Edward Conard

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  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Sunday, June 30, 2019

Sanderss Socialism Wont Bring On the Revolution

AI Summary. Research on U.S. policymaking argues democratic politics track middle-class preferences rather than those of the rich: an influential 2014 study found policy outcomes align with high earners' views, but that group includes many who are not wealthy and whose preferences largely correlate with the middle class.

Noah Smith Bloomberg
Date Posted:
June 30, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Middle class, not the rich, tend to drive Democratic politics.

Does policy follow middle-class preferences rather than those of the rich?

Core argument: Gilens and Page's 2014 study found U.S. policy outcomes align with the preferences of high earners, but that group includes many who are not truly wealthy, and their preferences often correlate with those of the middle class.

Despite perceptions of the U.S. as an oligarchy, research suggests that democratic politics are more influenced by the middle class than the rich. Gilens and Page's 2014 study found policy outcomes align with high earners' preferences, but this group includes many who aren't truly wealthy. Importantly, their preferences often correlate with those of the middle class, indicating policies reflect broader public will. Other studies, like Peter Enns's 2015 paper, support this, concluding that policy aligns with middle-class interests. This suggests that while Sanders's policies may reduce inequality, they are unlikely to trigger a socialist revolution, as the middle class remains a key driver in shaping democratic politics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gilens and Page's 2014 study found U.S. policy outcomes align with the preferences of high earners, but that group includes many who are not truly wealthy, and their preferences often correlate with those of the middle class.
  2. Peter Enns's 2015 paper concludes that U.S. policy aligns with middle-class interests, supporting the view that democratic politics are more influenced by the middle class than by the rich.
  3. Sanders's policies may reduce inequality but are unlikely to trigger a socialist revolution, since the middle class remains a key driver in shaping democratic politics.

“…Those who believe the U.S. is an oligarchy often cite the research of political scientists Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page. In a 2014 paper, Gilens and Page measured correlations between policy outcomes and the preferences of various income groups. They found that policy was most highly correlated with the preferences of high earners. Some take this result as an indication that the rich have their way in U.S. politics, while the poor and middle class are voiceless. But there are many reasons to doubt that conclusion. First of all, the group that Gilens and Page label “affluent” are those making more than $146,000 a year. Although this takes in the billionaire class that socialists rail against, it mostly includes people who could hardly be considered rich. More importantly, the authors found a strong correlation between the preferences of this affluent group and those of the middle class — in other words, the policies that are enacted don’t often seem to buck the will of the broad public. Additionally, correlation doesn’t equal causation — politicians might do things that they think will benefit the overall economy, and that only coincidentally happen to please the affluent. It’s also likely that Gilens and Page are just wrong. A number of other research teams have done their own studies, and most concluded that it’s the middle class, not the rich, who tend to hold sway in democratic politics. A 2015 paper by political scientist Peter Enns, for example, concludes that “policy ends up about where we would expect if policymakers represented the middle class and ignored the affluent.”…”

Noah Smith, “Sanders’s Socialism Won’t Bring On the Revolution,” Bloomberg, June 28, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-28/sanders-s-socialist-revolution-won-t-go-far-with-middle-class

Sanders’s Socialism Won’t Bring On the Revolution

The front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination is still the centrist Joe Biden. But two strong candidates on the left are competing to topple him — Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. Both have spent years advocating for higher wages, higher taxes, stricter regulation of corporations and a variety of other egalitarian goals. But there’s a big difference between the two when it comes to ideological positioning — Sanders proudly declares himself a socialist, while Warren labels herself “capitalist to my bones.”

In past decades, those labels might have had more rigorous distinctions. But these days, socialists in the U.S. don’t do a lot of arguing over what’s needed to produce revolution, or whether workers ought to own businesses and factories. And Warren feels perfectly comfortable calling herself a capitalist while advocating government-run health insurance, worker representation on corporate boards and government promotion of industry. So what do the socialist or capitalist labels mean in the U.S. in 2019?

A big difference might be how one thinks about power. Sanders, in a recent criticism of Warren, declared that she had been embraced by corporate interests:

Sanderss Socialism Wont Bring On the Revolution: Extended Excerpt Image 1

This seems to reflect a more general view among American socialists that wealth concentration — at both the individual and corporate levels — has subverted the political process. According to this narrative, the U.S. is now an oligarchy, where billionaires and corporate lobbyists are able to buy their preferred policies. Taxing wealth and profit, according to this view, won’t simply create a more materially equitable society, but a more politically democratic one as well. If wealth equals power, a more equal distribution of the former automatically leads to a more equal distribution of the latter. That raises the expectation that economic equality could snowball — that higher taxes on wealth and profits could lead to the election of leaders who are eager to enact even more egalitarian policies.

But how accurate is this narrative? Looking at modern history, has greater egalitarianism been a self-reinforcing process? The greatest period of U.S. economic equality was in the late 1970s:

Sanderss Socialism Wont Bring On the Revolution: Extended Excerpt Image 2

But this era of equality is precisely when the U.S. took a turn toward free-market conservatism, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Meanwhile, corporate profits as a share of the economy hit a trough during Reagan’s second term and — with a few interruptions during recessions — have been rising ever since:

Sanderss Socialism Wont Bring On the Revolution: Extended Excerpt Image 3

But this seemed to merely whet the country’s appetite for deregulation.

