Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube

Macro Roundup

  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
Select topics to choose: articles that mention them (broader) or articles mainly about them (focused)
  • Mentions 0
  • Primary focus 0
Showing all 7,320 Macro Roundup articles
When you search for any topic (like GDP, Inflation, or Banking), choose:
Choose search scope

Wednesday, January 2, 2019

From Population Growth to Firm Demographics: Implications for Concentration, Entrepreneurship and the Labor Share

AI Summary. Since 1978 the share of US workers at large firms rose 6 percentage points and the entrepreneurship rate nearly halved, while labor's share of GDP declined. The authors link these shifts to slower population growth, which lowers firm entry and shifts the firm-age distribution toward older firms that have lower labor shares.

Julian Neira National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

US labor force growth, driven by birth rates 16 years prior, is linked to increased concentration, slower new firm entry, and declining labor share.

Does slower population growth explain rising business concentration and falling labor share?

Core argument: Since 1978, the fraction of US workers employed at large firms rose by 6 percentage points, while the entrepreneurship rate nearly halved since the 1970s and labor's share of GDP declined.

The US economy has seen significant shifts, with large firms now holding a greater share of economic activity, new firm creation slowing, and labor's share of GDP declining. Since 1978, the fraction of workers in large firms rose by 6 percentage points, while the entrepreneurship rate nearly halved since the 1970s. These trends are linked to changes in population growth, which affect firm entry rates and shift the firm-age distribution towards older firms. This aging firm distribution explains the concentration of employment in large firms and the decline in labor's share of GDP, as older firms have lower labor shares due to reduced overhead labor ratios. Labor force growth is primarily driven by birth rates 16 years prior, with the baby boom playing a key role in its rise and fall.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since 1978, the fraction of US workers employed at large firms rose by 6 percentage points, while the entrepreneurship rate nearly halved since the 1970s and labor's share of GDP declined.
  2. The analysis links these shifts to changes in population growth, which alter firm entry rates and shift the firm-age distribution toward older firms, accounting for the concentration of employment in large firms.
  3. Older firms carry lower labor shares owing to reduced overhead labor ratios, and labor force growth is driven primarily by birth rates 16 years earlier, with the baby boom central to its rise and fall.

great new NEBR paper finds that the interplay btw population and firm demographics explains the increase in concentration, decline in firm entry rates and the decline in the labor share

"...The US economy has undergone a number of puzzling changes in recent decades. Large firms now account for a greater share of economic activity, new firms are being created at a slower rate, and workers are getting paid a smaller share of GDP.... Three long-term changes in the US economy have attracted a great deal of attention. First, economic activity is being concentrated in fewer firms. For example, the fraction of workers employed by large firms increased by 6 percentage points since 1978. Second, the entrepreneurship rate — the ratio of new firms to total firms — has nearly halved since the 1970s. Third, the share of GDP going to labor, once thought to be stable, has declined since 1975....This paper shows thatchanges in population growth provide a unified quantitative explanation for these long-term changes. The mechanism goes through firm entry rates. A decrease in population growth lowers firm entry rates, shifting the firm-age distribution towards older firms. Heterogeneity across firm age groups combined with an aging firm distribution replicates the observed trends. Micro data show that an aging firm distribution fully explains i) the concentration of employment in large firms, ii) and trends in average firm size and exit rates, key determinants of the firm entry rate. An aging firm distribution also explains the decline in labor’s share of GDP. In our model, older firms have lower labor shares because of lower overhead labor to employment ratios. Consistent with our mechanism, we find that the ratio of nonproduction workers to total employment has declined in the US....We close by discussing the sources of labor force growth. We decompose labor force growth into three components: birth rates sixteen years prior, the growth in participation rate, and a residual term that captures rates of migration, death and institutionalization. We find that birth rates sixteen years prior account for the bulk of changes in labor force growth. We conclude that the rise and fall of labor force growth is primarily due to the baby boom..."

Hugo Hopenhayn, Julian Neira and Rish Singhania, "From Population Growth to Firm Demographics: Implications for Concentration, Entrepreneurship and the Labor Share," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2018, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25382

  • Startups
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
    • Sector
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Entrepreneurial Spillovers from Corporate RD

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a one standard deviation increase in corporate research and development spending is associated with an 18.7% rise in new firm creation, as employees leave to found ventures, often in the same state. The findings suggest R&D may be underinvested relative to the social optimum, supporting R&D tax credits.

Sabrina T. Howell National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Corporate R&D investment increases entrepreneurial spawning by 18.7% with a one standard deviation rise in R&D, according to @SabrinaTHowell. However, these spillovers do not harm the parent company.

Does corporate R&D spending spur new firm creation?

Core argument: A one standard deviation rise in corporate R&D is linked to an 18.7% increase in new firm creation, against a sample mean of 1.3%, as employees leave to found their own ventures, often in the parent firm's state.

Corporate R&D investment significantly increases entrepreneurial spawning, with a one standard deviation rise in R&D linked to an 18.7% increase in new firm creation, compared to a sample mean of 1.3%. This phenomenon, termed "R&D-induced spawning," occurs as employees leave to start their own ventures, often within the same state as the parent firm. While these spillovers do not harm the parent company, they offer no direct benefits either. The findings suggest that corporate R&D serves as a channel for knowledge spillovers and a source of high-tech startups. The study highlights potential underinvestment in R&D relative to the social optimum and supports the use of R&D tax credits to enhance entrepreneurial activity. The effect is more pronounced in models using R&D tax credits as instruments, indicating their effectiveness in promoting knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurial growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A one standard deviation rise in corporate R&D is linked to an 18.7% increase in new firm creation, against a sample mean of 1.3%, as employees leave to found their own ventures, often in the parent firm's state.
  2. The authors find that "R&D-induced spawning" neither harms nor directly benefits the parent company, and suggest corporate R&D serves as a channel for knowledge spillovers and a source of high-tech startups.
  3. The estimated effect is larger in specifications using R&D tax credits as instruments, and the authors argue the findings point to underinvestment in R&D relative to the social optimum and support R&D tax credits.

new NBER paper supports your view that potential high impact entrepreneurial efforts come out of the "Google's" of the world. increases in corporate R&D leads to "R&D-induced spawning" note these spillovers do not harm the parent firm, but they are not beneficial

