging from 32% to 46%. This disparity highlights the increasing concentration of income among higher earners. In 2016, the top quintile received 55% of total market income, up from 43% in 1979, while the bottom quintile's share decreased from 6% to 4%. These shifts underscore the widening income inequality over the decades. The data suggests that policy interventions may be necessary to address the growing economic divide and ensure more equitable income distribution across all quintiles.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Market income for the top quintile of U.S. households grew 101% between 1979 and 2016, versus 32% for the bottom quintile and 32%–46% for the middle three quintiles.
  2. The top quintile's share of total market income rose from 43% in 1979 to 55% in 2016, while the bottom quintile's share fell from 6% to 4%.

CBO Staff, "The Distribution of Household Income, 2016," Congressional Budget Office, July 9, 2019, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55413

Ed Comment:Lowest quintile: From (25,700 net taxes and transfers-17,200 market = 8,5000 gov handouts)/17200 market = 49% handouts as a share of market income to (48,900-25,300=23,600)/25,300 = 93%!!! WTF? The changes are too large to leave unexplained. Middle: from (55.7-67.6)/67.0=18% tax rate to 86.4-92.0/92.0=6% tax rate?! ditto. Top 1%: from 1-(448.3/666.8)= 33% to 1-(1535.3/2329.5) = 34%

happily the new CBO 2016 household income distribution is out! they have a great table builder function

so btw 1979 and 2016 for households in the lowest quintile with children went from 17,200 (Market Income) 19,200 (Before Taxes/Transfers) 25,700 (Net taxes/transfers) to 25,300 (Market) 27,300 (Before taxes/transfers) 48,900 (Net taxes/transfers)

households in the middle quintile with children went from 67,600 (Market Income) 69,100 (Before Taxes/Transfers) 55,700 (Net taxes/transfers) to 92,000 (Market) 95,700 (Before taxes/transfers) 86,400 (Net taxes/transfers)

for that same group/period for top 1% the numbers went from 666.800 (Market Income) 668,200 (Before Taxes/Transfers) 448,300 (Net taxes/transfers) to 2,329,500 (Market) 2,330,500 (Before taxes/transfers) 1,535,300 (Net taxes/transfers)

  • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Dont Deliver

AI Summary. Private-equity megafunds of $10bn or more returned 14.4% annualized over five years net of fees versus 14.1% for the S&P 500, and matched the index's 10.2% return over 12.75 years, according to Cambridge Associates. Larger funds have fewer sizable targets to buy, which limits their options and tends to produce market-like returns.

Miriam Gottfried Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 10, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Private-equity megafunds posted 14.4% five-year annualized returns net of fees, barely surpassing the S&P 500’s 14.1%. Larger funds face challenges in finding sizable investment targets, limiting options and often leading to market-like returns.

Do private-equity megafunds outperform the stock market?

Core argument: Private-equity megafunds of $10bn or more returned 14.4% annualized over five years net of fees through last September, barely above the S&P 500's 14.1%, according to Cambridge Associates.

Private-equity megafunds, those $10bn or more, posted 14.4% five-year annualized returns net of fees by last September, barely surpassing the S&P 500's 14.1%, per Cambridge Associates. Over 12.75 years, these funds matched the S&P 500's 10.2% return. Larger funds face challenges in finding sizable investment targets, limiting options and often leading to market-like returns. Smaller funds, under $350m, show a lower correlation (0.38) with the S&P 500 compared to megafunds (0.62). Despite their appeal to large investors like sovereign-wealth funds, megafunds' performance often doesn't justify their size, as they struggle to outperform in bull markets and are less flexible than smaller funds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Private-equity megafunds of $10bn or more returned 14.4% annualized over five years net of fees through last September, barely above the S&P 500's 14.1%, according to Cambridge Associates.
  2. Over 12.75 years, private-equity megafunds matched the S&P 500's 10.2% return, as larger funds face difficulty finding sizable investment targets, limiting options and often producing market-like returns.
  3. Private-equity funds under $350m show a 0.38 correlation with the S&P 500 versus 0.62 for megafunds, which struggle to outperform in bull markets and are less flexible than smaller funds.

though you would like this chart

"...Taken together, private-equity funds of $10 billion or more posted 14.4% five-year annualized returns net of fees as of the end of last September, barely edging past the 14.1% return for the S&P 500, according to data from investment firm Cambridge Associates. Buyout funds’ relative performance doesn’t improve much over a longer time frame. Over a span of 12.75 years—the longest period for which Cambridge has sufficient data on megafunds—returns for these large funds was 10.2%, the same as the broader index, its data show. The reasons behind the trend are simple: Bigger funds generally have to find bigger targets to invest their money, which means they have fewer options. It tends to be more difficult to broadly implement new operating strategies at larger companies than at smaller ones. Megafunds, as a result, are often buying the market. The smaller the fund is, the less its returns tend to be tied to the broader market. U.S. funds of less than $350 million had a correlation of 0.38 with the S&P 500, compared with 0.62 for funds $10 billion or more, according to Cambridge...."

Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Dont Deliver: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Miriam Gottfried, "Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Don’t Deliver.,"Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-equity-firms-are-raising-bigger-and-bigger-funds-they-often-dont-deliver-11560859200

Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Don’t Deliver.

Blackstone Group LP is in the final stretch of raising what would be the largest private-equity fund ever. Big funds, however, don’t necessarily translate into big returns.

The private-equity giant has capped its latest fund at around $25 billion amid strong demand, according to people familiar with the matter. Collecting that would take the fund past the $24.6 billion record set by Apollo Global Management LLC in 2017. Others also are raising big funds: Advent International said earlier this month it had raised a $17.5 billion fund, and software-focused Vista Equity Partners is raising a $16 billion vehicle.

The rise of megafunds reflects the growing demand for private equity from large investors such as sovereign-wealth funds with hundreds of millions of dollars to put to work. With interest rates still persistently low, the industry’s historical reputation for 20%-plus returns, is appealing—even if it means paying higher fees and having money locked up for long periods.

The problem is that the largest funds haven’t always lived up to the hype. Taken together, private-equity funds of $10 billion or more posted 14.4% five-year annualized returns net of fees as of the end of last September, barely edging past the 14.1% return for the S&P 500, according to data from investment firm Cambridge Associates.

Buyout funds’ relative performance doesn’t improve much over a longer time frame. Over a span of 12.75 years—the longest period for which Cambridge has sufficient data on megafunds—returns for these large funds was 10.2%, the same as the broader index, its data show.

The reasons behind the trend are simple: Bigger funds generally have to find bigger targets to invest their money, which means they have fewer options. It tends to be more difficult to broadly implement new operating strategies at larger companies than at smaller ones. Megafunds, as a result, are often buying the market.

The smaller the fund is, the less its returns tend to be tied to the broader market. U.S. funds of less than $350 million had a correlation of 0.38 with the S&P 500, compared with 0.62 for funds $10 billion or more, according to Cambridge.

Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Dont Deliver: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Granted, some members of the current crop of megafunds may be more successful than others, for example, if a unique strategy such as Vista’s performs better than the broader market. Even when pooled together, returns for megafunds compare more favorably with other indexes such as the MSCI All Country World Index, which is more global and less technology-heavy than the S&P 500. And they tend to be less volatile than smaller funds because the companies they own have relatively predictable streams of cash flows, Cambridge says.

Megafund managers say their main periods of outperformance tend to come when the market is down—not in a decadelong bull market like the current one. Megafunds also provide one of the few places for large pension and sovereign-wealth funds to invest massive amounts of cash all at once. That offers them a way for them to get exposure to the growing slice of the market that isn’t traded on major exchanges.

“They are definitely serving a role in your portfolio, but it may not be the role you think they are serving,” said Andrea Auerbach, head of the global private-investments group at Cambridge, in an interview. “Size is the frenemy of performance.”

Investors piling into Blackstone’s latest fund can look at its past performance for an indication of where returns may be heading. Its 2011 fund, a $15 billion pool, posted annualized returns of 15.2% net of fees as of last September, public pension data show. That is less than 2 percentage points above the annualized total return for the S&P 500 with dividends reinvested over the same period.

Blackstone’s $18 billion fund raised in 2016 returned a net 22.9% through last September versus about 16% for the S&P 500 over the same period. Some pension funds still consider that fund too young for those results to be meaningful.

Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Dont Deliver: Extended Excerpt Image 3


For some investors, particularly large U.S. pensions with limited staff and large amounts of money to put to work, there aren’t a lot of alternatives to investing in large funds. Many have responded to limited returns by pushing for more opportunities to co-invest in buyouts alongside private-equity funds, a strategy that can boost returns because they can avoid fees.

California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest U.S. public pension fund, which aims to commit between $10 billion and $13 billion a year to private equity, is exploring a new model for investing in it. Under the current plan, the pension fund would become the sole backer of at least two limited-liability companies. These companies would be overseen by outside managers, who would invest directly in companies on Calpers’s behalf. The fund would also continue its regular investments in private-equity funds.

Other institutions whose size allows them to be more nimble have opted to invest mostly with smaller managers. Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., which has about $60 billion under management and commits around $1.6 billion a year to private equity, targets funds in the range of $500 million to $1 billion. It aims to be one of the larger investors in these funds by writing checks of $50 million to $100 million, a position that also gives it access to more co-investment opportunities.

