Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, December 13, 2018

AI Summary. Americans are more likely than people in peer countries to surpass their parents' income in absolute terms, but the US is not an outlier in relative earnings mobility, or movement beyond a parent's rank in the income distribution. Because US inequality is higher, absolute gaps between children shrink less by adulthood than elsewhere.

Scott Winship Archbridge Institute
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Americans have a higher likelihood of surpassing their parents’ income, yet they face challenges in moving beyond their parents’ income distribution rank.

How does US economic mobility compare with peer countries?

Core argument: Americans are more likely to surpass their parents' income, yet face greater difficulty moving beyond their parents' rank in the income distribution.

Americans have a higher likelihood of surpassing their parents' income, yet they face challenges in moving beyond their parents' income distribution rank. The US is not an outlier in relative earnings mobility compared to international counterparts, but absolute mobility patterns reduce childhood inequalities less than in other countries. This is due to higher levels and growth of inequality in the US, where absolute inequalities between children diminish less by adulthood. Relative mobility measures align more closely with conceptions of opportunity, and as research methods improve, cross-national differences may appear smaller.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Americans are more likely to surpass their parents' income, yet face greater difficulty moving beyond their parents' rank in the income distribution.
  2. The US is not an outlier in relative earnings mobility compared with other countries, but its absolute mobility patterns reduce childhood inequalities less, as absolute gaps between children diminish less by adulthood amid higher levels and growth of inequality.
  3. Relative mobility measures align more closely with conceptions of opportunity, and as research methods improve, cross-national differences in mobility may appear smaller.

new Winship note looks at cross country mobility finds that there no basis for strong assertions that relative earnings mobility is higher outside the US US mobility is in line with our international comps. Americans have a greater chance of exceeding their parents’ income than the usual suspects (Chetty et al.) suggest, but they have a lower chance of transcending their parents’ rank in the income distribution

"....Focusing on earnings, the US is not an outlier in terms of relative mobility, even if absolute mobility patterns tend to reduce childhood inequalities less here than in other countries (as indicated by IGEs).* This is an important distinction, because commentators and researchers often claim to be concerned about relative mobility—transcending initial position or rank— even as they point to IGEs, which summarize absolute mobility patterns. IGEs look higher, and so “mobility” lower, when grown children have more contemporary inequality versus the cross-sectional inequality their parents experienced. But the fact that the income gap between the upper middle class and the poor has grown says nothing about whether it has become harder for a poor child to become an upper-middle-class adult....relative mobility measures accord better with most conceptions of opportunity than do absolute mobility measures (including the IGE). (Relative mobility measures also have practical advantages over absolute mobility measures, as discussed in that section.).... The evidence indicates the US holds its own when it comes to relative earnings mobility, whether looking at sons or daughters. It also tells us that when parental family income is the basis for assessing mobility, relative mobility looks lower in the US than elsewhere. And, reflecting the higher levels and growth of inequality in the US, absolute inequalities between children tend to diminish less in the US by adulthood than they do in other countries, whether looking at earnings or family income. As the relative mobility literature continues to grow more sophisticated, it would not be surprising to see more studies using parental income that find smaller cross-national differences, following the trajectory of the relative earnings mobility research. And even research estimating IGEs is likely to continue finding higher elasticities than the less-methodologically sound studies of the past, as has happened in the US as methods have improved....."

Scott Winship, "Economic Mobility in American A State of the Art Primer Part 2: The United States in Comparative Perspective," Archbridge Institute, December 2018, https://www.archbridgeinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Archbridge-Economic-Mobility-primer-part2-US-in-perspective.pdf

*international elasticity

AI Summary. A shortage of U.S. blue collar workers, driven by a shrinking supply of manual and low-pay service labor as the workforce becomes more educated and less willing to take such jobs, is raising wages for those positions and narrowing wage inequality. Retiring baby boomers and stigma around light industrial work leave physically demanding jobs hard to fill.

Rich Miller Bloomberg
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The US labor market is shifting due to a shortage of blue collar workers, driven by a shrinking supply of manual & low-pay service workers as the labor force becomes more educated & less willing to take on such jobs @RichMiller

Is a blue collar worker shortage raising wages and narrowing inequality?

Core argument: A shortage of U.S. blue collar workers is raising wages for manual and low-pay service jobs and narrowing wage inequality, as the labor force becomes more educated and less willing to take such positions.