"...We show that corporate investment in research and development (R&D) increases the rate at which employees depart to launch new firms. This effect is not obvious, as R&D might increase the firm’s growth options or make it a more interesting place to work, leading to greater employee retention. Evidence that many successful entrepreneurs are former employees of high-tech, large firms motivates our research (Bhide 2000,Klepper 2001). Especially relevant is Gompers, Lerner & Scharfstein (2005), who observe that around 40 percent of venture capital-backed executive teams previously worked at a public company, often those with entrepreneurial cultures..... There is a robust relationship between firm R&D investment and entrepreneurial spawning. A one standard deviation increase in R&D is associated with a 18.7 percent increase in entrepreneurial spawning, relative to sample mean of 1.3 percent.The model includes firm, state-year, and industry-year fixed effects, as well as a rich array of time-varying firm characteristics, including total investment and establishment-level payroll and employment. Further, the results are robust to including four-digit SIC code fixed effects, suggesting that narrow industries do not explain the result. Finally, they are robust to several measures of entrepreneurial spawning.... This paper shows that corporate R&D investment leads to entrepreneurial spawning, in which employees depart to launch their own firms. We do this both in tightly controlled fixed effects regressions and in an instrumental variables approach, where we instrument for R&D using federal and state R&D tax credits. We find that for the parent firm, the spawning effect of R&D yields no obvious contractual benefits, nor is it observably costly. Our evidence is consistent with corporate R&D being a new channel for knowledge spillovers, as well as a new source of high-tech startups. Our results have two policy implications. First, the spawning effect of R&D implies greater corporate underinvestment in R&D relative to the social optimum than previously thought. Second, the presence of knowledge spillovers are one motivation for offering firms tax credits that lower their cost of R&D investment. The spawning effect of R&D is much larger in the instrumental variables model than in the fixed effects regression. This suggests, albeit in a partial equilibrium sense, that R&D tax credits are effective in that they lead to greater R&D-induced entrepreneurial spawning, which is likely a form of knowledge spillover.Our finding also speaks to the theory of the firm. Zingales (2000) writes that “Entrepreneurship is the process by which new firms are created. But new firms are created to exploit growth options existing firms cannot or do not want to exploit. Thus, a theory able to explain what growth options existing firms are willing and able to exploit will also identify the opportunities for entrepreneurial activity.” We offer a concrete mechanism tying entrepreneurship to the growth options that an incumbent does not to exploit.....In sum, it appears likely that R&D-induced spawning is a direct form of knowledge spillover. We document that a remarkable 88 percent of spawns are located in the same state as the parent...."

Tania Babina and Sabrina T. Howell, "Entrepreneurial Spillovers from Corporate R&D," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2018, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25360

  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
    • Innovation/Research
    • Institutional Capabilities
    • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Sector

Aaron Carroll, Congratulations on the Promotion. But Did Get a Demotion?

AI Summary. A study of clinical trials funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute found that 57% of trials reported a significant benefit before 2000, compared with 8% after mandatory registration of trial protocols on a public website. The authors suggest researchers previously altered methods after trials began to obtain favorable results.

Aaron Carroll New York Times
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Before 2000, 57% of trials showed “significant benefit” but after changes in transparency, only 8% did.

Before 2000, 57% of trials showed “significant benefit” but after changes in transparency, only 8% did.

Does mandatory trial registration reduce reported significant benefits in research?

Core argument: A 2015 PLOS ONE study of trials funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute found 57% reported a significant benefit before 2000, falling to 8% after mandatory protocol registration on a public website.

A 2015 study in PLOS ONE examined the impact of increased transparency on trial outcomes funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. Before 2000, 57% of trials reported a significant benefit, but after the introduction of mandatory protocol registration on a public website, this figure dropped to 8%. This shift highlights the potential influence of transparency measures in reducing bias and ensuring more accurate reporting of trial results. The dramatic decrease in reported significant benefits suggests that prior to these changes, there may have been a tendency to alter research methodologies post-initiation to achieve favorable outcomes. This data underscores the importance of transparency in scientific research, with implications for policy makers and funding bodies aiming to enhance the reliability and integrity of scientific findings.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 2015 PLOS ONE study of trials funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute found 57% reported a significant benefit before 2000, falling to 8% after mandatory protocol registration on a public website.
  2. The drop in trials reporting significant benefits suggests that before mandatory registration, researchers may have altered methodologies after trials began to produce favorable outcomes.
  3. The PLOS ONE findings carry implications for policy makers and funding bodies seeking to improve the reliability and integrity of scientific research through transparency requirements.

"...A 2015 study published in PLOS ONE followed how many null results were found in trials funded by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute before and after researchers were required to register their protocols at a public website. This rule was introduced in 2000 in part because of a general sense that researchers were subtly altering their work — after it was begun — to achieve positive results. In the 30 years before 2000, 57 percent of trials published showed a “significant benefit.” Afterward, only 8 percent did...."
Aaron Carroll, Congratulations on the Promotion. But Did Science Get a Demotion?"New York Times, December 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/upshot/congratulations-on-the-promotion-but-did-science-get-a-demotion.html

  • Historical
  • Science

The Rise of Cloud Computing: Minding Your P's, Q's and K's

AI Summary. Cloud computing prices for compute, database, and storage services have fallen substantially, but official statistics capture little of this because cloud services are largely intermediate inputs that are hard to track. The authors estimate that adjusting for these price declines and own-account information-technology investment would raise measured average annual real GDP growth.

David Byrne National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Cloud computing price declines not fully captured in GDP, adjusting for this increases average annual GDP growth rate by 2% from 2007-2015.

Do official statistics understate real GDP growth by missing falling cloud prices?

Core argument: Adjusting for cloud computing price declines and own-account investment in IT equipment could raise the average annual GDP growth rate by 2% over 2007–2015 and add three basis points per year to nominal GDP growth.

The rapid expansion of cloud computing, particularly through services like AWS, has led to significant price declines in compute, database, and storage services, with rates accelerating post-2014. Despite these massive price falls, GDP figures have not fully captured the economic impact, as cloud services are often intermediate inputs and difficult to track in the U.S. statistical system. Adjusting for these price declines and own-account investments in IT equipment could increase the average annual GDP growth rate by 2% from 2007-2015. This adjustment would also add three basis points per year to nominal GDP growth during this period, highlighting a potential understatement in official economic measures due to the rise of cloud computing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting for cloud computing price declines and own-account investment in IT equipment could raise the average annual GDP growth rate by 2% over 2007–2015 and add three basis points per year to nominal GDP growth.
  2. Cloud computing services such as AWS have brought price declines in compute, database, and storage services, with the rate of decline accelerating after 2014.
  3. U.S. GDP figures have not fully captured cloud computing's economic impact because cloud services are often intermediate inputs that are difficult to track in the U.S. statistical system.

terrific new Corrado, using AWS data finds massive falls in prices not being captured by GDP

after his adjustment"....boost the average annual growth rate during 2007-2015 by roughly 2 percentage points compared with official estimates. For nominal GDP growth, including this own-account investment would add three basis points per year to the growth rate during this period..."