Steve Moseley, Alaska Permanent Fund’s head of alternative investments, said the strategy requires more legwork because he has to oversee more investments and more relationships with general partners. But the state fund’s private-equity investments have posted five-year annualized returns of 22.6% as of the end of last year.

“We discovered that by having more robust relationships with mid-sized and smaller we could deliver better returns,” Mr. Moseley said. “I don’t envy the folks who are managing the giant public pension funds.”

  • Financial Markets
  • Comparisons
    • Other Comparison

Q: How much turnover is there among the richest Americans? A: A lot according to IRS data

AI Summary. Internal Revenue Service data show high turnover among the 400 highest-income US taxpayers: of 4,584 unique filers, 71.2% appeared only once and just 3% appeared for 10 or more years. The article attributes this to one-time capital gains, which made up over 60% of the group's income in one year.

Mark Perry American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
July 10, 2019
Is Database:
Database

According to @MarkPerry, IRS data from 1992-2014 reveal significant turnover among the Top 400 taxpayers, with 71.2% appearing only once in this elite group.

How much turnover is there among the highest-income American taxpayers?

Core argument: IRS data for 1992–2014 show 71.2% of the 4,584 unique taxpayers who reached the Top 400 by income appeared only once, and just 3% appeared for 10 or more years.

IRS data from 1992-2014 reveal significant turnover among the Top 400 taxpayers, with 71.2% appearing only once in this elite group. Out of 4,584 unique taxpayers, only 17% appeared more than once, and a mere 3% were in the Top 400 for 10 or more years. This high turnover is largely due to substantial one-time capital gains, such as sales of appreciated stock or businesses, rather than consistent high salaries. In 2014, the Top 400's combined income from capital asset sales was $76.8bn, over 60% of their total AGI of $127bn. This dynamic reflects the fluid nature of income mobility in the US economy, challenging the notion of static income groups and highlighting the importance of considering turnover when discussing tax policies and income inequality.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IRS data for 1992–2014 show 71.2% of the 4,584 unique taxpayers who reached the Top 400 by income appeared only once, and just 3% appeared for 10 or more years.
  2. Only 17% of the 4,584 unique Top 400 taxpayers from 1992–2014 appeared more than once, with turnover attributed largely to one-time capital gains from sales of appreciated stock or businesses rather than consistent high salaries.
  3. The Top 400 taxpayers reported $76.8bn of income from capital asset sales in 2014, over 60% of their total adjusted gross income of $127bn.

“…According to the IRS from a previous report on the dynamics of the Top 400 earners (updated here with 2014 data), “The data reveal a mostly changing group of taxpayers over time. In fact, there were 4,584 different taxpayers represented in total for the 23-year period between 1992 and 2014. Of these, fewer than 17% appear more than once and only 3% were represented in 10 or more years. Nearly three out of four taxpayers (71.2%) were in the Top 400 in only a single year.”…”

Mark Perry, "Q: How much turnover is there among the richest Americans? A: A lot according to IRS data," American Enterprise Institute, July 9, 2019, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/q-how-much-turnover-is-there-among-the-richest-americans/

Q: How much turnover is there among the richest Americans? A: A lot according to IRS data

Q: How much turnover is there among the richest Americans? A: A lot according to IRS data: Extended Excerpt Image 1


As I reported on CD back in 2016 in a post titled “New IRS data show that 71% of US taxpayers who make it into the ‘Top 400’ are there for only a single year“:

Of the 9,200 total tax returns filed in the 23 years from 1992 to 2014 for the 400 highest earners in each year, there were 4,584 unique, individual taxpayers in the Top 400 over those 23 years, since some taxpayers were in the Top 400 group in more than one year. The new IRS data show that:

1. Of the group of 4,584 unique top earners from 1992-2014, there were 3,262 individual taxpayers who made it into the “Fortunate 400” only one time during the 23-year period. Those 3,262 one-timers represent 71.2% of the total 4,584 taxpayers (see chart above), and therefore only 1,322 taxpayers that make up the rest of that elite group (28.8% of the 4,584 total, or about one in four) were able to make it into the Top 400 in more than one year between 1992 and 2014.

2. Moreover, since 3,262 earners made it into the Top 400 only once (71.2%) and another 558 taxpayers (12.2%) made it into the top group twice between 1992 and 2014 (see table above), that means that 83.3% of the top earners made it into the “Fortunate 400” only once or twice (3,820 out of 4,584), and only 16.7% (764 taxpayers out of 4,584) were able to make it into the top group in more than 2 years out of 23 years.

3. There were only 138 taxpayers out of the 4,584 total taxpayers in the top earner group (3%) who were in the Top 400 in 10 or more years out of 23 (see table).