The U.S. labor market is experiencing a significant shift due to a shortage of blue collar workers, driven by a shrinking supply of manual and low-pay service workers as the labor force becomes more educated and less willing to take on such jobs. This shortage is boosting wages for blue collar positions and narrowing wage inequality, while also drawing more women into these roles. The challenge is exacerbated as baby boomers retire, leaving manufacturers and companies with physically demanding jobs struggling to fill positions. Younger workers are increasingly pursuing educational alternatives or avoiding these jobs due to the stigma associated with light industrial work. This trend highlights a critical need for policy adjustments to address the evolving labor market dynamics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A shortage of U.S. blue collar workers is raising wages for manual and low-pay service jobs and narrowing wage inequality, as the labor force becomes more educated and less willing to take such positions.
  2. Baby boomer retirements are deepening the shortfall, leaving manufacturers and companies with physically demanding jobs struggling to fill positions while younger workers pursue educational alternatives or avoid light industrial work because of its stigma.
  3. The blue collar labor shortage is drawing more women into manual and low-pay service roles.

Not sure if educational attainment is the best proxy here

"...A surprise shortage of blue collar workers is changing the contours of the U.S. labor market, boosting their pay, narrowing wage inequality and drawing more women into those jobs. The shortfall is being driven by a shrinking supply of manual and low-pay service workers as the labor force becomes more educated and less willing to take on such jobs, according to a new Conference Board study.....“The acute shortage of talent in the blue collar space is very, very pronounced,” said Peter Quigley, executive vice president at Kelly Services Inc., a staffing company with branches in all 50 U.S. states. Manufacturers and other companies with physically demanding jobs are finding it tough to fill those positions when baby boomers retire. “It’s harder and harder to attract younger people into those jobs, either because they’re pursuing education alternatives or the stigma associated with light industrial work,” Quigley said....."

Rich Miller, "Blue Collar Worker Shortage Turns U.S. Labor Market on Its Head,"Bloomberg, December 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-13/blue-collar-worker-shortage-turns-u-s-labor-market-on-its-head

AI Summary. A Louisiana audit found that 82% of a random sample of 100 Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the benefits they received, with 10% reporting annual incomes above the state's median household income. The audit attributed the problem to underreported income under enrollment rules that allow people to join Medicaid without income verification.

Robert Doar Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

A recent audit in Louisiana revealed that 82% of a random sample of 100 Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the benefits they received, highlighting significant flaws in the means-tested welfare system.

Do enrollment rules without income verification let ineligible recipients receive Medicaid?

Core argument: A Louisiana audit found 82% of a random sample of 100 Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the benefits they received.

A recent audit in Louisiana revealed that 82% of a random sample of 100 Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the benefits they received, highlighting significant flaws in the means-tested welfare system. The primary issue identified was the underreporting of income, facilitated by enrollment rules that permit individuals to join Medicaid without income verification. Notably, 10% of the sampled recipients had annual incomes exceeding the state's median household income, underscoring the inefficacy of current verification processes. This data suggests systemic vulnerabilities in welfare programs, potentially leading to substantial fiscal inefficiencies and misallocation of resources. The findings call for a reassessment of eligibility verification mechanisms to ensure that welfare benefits are accurately targeted to those in genuine need, thereby optimizing public expenditure and enhancing program integrity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Louisiana audit found 82% of a random sample of 100 Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the benefits they received.
  2. The Louisiana audit identified underreporting of income as the primary issue, facilitated by enrollment rules that permit individuals to join Medicaid without income verification.
  3. Among the 100 Medicaid recipients sampled in Louisiana, 10% had annual incomes exceeding the state's median household income.

"...The report came from Louisiana’s legislative auditor, Daryl G. Purpera, who selected100 Medicaid recipients at random and found that 82 of them shouldn’t have qualified for all the benefits they received.Most were underreporting income, taking advantage of enrollment rules that allow people to join Medicaid without any verification. Ten of the randomly selected Medicaid recipients even had annual incomes above the state’s median household income...."

Robert Doar, "‘Means Tested’ Welfare Means Nothing in Practice,"Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/means-tested-welfare-means-nothing-in-practice-11544573570

AI Summary. Median education-adjusted household income for households headed by Millennials reached $69,000, exceeding nearly every other year on record, including the roughly $67,600 earned by similarly aged households at the prior peak. Yet real average full-time earnings of Millennial male household heads matched those of Generation X men and were more than 10% below Baby Boomer men at comparable ages.