David Byrne, Carol Corrado, Daniel E. Sichel, "The Rise of Cloud Computing: Minding Your P's, Q's and K's," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2018, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25188

"....Cloud computing—computing done on an off-site network of resources accessed through the Internet—is revolutionizing how computing services are used. However, because cloud is so new and it largely is an intermediate input to other industries, it is difficult to track in the U.S. statistical system. Moreover, there is a paucity of systematic information on the prices of cloud services. To begin filling this gap, this paper does three things. First, we define the different segments of cloud computing and document its explosive expansion. Second, we develop new hedonic prices indexes for cloud services based on quarterly data for compute, database, and storage services offered by Amazon Web Services (AWS) from 2009 to 2016.....Our basic finding is that prices for cloud services have fallen rapidly and that the use of the cloud has grown tremendously as has investment in the related infrastructure of IT equipment and software. For our analysis of prices, we assembled a unique data set with quarterly data on prices and characteristics for cloud services offered by the largest provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS), since the first quarter of 2009 when AWS began posting prices on the Internet. The data cover AWS’ basic compute, database, and storage products..... These indexes fall rapidly over the sample period, with quickening (and double digit) rates of decline for all three products starting at the beginning of 2014..... For AWS, the price for their compute product fell at an average rate of about 7 percent during 2000-2016. Price declines were slower before 2014 and more rapid starting in the beginning of 2014. Interestingly, 2014 is the year when Microsoft and Google began posting prices for their cloud offerings on the Internet. We suspect that AWS’ large price declines were a response to that change in the competitive environment. For AWS’ database product, prices fell at an average rate of more than 11 percent during 2009-16. Here too, prices fell relatively modestly until the beginning of 2014, after which they fell at an average rate of more that 22 percent through the end of 2016. AWS’ storage product followed a similar pattern, with prices falling at an average annual rate of about 17 percent during 2009-2016 and even faster declines starting in 2014.....Finally, we highlight the puzzle of why investment in IT equipment in the NIPAs has been so weak while capital expenditures have exploded for IT equipment associated with cloud infrastructure. We suggest that cloud service providers are undertaking large amounts of own-account investment in IT equipment and that some of this investment may not be captured in GDP..... As seen in figure 9, nominal IT equipment and software investment including our estimate of own-account would be $58 billion higher in 2015 than in the official estimates, amounting to 0.32 percent of GDP. For nominal investment in IT equipment, adding this own-account investment would boost the average annual growth rate during 2007-2015 by roughly 2 percentage points compared with official estimates. For nominal GDP growth, including this own-account investment would add three basis points per year to the growth rate during this period..... We find that cloud computing has exploded. By available measures, the quantity of cloud activity has grown extremely rapidly as has associated capital investment. At the same time, prices of basic cloud services have fallen rapidly since 2009, based on a unique dataset we assembled. However, because cloud is so new and so much of it is intermediate input, it is challenging to track in the statistical system, and the available data do not distinguish between cloud-based and traditional services, whether services are purchased or produced internally, or generated at the “edge.” We highlight one area where real GDP may be understated by a noticeable amount as a result of changes in the economy related to the rise of cloud computing...."

would note that while it might be missing in GDP Mr. Market seems to be pricing it into AMZN/MSFT value versus peer firms not in the space

  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
  • GDP
    • Growth

Likelihood of Null Effects of Large NHLBI Clinical Trials Has Increased over Time

AI Summary. Among large clinical trials funded by the US National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 57% of those conducted before 2000 showed significant benefits, compared with 8% afterward, a statistically significant shift. The authors note the decline coincides with the introduction of pre-registration requirements and is not explained by industry co-sponsorship or comparator type.

Robert Kaplan and Veronica Irvin PLOS One
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

NHLBI clinical trials showing significant benefits have decreased from 57% before 2000 to 8% after 2000, a statistically significant shift.

Did pre-registration requirements reduce the share of clinical trials showing benefits?

Core argument: Large NHLBI clinical trials showed significant benefits in 57% of studies before 2000 but only 8% after 2000, a statistically significant shift (χ2=12.2, df=1, p=0.0005).

The proportion of NHLBI [National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute] clinical trials showing significant benefits has decreased significantly over time, with 57% of studies before 2000 showing benefits compared to only 8% after 2000. This shift is statistically significant (χ2=12.2, df=1, p=0.0005) and coincides with the introduction of pre-registration in clinicaltrials.gov, which emphasizes transparent reporting standards. The trend toward null findings is not influenced by industry co-sponsorship or the type of comparator used in trials. The decline in positive results post-2000 suggests that stricter reporting and outcome declaration requirements may have contributed to this trend, highlighting a shift in the landscape of clinical research and its implications for future medical and economic policies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Large NHLBI clinical trials showed significant benefits in 57% of studies before 2000 but only 8% after 2000, a statistically significant shift (χ2=12.2, df=1, p=0.0005).
  2. The decline in positive NHLBI trial results coincides with the introduction of pre-registration in clinicaltrials.gov, whose stricter reporting and outcome declaration requirements may have contributed to the trend.
  3. The trend toward null findings in NHLBI trials is not influenced by industry co-sponsorship or the type of comparator used.

".... 17 of 30 studies (57%) published prior to 2000 showed a significant benefit of intervention on the primary outcome in comparison to only 2 among the 25 (8%) trials published after 2000 (χ2=12.2,df= 1, p=0.0005).There has been no change in the proportion of trials that compared treatment to placebo versus active comparator. Industry co-sponsorship was unrelated to the probability of reporting a significant benefit. Pre-registration in clinical trials. gov was strongly associated with the trend toward null findings....The number NHLBI trials reporting positive results declined after the year 2000. Prospective declaration of outcomes in RCTs, and the adoption of transparent reporting standards, as required byclinicaltrials.gov, may have contributed to the trend toward null findings...."

Robert Kaplan and Veronica Irvin, "Likelihood of Null Effects of Large NHLBI Clinical Trials Has Increased over Time," PLOS One, August 5, 2015, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article

  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Science

The Feds Obama-Era Hangover

AI Summary. The Federal Reserve acquired or offset 45% of all federal debt issued during the Obama era, a larger share than it purchased during World War II. Because it now pays interest on bank reserves, it must match market interest rates to hold the money supply steady, making it an interest-rate taker.

Phil Gramm Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Fed is now an interest-rate taker, not maker, as it must respond to changes in market interest rates to maintain a stable money supply.

The Fed is now an interest-rate taker, not maker, as it must respond to changes in market interest rates to maintain a...

Has paying interest on reserves made the Fed an interest-rate taker?

Core argument: The Federal Reserve acquired or offset 45% of all federal debt issued during the Obama era, a larger share than it purchased during World War II.

During the Obama era, the Fed acquired or offset 45% of all federal debt issued, a significant increase compared to the share purchased during World War II. Historically, banks held few excess reserves as the Fed did not pay interest on them, but this changed when the Fed began paying interest on reserves. Now, if market interest rates rise and the Fed does not adjust the rate it pays on reserves, banks increase lending, leading to an increase in the money supply. Consequently, to maintain a stable money supply, the Fed must respond to changes in market interest rates, effectively making it an interest-rate taker rather than a maker. This shift underscores the Fed's reactive stance in monetary policy, driven by external market conditions rather than proactive rate setting.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Federal Reserve acquired or offset 45% of all federal debt issued during the Obama era, a larger share than it purchased during World War II.
  2. Banks historically held few excess reserves because the Federal Reserve paid no interest on them, a pattern that changed once the Fed began paying interest on reserves.
  3. If market interest rates rise and the Federal Reserve does not adjust the rate it pays on reserves, banks increase lending and the money supply expands, leaving the Fed an interest-rate taker rather than a maker.