4. Why is there such a high turnover among the Top 400 and why are most taxpayers in that group for only a single year? Data in Table 1 of the IRS report provide an answer. The combined salaries and wages of the Top 400 in 2014 were about $5.6 billion, which represented only 4.4% of those taxpayers’ combined Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of about $127 billion. But those top taxpayers as a group had about $76.8 billion in income from sales of capital assets in 2014, which was more than 60% of their combined AGI of $127 billion. So while the Top 400 are certainly high earners (average salary of about $14 million in 2014), what puts them into the Top 400 in a given year isn’t their high salaries, but rather their large gains from the sale of capital assets (average capital gain for the Top 400 taxpayers in 2014 was $192 million) - which are often one-time sales of appreciated stock, or one-time gains from selling a business, partnership, farm, or real estate.

5. Data from Table 1 also reveal that the Top 400 are a pretty generous group based on their reported charitable contributions. In 2014, the Top 400 combined gave nearly $14.5 billion to charity, at an average of more than $37 million per taxpayer. Even though that Top 400 group represented only about three one-thousandths of 1% of all 148.6 million taxpayers in 2014 (0.000269%), those 400 taxpayers accounted for nearly 7% of the $210 billion in total charitable contribution deductions in 2014.

According to the IRS from a previous report on the dynamics of the Top 400 earners (updated here with 2014 data), “The data reveal a mostly changing group of taxpayers over time. In fact, there were 4,584 different taxpayers represented in total for the 23-year period between 1992 and 2014. Of these, fewer than 17% appear more than once and only 3% were represented in 10 or more years. Nearly three out of four taxpayers (71.2%) were in the Top 400 in only a single year.”

MP: Whenever we hear commentary about the top or bottom income quintiles, or the top or bottom X% of Americans by income (or the Top 400 taxpayers), a common assumption is that those are static, closed, private clubs with very little dynamic turnover. That is, once you find yourself in a top or bottom quintile, or a certain income percentile, or the Top 400, you’ll likely stay there for decades or even for life. But economic reality is very different - people move up and down the income quintiles and percentile groups throughout their careers and lives. The top or bottom 1/5/10% by income, just like the top or bottom income quintiles, are never the same people from year to year, because there is constant, dynamic turnover as we move up and down the income categories.

It’s very likely that most of the members of the IRS’s Top 400 started in one of the lower-income quintiles early in their lives and careers, and advanced into the higher income quintile and eventually into the Top 400 as they become successful, and they may drop into a lower-income quintile later in life. As the new IRS data show, almost three out of every four members of the ever-changing “Fortunate 400” over the last 23 years were only “members” of that group for a single year, which reflects the dynamic nature of the US economy and the significant income mobility that exists for Americans — at all levels of income.

Note: The IRS discontinued the top 400 taxpayer data series after tax year 2014 and replaced it with data on taxpayers at the.001 percentile level, which in 2014 represented the top 1,396 returns. According to the IRS: “This is a more analytically useful tabulation compared to the top 400 tabulation in that it provides a longitudinally consistent data point relative to the entire percentile distribution. As the number of returns increases with the growth of the economy, the number of returns in the.001 percentile will increase proportionally as well thus allowing for a consistent high-income data series.”

This post (and title) was inspired by a report yesterday by Robert Bellafiore and Aida Vazquez-Soto at the Tax Foundation titled “How Much Turnover Is There Among the Richest Americans?” based on the same IRS data above for the Top 400 Taxpayers from 1992 to 2014. Here’s a big slice of that report:

Income inequality has been a prominent topic on the presidential campaign trail, leading to proposals for wealth taxes, higher marginal income tax rates, and other policies. As scholars and everyday taxpayers continue to debate this issue and the question of increasing taxes on the richest Americans, one observation to keep in mind is the high degree of turnover among the highest-income Americans.

Data from the Internal Revenue Service shows the frequency of those filing who make the top 400 individual income tax returns with the highest adjusted gross income from 1992 to 2014. Of the 4,584 people who made it into the top 400 at some point over that period, 3,262 qualified for only one year. In other words, 71.2% of those who were in the top 400 made it once and not again. Of that same overall group, 138 people did qualify for at least a decade.

These data illustrates another important point about how tax rates, or the share of the tax burden on an income group, have changed over time: We should not conclude without evidence that it is the same people in that income group the entire time. For example, it can be easy to look at data on the top 1 percent’s tax rates over time and assume that the same people belong to that group in every year. However, such data on its own often doesn’t tell us whether a given income group represents the same people year after year, experiences a complete turnover annually, or something in between.

When the data do provide information on the people in a given group, as is the case here, the results can be surprising. At least among the top 400 such filers, there is more turnover than many might think. Policymakers and taxpayers should keep this in mind and be careful not to jump to unjustified conclusions as they consider the many changes to our tax code being debated today.

  • Inequality
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income


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