Macro Roundup

They replicated this table largely northern European counties (Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Scotland, Sweden, and Wales) however they don't provide individual country level data in the paper, though their Exhibit 4 (attached) shows that they did do the calculations, just didn't include them.

CEA Staff "The Oppertunity Costs of Socialism," The Council of Economic Advisers," October 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Opportunity-Costs-of-Socialism.pdf

Random Critical Analysis, "Why everything you have said about the determinants of health expenditure is wrong in one million charts: a response to Noah Smith.," November 19, 2018, https://randomcriticalanalysis.com/2018/11/19/why-everything-you-know-about-healthcare-is-wrong-in-one-million-charts-a-response-to-noah-smith/

4) From CEA Cancer survival rates

3) From RCA MRI/Population

2) RCA Health Care expenditure consumption measure

1) From RCA Medical expenditures and # of health care workers

Plz find the source cited for the comparison of cancer survival rates in the Whitehouse study and see if we can view it country by country.

these guys ~ lifted your metric

"...Before the tax reform took effect the CBO projected that the tax cuts would have only a modest impact on economic growth, and it continues to predict that stagnation lurks around every corner. Yet it now has projected in consecutive annual reports that higher-than-expected growth will add an extra $1.2 trillion to federal revenue in the coming decade, covering about 80% of the Treasury’s original projected cost of the tax cuts. If 3% growth is sustained for another year, the growth surge will have paid for the tax cuts....."
Phil Gramm and Michael Solon, "Tax Reform Unleashed the U.S. Economy,"Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-reform-unleashed-the-u-s-economy-11551740837

"... “If you can hold unemployment at a low level for a long time there are substantial benefits,” Janet Yellen, the former chairwoman of the Federal Reserve, said in an interview. “Real wage growth will be faster in a tight labor market. So disadvantaged workers gain on the employment and the wage side, and to my mind, that’s clearly a good thing.” This was one of Ms. Yellen’s hopes when she was running the Fed from 2014 to 2018; keep interest rates low and let the economy run strong enough to keep driving hiring. In the process, the theory went, disadvantaged workers could be drawn from the fringes of the economy. With luck, inflation wouldn’t take off in the process. Her successor, Jerome Powell, has generally followed the strategy, moving cautiously on rates. “This is a good time to be patient,” Mr. Powell told members of Congress Tuesday.... The plan seems to be paying big dividends now, but will it yield long-term results for American workers? Two risks loom. The first is that the low-skill workers who benefit most from a high-pressure job market are often hit hardest when the job market turns south. Consider what happened to high-school dropouts a little more than a decade ago. Their unemployment rate dropped below 6% in 2006 near the end of a historic housing boom, then shot up to more than 15% when the economy crumbled....The U.S. is adding jobs in low-skilled services sectors. Four of the six occupations the Labor Department expects to add the most jobs through 2026 require, at most, a high-school diploma. Personal-care aide, a job which pays about $11 an hour to help the elderly and disabled, is projected to add 778,000 jobs in the decade ended in 2026, the most of 819 occupations tracked. The department expects the economy to add more than half million food prep workers and more than a quarter million janitors. Those low-skill workers are reaping pay gains in part because there aren’t a lot of people eager to fill low-skill jobs anymore. Only about 6% of U.S. workers don’t hold a high school diploma, down from above 40% in the 1960s, according research by MIT economist David Autor James O. Wilson dropped out of high school in the 10th grade and started selling drugs, which eventually led to a lengthy incarceration. When Mr. Wilson, 59, was released in 2013 he sought out training at Goodwill, where he learned to drive a forklift. Those skills led him to a part-time job at a FedEx Corp. facility at an Indianapolis, Ind., airport. He was promoted to a full-time job in 2017, and is now earning more than $16 an hour. He has a house with his wife and enjoys taking care of his cars, including a prized Cadillac. “I wanted to show FedEx you can take a person, and he can change,” he said. “I want FedEx to say, ‘Do you have any more people like him?’” Skilled workers in high-tech and managerial positions are also benefiting from the high-pressure labor market, particularly in thriving cities. Of 166 sectors that employ at least 100,000 Americans, software publishing pays the highest average wages, $59.81 an hour in the fourth quarter of 2018. Wages in the field grew 5.5% from a year earlier, well outpacing 3.3% overall growth in hourly pay. The average full-time employee in the sector already earns more than $100,000 a year...."

Eric Morath and Lauren Weber, "Inside the Hottest Job Market in Half a Century,"Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-hottest-job-market-in-half-a-century-11551436201

"...Research on the effect of an aging population on economic growth has tended to focus on labor force participation and the dependency ratio, and the limited work that has examined the effect of aging on productivity remains inconclusive. This analysis contributes to the aging and productivity literature and finds a strong negative effect of aging on productivity using both state-industry aggregate data and matched employeremployee microdata. The aggregate data show a clear relationship between an older workforce and lower productivity at the state-industry level, in both cross-section and panel models. The results are confirmed using employer-employee linked data from private sector human resource company ADP that show having older coworkers reduces an individual’s wages. Robustness tests include three-digit ZIP code geographic fixed effects and firm fixed effects for a sample of large nationwide firms. The results suggest that between a quarter and full percentage point of the slowing in annual productivity growth in recent years may be due to aging, an effect that is likely to persist for the next decade... Given this, the aging of the workforce has reduced productivity by between 3% and 9%, equal to between 0.25% and 0.7% per annum.."..."