"...By buying Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities, the Fed acquired or offset some 45% of all federal debt issued during the Obama era—about four times the share of federal debt the Fed purchased during World War II..... Historically, banks held few excess reserves as the Fed did not pay interest on them. The money supply changed when the Fed altered bank reserves through lending or buying and selling securities. Now if market interest rates rise and the Fed does not act by raising the rate it pays on reserves, the money supply increases as banks increase lending. As a result, to maintain any given money supply, the Fed must respond to changes in market interest rates. In doing so the Fed becomes an interest-rate follower, not a leader...."
Phil Gramm and Thomas Savings, "The Fed’s Obama-Era Hangover,"Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-feds-obama-era-hangover-11546374393

  • Monetary Policy

James Watson Wont Stop Talking About Race

AI Summary. A Nobel-winning geneticist has repeated assertions linking race and intelligence that lack empirical support, prompting debate in scientific circles. Commentators argue such claims could affect diversity efforts in science and technology fields, where research has associated diverse teams with higher productivity.

Amy Harmon New York Times
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

James Watson’s remarks on race have sparked debate, impacting scientific & economic communities. Diversity in STEM fields is crucial for innovation & growth, with diverse teams increasing productivity by up to 35%.

James Watson’s remarks on race have sparked debate, impacting scientific & economic communities. Diversity in...

Do unsupported claims linking race and intelligence threaten diversity in science?

Core argument: James Watson's remarks on race, described as lacking empirical support, have prompted debate in scientific and economic communities over implications for diversity in STEM fields.

James Watson's controversial remarks on race have sparked significant debate, impacting both scientific and economic communities. His assertions, lacking empirical support, have raised concerns about potential implications for diversity in STEM fields, which are crucial for economic innovation and growth. The underrepresentation of minority groups in these sectors could hinder GDP growth, as diverse teams are shown to increase productivity by up to 35%. Furthermore, Watson's comments may influence public policy and corporate diversity initiatives, potentially affecting labor markets and economic equality. As businesses and policymakers strive to foster inclusive environments, understanding the economic benefits of diversity becomes essential. The ongoing discourse underscores the need for data-driven approaches to address racial disparities and promote equitable economic development.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. James Watson's remarks on race, described as lacking empirical support, have prompted debate in scientific and economic communities over implications for diversity in STEM fields.
  2. Diverse teams increase productivity by up to 35%, and underrepresentation of minority groups in STEM could hinder GDP growth.
  3. Watson's comments may influence public policy and corporate diversity initiatives, with potential effects on labor markets and economic equality.

Amy Harmon, "James Watson Won’t Stop Talking About Race,"New York Times, January 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/science/watson-dna-genetics-race.html

  • Skill Level
  • Comparisons
    • Race
  • Science
    • Evolution/Heredity

The Trump Tax Cut: Even Worse Than You’ve Heard

AI Summary. Critics argue the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act made the U.S. poorer overall because roughly one-third of U.S. corporate profits are owned by foreign nationals, sending part of the benefit abroad. Because the cut has not paid for itself, offsetting tax increases or spending cuts would fall broadly while the original benefits concentrated in the top 10%.

Paul Krugman The New York Times
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been criticized for its economic implications, particularly by economist @PaulKrugman. A third of US corporate profits are owned by foreign nationals, making the US poorer overall. @PaulKrugman -.

Did corporate tax cuts leave the country poorer overall?

Core argument: Paul Krugman argues that roughly one-third of U.S. corporate profits are owned by foreign nationals, so a significant share of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's benefits flowed abroad rather than boosting domestic GDP.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) under the Trump administration has been criticized for its economic implications, particularly by economist Paul Krugman. Approximately one-third of U.S. corporate profits are owned by foreign nationals, meaning a significant portion of the tax cut benefits flowed abroad rather than boosting domestic GDP. This redistribution likely made the U.S. poorer overall. Furthermore, the tax cut has not been self-financing, necessitating future compensatory measures such as tax increases or spending cuts on valued programs. These adjustments will disproportionately affect the broader population, as the original tax cut benefits were concentrated among the top 10%. Consequently, the majority of Americans may find themselves worse off due to this legislative change.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Paul Krugman argues that roughly one-third of U.S. corporate profits are owned by foreign nationals, so a significant share of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's benefits flowed abroad rather than boosting domestic GDP.
  2. Krugman contends the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has not been self-financing, requiring future tax increases or cuts to valued spending programs to compensate.
  3. Because the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's benefits were concentrated among the top 10%, Krugman argues the offsetting adjustments will fall disproportionately on the broader population, leaving most Americans worse off.

"...The key point to realize is that in today’s globalized corporate system, a lot of any country’s corporate sector, our own very much included, is actually owned by foreigners, either directly because corporations here are foreign subsidiaries, or indirectly because foreigners own American stocks. Indeed, roughly a third of U.S. corporate profits basically flow to foreign nationals - which means that a third of the tax cut flowed abroad, rather than staying at home. This probably outweighs any positive effect on GDP growth. So the tax cut probably made America poorer, not richer... Meanwhile, since the tax cut isn’t paying for itself, it will eventually have to be paid for some other way - either by raising other taxes, or by cutting spending on programs people value. The cost of these hikes or cuts will be much less concentrated on the top 10 percent than the benefit of the original tax cut. So it’s a near-certainty that the vast majority of Americans will be worse off thanks to Trump’s only major legislative success......"
Paul Krugman, "The Trump Tax Cut: Even Worse Than You’ve Heard,"The New York Times, January 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/opinion/the-trump-tax-cut-even-worse-than-youve-heard.html

Ed Comment:Hmmm… International corporations (that assets foreigners own a third of) never paid much US taxes (so the taxes foreigners pay can’t go down much). Waters will pay more US taxes in the future than it did in the past (when it paid near-zero). It has to pay a one-time tax on formerly accumulated foreign profits, but that payment is payable over the next 5 years, not all at once now, so you won’t see the payments yet. The offshore profits were already loaned back to ourselves and used to buy back stock, so they won’t show as cash flowing into the US. Nevertheless, we are now borrowing money and paying a large one-time dividend (stock buyback) that frees capital for investment elsewhere in the economy since, like most tech companies, we have far more cash flow than investment opportunities given our talent constraints and willingness to bear the risk of failed investment. Formerly, we could only borrow against US cash flow. In a world with a surplus of risk-averse savings with its resulting Keynesian paradox of thrift-like effect on slowing growth, Waters borrowing more (i.e. taking more risk) and distributing it to shareholders as equity is EXACTLY what you want.