Ernie Tedeschi @ernietedeschi
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Millennial households saw median adjusted income of $69,000 in 2017, surpassing nearly every year on record except 2000. However, individual earnings for Millennial men are comparable to Gen X in 1998 & 10% lower than Boomers in 1978.

Do higher household incomes hide stagnant individual male earnings across generations?

Core argument: Median education-adjusted household income for Millennial-headed households reached $69,000 in 2017, exceeding nearly every other year on record except around 2000, when similar-aged households earned $67,600 in inflation-adjusted dollars.

In 2017, the median adjusted income for households headed by Millennials was $69,000, surpassing nearly every other year on record except around 2000, when similar-aged households earned $67,600 in inflation-adjusted dollars. Despite this, the real average full-time labor earnings of a Millennial male household head in 2014 were comparable to those of a Generation X male in 1998 and over 10% lower than a Baby Boomer male in 1978. This data highlights a complex economic landscape where Millennials achieve higher household incomes yet face stagnation in individual earnings compared to previous generations, suggesting shifts in household dynamics and economic pressures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Median education-adjusted household income for Millennial-headed households reached $69,000 in 2017, exceeding nearly every other year on record except around 2000, when similar-aged households earned $67,600 in inflation-adjusted dollars.
  2. Real average full-time labor earnings of a Millennial male household head in 2014 were comparable to those of a Generation X male in 1998 and more than 10% below a Baby Boomer male in 1978.

Federal Reserve Board, Pew, and Ernie Tedeschi adjusted Pew for education

Christopher Kurz, Geng Li, and Daniel Vine, "Are Millennials Different?," Federal Reserve, December 2018, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018080pap.pdf

Ernie Tedeschi, "Median Household Income by Birth Cohort and Age (Education-Adjusted)," @ernietedeschi, December 11, 2018, https://twitter.com/ernietedeschi/status/1072701599322128384

"....The median adjusted income in a household headed by a Millennial was $69,000 in 2017. That is a higher figure than for nearly every other year on record, apart from around 2000, when households headed by people ages 22 to 37 earned about the same amount - $67,600 in inflation-adjusted dollars. (A recent study by the Federal Reserve, which also looked at Millennials’ income, used a different methodology and data source.)..."

Richard Fry, "Young adult households are earning more than most older Americans did at the same age," Pew Research Center, December 11, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/11/young-adult-households-are-earning-more-than-most-older-americans-did-at-the-same-age/

Pew:

“the real average full-time labor earnings of a millennial male household head in 2014 were about the same as those for a comparable male Generation X household head in 1998 and over 10 percent lower than those for a comparable male baby boomer household head in 1978....”

AI Summary. Millennials' average real income, measured in 2016 dollars, has not kept pace with that of Gen X or Baby Boomers at comparable life stages. Despite higher educational attainment, Millennials faced a labor market with fewer high-paying job opportunities as well as rising housing and education costs.

Christopher Kurz, Geng Li and Daniel Vine Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Millennials’ average real income has not kept pace with Gen X or Baby Boomers at similar life stages, partly due to the Great Recession and slower wage growth.

Have Millennial incomes kept pace with earlier generations at similar ages?

Core argument: Millennials' average real income, measured in 2016 dollars, has not kept pace with that of Gen X or Baby Boomers at comparable life stages.

Millennials have experienced distinct economic challenges compared to previous generations, as evidenced by their average real income trends. Data shows that Millennials' average real income, adjusted to 2016 dollars, has not kept pace with that of Gen X or Baby Boomers at similar life stages. This disparity is partly due to the economic conditions they faced, including the Great Recession and slower wage growth. Despite higher educational attainment, Millennials have encountered a labor market with fewer high-paying job opportunities, impacting their overall income trajectory. Additionally, rising costs in housing and education have further strained their financial stability. These factors suggest that Millennials' economic experiences are indeed different, with potential long-term implications for consumption patterns, savings rates, and economic mobility. Understanding these generational income dynamics is crucial for policymakers aiming to address economic inequality and foster sustainable growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Millennials' average real income, measured in 2016 dollars, has not kept pace with that of Gen X or Baby Boomers at comparable life stages.
  2. The Great Recession, slower wage growth, and a labor market with fewer high-paying jobs despite Millennials' higher educational attainment are cited as partial explanations for the income gap.
  3. Rising housing and education costs have further strained Millennials' financial stability, with potential long-term implications for consumption patterns, savings rates, and economic mobility.

Updated chart to include medians. Changed title to reflect the topline number is an average. Added footnote to explain brackets.