Why did the U.S. support a capitalist revolution right at the point when inequality was at its nadir? The most prosperous Americans might have been able to exert a major influence even though their wealth hadn’t yet reached its present lofty heights — after all, even today, the biggest political donors spend only a small fraction of their net worth on politics or buying influence. Alternatively, the country’s leaders really believed that economic liberalization was what was necessary to get the economy moving again after almost a decade of stagnation. Or it could be that policy is like a pendulum, and that the public will tends to run counter to prevailing trends.

Those who believe the U.S. is an oligarchy often cite the research of political scientists Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page. In a 2014 paper, Gilens and Page measured correlations between policy outcomes and the preferences of various income groups. They found that policy was most highly correlated with the preferences of high earners. Some take this result as an indication that the rich have their way in U.S. politics, while the poor and middle class are voiceless.

But there are many reasons to doubt that conclusion. First of all, the group that Gilens and Page label “affluent” are those making more than $146,000 a year. Although this takes in the billionaire class that socialists rail against, it mostly includes people who could hardly be considered rich. More importantly, the authors found a strong correlation between the preferences of this affluent group and those of the middle class — in other words, the policies that are enacted don’t often seem to buck the will of the broad public. Additionally, correlation doesn’t equal causation — politicians might do things that they think will benefit the overall economy, and that only coincidentally happen to please the affluent.

It’s also likely that Gilens and Page are just wrong. A number of other research teams have done their own studies, and most concluded that it’s the middle class, not the rich, who tend to hold sway in democratic politics. A 2015 paper by political scientist Peter Enns, for example, concludes that “policy ends up about where we would expect if policymakers represented the middle class and ignored the affluent.”

This isn’t to say that the extremely wealthy exert no influence over the political process, or that corporate lobbyists wield no power in Washington. What it does suggest is that the struggle for equality of political power will be an eternal, ongoing one. The idea that reducing wealth and profit concentration will ignite a self-reinforcing political process that will eventually lead to true socialism seems like wishful thinking. Sanders’s policies would undoubtedly make the U.S. a less unequal society, but they are far more likely to end up as reform than revolution.

  • Politics
  • Comparisons
    • Other Comparison
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Monday, July 1, 2019

Gray Wave of Workers Gives Slow-Growing World a Boost

AI Summary. Rising labor-force participation among workers over 55 in Italy, Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and France added 18.8m workers, a 5.5% boost to labor supply, according to OECD data. In Germany, participation gains among those aged 55-79 turned a projected 2.4% workforce contraction into 9.6% growth, adding 3.8m people.

Sarah Chaney Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 1, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Uptick in labor-force participation among over-55s in Italy, Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and France has increased by 18.8m workers, a 5.5% boost in labor supply, according to @WSJ @SarahChaney3.

Are older workers offsetting shrinking workforces in advanced economies?

Core argument: Labor-force participation among over-55s in Italy, Japan, the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France has added 18.8m workers since 2001, a 5.5% boost to labor supply, according to OECD data.

Since 2001, labor-force participation among over-55s in Italy, Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and France has increased by 18.8m workers, a 5.5% boost in labor supply, according to OECD data. If Germany's 55-79 age group had maintained 1991 participation rates, its workforce would have shrunk by 2.4% by 2018; instead, it grew by 9.6%, adding 3.8m people. Similarly, Italy's workforce would have contracted without increased elderly participation. Japan exemplifies this trend, with labor-force participation among those aged 55-64 rising from 68.2% in 2011 to 77% in 2018. This suggests potential for further employment rate increases if other nations emulate Japan's approach, providing a significant boost to slow-growing economies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Labor-force participation among over-55s in Italy, Japan, the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France has added 18.8m workers since 2001, a 5.5% boost to labor supply, according to OECD data.
  2. Germany's workforce grew 9.6% by 2018, adding 3.8m people, whereas it would have shrunk 2.4% had its 55–79 age group kept 1991 participation rates; Italy's workforce likewise would have contracted.
  3. Japan's labor-force participation among those aged 55–64 rose from 68.2% in 2011 to 77% in 2018, suggesting room for further employment-rate gains if other nations follow Japan's approach.

WSJ reports on the same OECD data showing an uptick in LFP by older workers that we pulled a few weeks ago

"...The rise in labor-force participation of over-55 year olds in Italy, Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France since 2001 equates to a combined 18.8 million workers, or a 5.5% boost in their supply of labor, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development....If the same share of Germans age 55 to 79 were in the labor force in 2018 as in 1991, Germany’s overall workforce would have contracted by 2.4%, or nearly 1 million people, over that period, according to an analysis by Mark Keese, an OECD employment economist. Instead, it expanded by 9.6%, or 3.8 million people. Italy’s labor force also would have contracted without growth in elderly participation..... Still, Mr. Keese points to Japan, which continues to defy economic odds despite its population’s advanced age. In 2018, 77% of Japanese aged 55 to 64 were in the labor force, up from 68.2% in 2011. “If other countries follow Japan’s pathway, then there’s still scope for employment rates to rise quite considerably, even from their current high levels,” he said...."

Sarah Chaney, "Gray Wave of Workers Gives Slow-Growing World a Boost,"Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/gray-wave-of-workers-gives-slow-growing-world-a-boost-11561899600

  • Demographics
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation


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