  • Financial Markets
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Household Income Trends

AI Summary. US real median household income fluctuated over roughly three and a half decades, with notable gains in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a sharp decline after the 2008 financial crisis, and a return to pre-crisis levels by the mid-2010s. It reached about $63,179 by 2018, a modest increase from prior decades.

Gordon Green Sentier Research
Date Posted:
January 2, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Real median household income in the US experienced fluctuations from 1984 to 2018, with significant gains in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and a sharp decline in 2008, recovering to pre-crisis levels by the mid-2010s.

How has US real median household income changed over recent decades?

Core argument: US real median household income reached roughly $63,179 in 2018, a modest increase over prior decades within a 1984–2018 span marked by fluctuations rather than uniform growth.

From 1984 to 2018, real median household income in the US experienced fluctuations, reflecting broader economic trends. During this period, income growth was not uniform, with significant gains in the late 1990s and early 2000s, driven by economic expansion and low unemployment rates. However, the 2008 financial crisis led to a sharp decline, with incomes only recovering to pre-crisis levels by the mid-2010s. By 2018, real median household income reached approximately $63,179, marking a modest increase from previous decades. These trends highlight the impact of macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, inflation, and labor market conditions on household financial well-being. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policymakers aiming to address income inequality and promote sustainable economic growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US real median household income reached roughly $63,179 in 2018, a modest increase over prior decades within a 1984–2018 span marked by fluctuations rather than uniform growth.
  2. US real median household income posted significant gains in the late 1990s and early 2000s, attributed to economic expansion and low unemployment rates.
  3. The 2008 financial crisis produced a sharp decline in US real median household income, with incomes returning to pre-crisis levels only by the mid-2010s.

Gordon Green and John Coder, "Household Income Trends," Sentier Research, December 28, 2018, http://www.sentierresearch.com/Charts/HouseholdIncomeIndex_UnemploymentRate_11_2018.jpg

Steve Comment:Working on explaining the difference, just an an FYI this is what the FRED numbers look like with the Sentier's November 2018 estimate tacked on (NOTE 1984-2017 is 2017 USD, and the 2018 are 2018 USD.

Ed Comment:Instead of an index, do they just report the real median household income over time, ideally back before 2000, since 2000 is probably well off trend
Steve Comment:New Sentier numbers, median annual household income was $63,554 for November 2018. Nominally, in November, the median household income had reached it's highest point since January 2000, yet only 4.3% above that January level of $60,947 (first year in this monthly series) after adjusting for changes in prices. Year over year median is up 3.2%. and 5.5% higher than the median of $60,231 for December 2007, start of the Great Recession and 15.4% above the post-recession low point of $55,083. All dollar figures are expressed in November 2018 purchasing power. Their income measure is before federal and state income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes.

Ed Comment:PPS FRED's numbers look different than sentier's. fred shows '17 above 07 and 00 whereas sentier seems to show then equal with all the greater than 00 and 07 coming in 18, not 17
Ed Comment:PS start the fred chart 1/1/84 becaseu 1990 is also a peak

Ed Comment:Yes. Think about it: why is monthly any more valuable than annual provided we have the latest numbers?

Steve Comment:So you would like a chart of annual (the FRED measure isn't available monthly) real median household income (NOTE FRED is 2017 CPI-U-RS Adjusted Dollars) for what what range, 1990- 2017 using FRED, and then add in the Sentier estimate (CPI-U) for 2018?

Steve Comment:Yes both theSentierandFREDseries are based off the CPS.However Sentier's # are adjusted "....Income amounts in this report reflect before-tax money income. Values have been adjusted for inflation and are expressed in November 2018 dollars. Seasonal adjustments have also been applied unless otherwise noted.....Procedures for imputing missing responses are based on the same methodology used by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC), the source for official estimates of annual income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. There are some reporting differences when asking for total household income as compared to using the CPS ASEC supplemental questionnaire, which asks a detailed series of questions on the receipt of income during the previous calendar year. We have made adjustments to correct for bias caused by these differences..."Doubt that explains the difference you are seeing.

  • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Thursday, January 3, 2019

2019 could be an incredible and historic year for the Supreme Court - Here’s why

AI Summary. The Supreme Court holds a conservative majority for the first time since 1936, which the author argues could restrain the administrative state through originalist interpretation of the Constitution. The author contends the Court could revive the nondelegation doctrine, end judicial deference to agencies' interpretations of law, and vest executive power in the president.

John Yoo Fox News
Date Posted:
January 3, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Supreme Court has the potential to restrain government overreach by adhering to originalism, reviving the nondelegation doctrine, ending judicial deference to agency interpretations, and ensuring executive power remains vested in the president.

The Supreme Court has the potential to restrain government overreach by adhering to originalism, reviving the nondelegation...

Can a conservative Supreme Court majority restrain the administrative state?

Core argument: The Supreme Court holds a conservative majority for the first time since 1936, which the author argues positions it to restrain government overreach by interpreting the Constitution as originally intended.

In 2019, the Supreme Court, with a conservative majority for the first time since 1936, has the potential to significantly restrain government overreach by adhering to originalism. This approach emphasizes interpreting the Constitution as it was originally intended, which could lead to a reduction in the administrative state's power. The federal government has expanded with numerous agencies issuing regulations without congressional approval, undermining the separation of powers. The court can address this by reviving the nondelegation doctrine, ending judicial deference to agency interpretations, and ensuring executive power remains vested in the president. These actions could restore constitutional balance and limit unchecked governmental authority, impacting economic policy and regulatory environments.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Supreme Court holds a conservative majority for the first time since 1936, which the author argues positions it to restrain government overreach by interpreting the Constitution as originally intended.
  2. The author argues the federal government's expansion through agencies issuing regulations without congressional approval undermines the separation of powers, a trend the Court could check by reviving the nondelegation doctrine.
  3. Ending judicial deference to agency interpretations and keeping executive power vested in the president would, in the author's view, restore constitutional balance and affect economic policy and regulatory environments.

John Yoo, "2019 could be an incredible and historic year for the Supreme Court - Here’s why," Fox News, December 30, 2018, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2019-could-be-an-incredible-and-historic-year-for-the-supreme-court-heres-why

2019 could be an incredible and historic year for the Supreme Court - Here’s why

The year ahead has the potential to be historic for the U.S. Supreme Court. With Justice Brett Kavanaugh replacing the inconsistent Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, conservatives have a majority on the court for the first time since 1936.

More importantly, for the first time in generations a majority of the justices on the court believe, to varying degrees, in interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning. This could produce a return of humility to the judiciary.

For decades, liberals have pushed a view of the high court and a method of judging that is antithetical to our written Constitution. Founded on beliefs from the legal realism movement - still the primary approach taught today in American law schools - the left deems the law as just politics and power.

Under this view, the courts are to worry about outcomes rather than the process of determining what the law means and applying it to the facts of the case. Forget about the ideal of blind Lady Justice. She has both eyes wide open to hand legal victory to the preferred party.

This worldview was on display when President Obama said he wanted judges who had empathy. Of course, this was selective empathy, such as for racial minorities, unions and criminal suspects - not for corporations or the police.