Christopher Kurz, Geng Li and Daniel Vine, “Are Millennials Different?” Federal Reserve Board 2018, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018080pap.pdf

Friday, December 14, 2018

AI Summary. U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt has reached roughly 0.46x GDP, above its 2008-09 peak of 0.45x. Most companies can still cover their interest payments, but their capacity to do so has diminished as borrowing costs rise.

Alexandra Scaggs Barron's
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt has surged to approximately 0.46x the size of GDP, surpassing its 2008-09 peak of 0.45x GDP.

Are rising borrowing costs eroding corporations' ability to service record debt?

Core argument: U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt has reached roughly 0.46x GDP, surpassing its 2008–09 peak of 0.45x GDP.

U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt has surged to approximately 0.46x the size of GDP, surpassing its 2008-09 peak of 0.45x GDP. This increase in debt relative to economic output highlights a growing vulnerability as rising interest rates make borrowing more expensive. While most companies can still manage their interest payments, their capacity to do so has diminished in recent years. The current economic environment, characterized by higher borrowing costs, poses challenges for corporations that have relied on cheap credit to finance growth and operations. As interest rates continue to rise, the pressure on corporate balance sheets is likely to intensify, potentially impacting investment and expansion plans. This situation underscores the importance of prudent financial management and strategic planning in navigating the complexities of a changing macroeconomic landscape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt has reached roughly 0.46x GDP, surpassing its 2008–09 peak of 0.45x GDP.
  2. Most U.S. companies can still cover their interest payments, though their capacity to do so has diminished in recent years.
  3. Rising interest rates raise borrowing costs for corporations that relied on cheap credit to finance growth and operations, adding pressure to corporate balance sheets.

Great chart"...As a result, U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt when compared with economic output has climbed to roughly 0.46 times the size of the gross domestic product, exceeding its peak of about 0.45 times GDP during the 2008-09 contraction.....Most companies can still easily pay interest on their debt, but their capacity has declined in recent years, according to FactSet..."

Rising Interest Rates Complicate the Corporate Borrowing Spree: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Rising Interest Rates Complicate the Corporate Borrowing Spree: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Alexandra Scaggs, "Rising Interest Rates Complicate the Corporate Borrowing Spree,"Barrons, December 13, 2018, https://www.barrons.com/articles/stocks-or-bonds-investors-must-choose-with-rising-rates-51544725284

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects mandatory spending on programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will rise from 13.1% of GDP to 15.2% over a decade, while discretionary spending falls from 6.3% to 5.4%. Federal revenues are projected to rise from 16.5% of GDP to 18.5% if current laws remain unchanged.

CBO’s Budget Analysis Division and Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Mandatory spending is projected to rise from 13.1% of GDP in 2017 to 15.2% by 2028, driven by programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

How will federal spending and revenues shift as a share of GDP?

Core argument: CBO projects mandatory spending will rise from 13.1% of GDP in 2017, when it totaled $2.8tn, to 15.2% by 2028, driven by programs including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that mandatory spending, which was $2.8tn in 2017, will rise from 13.1% of GDP in 2017 to 15.2% by 2028, driven by programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Spending on individuals aged 65+ is expected to increase from 6.7% of GDP in 2018 to 8.8% in 2028. Conversely, discretionary outlays are projected to decline from 6.3% of GDP in 2018 to 5.4% in 2028. Federal revenues, primarily from individual income taxes, were $3.3tn in 2018, equating to 16.4% of GDP, with a historical average of 17.4%. If current laws remain unchanged, revenues are anticipated to rise from 16.5% of GDP in 2019 to 18.5% by 2028. These projections highlight the growing fiscal pressure from mandatory spending and the need for strategic deficit reduction measures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects mandatory spending will rise from 13.1% of GDP in 2017, when it totaled $2.8tn, to 15.2% by 2028, driven by programs including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
  2. CBO projects spending on individuals aged 65+ will increase from 6.7% of GDP in 2018 to 8.8% in 2028, while discretionary outlays decline from 6.3% to 5.4% of GDP.
  3. Federal revenues were $3.3tn in 2018, or 16.4% of GDP, below the 17.4% historical average, and CBO projects they will rise from 16.5% of GDP in 2019 to 18.5% by 2028 under current law.

Lots of great data here on the lay of the land of Federal spending and revenue. CBO's playbook for potential deficit reduction.