Adam Ozimek, Dante DeAntonio and Mark Zandi, "Aging and the Productivity Puzzle," Moody's Analytics, September 4, 2018, https://ma.moodys.com/rs/961-KCJ-308/images/2018-09-04-Aging-and-the-Productivity-Puzzle.pdf

"......The United States has been running trade deficits for so long that we have forgotten how strange this is, and if we think about it at all we tend simply to dismiss the problem as a consequence of American profligacy. But even if profligacy were truly a problem, in a well-functioning world of global trade, if a country like the United States were to run deficits, after a fairly short time these deficits would force changes (mostly monetary but also structural) in the U.S. economy that would eliminate the deficits. Persistent U.S. trade deficits are unnatural, and there has to be a reason they exist. What is more, these U.S. trade deficits force the United States into accepting either higher unemployment or a more rapid increase in debt. If the country wants to escape this condition, the United States must reduce its trade deficit with the world, but not by addressing the trade deficit directly through import tariffs or quotas. Instead, the United States must address foreign capital inflows directly, perhaps by taxing them..... all or most investment falls into one of two categories. The first category consists of projects whose value is not sensitive to marginal changes in demand, perhaps because they bring about very evident and significant increases in productivity, or because the economy suffers from significant underinvestment. The second category consists of projects whose value varies as a function of future expected changes in demand. I discuss this topic further in the “Where Might This Argument Be Wrong?” section of a previous blog post. I show in that post that in economies like the United States, in which the profitability of most investments is a function of changes in demand (the second category) rather than in the cost of borrowing (the first category), rising income inequality and higher ex-ante savings can actually result in less investment rather than more. The point is that U.S. income inequality could increase the gap between savings and investment by even more than we might otherwise assume. Not only does it cause the savings of the rich to rise faster than investment, but it might actually cause investment to decline.This isn’t just theory. The increase in the savings share of German GDP after the Hartz reforms was matched by a reduction in the investment share, not the expected increase. And while it is too early to make the same claim about the Trump tax cuts of December 2017, which were supposed to boost investment by boosting savings, so far they seem to have done nothing of the sort.. Be that as it may, whether investment actually declines or merely grows more slowly than the decline in consumption, in a closed system like the global economy, savings and investment are by definition equal. This implies that in any country if a policy causes savings in one part of the economy to rise and investment to rise more slowly, or even decline, the domestic imbalance between savings and investment can be resolved in one (or some combination) of only two ways:1) The excess savings can be exported, in the form of capital account deficits along with the corresponding trade and current account surpluses. 2) Something else must happen to cause savings in another part of the economy to drop, so in the aggregate there is no net increase in savings. It is clear that the first of these two conditions does not apply to the United States. The country has no control over its ability to import or export savings. Its capital account is largely determined abroad. Why? Because the United States has deep, completely open, and highly flexible capital markets and very strong governance, so the country ultimately absorbs a large part of the excess savings of the rest of the world—roughly 40-50 percent of the sum of foreign capital account deficits in recent years—the extent of which is only partially determined by domestic U.S. conditions or policies. As long as the United States runs a capital account surplus, and as long as this surplus is determined by foreign conditions and policies the country largely cannot control, the United States cannot be a net exporter of any excess savings accumulated through its high level of income inequality. This means the second condition must apply. This is not a theoretical proposal but rather an accounting identity that cannot be broken: if the United States cannot export the excess of savings over investment, it cannot have these excess savings. That being the case, something else must happen to cause savings in another part of the U.S. economy to drop by enough to absorb the sum of excess U.S. savings caused by income inequality and excess foreign savings imported into the United States. This has been the hardest part for even trade experts to understand, but there are many ways in which conditions that drive up savings in one part of the U.S. economy can drive them down elsewhere. I discuss some of these ways in the “What Drives Down Savings” section of my previous blog post. What this all means is that, in one way or another, distortions (either in the U.S. economy or abroad), have transformed the United States from what should have been a reasonably persistent surplus economy into the world’s largest deficit economy. As I have explained before (including here, here, here, and here), ultimately the United States must respond to the distortions created by net capital inflows, and the consequent current account deficit, with either more unemployment or more debt. This explains the real relationship between the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit: if the United States is to avoid higher unemployment, either the U.S. government must run a fiscal deficit or U.S. authorities, including the Federal Reserve, must create conditions under which private American (mainly households) run deficits and raise debt levels. The extent of the distortion can be enormous. Assuming that the United States should normally run a current account surplus of roughly 2-3 percent of GDP, in line with that of other rich, capital-exporting countries and substantially lower than the UK’s surplus at the end of the nineteenth century, the American current account deficit of roughly 3 percent of GDP implies a distortion equal to 5-6 percent of U.S. GDP, or a very high 1 to 1.5 percent of global GDP. This suggests that, while the United States currently absorbs 40-50 percent of the world’s current account deficits, it may be absorbing up to two-thirds of all the world’s excess savings...."

Michael Pettis, "Should the United States Run a Trade Surplus?,"China Financial Markets, March 4, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/78496