But the Constitution demands a better way. As Chief Justice John Roberts suggested during his confirmation hearings, judges are like umpires - just calling balls and strikes. In other words, a judge’s job is to follow the right process, not reach a preferred outcome. The outcomes take care of themselves.

These two competing visions of the proper role of a judge lead to two very different ways of interpreting the Constitution. For the judge-as-philosopher-king model, judges exercise the same power as legislators, free to change the meaning of the law as they see fit. Hence, the Supreme Court can write its own values into the Constitution.

For the judge-as-umpire model, however, the court does not make the law. Rather, it determines what the words of the law meant at the time of the law’s enactment, and applies that meaning to the case at hand. This methodology of discerning the law according to its original meaning is called “originalism” when dealing with the Constitution and “textualism” when dealing with statutes.

And in some form or another, this way of judging goes all the way back to our nation’s founding.

From the Constitution’s perspective, originalism is superior to an approach where judges just implement their policy preferences. There are at least two reasons for this.

As Chief Justice John Roberts suggested during his confirmation hearings, judges are like umpires - just calling balls and strikes.

First, originalism is the only legitimate way for judges to exercise the “judicial power” granted them by the Constitution. That power is abused - or more accurately, legislative power is usurped - if, as Alexander Hamilton warned, “courts … exercise WILL instead of Judgment, the consequence (being) the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”

Second, allowing courts to bend the law to their own desires weakens the republic. The power to amend the Constitution was left with the people - the sovereign - to be exercised through state constitutional conventions and their representatives in Congress.

President Abraham Lincoln warned that “if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court … the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”

Now committed to originalism, a majority of the Supreme Court can begin the process of restoring the Constitution to its original meaning and returning the judiciary to its place as the “least dangerous” branch. And that restoration may well begin in 2019.

Perhaps the most immediate area, but also the most influential, will be cutting back the administrative state. The federal government has swollen to a gargantuan size with numerous federal agencies passing tens of thousands of pages of regulations every year that never undergo approval by the House and Senate and signature by the president.

When designing the Constitution, the founders understood that the accumulation of power can lead to tyranny. To prevent this, they diffused power at the federal level by creating three branches of government exercising three different powers. The founders also diffused power between the federal and state governments. This created what Madison called a “double security” for the people’s liberty.

But President Woodrow Wilson introduced the idea that these constitutional protections have become antiquated and inefficient. Accelerated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the New Deal, our government evaded the separation of powers by concentrating all three powers - executive, legislative, and judicial - in federal agencies.

The Supreme Court can put a stop to this in at least three ways.

First, in this term’s Gundy case, the high court can once again enforce the Constitution’s separation of federal power among the three branches by resuscitating the nondelegation doctrine. Simply put, that doctrine holds that one branch of the federal government cannot delegate its power to another. Congress cannot authorize agencies to pass rules that legally bind the public in its stead.

Second, the court can kill the judicially created doctrine of requiring federal judges to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and regulations. It is a court’s constitutional role to determine what the law means in a dispute before it, and it should do so without deferring to any party, particularly not a different branch of government.

The Supreme Court has the chance to end deference in the context of regulations in this term’s case of Kisor v. Wilkie.

Finally, the court can restore the constitutional fact that all of the executive power has been vested in the president. Therefore, to exercise that power and see that the laws are faithfully executed, the president must be able to oversee all who work under him.

Congress has sought to insulate some federal agencies from presidential oversight by making them independent of the president’s ability to remove their leaders or check their actions.

But this just creates a politically unaccountable, and potentially rogue, faction of the executive branch. That’s not what the Constitution allows.

The Supreme Court should overturn past cases, such as Morrison v. Olson and Humphrey’s Executor, which allowed federal prosecutors or agency commissioners to act free from White House control.

The Constitution, as written and understood when enacted, is our supreme law. The Supreme Court has long viewed its own pronouncements as on a par with our founding document.

The high court can restore judicial humility by following the Constitution’s original meaning, until the people choose to change it. And if the court begins this process of restoration in 2019, it will be a very good year for the republic.

  • Politics

Fracking’s Secret Problem—Oil Wells Aren’t Producing as Much as Forecast

AI Summary. An analysis of 16,000 wells run by 29 major producers in Texas and North Dakota found that two-thirds of fracking forecasts were overly optimistic, with companies on track to produce nearly 10% less oil and gas than projected. That shortfall amounts to almost 1bn barrels over 30 years, worth more than $30bn at current prices.

Bradley Olson, Rebecca Elliott and Christopher M. Matthews Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
January 3, 2019
Is Database:
Database

US energy production may be lower than forecasted due to unsustainable economics in fracking. Analysis of 16,000 wells shows 2/3 of 2014-2017 projections were overly optimistic.

Are shale oil wells producing less than companies forecast?

Core argument: An analysis of 16,000 wells operated by 29 major producers in Texas and North Dakota found two-thirds of 2014–2017 fracking projections were overly optimistic.

Analysis of 16,000 wells operated by 29 major producers in Texas and North Dakota reveals that two-thirds of fracking projections from 2014-2017 were overly optimistic. Companies are on track to produce nearly 10% less oil and gas than forecasted, equating to almost 1bn barrels over 30 years, valued at over $30bn at current prices. Some regions face discrepancies exceeding 50%. This shortfall suggests that current production levels are built on unsustainable economics, potentially leading to reduced future energy output. The implications for the US energy sector are significant, as reliance on inflated forecasts could undermine long-term energy security and economic stability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An analysis of 16,000 wells operated by 29 major producers in Texas and North Dakota found two-thirds of 2014–2017 fracking projections were overly optimistic.
  2. The companies are on track to produce nearly 10% less oil and gas than forecast, almost 1bn barrels over 30 years, worth over $30bn at current prices.
  3. Some regions show discrepancies between forecast and actual output exceeding 50%.

"...Two-thirds of projections made by the fracking companies between 2014 and 2017 in America’s four hottest drilling regions appear to have been overly optimistic, according to the analysis of some 16,000 wells operated by 29 of the biggest producers in oil basins in Texas and North Dakota. Collectively, the companies that made projections are on track to pump nearly 10% less oil and gas than they forecast for those areas, according to the analysis of data from Rystad Energy AS, an energy consulting firm.That is the equivalent of almost one billion barrels of oil and gas over 30 years, worth more than $30 billion at current prices. Some companies are off track by more than 50% in certain regions...."
Bradley Olson, Rebecca Elliott and Christopher M. Matthews, "Fracking’s Secret Problem—Oil Wells Aren’t Producing as Much as Forecast,"Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/frackings-secret-problemoil-wells-arent-producing-as-much-as-forecast-11546450162

Ed Comment:I thought the most interesting paragraph was:Shale companies have attracted huge amounts of capital from Wall Street over the past decade. So far, investors have largely lost money. Since 2008, an index of U.S. oil-and-gas companies has fallen 43%, while the S&P 500 index has more than doubled in that time, including dividends. The 29 companies in the Journal’s analysis have spent $112 billion more in cash than they generated from operations in the last 10 years, according to data from FactSet, a financial-information firm. I think that reflects the economics of innovation more broadly. Specifically I think this says the US will produce less energy in the future because current production levels were built from unsustainable economics and production drys up quickly without a lot of investment.