".....Mandatory spending—which totaled about $2.8 trillion in 2017, or 70 percent of federal outlays—consists of spending that is generally governed by statutory criteria and is not normally constrained by the annual appropriation process....As a share of the economy, mandatory spending increased significantly between 1968 and 1975, from 5.5 percent to 9.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).... If no new laws were enacted affecting mandatory programs, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that mandatory outlays would continue to increase as a share of the economy, rising from 13.1 percent of GDP in 2017 to 15.2 percent in 2028.3 By comparison, such spending averaged 9.8 percent of GDP over the past five decades....in CBO’s projections, spending on people age 65 or older for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid would increase from 6.7 percent of GDP in 2018 to 8.8 percent in 2028.... In the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline projections, discretionary outlays decline further relative to the size of the economy, falling from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2018—already below their 50-year average of 8.5 percent—to 5.4 percent in 2028....in 2018, the federal government collected $3.3 trillion in revenues, equal to 16.4 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).Individual income taxes were the largest source of revenues, accounting for 51 percent of the total. Social insurance taxes (primarily payroll taxes collected to support Social Security and Medicare) accounted for 35 percent. Six percent of the total was from corporate income taxes. Other receipts made up the remaining 8 percent (see Figure 4-1)....Over the past 50 years, total federal revenues have averaged 17.4 percent of GDP—ranging from a high of 20.0 percent in 2000 to a low of 14.6 percent in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 4-2).That variation in total revenues as a share of GDP has primarily resulted from fluctuations in receipts of individual income tax payments and, to a lesser extent, in collections of corporate income taxes....From 1968 to 2018, revenues from individual income taxes have ranged from slightly more than 6 percent of GDP (in 2010) to slightly less than 10 percent of GDP (in 2000).... If current laws generally remained unchanged, revenues would gradually rise over the next decade—increasing from 16.5 percent of gross domestic product in 2019 to 18.5 percent by 2028...."

CBO’s Budget Analysis Division and Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, "Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028," Congressional Budget Office, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files

AI Summary. Some rural US counties post high output per worker — roughly $306,000 in Sioux County, Nebraska, and $203,000 in Southeast Fairbanks, Alaska — but support few jobs because their economies rest on mechanized oil extraction and large-scale agriculture. Excluding such cases, 50–55m Americans live in rural communities with limited private-sector job opportunities.

Eduardo Porter New York Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The US has 50-55 million people in rural communities with limited private sector job opportunities, raising questions about viable solutions for revitalizing these areas.

Does high output per worker in rural areas create many jobs?

Core argument: Sioux County, Nebraska, generates an economy worth $306,000 per worker, yet supports few jobs because such output comes from mechanized industries such as oil extraction and large-scale agriculture.

Despite some rural areas achieving high productivity levels, such as Sioux County, Neb., with an economy worth $306,000 per worker, these regions support few jobs due to reliance on mechanized industries like oil extraction and large-scale agriculture. Similarly, Southeast Fairbanks, Alaska, boasts an output per worker of $203,000 but has a population under 7,000. Excluding these exceptions, the US still has 50-55m people in rural communities with limited private sector job opportunities. This economic landscape raises questions about viable solutions for revitalizing these areas or whether depopulated regions should be left to revert to nature.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sioux County, Nebraska, generates an economy worth $306,000 per worker, yet supports few jobs because such output comes from mechanized industries such as oil extraction and large-scale agriculture.
  2. Southeast Fairbanks, Alaska, produces $203,000 of output per worker with a population under 7,000, another case where high productivity coincides with minimal employment.
  3. Excluding such high-productivity exceptions, 50-55m Americans live in rural communities with limited private sector job opportunities, raising the question of whether depopulated regions should be left to revert to nature.

new Porter just an FYI"....There are, to be sure, some rural communities with productivity as high as some big cities. But they rely on heavily mechanized and automated industries that support few jobs: oil extraction or large-scale agriculture, in which tractors talk to satellites and no drivers are involved. The livestock business on the vast pastures of Sioux County, Neb., for example, supports an economy worth $306,000 per worker, according to data from Mr. Muro and Jacob Whiton of Brookings. But only 1,200 people live there. In the Southeast Fairbanks area of Alaska, it is all about oil and gas. Output per worker is $203,000. But its population doesn’t quite reach 7,000. Excluding these places, the United States is still left with 50 to 55 million people living in rural communities that no longer have much to offer them economically. What if nothing really works? Is there really no option but to do nothing and, as some have suggested, return depopulated parts of rural America to the bison?..."
Eduardo Porter, "The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy,"New York Times, December 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline.html