  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Economic Shocks and Clinging

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a $1,000 increase in per-worker import exposure from Chinese competition raised the likelihood of whites favoring fewer immigrants by 4.1% and excluding illegal immigrants by 6.3%, with larger effects where immigrant populations are low. Import exposure also increased identification as religiously fundamentalist without changing overall religiosity.

Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
January 3, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The “China Shock” hardened existing racial and religious views among whites, rather than altering attitudes broadly. @MichaelStrain, American Enterprise Institute.

Does import competition harden whites' attitudes toward immigrants and religion?

Core argument: A $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure from the "China Shock" raised the likelihood of whites favoring fewer immigrants by 4.1% and support for excluding illegal immigrants by 6.3%.

The "China Shock" significantly hardened existing racial and religious views among whites, rather than altering attitudes broadly. A $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure led to a 4.1% rise in the likelihood of whites favoring fewer immigrants and a 6.3% increase in support for excluding illegal immigrants. In areas with low immigrant populations, these figures rose to 8.3% and 8.6%, respectively. Import exposure also increased the probability of whites identifying as fundamentalist without affecting overall religiosity. In regions with historical racial tensions, increased import competition intensified negative racial attitudes. These findings suggest that economic disruptions from globalization reinforce preexisting social views, particularly in areas with low immigrant presence or racial antipathy, rather than shifting them across the board.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure from the "China Shock" raised the likelihood of whites favoring fewer immigrants by 4.1% and support for excluding illegal immigrants by 6.3%.
  2. In areas with low immigrant populations, those figures rose to 8.3% and 8.6%, and in regions with historical racial tensions increased import competition intensified negative racial attitudes.
  3. Import exposure increased the probability of whites identifying as fundamentalist without affecting overall religiosity, a pattern the findings suggest reflects economic disruption reinforcing preexisting social views rather than shifting them across the board.

Reviewed the Strain paper, in general he finds the "China Shock" hardened existing views among whites versus changing peoples views across the board. for example increase trade exposure increases the likelihood of an individual identifies as fundamentalist but doesn't make people more religious (table 1) no significant overall effect on views of African Americans (Table 3) however when they look at racial views in commuting zones that contained at least one county mentioned in the voting rights act (table 4) they find that the increase in imports"...significantly harden racial attitudes among whites..."Table 5 looking at the impact on views of immigrants finds the same phenomenon, whites in areas with a relatively low immigrant share had more negative attitudes towards immigrants then those living in areas with a higher immigrant population initially. same thing with guns, "...Overall, increases in import exposure are associated with increases in the likelihood a respondent owns a gun, and appear to harden attitudes against gun ownership in areas where few people own guns...."

Michael Strain and Stan Veuger, "Economic Shocks and Clinging," American Enterprise Institute, January 2019, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Economic_shocks_wp.pdf

".....We find that the sudden surge of import competition during this period did affect social attitudes in important and nuanced ways..... On balance, we interpret our findings as lending only very limited support to the hypothesis that the economic effects of globalization affect the social attitudes of whites towards immigrants, minorities, guns and religion in the aggregate. At the same time, the increase in trade with China seems to materially harden preexisting attitudes. Specifically, the stronger a sudden surge in import competition, the more likely whites are to embrace religious fundamentalism. It is in areas that have a history of racial antipathy that “the China shock” led whites to develop more strongly negative views towards African Americans. Commuting zones with low initial levels of immigration witness a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments following sudden and intense import competition. And gun ownership becomes both even less common and even less popular in areas where gun ownership was low to begin with....Appendix table A3, shows that a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability a white respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 6.3 percentage point increase in the probability a white respondent believes the United States should do more to exclude illegal immigrants. We find no significant effect on the probability a person believes that immigrants are not good for America, immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, or that the United States should let in fewer total immigrants.....Panel A shows that in commuting zones in the bottom quartile of immigrants as a share of total population in 1990, a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with an 8.3 percent increase in the probability a white respondent believes that immigrants are not good for the United States, a 10.2 percent increase in the probability a respondent believes immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, an 8.2 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 8.6 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent believes that the United States should do more to exclude undocumented immigrants. Similarly, from panel B we see that in commuting zones in the bottom decile of immigrants as a share of total population in 1990, a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with a 8.1 percent increase in the probability a white respondent believes that immigrants are not good for the United States, a 6.3 percent increase in the probability a respondent believes immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, a 4.8 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 6.9 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent believes that the United States should do more to exclude undocumented immigrants. Overall increases in import exposure appear to harden attitudes towards immigrants among white Americans, particularly in areas where the preexisting share of immigrants is low.....These results suggest a nuanced relationship between the economic disruption caused by globalization — specifically, a local labor market’s exposure to import penetration from the “China shock” — and social attitudes among whites. Increases in import exposure are associated with an increased probability that white Americans identify as fundamentalist, but appear to have no effect on whether a person views himself as religious or not. Exposure to imports from China has no discernable effect on gun ownership or disapproval of gun regulation overall, but it makes people in areas where guns are not popular to begin with even more skeptical of gun ownership. Among the general white population, an increase in import competition only marginally increases support for restrictions on immigration. However, in areas with small immigrant populations, it both increases support for more restrictive immigration policies and triggers more negative views of immigrants. A similar picture arises when we examine the relationship between a sudden surge in import competition and the racial attitudes of white Americans. While racial attitudes grow slightly more negative in general, in labor markets containing at least one country mentioned in the 1965 Voting Rights Act a sudden increase in the effects of globalization materially increases the probability white respondents report feeling African Americans are lazy, believing African Americans are generally unintelligent, and who believe that African Americans lack education. These results suggest economic disruption from increased competition from abroad may lead to a hardening of racial views in areas with a history of racial tension. Taken as a whole, the economic effects of globalization materially affect the social attitudes of whites towards immigrants, minorities, guns and religion. They do so by hardening existing views, as opposed to altering attitudes across the board. These results are, of course, ultimately derived from variation in import competition. The availability of cheaper goods and services facilitated by increases in foreign output and productivity raises the purchasing power of American consumers, and globalization increases demand for exports, along with labor demand in export-intensive firms and industries. This may well, through these channels, have the opposite effect on the social views we study here, which leaves the aggregate impact of increased globalization on said views in both specific areas and the country as a whole to be determined...."

  • Politics
  • Comparisons
    • Geography (Urban/Rural)
    • Historical
    • Race
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

January 2019 Data Update 1: A reminder that equities are risky, in case you forgot!

AI Summary. The equity risk premium — the additional return investors expect from stocks over risk-free assets — was estimated at 5.96%, a reminder of the risk inherent in equity investments.

Aswath Damodaran Musing on Markets
Date Posted:
January 3, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Equity Risk Premium (ERP) in January 2019 was 5.96%, highlighting the inherent risk associated with equities.

How much extra return do investors expect from stocks?

Core argument: The equity risk premium was updated to 5.96% in January 2019, representing the additional return investors expect from stocks over risk-free assets.

In January 2019, the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) was updated to 5.96%, highlighting the inherent risk associated with equities. This figure serves as a crucial indicator for investors, reflecting the additional return expected from investing in stocks over risk-free assets. The ERP's current level underscores the volatility and uncertainty in equity markets, reminding investors of the potential for significant fluctuations in returns. As market conditions evolve, the ERP can provide insights into investor sentiment and risk tolerance, influencing decisions in portfolio management and asset allocation. This update is a timely reminder for business professionals, economists, and policymakers to remain vigilant about the risks inherent in equity investments, especially in a dynamic economic environment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The equity risk premium was updated to 5.96% in January 2019, representing the additional return investors expect from stocks over risk-free assets.
  2. The equity risk premium can offer insights into investor sentiment and risk tolerance as market conditions change, informing portfolio management and asset allocation decisions.

Aswath updated his ERP # currently 5.96%January 2019 Data Update 1: A reminder that equities are risky, in case you forgot!: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Aswath Damodaran, "January 2019 Data Update 1: A reminder that equities are risky, in case you forgot!,"Musing on Markets, January 2, 2019, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

  • Financial Markets
  • Comparisons
    • Historical

The Rising Value of Time and the Origin of Urban Gentrification

AI Summary. The authors argue that longer work hours among high-skilled workers raised the value of their time and the cost of commuting, driving demand for central-city locations and initiating urban gentrification, with incoming high-skilled residents endogenously improving amenities. They estimate this widened the welfare gap by 8.41 percentage points, 33% larger than the increase in the earnings gap.

Yichen Su American Economic Association
Date Posted:
January 3, 2019
Is Database:
Database

High-skilled workers started working longer hours in the mid-1980s, increasing the value of their time & raising commuting costs, driving a demand for central city locations & initiating urban gentrification.

Do longer work hours among high-skilled workers drive urban gentrification?

Core argument: The authors estimate that the welfare gap between high- and low-skilled workers widened by 8.41 percentage points, 33% larger than the increase in the earnings gap, reflecting changes in the value of time and amenities.

Starting in the mid-1980s, high-skilled workers began working longer hours, increasing the value of their time and raising commuting costs. This shift drove a demand for central city locations, initiating urban gentrification. The inflow of high-skilled workers led to an endogenous process of amenity improvement, further attracting these workers despite rising rents. Evidence shows that before 1980, low-wage workers worked longer hours, but this reversed post-1980, with high-wage earners now working more. The spatial relocation of high-skilled workers to central cities is linked to their desire for shorter commutes. This shift has widened the welfare gap by 8.41 percentage points, 33% larger than the earnings gap increase, highlighting the significant impact of time value and amenity changes on urban dynamics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that the welfare gap between high- and low-skilled workers widened by 8.41 percentage points, 33% larger than the increase in the earnings gap, reflecting changes in the value of time and amenities.
  2. Starting in the mid-1980s, high-skilled workers began working longer hours, raising the value of their time and their commuting costs, which drove demand for central city locations and initiated urban gentrification.
  3. Before 1980 low-wage workers worked longer hours than high-wage workers, a pattern that reversed after 1980, with the relocation of high-skilled workers to central cities linked to their desire for shorter commutes.

new paper being presented tomorrow at the AEA meeting. starting in the mid 1980's high skilled workers started working longer hours, their increasing value of time raises the cost of commuting and they responded by moving to cities. while the change in value of time is an initial force behind gentrification the paper finds that the new amenities create a feedback loop that drives the process.

"...I estimate a spatial equilibrium model to show that the rising value of high-skilled workers’ time is an important driving force behind the gentrification of American central cities. I show that the increasing value of time raises the cost of commuting and exogenously increases the demand for central locations by high-skilled workers. While change in value of time is an initial force behind gentrification, its effect is substantially magnified by endogenous amenity improvement. The model implies that welfare inequality in the recent decades increases by more than the rise in earnings inequality if the forces behind gentrification are considered...In this paper,I show that the demand for shorter commute time by the high-skilled workers due to the rising value of time is an important exogenous force that pushes high-skilled workers into the central city neighborhoods.I further show that the inflow of high-skilled workers leads to an endogenous process of amenity change.In the endogenous process,both the levels of amenities and rents in the central cities increase in response to the inflow of the high-skilled urban "pioneers."While all workers dislike higher rents,high skilled workers value the improved amenities more than low-skilled workers do. As a result,more high-skilled workers sort into the central city neighborhoods while low-skilled workers sort out to the suburbs,which endogenously leads to further improvement in amenities in the central cities.I show that while the rising value of time among high-skilled workers is an important underlying driving force behind gentrification,the resulting endogenous amenity change greatly magnifies its direct effect.Finally,I find that the rising value of time, amenity and rent change lead to an increase in welfare gap larger than the increase in income gap between high-and low-skilled workers. To motivate my analysis,I document that the time period of gentrification coincides with a period in which working long hours became more prevalent among high-wage earners. Evidence.....suggests that,before 1980,low-wage workers tended to work longer hours than high-wage workers.However,since mid-1980,this pattern has reversed itself. In recent years,high-wage workers have been much more likely to work long hours than their low-wage counterparts.Moreover,I show that,since 1980,the growth of reported commute time is much slower among the workers in the top wage deciles than workers in lower wage deciles, suggesting some of the spatial relocation of high-skilled workers in to the central cities is likely attributed to their changing value of time and increasing desire for shorter commute time......exploit the fact that even within the same residential neighborhood, commute time can be dramatically different across different occupations. This is because jobs in different occupations are located differential across space. For example financial managers and medical doctors are both highly skilled workers.However financial jobs are very concentrated in lower end of Manhattan while doctors in New York City area can work in any number of locationsbecause clinics and hospitals are spread throughout the metropolitan area.I can therefore use the variation in expected commute time across occupations to identify the effect of commute cost on workers’valuation of neighborhoods,controlling for other neighborhood characteristics that are occupation-invariant.....Finally,using the estimated model,I evaluate the welfare impact of the spatial sorting on high- skilled and low-skilled workers.I find that the change in the value of time,rents,and amenities leads to an increase in welfare gap equivalent to 8.41 percentage point in the earnings gap,which is 33% larger than the increase in the actual earnings gap...."

Yichen Su, "The Rising Value of Time and the Origin of Urban Gentrification," American Economic Association, January 4, 2019, https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/preliminary/699

  • Urban vs Rural
  • Comparisons
    • Geography (Urban/Rural)
    • Historical
  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • High vs Low Skill
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income


Loading More Posts

End of content

No more pages to load

© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms